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Abstract 
This is a study of the creation and evolution of state forestry within colonial Kenya in social, 
economic, and political terms. Spanning Kenya’s entire colonial period, it offers a chronological 
account of how forestry came to Kenya and grew to the extent of controlling almost two million 
hectares of land in the country, approximately 20 per cent of the most fertile and most populated 
upland (above 1,500 metres) region of central Kenya . The position of forestry within a colonial 
state apparatus that paradoxically sought to both ‘protect’ Africans from modernisation while 
exploiting them to establish Kenya as a ‘white man’s country’ is underexplored in the country’s 
historiography. This thesis therefore clarifies this role through an examination of the relationship 
between the Forest Department and its African workers, Kenya’s white settlers, and the colonial 
government. In essence, how each of these was engaged in a pursuit for their own idealised ‘good 
forest’.  
Kenya was the site of a strong conservationist argument for the establishment of forestry that 
typecast the country’s indigenous population as rapidly destroying the forests. This argument was 
bolstered against critics of the financial extravagance of forestry by the need to maintain and 
develop the forests of Kenya for the express purpose of supporting the Uganda railway. It was this 
argument that led the colony’s Forest Department along a path through the contradictions of 
colonial rule. The European settlers of Kenya are shown as being more than just a mere thorn in the 
side of the Forest Department, as their political power represented a very real threat to the 
department’s hegemony over the forests. Moreover, Kenya’s Forest Department deeply mistrusted 
private enterprise and constantly sought to control and limit the unsustainable exploitation of the 
forests. The department was seriously underfunded and understaffed until the second colonial 
occupation of the 1950s, a situation that resulted in a general ad hoc approach to forest policy. The 
department espoused the rhetoric of sustainable exploitation, but had no way of knowing whether 
the felling it authorised was actually sustainable, which was reflected in the underdevelopment of 
the sawmilling industry in Kenya.  
The agroforestry system, shamba, (previously unexplored in Kenya’s colonial historiography) 
is shown as being at the heart of forestry in Kenya and extremely significant as perhaps the most 
successful deployment of agroforestry by the British in colonial Africa. Shamba provided numerous 
opportunities to farm and receive education to landless Kikuyu in the colony, but also displayed 
very strong paternalistic aspects of control, with consequential African protest, as the Forest 
Department sought to create for itself a loyal and permanent forest workforce. Shamba was the 
keystone of forestry development in the 1950s, and its expansion cemented the position of forestry 
in Kenya as a top-down, state-centric agent of economic and social development. 
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Introduction 
The Kenyan ‘good forest’1 
 
In 1965, W.G. Dyson, Forestry Consultant to the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization 
and a former conservator within the colonial Forest Department of Kenya, recounted a scathing 
comment that had been directed at him by a development consultant: “from what I have seen of 
forestry in my travels, it seems to consist mainly of cutting down trees in order to plant more trees.” 
For Dyson, the comment was only a step above the usual question he received: “so you are a 
forester, what do you do? Plant trees?”2 Foresters today may well recognise such comments, but 
they speak to a deeper phenomenon, of a general ignorance of the importance of forests and 
forestry in the forging of the modern world. Indeed, as Nancy Langston puts it, “Many people [at 
least in the West] see forests as little more than attractive backdrops to the real stuff of human 
history, but our human stories are intimately interconnected with forests.”3 Besides their obvious 
ecological roles, not least in releasing oxygen, forests have very literally fuelled the rise of 
civilisations and provided timber to allow peoples around the world to reach out across the globe 
in acts of exploration, trade, war, and settlement.  
As Richard Grove has persuasively argued, by the end of the eighteenth century there was a 
growing awareness within the Western world about the ramifications of the over-exploitation of 
forests.4 Fears of localised climate change, flooding, and, conversely, desiccation became common 
and began to be addressed by the emergence of systems of forestry embedded within 
Enlightenment thought. Thus, by the turn of the nineteenth century, the rational, scientific 
management of forests began to dominate on the continent, particularly in France and Prussia, from 
where it spread to British India and beyond, despite violent resistance and protest by indigenous 
                                                                
1 The term comes from C.A. Conte, 'The forest becomes desert: forest use and environmental change in Tanzania's 
west Usambara mountains', Land Degradation and Development, 10, (1999), p. 292. Conte’s use of this term, ‘good 
forest’, is in large part the inspiration for the research structure employed in this thesis. In his analysis of forest 
history of the Usambara mountains he emphasises the differing views of what constituted a good forest to different 
users. He concludes that British foresters’ attempts to create a good forest of sustainable timber ultimately failed, 
leaving a forest that was good for no one. See also Conte’s Highland Sanctuary: Environmental History in Tanzania’s 
Usambara Mountains (Ohio University Press, 2004), 68–95.  
2 W.G. Dyson, The Justification of Plantation Forestry in the Tropics. (Bib. Orton IICA / CATIE, 1965), 1. 
3 Nancy Langston, ‘Global Forests’, in A Companion to Global Environmental History, ed. J. R. McNeill and Erin Stewart 
Mauldin (John Wiley & Sons, 2015). 
4 Richard H. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 
1600-1860 (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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populations, by the late nineteenth century.5 In what is probably the most widely read piece of work 
that discusses this development, James Scott’s Seeing like a State conceptualises this scientific 
forestry as an embodiment of the modernising, simplifying tendency of the state.6 Within this 
formulation, the complex ecosystems of forests are abstracted, simplified, and categorised 
according to their use to the state. Through the eyes of the state, forests became reserves isolated 
from local peoples, their previous multifarious economic and social functions cast aside in favour 
of the creation of monocultural fields of timber and fuel to be harvested and resown. 
This thesis uses this focus on the state as a tool to analyse the development of scientific 
forestry within Kenya between 1895 and 1963. The pursuit of the ‘good forest’7 is thus the tale of 
how an idealized but limited conception of forestry was applied to the forests of a British settler 
colony. Consequently, the research explores how foresters and their African employees, colonial 
politicians and civil servants, sawmillers, scientists, and settlers pursued various, sometimes 
competing and sometimes complimentary visions of what a good, useful, and valuable forest was 
in colonial Kenya. Significantly, this is an approach to understanding forestry in Kenya that is 
lacking in the current literature on the environmental, political, and economic history of colonial 
Kenya. Fundamentally this is an exploration of how the management of Kenya’s forests changed – 
for many were managed before 1895 – over an almost seventy-year period in which a colonial and 
subsequent nation state with a capitalist economy was created. 
Colonial Kenya is the ideal context for an investigation such as this, firstly because of the 
substantial gap in knowledge relating to the history of forestry in Kenya, and secondly because of 
the complex dynamics of the actors involved. The chief difference between Kenya and the other 
British East African colonial territories (essentially modern-day Uganda and Tanzania) was the 
political and economic dominance of white, European agricultural settlers. While in some cases 
African political elites participated in the power dynamics of local forest reservation, the African 
majority of the colony were essentially excluded from the competing visions of land use held by the 
Forest Department and the European settlers that were filtered through a sometimes hostile or 
ambivalent central administration. The narrative presented in this thesis is therefore ultimately an 
internal power struggle between the private sphere and the state. The large political influence that 
the settler group wielded and the agricultural and industrial potential of the colony, as perceived 
by the colonial administration and Colonial Office, as well as political crises such as the infamous 
Mau Mau insurrection, meant that the barriers to forestry were high in colonial Kenya. Thus, Kenya 
                                                                
5 S. Ravi Rajan, Modernizing Nature: Forestry and Imperial Eco-Development 1800-1950 (Oxford: OUP, 2006); 
Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya, Revised edition 
(University of California Press, 2000); Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil, ‘State Forestry and Social Conflict in 
British India’, Past & Present, no. 123 (1989): 141–77; Thaddeus Raymond Sunseri, Wielding the Ax: State Forestry 
and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000 (Ohio University Press, 2009). 
6 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale 
University Press, 1999). 
7 See footnote 1 for the origin of this term. 
Historiographical Context   13 
represented a stringent test of whether the forestry ideal of a rational, sustainable good forest could 
be realised. 
 
Historiographical Context 
Kenya was a settler state; its land and climate were racially defined, as its fertile highland regions 
appealed to white Europeans seeking to replicate sedentary extensive agricultural systems of cattle 
and sheep and grow the crops demanded by the industrialised metropole. Kenya’s highlands 
offered a warm temperate climate that promised to make Kenya the next Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, or South Africa. Because of this appeal to white settlers, Berman and Lonsdale have argued 
that the colonial state that was established in Kenya was, at least until the 1930s, a contradiction. It 
was incoherent, more hydra-like than a strong and singularly focused leviathan because of 
conflicting policies that sought to create a modern, capitalist ‘white-man’s country’ and develop and 
protect African agriculture.8 As historians such as Kennedy and Lonsdale have indicated, the 
settlers that came to Kenya were extremely eclectic in character and eventual success, but 
overwhelmingly moneyed. Kenya was not to be a colony of poor whites, for even when many 
settlers experienced financial dire straits, they still upheld a strong sense of class, of aristocracy, 
and kept alive the dream that Kenya would achieve self-rule and become a dominion not a 
protectorate or colony, a true ‘white-man’s country’.9 Of course, the settlers owed their position 
within Kenya to their ability to leverage support for white settlement in the UK parliament, which 
was successful enough to block objectors to white settlement within the Colonial Office and the 
nascent colonial government in Kenya. As Murphy argues, the establishment of white settlement in 
Kenya linked the country’s early capitalist development with those white settlers. This was a 
system of massive alienation of prime agricultural and forest land, restricting Africans to reserves, 
and invoking legislation and infrastructure that relied on the creation of often brutally oppressive 
African clients, the chiefs, to aid the formation of an African labour supply to support white 
settlement.10  
                                                                
8 John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, ‘Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 
1895-1914’, The Journal of African History 20, no. 4 (1979): 487–505; Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial 
Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (London: James Currey, 1990). 
9 Dane Keith Kennedy, Islands of White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939 (Duke 
University Press, 1987); John Lonsdale, ‘Home County and African Frontier’, in Settlers and Expatriates: Britons Over 
the Seas, ed. Robert Bickers (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 75–111. See also, Brett L. Shadle, The Souls of White Folk: White 
Settlers in Kenya, 1900s-20s (Manchester University Press, 2015); John Overton, ‘War and Economic Development 
Settlers in Kenya, 1914-1918’, The Journal of African History 27, no. 1 (1 January 1986): 79–103; Paul Mosley, The 
Settler Economies: Studies in the Economic History of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1963 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1983); Ian Spencer, ‘Settler Dominance, Agricultural Production and the Second World War in Kenya’, The 
Journal of African History 21, no. 4 (1 January 1980): 497–514; Kenneth Good, ‘Settler Colonialism: Economic 
Development and Class Formation’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 14, no. 4 (1 December 1976): 597–620, 
doi:10.2307/160148; Paul van Zwanenberg, ‘Kenya’s Primitive Colonial Capitalism: The Economic Weakness of 
Kenya’s Settlers up to 1940’, Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 9, no. 2 (1 
January 1975): 277–92, doi:10.2307/484084. 
10 John F. Murphy, ‘Legitimation and Paternalism: The Colonial State in Kenya’, African Studies Review 29, no. 3 (1 
September 1986): 55–65, doi:10.2307/524083; Gavin Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of 
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By the 1920s, the colonial state had defined the country spatially; settlers had access to much 
of the best agricultural land that was in close proximity to the Uganda Railway. The railway was the 
essential artery of the whole colonial project in East Africa, enabling imports to flow into Kenya and 
Uganda and exports to flow out; it made white settlement a practical reality. This spatial 
segregation was, as Overton has argued, the foundation of the state’s support for settler capitalism 
upon which were built policies that limited African access to lucrative agricultural products, such 
as coffee, and directed African labour onto settler farms.11 As an element of the state, forestry within 
Kenya functioned within this contradictory framework. Indeed, as Overton has indicated, forestry 
allowed the colonial state to increase the spatial segregation of Kenya by a further 1.3 million 
hectares of land, an area that was approximately half as large as the more infamous land alienations 
that were made to settlers.12 In itself, this indicates that the modernist state tendencies of 
calculating and abstracting the value of nature, an important feature of the state made clear by 
Scott, was very much present in Kenya.13 Yet, no work has explored forestry in Kenya as an 
expression of state power. The most comprehensive consideration of the nature of the colonial state 
in Kenya is provided by Berman and Lonsdale, but to them the technical departments of the colonial 
state in Kenya, which included forestry, were “preoccupied with servicing settler accumulation. … 
[And] [t]he state never ceased to try to provide the conditions for the reproduction of settler 
capitalism… .”14 However, the fact that 98 per cent of the then known forests of Kenya were 
appropriated as Crown Land by 1922 rather than being made available for purchase to settlers 
suggests that forestry in Kenya was not just acting as the servant of settler capital.15 Indeed, Castro 
has argued in his extensive work on the impact of state forestry in Kenya on Kikuyu peoples that 
the forested upland slopes of Mount Kenya were reserved in 1910 “to protect the forest from 
supposedly destructive indigenous land-use practices and to prevent white land speculators from 
obtaining private ownership.”16 There is no other discussion of this aspect of state control and 
forestry or its relation to white settlement within the historiography on Kenya, although these 
themes are present in discussions of Kenya’s and Tanzania’s savannah areas and the removal of 
                                                                
an African Petite Bourgeoisie 1905-1970 (London: Yale University Press, 1980); John Overton, ‘The Colonial State 
and Spatial Differentiation: Kenya, 1895-1920’, Journal of Historical Geography 13, no. 3 (1 July 1987), 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.stir.ac.uk/docview/1300171895?accountid=14755. Murphy also provides a 
clear overview of the development of the idea of the contradictory colonial state and how this view came to 
dominate over the earlier conceptions of the colonial state as a mere organ of metropolitan capital (dependency 
theory) or the colonial state as a puppet of the European settlers. For a discussion of these themes across a broader 
African context, see Naomi Chazan et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Macmillan Education, 1988); 
Sara Berry, ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land’, Africa 62, no. 3 (July 1992): 
327–355, doi:10.2307/1159747.     
11 Overton, ‘The Colonial State and Spatial Differentiation’. 
12 Ibid., 272. 
13 Scott, Seeing like a State. 
14 Lonsdale and Berman, ‘Coping with the Contradictions’, 504. 
15 R.L. Robinson, ‘Forestry in the Empire’, Empire Forestry 1 (March 1922): 23. 
16 Alfonso Peter Castro, ‘The Political Economy of Colonial Farm Forestry in Kenya: The View from Kirinyaga’, in 
Tropical Deforestation: The Human Dimension, ed. Leslie E. Sponsel, Thomas N. Headland, and Robert C. Bailey (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 127. Emphasis added. 
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Africans to form the ‘wildernesses’ of national parks.17 In particular, Neumann has considered these 
statist processes as creating what he terms artefactual nature, in that these are wild places created 
“not by nature, but by human hand and that is an artefact of  the state’s assertion of territorial 
ownership and control.”18 Clearly, the role of the state in defining its own sovereignty is vitally 
important for understanding how the colonial state functioned and this is therefore a theme of 
major significance in discussing forestry in Kenya. The above discussion suggests that forestry in 
Kenya was caught in the middle of the contradictions of the colonial settler state. The goal of 
forestry within this confused state apparatus is, therefore, the core theme that this thesis seeks to 
explore through an examination of the relationship between the Forest Department, Kenya’s white 
settlers, and the colonial government; in essence, how each of these were engaged in a pursuit for 
their own idealised ‘good forest’. 
Looking more widely, the agenda of development – how a colony would be changed primarily 
in terms of its economy and politics – formed an important constituent of colonial rule across Africa 
but was clouded by ambivalence. As Hodge has argued within the context of development, “Out of 
the complex and dialectical intersection of ideas, expertise, and bureaucratic power emerged a 
collective imperial agenda torn by inconsistency, indecisiveness, and objectives pulling in divergent 
and often conflicting directions.”19 Anderson’s research into Lembus forest of Baringo, Kenya, offers 
an example of these colonial confusions that stretched across the whole colonial period. Lembus 
was alienated to white settlers in the first decade of the twentieth century despite the protests of 
the Forest Department, which would spend the next 50 years trying to wrest control of the forest 
from settler hands and the Africans who lived within it. The attempted improvement of agricultural 
land in wider Baringo district was also symptomatic of this ambivalence, as although the scheme 
was much lauded by the government through the 1930s it was severely underfunded and 
understaffed; key factors in its failure.20  
The issue of the fiscal weakness of colonial rule was indeed often at the heart of the 
contradictions within that rule. Berry has argued that this weakness was expressed in Kenya’s 
                                                                
17 John M. MacKenzie, The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservation and British Imperialism (Manchester University 
Press, 1997); E. I. Steinhart, Black Poachers, White Hunters: A Social History of Hunting in Colonial Kenya (Oxford, 
2006); Roderick P. Neumann, ‘Nature-State-Territory: Toward a Critical Theorization of Conservation Enclosures’, 
in Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social Movements, ed. Richard Peet and Michael Watts, 2nd 
ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), 193–217; Aneesa Kassam and Ali Balla Bashuna, ‘Marginalisation of the Waata 
Oromo Hunter–Gatherers of Kenya: Insider and Outsider Perspectives’, Africa 74, no. 2 (2004): 194–216, 
doi:10.3366/afr.2004.74.2.194; W.K. Lindsay, ‘Integrating Parks and Pastoralists: Some Lessons from Amboseli’, in 
Conservation in Africa: Peoples, Policies and Practice, ed. David M. Anderson and Richard H. Grove (Cambridge, 1989), 
149–60; Roderick P. Neumann, ‘The Postwar Conservation Boom in British Colonial Africa’, Environmental History 
7, no. 1 (January 2002): 22–47; William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, Environment and Empire (Oxford University 
Press, Incorporated, 2009); Helge Kjekshus, Ecology Control & Economic Development in East African History: The 
Case of Tanganyika 1850-1950 (James Currey, 1996). 
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colonial state through an overreliance on indirect rule; a system that elevated or created African 
elites and utilised them to force Africans into a capitalist colonial economy dependent on settler 
agriculture, while simultaneously denying them full access to that economy.21 As Conte and 
Neumann have both argued, the goals of forestry in neighbouring Tanganyika were seriously 
hampered by a lack of support from the colonial administration that resulted in an inadequate 
operating budget and a shortage of forestry personnel. Mirroring development history in the field 
of agriculture, Tanganyika’s forestry department was to be saved by growing concerns about soil 
degradation in the 1930s, which found expression after the Second World War in the massively 
expanded funding given to the department.22 Funding, or the lack of it, and how this affected the 
development of forestry within Kenya has thus far been unexplored by historians of the country. 
This thesis will therefore explore the financial realities of creating scientific forestry in Kenya, with 
particular reference to how this affected aspects of forestry such as programmes of scientific 
research.  
Moreover, the ‘thin white line’, representing the colonial rule of a few thousand Europeans 
over millions of Africans, is related to the investigation of how the colony’s Forest Department 
maintained order within its forest reserves. Again, the existing historiography on Kenya largely 
ignores the upholding of law and order within the Crown forest reserves, despite Anderson 
identifying these spaces as probable conduits for illegal activity and the forests being the principle 
arena of Mau Mau activity during the 1950s.23 There is currently no work, for example, on the role 
of the Forest Department in the government’s suppression of Mau Mau or what part, if any, the 
African employees of the department who worked in the forests played in this process. The closest 
we come to a discussion that considers the Forest Department’s maintenance of law and order in 
the forests is Castro’s consideration of Kikuyu protest at Forest Department conservation practices 
on the slopes of Mount Kenya, which is indirectly linked to the rise of Mau Mau sentiment, 
Anderson’s work on African opposition to forest reservation, and Castro’s consideration of the use 
of on-the-spot fines to punish violators of forest laws within forests found within African reserves 
(that is, not the Crown forests).24 This was, he argues, a practice that provided a steady and not 
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insignificant revenue stream to the department as it was seen by Africans as effectively a form of 
taxation on forest produce; an argument that will certainly be investigated by this study.25 Sunseri 
provides an analysis of forest policing in Tanganyika, in which overworked African agents of 
colonial rule are revealed as the gatekeepers to forest and tree use, opening them up to abuses of 
power and corruption, and creating popular resentment that fostered nationalism.26 There is, 
therefore, clear and important scope for investigating how the rationalising agenda of state forestry 
was actually applied on the ground in colonial Kenya, particularly in respect of the hitherto 
underexplored Crown forests.   
The desire by Europeans to transform and, in their eyes, improve the landscapes they 
conquered across the colonised world has been argued by Anderson and Grove as a projection of 
European conceptions of an imagined ‘Eden’. This informed a narrative for the need to conserve 
landscapes against the threat of their supposed potential destruction by Africans.27 According to 
Grove, the idea of conservation grew from eighteenth-century imperial experiences of the rapid 
degradation of island ecosystems to become a core concept in how land would be managed across 
the empire.28 This was a conservation in which the constituent parts of an ecosystem were 
categorised and evaluated based on their usefulness to the imperial machine, a usefulness that was 
of course determined by the white and west European culture and economics of the men who built 
that machine. Thus fauna across the empire were hunted to feed the bellies and egos of pioneer 
settlers and make way for cattle, sheep, and crops. Concurrently, indigenous people’s rights of 
access to such resources were restricted so that supposedly sustainable killing might continue in 
the interests of the colonial rulers.29 Similar to Anderson’s work on Baringo, Mackenzie’s research 
into colonial projects of soil conservation in Kenya has shown how within this agenda Africans, and 
African agricultural practice in particular, were stereotyped as a danger to the ecological balance of 
the colony, thereby justifying draconian policies of agricultural improvement. Conservation thus 
allowed what was at heart a political problem of the unequal distribution of land within the colony 
to be cast as a technical problem that could be solved by scientific intervention.30 Notably, 
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Ofcansky’s account of the development of forestry in Kenya repeats this colonial line, arguing that 
African shifting cultivation and overgrazing caused large-scale deforestation and soil erosion. 
Ecological balance, he argues, was only ensured by the presence of disease, war, and famine in 
precolonial Kenya. “When the British arrived and imposed a sense of order on tribal relations and, 
more importantly, adopted policies to relieve famine, forest destruction and soil erosion 
accelerated”, Ofcansky argues.31 In the light of research by Fairhead and Leach that dispels similar 
colonial narratives in West Africa, such accounts of colonial Kenya need serious reappraisal.32   
Conservation played an integral role in forestry as it developed across the British Empire. As 
outlined by Barton and Bennett, within India conservation of the forest resource was at the heart 
of the psyche of the Indian Forest Service. As Barton has separately argued, this was a stance that 
was grounded upon the utilitarian Benthamite principle that policy should be for the greater good, 
even if this meant hardship for the minority. This enshrined the principle of forests as state 
property with limited rights of access and usage to indigenous peoples, all for the greater good. 
Forestry passed on, Barton argues, this fortress conservation approach to the larger environmental 
movement in the twentieth century.33 However, as Bryant reminds us in his work on teak extraction 
in colonial Burma, conservation did not preclude capitalism. Conservationist scientific forestry may 
have opposed the laissez-faire forestry of private enterprise, but it still sought to make a profit as 
long as this was based on sustainable, managed exploitation of the forests.34 Sunseri reiterates this 
argument within the context of Tanganyika, where he posits that forest exploitation during the 
Second World War highlighted the profit potential of the territory as a timber producer, which was 
a major factor in an expanded plantation programme following the war.35 In large part, motivations 
behind forestry through the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
founded on the financial success of forestry in India. Thus, the Indian example of European scientific 
forestry reborn to meet the needs of empire was repeated across (and adapted to) British Africa, 
aided by the spread of personnel, knowledge, and experience from India.36 Anderson’s research 
into Lembus forest, for example, touches upon the motivations that lay behind forestry in Kenya. 
He argues the financial success of forestry in India provided an example that such conservationist 
strategies had practical merit for the imperial purse. Outlining the Kenyan Forest Department’s 
opposition to forest alienation and African occupation, Anderson paints a picture of a department 
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driven by a conservationist agenda and the need to make money.37 This agenda received massive 
support during colonial Kenya’s twilight years after the Second World War as expert-led 
development was brought to the fore of colonial policy.38 With this ‘second colonial occupation’, the 
importance of protecting agricultural land in Kenya meant that the narrative of soil conservation 
carried with it political leverage.39 In the case of Lembus forest, the Forest Department’s insistence 
on the importance of the forest as a water catchment area allowed it to gain control of the forest 
from Africans and logging companies. Otieno’s investigation of the 1950s afforestation project of 
Kisian Hill in Nyanza reveals that the conservation argument could be deployed in situations where 
it simply had no bearing. Despite admitting a decade earlier that afforestation would have no 
positive effect on local water catchment at Kisian, the department used this argument to assure it 
would have access to funds from the Swynnerton Plan, the massive policy of invasive, forced 
agricultural development and villigization that was enacted in the wake of Mau Mau.40 
Furthermore, Otieno’s work warns that the conservation argument can be taken too far, obscuring 
the agency and politics of Africans in their negotiations with the Forest Department during the 
formation of protected forests within African reserves. Otieno reminds us that colonialism could be 
a “mutually constituted process and a product of misunderstandings” between the coloniser and 
colonised.41 Like Otieno, Castro focuses on the subaltern across several studies that consider the 
effects of scientific forestry on ethnic groups living in proximity to Mount Kenya. Castro paints a 
picture of Africans struggling against and ultimately failing to find a voice within the Forest 
Department’s pursuit of conservation. Moreover, Castro recounts how empire forestry was able to 
replace indigenous forestry systems that existed to provide both spiritual and physical resources 
to peoples around Mount Kenya.42 
Conservation, economics, and politics are clearly at the heart of forestry and work by 
Anderson, Otieno, and Castro has shown how this played out in a scattering of local examples across 
Kenya. However, there remains a significant gap in understanding what drove forestry colony-wide. 
In particular, the politics and economics of timber extraction have only been briefly covered by 
Castro although Anderson’s work on Lembus illustrates that antagonism could exist between the 
private sphere and the Forest Department. This topic merits much closer examination if we are to 
understand how the nexus between conservation and alleged scientific and sustainable exploitation 
occurred. Moreover, the role of Kenya’s settlers in forest reservation and exploitation has only been 
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touched upon by Anderson’s work on Lembus forest and warrants fuller investigation to reveal the 
influence of this politically very powerful group on forestry in Kenya. 
The forestry of the British Empire has also been shown as developing along a web of 
connections between the metropole, India, the dominions, and colonies. Bennett, Brown, and 
Beinart in particular have shown how forestry knowledge flowed around the world.43 With this 
flow went tree species, most famously Eucalyptus, that were planted (often on appropriated African 
land) to primarily meet the needs of settler and coloniser but not indigenous peoples or even native 
fauna. Thus, forestry allowed not just the conservation of forest for foreign agendas but also the 
conversion of forest and grassland to alien ecosystems to meet those agendas.44 However, as 
Vandergeest and Peluso remind us with their research into the creation of colonial forestry regimes 
in Southeast Asia, the roles of local politics and ecologies should not be overlooked in the localised 
histories of the development of forestry.45 Ofcansky briefly outlines how forestry ideas spread from 
South Africa to Kenya via the agency of Cape Colony forester David Ernest Hutchins in 1906, 
resulting in an emphasis on exotic plantation creation since this was very well developed in South 
Africa.46 Moreover, the importance of both trans-empire networks and local agency seem 
particularly pertinent in colonial Kenya since, as Castro tells us, it was the site of taungya 
agroforestry operations that were inspired by colonial experience in Burma.47 This system, known 
as shamba (Swahili – farm, cultivation) in Kenya, also has a long and turbulent post-colonial history, 
and its apparently stable operation during the colonial period now seems to be looked upon 
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through somewhat rose-tinted glasses as policy makers in Kenya and foreign experts assess and 
reconfigure it for a role within a Kenyan landscape impacted by climate change.48 The very brief 
references to this system in the Kenyan historiography suggest a more complex picture. Furedi 
casts shamba and the wider state forests that it operated within as centres of political dissent. This 
invites comparisons to the operation of taungya in colonial Burma, where it resulted in repeated 
cases of violent protest because, Bryant argues, it represented a fundamental contradiction 
between the needs of forestry (the extraction of high value timber) and the local people.49 Similar 
patterns of resistance to colonial forestry and agroforestry are documented by Sunseri in 
Tanganyika.50 Returning to Kenya, Kanogo conversely argues that working within shamba was seen 
in a positive light by Kikuyu farmers moving away from life on the farms of white settlers, as shamba 
gave access to education.51 Finally, in discussing the expansion of shamba in the wake of the Mau 
Mau revolt in the mid-1950s, Elkins argues the system represented a way for the colonial 
government to reward Kikuyu who had remained loyal and fought against Mau Mau.52 In doing so, 
Elkins’ argument implicitly casts aside the warning by Rajan that forestry and bodies of imperial 
technical expertise should be seen as actors within the colonial story rather than merely tools of 
the state deployed to fix colonial problems as and when needed.53 There is thus only a smattering 
of discussion of shamba within the historiography, yet this discussion does link it to important 
processes of protest, development, and nationalism. Clearly, a much fuller investigation of shamba 
is required, and one that takes into account the agency of forestry itself and the networks of 
personnel and knowledge that this was built upon. Shamba and its embodiment as a process born 
of international networks will therefore be explored in this thesis. 
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Research Framework 
The historiographical overview has identified several major themes within the environmental 
history of colonial forestry and gaps in the current literature on Kenya in relation to these themes. 
Based on this assessment, the following brief research questions are used to define the historical 
approach taken in this study.  
Research questions 
1. What roles did forestry play within the colonial state? 
2. How was forestry in Kenya affected by the reality of colonial rule being only a ‘thin 
white line’ in terms of the effects of financial constraints on forestry operations? 
3. How were indigenous forest management systems affected by the arrival of colonial 
forestry? How were Africans perceived in relation to forests by members of the Forest 
Department and wider government, and how did this inform policy, that is, was there 
a ‘degradation narrative’ within Kenya and how did this play out? 
4. What were the drivers of forestry and what role did the colonial conservation narrative 
play in forestry motivations? 
5. What role did imperial networks of knowledge and personnel transfer play in forestry? 
In particular, how did the imported taungya (shamba in Kenya) agroforestry system 
develop? 
The thesis utilises an exploration of archival and published primary source documents to 
reach answers to these questions. The historiographical overview has demonstrated that forests 
have been the nexus of typically competing viewpoints of land and resource use; awareness of this 
drove the selection of sources employed. Forests, for example, may be viewed by the state as a 
strategic asset whose importance is seen as negating the use of those forests by other groups. 
Private enterprise, represented by the stereotypically unscrupulous capitalist sawmiller, may 
consider forests to be nothing more than mines waiting to be stripped of timber. Indigenous 
peoples typically invest forests with numerous social, political, and economic values that are often 
completely ignored, misunderstood, or otherwise maligned by state and private actors, clearly 
shown in Kenya by Castro’s, Anderson’s, and Otieno’s work on African forest reserves. Indeed, 
because of the coverage provided by these scholars into African-forest interactions, and the 
concurrent absence of literature dealing with forestry as a separate but integral part of the colonial 
state, the bulk of the sources upon which this thesis is based come from the colony’s Forest 
Department itself. This emphasis on the agency of forestry provides a novel foundation for the 
discussion of forestry within Kenya that takes into account the politically and economically 
important role of white settlers in the colony; the factor that truly makes the colonialism that 
developed in Kenya unique.  
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The sources themselves primarily come from Kenya’s National Archives (KNA), the National 
Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), the University of Oxford’s Bodleian Radcliffe Science Library 
and Weston Library, the British Library, and the National Library of Scotland. Official documents, 
memoranda, reports, books, journal articles, minutes of meetings, and correspondence form the 
bulk of the material scrutinised, with most being produced by the colonial Forest Department of 
Kenya, the Colonial Office, the colonial government of Kenya, and allied organisations (such as the 
Empire Forestry Association). In particular, the annual (and sometimes triannual) reports of the 
Forest Department were a key source for statistical and outline data. Contact was made with several 
of the few surviving members of the colonial Forest Department, who provided me with 
information via email and telephone interview.54 The attitudes of settlers (including the timber 
industry) has been gleamed from correspondence, their publications, and the reports and minutes 
of applicable organisations (for example, the timber cooperative known as Timsales and white 
farmers’ associations). 
This thesis examines the politics and economics of certain forested areas of Kenya, and the 
actors that participated in this, that have largely escaped historical study, what were termed the 
Crown forests. Crown forests were state forests, reserved by the government and under direct and 
theoretical total control of the Forest Department. Indeed, the Crown forests made up the majority 
of the land defined as forest by the colonial government throughout the colonial period. For 
example, in 1931 Crown forests represented 97 per cent of the forest estate, although this did fall 
to 73 per cent by 1962.55 This thesis therefore posits that colonial forest policy in Kenya was bound 
up in the control, development, and exploitation of this state forest estate. These forests are 
predominantly found in the central and western highlands of the country, and are clustered around 
prominent topographical features such as Mount Kenya, Mount Elgon, the Aberdares range, and the 
Mau Escarpment of the Rift Valley. All such forests are above 1,000 metres in altitude and therefore 
typically montane in nature. Although Crown forest could also be found on the coast and, from the 
late 1950s, on the green islands of the mountains of Kenya’s arid northern province, the Forest 
Department’s overwhelming focus was the more highly populated and forested central and western 
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Figure I. The highland forest and grassland zones of Kenya, reserved forests, and land alienated for white 
settlement. Sources: Atlas of Kenya, 1st ed. (Nairobi: Survey of Kenya, 1959); D.E. Hutchins, ‘Report on the 
Forests of British East Africa’ (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, October 1909), [Cd. 4723]. 
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regions of the colony; the thesis therefore follows this same focus.56   
Forestry itself is the primary actor under consideration, an approach that inherently sees the 
Forest Department and its staff and workers as separate entities capable of having their own 
motivations and goals that were quite distinct from an overarching notion of ‘colonialism’. Forestry 
will very much be explored as a part of the colonial state, but a part with a considerable degree of 
independence. Focus is directed toward what the priorities of the Forest Department were across 
the colonial period and the importance of the forestry ideology intrinsic to the department to these. 
This will cover themes of forest protection, afforestation, exploitation, and the development of 
forest science. The recruitment and utilisation of African workers (the ‘forest squatters’) to the 
department will be extensively explored within this theme, both in terms of the effect of Forest 
Department employment on the workers and their influence on forestry policy.57 Indeed, with the 
state’s legal takeover of the Crown forests, forest squatting was the only legal means that Africans 
had of residing within these forests although extensive ‘illegal’ settlement, cultivation, and 
‘criminal’ activities occurred throughout the colonial period that is, where possible, also explored.    
The relationship between the forests and the wider government, including the governor, 
Legislative Council, and other departments will also be explored. This is particularly relevant in 
reference to the role of forestry in the extension of state power over land, the government’s obvious 
political and budgetary control over the Forest Department, and its economic goals. Economics also 
underlies the final relationship being examined, that of the forests and the private sphere. Here, the 
private sphere encompasses the timber industry and the white settler community. The timber 
industry itself was overwhelmingly dominated by white settlers although there was also a minority 
of sawmills operated by Indians.58 Recognising the heterogeneous nature of this industry, the views 
                                                                
56 There is undoubtedly potential for research concerning Kenya’s coastal forests of mangroves and their hinterland, 
which had extensive and long precolonial links to trade across the Indian Ocean. However, this thesis aims to focus 
on the core processes of the Kenya Forest Department’s ‘policy’ formation and the struggles that shaped this. For a 
study that enlightens understanding of the political ecology of Tanzania’s coastal forests see Sunseri, Wielding the 
Ax. 
57 Aside from forest squatters employed by the Forest Department, there were also those Africans on temporary 
contracts with the sawmills who resided in forests. Because of a lack of records dealing with this second group of 
sawmill squatters and their rather temporary nature (they resided for shorter periods than Forest Department 
squatters), this thesis largely restricts itself to discussion of the Forest Department’s own forest squatters. It should 
be noted that like the considerably more well-known African squatters of the white highlands, the term ‘forest 
squatter’ was used in the colonial period without negative connotations, just as it is in the bulk of Kenya’s 
historiography. 
58 This research focuses on the determinants of forest policy in Kenya by primarily looking at the Forest 
Department’s own records. While the Asian community within Kenya was extremely active and vocal in the political 
sphere, records indicate it had little influence on the Forest Department. Speculatively, this may have been because 
of the urban base of the Asian community in comparison to the rural dominance of the white settlers. White farmers 
residing on large estates in the white highlands operated in proximity to forests and forestry. By contrast, large 
Asian businesses were clustered in major townships and Asians were, of course, restricted from owning large tracts 
of agricultural land. Although there were several sawmills and timber trading companies owned by Asians, white 
settlers still controlled the industry. This was further bolstered through European dominance of the main political 
and cooperative body of the timber industry, Timsales. Asians did feature as employees of the Forest Department 
and this aspect is explored in the thesis. Asians could attain a higher position within the department than Africans 
(at least until the early 1960s), yet they effectively also faced a colour bar that meant they were excluded from the 
possibility of influencing forest policy.     
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of the forests that it had will be investigated, and its relationship with the Forest Department 
extensively explored. Similarly, the impact of the white farmers on forestry and the forests will be 
examined. Forest reserves were key features of the Kenyan highlands, acting as buffers between 
the ‘white highlands’ and those areas where Africans were allowed to farm.59 In conjunction with 
metropolitan concerns, Kenya’s colonial politics were overwhelmingly imbued with the interests of 
the settlers. Thus, how this politically powerful group was able to influence forest policy is a vital 
area of research and differentiates Kenya from Uganda and Tanzania.60 Through scrutinising these 
relationships between the forests of Kenya and forestry institutions, the government, and the 
private sphere this thesis casts light upon both the role of forestry and forests within the creation 
of the both colonial state and subsequent nation state.  
The first chapter begins the analysis of forestry in Kenya by looking at the late-nineteenth 
century to the mid-1920s, from when Kenya might be considered a frontier protectorate to a British 
colony. It traces and analyses the establishment of forestry in Kenya, considering the importance of 
conservationist, economic, and geopolitical arguments as well as the significance of imperial 
personnel connections and the role of early white settlers in the creation of the Forest Department 
and how these characterised its development and policies. The second chapter deals with the mid-
1920s through to the Second World War. This was a period when the Forest Department attempted 
to consolidate the position of forestry in the colony; significant developments occurred in the 
growth of the timber industry and its relationship to the department, revealing the department’s 
priorities and shortcomings. The system of forest squatting, referred to throughout this thesis by 
the term most commonly used by the Forest Department – the shamba system – dramatically grew 
and was defined in the interwar years; its importance to forestry in the colony and the socio-
economic implications for Africans involved in it will all be explored. These developments are 
analysed in light of the political landscape of Kenya, specifically the importance of vocal white 
settler opposition to forestry in shaping forestry in the colony. The final chapter focuses on the post-
war years until Kenya’s independence from British rule in 1963.61 The twilight years of British rule 
in Kenya are shown as dramatically advancing the course of forestry in the colony. The growth of 
scientific research institutions is explored, together with how science was used to both attack and 
aid forest development and the expansion of state control. Similarly, the complex roles of the Forest 
Department and the state in a timber industry that was eager to partake of the rapid economic 
developments of 1950s Kenya are explored. Finally, the importance of the Mau Mau Emergency to 
                                                                
59 W.T.W. Morgan, 'The "White Highlands" of Kenya', The Geographical Journal, vol.129, no.2 (Jun 1963), p.143, 150 
60 For example, Sunseri’s Wielding the Ax explores many similar themes to this thesis (although his work has a closer 
focus on peasant resistance) within colonial and post-colonial Tanzania, which had a comparatively smaller and less 
influential settler population in comparison to Kenya. 
61 Independence is taken as a practical and natural cut-off point for this study. However, as the final chapter will 
touch upon, many of the themes relating to forestry continued into the post-colonial era. For a study that straddles 
the colonial and post-colonial see Otieno, ‘Forest Politics in Colonial and Postcolonial Kenya, 1940-1990s’. For 
specific discussion of the shamba system across these two time periods and an emphasis on the importance of the 
colonial period for imbuing the system with many of the characteristics that make it of continued (if not heightened) 
relevance today, see my own ‘Shamba Forestry in Colonial Kenya: Colonial Dominance or African Opportunity?’  
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forestry is analysed with a specific focus on the growth of the shamba system, African development, 
and villagization. The chapter ends with a consideration of the state of forestry as Kenya 
transitioned to independence, particularly in relation to the preparations the department made to 
deal with that changeover. The thesis concludes by considering how the findings from this 
investigation tie into ideas of forestry as a constituent part of the colonial state and an important 
element in social and economic development. Special emphasis is placed on the shamba system as 
a defining characteristic of forestry in Kenya and the importance of the success of this system for 
the spread of similar agroforestry systems across Africa and the wider tropical world today. 
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From the Abominable Jungle to the  
Scientific Forest Plantation  
c.1890 to 1925 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter will explore both the background to and the process of the creation of the East Africa 
Protectorate’s Forest Department in 1902. The period covered ranges from circa 1890, when 
British exploration of East Africa intensified, through the process of protectorate establishment and 
European settlement until 1925, when it is considered that the early period of the Forest 
Department’s consolidation and policy formation was complete under its first three conservators. 
Within this timeframe, the forests of East Africa went from being relatively unknown in terms of 
their extent and biological composition to the site of numerous forestry plantations: clear symbols 
of the scientific and colonial appropriation of African lands. 
  
 Exploring the Jungle 
In 1885 the missionary couple Rachel and Stuart Watt traversed the country today known as Kenya. 
Their account of this journey was typical; it dwelled on the arduous nature of journeying through 
“interminable forest” in which they and their porters had to stoop “underneath the giant creepers 
and intertwining branches, which droop over the narrow, darkened and tortuous track.”62 No doubt 
eager to satisfy their readers’ desires for tales of the impenetrable dark continent, other travellers 
also played up the dangers and difficulty of travel in East Africa. Trekking through the forests 
around Mount Kenya, the elephant hunter Arthur Neumann wrote in 1898 that,  
We had the most trying day imaginable, through the very densest, most abominable jungle it is 
possible to conceive. Our guides eventually lost themselves and us, and it was not till late in the 
afternoon that we at last struggled out into shambas [farmland].63  
                                                                
62 Rachel Watt, In the Heart of Savagedom. Reminiscences of Life and Adventure during a Quarter of a Century of 
Missionary Labours in East Equatorial Africa, ed. Stuart Watt (London: Marshall Brothers Ltd., 1913), 30, 33. Watt 
worked with the Church Missionary Society and was giving an account of her journeys in 1885. 
63 Arthur H. Neumann, Elephant-Hunting in East Equatorial Africa. Being an Account of Three Years’ Ivory-Hunting 
under Mount Kenia and among the Ndorobo Savages of the Lorogi Mountains, Including a Trip to the North End of 
Lake Rudolph (London, 1898), 66. 
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Forests at lower altitudes were infested by tsetse, necessitating the use of porters to carry the 
expeditions’ provisions.64 Equally dangerous were the mysterious inhabitants of forests along the 
travellers’ routes. While journeying through the high-altitude central highlands in 1893, John 
Gregory and his caravan feared the region’s Kikuyu to the extent that no camp was made in the 
forest, from which attack might come. When he visited the European station of Fort Smith, 13 km 
northwest of the future capital, Nairobi, no one was allowed outside the perimeter unless 
accompanied by at least 20 other men.65  
Even the weariest of travellers, however, began to soften after the long toil of the day was over 
and describe the aesthetic appeal of the forest. Camping at 2,500 metres on the slopes of Mount 
Kenya, Neumann looked down into the central highlands of Kenya and remarked, with a clear eye 
to timber potential, that, “the forest is very beautiful, and contains many fine timber trees. The trunk 
of one that I measured girthed about 15 feet and was straight as a dart for at least 60 feet.”66 Eager 
to entice wealthy hunters to the territory, the 1893 Handbook of British East Africa described the 
same forests as “entrancing, being free from creepers, carpeted with green sward, and intersected 
by beautiful glades and running water, while antelope, buffalo, and elephant abound.”67 The 
overriding theme of accounts from the last decade of the nineteenth century was that the forests of 
the British East Africa Protectorate, as the territory became known in 1895, had massive untapped 
potential. The coast contained extensive mangrove forests, the source of “very fine” poles that 
constituted an established Indian Ocean trade and one of the principal (if low value) export 
commodities of the Protectorate by 1897.68 The coastal hinterland contained a forest belt of 
“magnificent timber, of which the chief varieties are the mbambakofi, like mahogany, the gum copal 
tree, the teak and other hard woods, the acacia, the ebony, and various palms.”69 Moving west, after 
crossing the great expanse of plains and beginning the gradual ascent into the central highland 
region, Captain Lugard reported in 1893 the presence of “fine timber trees” in the country inhabited 
                                                                
64 For a map of the tsetse fly zone within Kenya, see figure 3-4 in chapter 3. 
65 John Walter Gregory, The Great Rift Valley. Being the Narrative of a Journey to Mount Kenya and Lake Baringo. With 
Some Account of the Geology, Natural History, Anthropology and Future Prospects of British East Africa ... With Maps 
and Illustrations (London, 1896), 21, 77. Gregory also makes reference to the use of camels by European travellers, 
apparently following the example set by the local Orma people. If camels were used, numerous fires were apparently 
lit to produce smoke that would envelop and protect the caravan from the dreaded tsetse fly. 
66 Neumann, Elephant-Hunting in East Equatorial Africa, 129. 
67 Intelligence Division of the War Office, Handbook of British East Africa, Including Zanzibar, Uganda, and the 
Territory of the Imperial British East Africa Company (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1893), 33. 
68 C. W. Hobley, ‘People, Places, and Prospects in British East Africa’, The Geographical Journal 4, no. 2 (1 August 
1894): 97, doi:10.2307/1773798; Africa. No. 7 (1897). Report by Sir A. Hardinge on the Condition and Progress of the 
East Africa Protectorate from Its Establishment to the 20th July, 1897. [With Map.], Parliamentary Papers: Command 
Papers, C.8683, LX.199, 1898, 43, 46–47. Although it was considered a principal export commodity in the 
Protectorate’s 1897 report, the value of this trade was slight compared to the major export items of ivory, grain, 
rubber, and livestock (in that order). In 1896-97 ‘building materials’, which must have been dominated by mangrove 
poles (typically known as borities) as well as a smaller quantity of timber from coastal forests constituted 2.2 per 
cent of the total value of exports from the Protectorate (and 2.3 per cent of export duty collected for the same 
period).  
69 Intelligence Division of the War Office, 1893 Handbook of British East Africa, 169. 
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by Kamba peoples.70 Turning north-west on route to Mount Kenya, he arrived in Kikuyu country 
where he was met with a “forest [that] contains magnificent timber trees, its large open glades 
between the patches of heavy wood are of the richest soil, and the country is well watered.”71 He 
further speculated that temperate zone trees such as oak, ash, cedar, and pine, as well as valuable 
tropical hardwoods such as teak, “would certainly become naturalised here.”72 As Lugard trekked 
west into the Nandi hills of the Rift Valley he found “forest all around us on every side, huge dense 
African forest of colossal trees.”73 Referring to Kenya’s largest forest, the Mau, John Bremner Purvis 
epitomised the optimistic view held by the first European travellers and administrators when he 
talked of the,  
… mighty forests of giant timber that patiently wait for the axe and saw and ingenuity of man or 
enterprise of the Government, to turn the best of the timber to better account than fuel for the 
iron horse, and from the rest provide that fuel more easily and cheaply than at present. Already 
some enterprising individuals are working in a small way, with the result that almost every article 
of furniture may be bought in Nairobi in a style and at a price that will compare with anything in 
England.74 
The forests of Kenya, although still largely unexplored by Europeans at the turn of the twentieth 
century, were clearly seen as holding potential to be developed into a resource for the growth of 
the Protectorate. Further fuelling this impression that Kenya contained a wealth of timber just 
waiting to be exploited were the numerous accounts reporting that the forests were uninhabited. 
Late-nineteenth and early twentieth century descriptions of uninhabited areas cover several 
of the major Kenyan forests, indicating a European perception that, broadly, the forests of the 
territory were unoccupied. While journeying up the Tana River in 1895, Reverend R.M. Ormerod 
crossed a 60-mile “almost unbroken” stretch of forest that was “practically a no-man’s land.”75 
When R.B. Buckley reported on his journey along the newly-finished Uganda railway in 1903, he 
emphasised the “extreme paucity of the population”76 and that the central highlands, “say the size 
of England north of Liverpool and Sheffield – is almost uninhabited at present, and it offers a field 
for colonization by Europeans… .”77 Buckey’s mistake, of course, was in supposing that the lands 
the railway crossed were representative of the highlands as a whole; rather, the Uganda railway’s 
                                                                
70 F.D. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire. Early Efforts in Nyasaland and Uganda, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1893), 278. 
71 Ibid., 1:337. 
72 Ibid., 1:422. 
73 Margery Perham and Mary Bull, eds., The Diaries of Lord Lugard, vol. 1 (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1959), 
385. 
74 John Bremner Purvis, Through Uganda to Mount Elgon (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), 83. Purvis does not state 
when he made his journey across the Mau. As it was by rail it was certainly after the completion of the railway in 
1904, although his reflections are a result of his being resident in East Africa since 1895. 
75 ‘The Rev. R. M. Ormerod’s Journeys on the Tana River’, The Geographical Journal 8, no. 3 (1 September 1896): 
285–86, doi:10.2307/1774190. The place names Ormerod gives remain elusive, however from his descriptions it is 
likely he was referring to the riverine forest between present-day Masabubu and Garissa.   
76 R. B. Buckley, ‘Colonization and Irrigation in the East Africa Protectorate’, The Geographical Journal 21, no. 4 (1 
April 1903): 350, doi:10.2307/1775678. 
77 Ibid., 362. 
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route was chosen based on engineering concerns and water supplies, and specifically avoided large 
areas of population which might present a hostile challenge to its operation.78 The fact that this 
oversight went uncommented on in the discussion of Buckey’s journey at the Royal Geographical 
Society is indicative of the general perception, and perhaps desire to believe, that British East Africa 
was only sparsely populated. With the total absence of comprehensive surveys, remarks made on 
maps produced by travellers were influential. Joseph Thomson, for example, ambiguously marked 
an approximate 100-mile stretch of forest between Mount Kenya and Lake Baringo as “Uninhabited 
forest, elephant numerous” despite only passing through the edge of the area on his 1884 
expedition.79 The issue of the true state of land occupation at the time of British conquest would of 
course go on to be a primary source of African political agitation within Kenya in the colonial period 
and beyond. In terms of forestry, it is clear that based on the scant, unscientific and generalising 
reports of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the forests of the territory were seen 
as virgin, vast, exploitable, and uninhabited; yet, they were also seen as under threat. 
 
1.2.1 Forest Destruction 
Early accounts of deforestation by Africans portrayed the practice either neutrally or in a positive 
manner. On an expedition through the Sotik area of the Rift Valley with the railway survey party in 
1893, J.W. Pringle described the typical method of forest clearance he witnessed: 
The clearing of the forest is done in a way similar to that practised by the Wa-Kikuyu and Wa-
Kamasia [Tugen]. The undergrowth and jungle is cut away by hand, and a fire lighted round the 
stumps of all the larger trees, which, after their fall, are left to cumber the ground and decay away, 
only the small undergrowth being dug up.80 
His insinuation, then, was that Kikuyu of central Kenya, Tugen of north-east central Kenya, and an 
unnamed ethnic group in Sotik (most likely Kipsigis) all engaged in similar forest clearance 
practices. Significantly, he did not chastise such clearance as wanton destruction, indeed he passed 
no judgement on these practice at all. In 1894, Charles Hobley of the British East Africa Company, 
which oversaw British interests in East Africa between 1888 and 1896, wrote of deforestation 
carried out by Kamba living south of modern-day Nairobi with a clear sense of admiration: 
A great deal of the country is covered with thick woods, mainly composed of a green-barked 
sponge-wood tree, but the Wakamba are gradually extending the area under cultivation, clearing 
away thick woods in a most patient and persevering manner.81 
Similar praise was given by the official handbook for East Africa in 1893 in describing Kikuyu forest 
clearance: “The country was once entirely wooded, but by the industry of its population it is now 
                                                                
78 Patrick Pringle, The Story of a Railway (London: Evans Brothers Limited, 1954), 19, 52. 
79 Joseph Thomson, ‘Through the Masai Country to Victoria Nyanza’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 
and Monthly Record of Geography, New Monthly Series, 6, no. 12 (1 December 1884): 712, doi:10.2307/1800706. 
80 J. W. Pringle, ‘With the Railway Survey to Victoria Nyanza’, The Geographical Journal 2, no. 2 (1 August 1893): 132, 
doi:10.2307/1773836. 
81 Hobley, ‘People, Places, and Prospects in British East Africa’, 117. 
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covered with cultivation.”82 From this perspective, deforestation was a sign of civilisation and 
development, a clearing away of the uneconomic (at that time) forests and establishment of 
agriculture that could fuel the potential future colony. In demonstrating their willingness to conduct 
this clearing, the Kamba and Kikuyu, in these two instances, are portrayed as a potential hard-
working workforce. Lugard also hailed this perceived characteristic, recounting that during a trip 
in 1890 “… I was especially struck with the vast extent of the cultivation, in comparison to the few 
villages I see. This seems to mark the Kikuyu as an industrious race.”83 After also describing the 
Kikuyu people he had encountered as “industrious”, Richard Crawshay goes on to describe the 
methods used to clear forests. Notably, like Pringle, this description carries no condemnation. 
If clearing a plantation in primeval forest, they commence operations by collecting quantities of 
dead wood, of which there is an extraordinary abundance, piling up this at the foot of the forest 
giants, and setting fire to it, keeping the fire burning for days, until either the base of the tree is 
charred throughout so that it falls straight away; or the tree dies as it stands, to fall, be burnt, and 
manure the ground with its potash a season or two later.84 
Concurrent to these accounts, however, was the view that forest clearances by Africans were 
tantamount to destruction of the forest resource. In 1893, while noting that the agrarian Meru 
people of central Kenya were “industrious cultivators”, Astor Chanler stated that “they are fast 
destroying the forest with which this range [the Nyambene Hills] was evidently formerly 
covered.”85 By 1897 this narrative was taken up officially. Sir Arthur Hardinge, the Commissioner 
and Consul General of the British East Africa Protectorate, sought to limit forest destruction through 
the territory’s first piece of forestry legislation, the Provisional Wood and Forests Regulations (1st 
January, 1897). Under these rules, “any European, Asiatic, or African, not a native of the province, 
shall not be allowed to cut timber without a permit, and that any person to whom such a permit is 
granted shall be obliged to plant, in lieu of any tree cut down by him, ten other trees of the same 
description.”86  
                                                                
82 Intelligence Division of the War Office, 1893 Handbook of British East Africa, 33. 
83 Perham and Bull, Diaries of Lord Lugard, 1:316. 
84 Richard Crawshay, ‘Kikuyu: Notes on the Country, People, Fauna, and Flora’, The Geographical Journal 20, no. 1 (1 
July 1902): 32, doi:10.2307/1775589. 
85 ‘Mr. Astor Chanler’s Expedition to East Africa’, The Geographical Journal 1, no. 6 (1 June 1893): 534, 
doi:10.2307/1773966. 
86 Report - Africa. No. 7, 27–28, 30, 63; The Official Gazette of the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates, vol. 1, 2 
(Mombasa, 1899), 2. This legislation was limited to Ukamba Province, which in 1897 encompassed the majority of 
the central highlands, including Mount Kenya, of Kenya (and a larger area than the later Central Province). Africans 
considered ‘native’ to the province were excluded from this legislation, suggesting either an acceptance that Africans 
had a right to the forests in proximity to their settlements or, and more realistically, an acceptance of the 
impossibility of policing the forests when, in 1897, the Protectorate was administered by a total of 22 European 
officers, only six of whom were engaged in Ukamba Province, which itself was estimated to be home to some 
2,500,982 Africans. It would have been comparatively easier to police the obviously much smaller and more 
recognisable European and Asian populations, although if Swahilis were included in this, being considered non-
native to the province, the population would still amount to 88,070. Also employed in Ukamba Province were 144 
soldiers of Punjabi or Sudanese origin, along with approximately 200 local native police under the command of two 
European officers. The role of these, however, was the defence of European stations against attacks of “hostile 
natives”. 
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This first extension of government control over the forests indicates there was sufficient 
concern within the nascent government over the level of forest exploitation that it was felt 
legislation was needed, despite much of the territory being still unexplored. Even at this early stage, 
it was recognised that a Forest Department would be created “when our revenue admits of it,”87 
indicating both the government’s wish to extend its control over the forests and the financial 
constraints it faced.  
There was an intensification of the demonization of African agriculture in the early 1900s, 
which further became explicitly linked to agricultural decline and the negative effects on nascent 
industries.88 In particular, Katherine and William Routledge’s ethnographic work on Kikuyu life 
condemned the indigenous method of shifting cultivation: 
So the Akikúyu pushed on and on. Their progress was like that of the locusts - the ranks at the 
rear, finding food supply exhausted, taking wing over the backs of the main body to drop to 
ground in the forefront. And as locusts clear a sturdy crop, so have the Akikúyu cleared the forest. 
In the heart of Kikúyu, except for a sacred grove here and there, scarcely a tree remains.89 
They reinforced their argument by employing photographs that allegedly showed the effects of 
deforestation and the perceived wastefulness of Kikuyu forest clearing (figure 1-1). For the 
Routledges, this “locust” had to be stopped, “not only in order to retain a heritage of such great 
beauty, but in the interests of timber supply, and, above all, of the rainfall of the country.”90 
Acknowledgement of the hydraulic repercussions of deforestation represent here a convergence of 
unofficial and official attitudes. By drawing attention to the effects of forests on water supplies, the 
Routledges were echoing sentiment that had, by this time, become ingrained in forestry literature.91 
Sir David Hutchins, the Chief Conservator of Forests between 1907 and 1911 agreed with regard to 
Kenia Province when he stated that: 92   
                                                                
87 Report - Africa. No. 7, 63. 
88 Damage to the rubber industry, a major component of the nascent colonial economy was particularly highlighted. 
Writing to the Royal African Society, one commentator considered the terrible effects that African collectors had on 
rubber vines: “One of the main assets of this coast country was Rubber, in the vine form most favoured by 
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89 W. Scoresby Routledge and Routledge, Katherine, With a Prehistoric People, The Akikuyu of British East Africa. 
Being an Account of the Method and Life and Mode of Thought Found Existent Amongst a Nation on Its First Contact 
with European Civilisation (London: Edward Arnold, 1910), 6. 
90 Ibid., 7. The Routledge’s With a Prehistoric People contains few photographs. It is notable that they therefore 
decided to employ photographs as evidence in the argument about Kikuyu forest destruction. Clearly this was an 
issue they felt strongly about. 
91 For an outline of the development of this view within forestry see Brett Bennett and Fred Kruger, Forestry and 
Water Conservation in South Africa: History, Science and Policy (ANU Press, 2015), 149. Interestingly, Hutchins did 
not cite contemporary research conducted on the links between forests and climate in South Africa. Possibly this 
was because this research began a process of debate within South Africa about the possible negative effect of forests 
on water supplies; clearly, Hutchins would have wanted to distance himself from even the vaguest stirrings of such 
a debate at a time when he was pushing for plantation establishment in the East Africa Protectorate. Ibid., 149–53.  
92 After 1918 Kenia Province was known as Kenya Province, after 1924 Kikuyu Province, and after 1933 Central 
Province. For an explanation of the Forest Department’s organisation see Appendices. 
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...the whole country would become bare rock if forest destruction [on Mount Kenya] were 
permitted to continue unchecked.  … The perennial character of the streams which represents 
their value for irrigation purposes, would certainly be lost if the forest were destroyed.93 
Hutchins was referring to the ‘indirect utility’ of forests. Direct utility was the forest’s ability to 
provide timber, firewood, and, to a lesser extent, bark, leaves, flowers, fruits, seeds, fibres, and the 
products of bee keeping. Indirect utility referred to the relationship between forests and rainfall, 
climate, and soil. While the direct utility of a forest was obvious and beyond question, foresters had 
to defend the extent or even existence of indirect utility. In his Manual of Forestry, the Oxford 
professor of forestry and extremely influential empire forester Wilhelm Schlich was adamant that,  
The effects of these agencies [climate, soil, water] have been observed and recorded from ancient 
times down to the present, and hundreds of pages could be filled with the record of instances in 
which forest vegetation has affected, or has been believed to have affected, the climate, the 
rainfall, the regulation of moisture, the stability of soil, the healthiness of countries and allied 
matters; if quantity of evidence alone were wanted, the case might be considered as 'proven.'94 
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For an overview on Schlich see Robert Scott Troup and Andrew Grout, ‘Schlich, Sir William Philipp Daniel (1840–
Figure 1-1. The Gorge of the Cha'-ni-a river near Nyeri. The left-hand image was taken by the Routledges in 
1904 and the right hand in 1907. Accompanying the right-hand image is the caption: "The squared log shown 
was the only piece of timber used for any useful purpose. All other was burnt as it lay on the ground.”  
Source: W. Scoresby Routledge and Routledge, Katherine, With a Prehistoric People, The Akikuyu of British 
East Africa. Being an Account of the Method and Life and Mode of Thought Found Existent Amongst a Nation on 
Its First Contact with European Civilisation (London: Edward Arnold, 1910), 8a-8b. 
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Hutchin’s 1907 report on the forests of Mount Kenya used and cited the arguments of Schlich as 
well as prominent scientist and conservationist George Perkin’s Marsh in its arguments for the 
government reservation of forest.95 This added considerable credence to a report that was 
presented to the Colonial Office and House of Commons, an audience that may have been aware of 
the work of Marsh and Schlich but unlikely to have read them.96 In this way, the Forest 
Department’s arguments for forest reservation were bolstered.97 
The Forest Department was also in agreement with the Routledges that Africans represented a very 
real threat to the forests of the Protectorate. For example, Hutchins’ 1907 report on Mount Kenya 
makes repeated references to the forests of the mountain being “destroyed” by Kikuyu farmers.98 
Similarly, the lavishly printed 1908 East Africa (British), Its History, People, Commerce, Industries, 
and Resources, essentially a publication designed to promote investment and settlement in the new 
protectorate, featured an article by the Acting Conservator of Forests Edward Battiscombe that 
discussed the highland ecological zone in which he stated: “Formerly the forests of this zone must 
have covered very large areas, but owing to the continual encroachment of the Wakikuyu 
cultivators and annual grass fires, it has now been reduced … to small patches of forest and isolated 
trees.”99 Surviving forestry literature is almost entirely focused on Kikuyu cultivators, no doubt 
because they lived among the potentially profitable and accessible Mount Kenya and Aberdare 
forests. Recalling his time in Kenya in the early 1920s, Assistant Conservator of Forests Richard St 
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95 Hutchins, 1907 Report of the Forests of Kenia, 31. Hutchins also supports his argument by saying it is in agreement 
with the opinions of S.L. Hinde, Sub-Commissioner for Kenia Province, and H.B. Muff, a geologist from the Geological 
Survey of the United Kingdom who was employed to find water sources for the Uganda Railway and report on the 
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96 In particular, Hutchins refers to Marsh’s 1864 Man and Nature; Or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human 
Action. Marsh, who is described by eminent environmental historian William Cronon as launching the modern 
conservation movement, was and is extremely widely read and cited on the topic of anthropogenic degradation of 
landscapes (William Cronon, ‘Foreword: A Classic of Conservation’ in George Perkins Marsh, Man and Nature 
(University of Washington Press, 1965), ix.). However, a close reading of Man and Nature reveals that Marsh was far 
from providing any definitive statement on the positive relationship between forests and rainfall. Indeed, Marsh 
presents his discussion with numerous qualifications and it is clear his aim was to collate, present, and draw 
tentative conclusions on the research of numerous continental scientists researching temperate, not tropical, 
forests. Schlich also prefaces his discussion of the topic with a warning that research to that date was mainly focused 
on continental Europe and may not necessarily be applicable to the tropical setting. Nevertheless, Hutchins utilised 
the fame and respect of these notable experts in their field to bolster his argument for the reservation of forest and 
even warned that without reservation the Protectorate would face an environmental and then agricultural disaster 
as its land turned to desert without the protection of forest. See George P. Marsh, Man and Nature; Or, Physical 
Geography as Modified by Human Action (London: Sampson Low, 1864), 182, 194; Schlich, Manual of Forestry (Vol. 
1), 32. For discussion of the influence of Marsh on forestry in South Africa and the United States, see Bennett and 
Kruger, Forestry and Water Conservation in South Africa, 2015, 150–52. 
97 These claims on the links between forests, precipitation, and soil conservation in Kenya appear to have been 
effectively unchallenged until the early 1950s, when conflict would erupt between the Forest Department and some 
European settlers (particularly those with cattle estates) over the scientific basis of the department’s claim that 
forest was the best preserver of the soil. See Chapter 3, section 3.1.3. 
98 Hutchins, 1907 Report of the Forests of Kenia. 
99 E Battiscombe, ‘Forests’, in East Africa (British). It’s History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources, by 
Somerset Playne, ed. F. Holderness Gale (London: The Foreign and Colonial Compiling and Publishing Co., 1908), 
252. 
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Barbe Baker invoked the typical paternalistic colonial attitude by stating the Kikuyu were “childlike, 
simple and impetuous. Their immediate concern was to make farms. Little did they dream of the 
value of the timber that they were destroying.”100 Observations from the 1890s of industrious 
farmers clearing away uneconomic forests were forgotten in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, replaced by a tale of environmental destruction. Confronting a crowd of several hundred 
Kikuyu in the early 1920s, St Barbe Baker declared: “A reproach hangs over your heads. The Masai 
are calling you ‘Forest Destroyers.’ I agree with the Masai - you are ‘Forest Destroyers.’”101 
  
1.2.2 Forest Destroyers? 
Considering the large body of evidence produced by official and unofficial colonial agents and the 
role this played in the justification for forestry, the issue of whether Africans and specifically the 
Protectorate’s largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, were ‘forest destroyers’ is worthy of investigation. 
Furthermore, it is a narrative repeated without critical investigation by Ofcanky’s article on forestry 
                                                                
100 Richard St. Barbe Baker, Men of the Trees: In the Mahogany Forests of Kenya and Nigeria. (London: George Allen 
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Profit and Sport in British East Africa. Being a Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged, of ‘A Colony in the Making’ 
(London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1919), 208–9.). For general discussion on the balance of nature concept and 
its rejection by current ecological thinking, see Dennis E. Jelinski, ‘There Is No Mother Nature—There Is No Balance 
of Nature: Culture, Ecology and Conservation’, Human Ecology 33, no. 2 (1 April 2005): 271–88, 
doi:10.1007/s10745-005-2435-7; Frank Egerton N., ‘Changing Concepts of the Balance of Nature’, The Quarterly 
Review of Biology 48, no. 2 (June 1973): 322–50; Richard J. Ladle and Lindsey Gillson, ‘The (Im)balance of Nature: A 
Public Perception Time-Lag?’, Public Understanding of Science 18, no. 2 (1 March 2009): 229–42, 
doi:10.1177/0963662507082893. Historical works can still be built upon the erroneous balance of nature concept, 
for example Thomas P. Ofcansky, Paradise Lost: A History of Game Preservation in East Africa (West Virginia 
University Press, 2002). 
101 Baker, Men of the Trees, 30. Baker’s book alleges that this crowd was composed of “thousands” of Kikuyu 
“warriors” who had come to attend a dance he had organized in the spirit of forest conservation. After a long speech 
in which he lambasted Kikuyu land management and extolled on the need to protect the forest he called for 
volunteers to join the Watu wa Miti (the ‘Men of the Trees’). 500 volunteers apparently stepped forward to join this 
organisation which was to plant and protect trees, from which he picked 50. See Ibid., 30–35. The Men of the Trees 
was and is a real organisation, now known as the International Tree Foundation (see 
http://internationaltreefoundation.org/ ), however, I can find no official colonial documents that confirm its 
creation by Baker in Kenya at this time (Baker does not give a precise date); no official documents discuss it. The 
alleged incident is however very revealing of the attitudes of Baker. 
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in Kenya that has thus far served as the definitive account of colonial forestry in the country.102 As 
the following will show, the events specific to Kenya that inspired this myth of forest degradation 
are far more complex than a simple case of an expanding population relentlessly destroying the 
forest.103  
Defining the extent of the forest clearance that was allegedly underway is problematic. The 
Forest Department itself attempted no such investigation, and when the Kenya Land Commission 
of 1932 made enquiries into the issue it received no clear answers. A.G. Baker, who was forest 
surveyor for the department in 1907, provided a calculation based on the statement of a single “old 
Kikuyu” that 500 square miles of forest had been cleared by Kikuyu cultivators in the 50 years prior 
to 1932.104 While not specifically referring to forest clearance, H.M. Gardner, the Conservator of 
Forests between 1928 and 1945, estimated that some 40 square miles of “forest land” were 
occupied by Africans in Kiambu and Fort Hall Districts by 1933 which were not occupied at the time 
of the Forest Department’s inception in 1902.105 The issue is further complicated by ambiguity on 
the part of the department on what precisely constituted a forest. In evidence to the Land 
Commission, Battiscombe stated that the term used by Gardner, “forest land”, referred specifically 
to “land dedicated for the production of trees and other products… by man” while “forest” would 
be defined “as land covered in tree growth and scrub.”106 The fact that Battiscombe himself 
confused the two terms in his testimony before providing his definitions suggests that the precise 
type of land Gardner, or indeed other forestry officers, referred to is unclear. Further ambiguity is 
generated by the absence of any definition of “scrub” when that term was used in discussions of 
vegetative cover. The existence of such confusion within the Forest Department itself, coupled with 
the absence of land clearance surveys, forces the accounts of forestry officers into the anecdotal and 
suggests that no definitive statement on the extent of ‘forest’ clearance can be made. 
If the term ‘scrub’ is linked to the equally nebulous and common term ‘bush’, there exists 
evidence that far from encroaching onto virgin, primeval forest, Africans in the central region were 
at least in part reclaiming agricultural land that they had lost during a period of extreme population 
decline. Waweru wa Karioki, a Local Native Council member in Kiambu, stated that “In the time of 
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Mr Hobley and Mr Hope we had a big famine and many thousands of people perished and as a result 
of the death of many people, the bush encroached upon our cultivated land.”107 The period referred 
to is the early 1890s when Hobley passed through the area, reporting that Masai raids on Kikuyu 
were increasing owing to the “anthrax scourge” (rinderpest) killing Masai cattle and so pushing 
them to raid Kikuyu cattle.108 The famine that Karioki mentions began in earnest in 1892, after a 
period of drought. Concurrently, rinderpest swept through the cattle populations of the central 
region with devastating effect. The raids that Hobley wrote about were accompanied by large scale 
movements of impoverished Masai, to whom smallpox was endemic. As the Masai sought refuge 
among Kikuyu clans, smallpox was able to reach epidemic proportions among the comparatively 
densely populated agrarian regions of the southern highlands. These catastrophes were followed 
in 1894 by a locust plague that destroyed large portions of Kikuyu crops and Masai grazing land 
alike, causing further population movements and deaths. In 1896 bronchitis spread through the 
Kikuyu peoples, causing high mortality compounded by the concurrent spread of the debilitating 
parasitic chigoe flea (jiggers). Further drought between 1897 and 1900 combined with outbreaks 
of rinderpest, bovine pleuropneumonia, locust swarms, and an additional outbreak of smallpox to 
create extreme famine conditions. The total number of deaths during this exceptionally severe 
decade is extremely difficult to calculate, with no official records and numerous seemingly 
exaggerated accounts. However, Dawson has estimated that between one tenth and one half of the 
total African population of Kenya’s central highlands died during the decade, with the Kikuyu, 
Kamba, and Masai most severely affected.109 Dawson further argues that population recovery 
among these groups did not commence until the 1920s, with rapid increases only coming in the 
1930s.110 
The socio-economic ramifications of the 1890s were immense for those living in the central 
region. Describing the people he encountered in Ngong Road Forest shortly after joining the Forest 
Department in the early 1900s, Battiscombe remarked, “they were a hybrid mixture of Masai and 
Kikuyu, the result of the old famine days when the Masai women went up to the Kikuyu country.”111 
Battiscombe did not realise the import of his observation. The movement and integration of Masai 
women into Kikuyu clans was the last resort of the Masai. With their cattle gone or dying, women 
were effectively traded for survival. John Ainsworth described the process as he saw it in the 1890s: 
Many of women and children and some of the old people belonging to the [Masai] clans near the 
Kikuyu country had, when semi-starvation came at the time of the Rinderpest, gone into the 
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Kikuyu villages for food, some to trade hides and skins, and others to beg or to steal. Many 
hundreds of these remained in Kikuyu for some time.112 
The beneficiaries of this immigration were the wealthiest of the Kikuyu, those who had enough 
land, livestock, and labour in the form of the extended clan to enable them not only to survive the 
trials of the 1890s but to profit from them. While Masai did what was necessary to maintain their 
independence, the poorest Kikuyu and Kamba became increasingly dependent on the same 
increasingly powerful elites, often giving up their land and labour in return for sustenance through 
the lean years.113 The increase in the number of trade caravans travelling through the central region 
as a result of the expansion of the British East Africa Company and the subsequent creation of the 
East Africa Protectorate exacerbated this situation. The expansion of the caravan trade during the 
1890s occurred to such an extent that Mackenzie argues it can be said to have caused the increasing 
commoditisation of African production. She further argues that there were two effects: an outflow 
of food at the precise time when that food was most needed in the famine-stricken areas of Kenya, 
and an increase in the wealth of those elites who dominated this trade which allowed them to 
consolidate and expand their holdings of livestock, land, and labour.114 
The disasters of the 1890s and the resultant population crash began the realignment of African 
communities toward the newly emerging colonial economy. This was a process that favoured those 
who were able to exploit it; that is, those individuals and clans who would become the new elite of 
chiefs and headman. The changes had significant effects on the forests of the central region. As 
Karioki stated, population decline meant large areas of cultivated land were abandoned, allowing 
secondary forest, ‘scrub’ or ‘bush’, to take their place. Importantly, such secondary forest was 
classified by the Forest Department in the same way as primary forest, that is, under the general 
term ‘forest’.  
Concurrently, the more dependable rainfall of the forests meant that famine conditions pushed 
people into those forests as a survival strategy. 115 The movement of people into the forests in the 
wake of the 1890s famines is shown in a 1908 Forest Department report on the approximate 20 km 
stretch of forest between Limuru and Kijabe, 25 km northwest of Nairobi, which stated, “natives 
came into this region after the famine of 1898.”116 After the alienation of land to settlers in the early 
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1900s, this trend intensified as “the occupation of these [settler] farms has automatically pushed 
the natives westward into the forest.”117     
Expansion into ‘forests’, at least part of which were in reality cultivated land that had turned 
to secondary forest, and the clearing of trees by Africans in the central region of Kenya in the early 
decades of the twentieth century was therefore not a consequence of population expansion but 
rather population decline. The disasters of the 1890s and early 1900s dramatically reduced the 
population of the highlands of Kenya and eroded survival capacities. Families and entire clans fled 
from their drought-stricken farms and congregated in areas where food was still being cultivated, 
selling their labour and land to survive, or establishing new farms inside the protective confines of 
the forests.118 The reorientation and growth of the elites of this region toward increased caravan 
trade and the nascent colonial economy allowed their further dominance over land, a factor 
exacerbated after European settlers began claiming land for themselves in the highlands. This land 
grabbing by elites, both African and European, pushed those without land to seek it inside forests 
or try to reclaim the farms they had fled from at the height of the crises in the 1890s. When the 
Forest Department began evicting Africans from their shambas in 1904, this attempt to reclaim land 
was recounted by John Ainsworth, Acting Deputy Commissioner: 
The natives themselves state to Mr. Hope that they are simply reoccupying land formerly used by 
them as shambas, if their contention is correct I must submit that the natives in question have a 
right to occupy the land…119    
Forest clearance by Africans in the first decades of the twentieth century was not caused by 
population expansion and the disastrous use of shifting cultivation. Rather, what was occurring was 
a convergence of local environmental factors – droughts and locust – with socio-economic and 
environmental changes that came with colonialism – the arrival and proliferation of diseases, the 
alienation of land to settlers, and the realignment of elite African agriculture to meet colonial needs 
and the subsequent increase in elite power because of this. Kikuyu were not forest destroyers but 
were certainly forest users. If scientific forestry was needed in the nascent East Africa Protectorate 
it was not because of the escalation of ‘destructive’ African farming methods, as colonial accounts 
maintain, but because of the arrival of colonialism itself. 
 
 Establishing Forestry 
Ofcansky has argued that the creation of the Forest Department in the East Africa Protectorate in 
1902 was a natural evolution from the 1897 Ukamba woods legislation.120 Such a statement 
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disguises the considerably more troubled and complex rationale for the department’s creation. The 
view of relentlessly destructive Africans was coupled with the economic importance of the forests 
in the reasoning behind establishing forestry in Kenya, while the department’s policies were 
influenced by the political and economic climate of the Protectorate.  
Sir Charles Eliot, Commissioner for the East Africa Protectorate, stated in 1902 that the Forest 
Department was created because of “the value of the East African forests and the obvious danger to 
which they are subjected from fires started by natives and reckless destruction for obtaining 
fuel….”121 However, while Eliot argued for the necessity in creating a forest department to prevent 
large-scale deforestation, he further believed that the goal “to insure an adequate fuel supply for 
the railway” was equally important, and that where forest reserves were established “they should 
interfere with colonisation as little as possible.”122 Eliot conceived the value of the forests in terms 
of their usefulness to the colony, supplying the railway with fuel and supporting colonisation. The 
1905 Handbook for East Africa, Uganda and Zanzibar displayed a similar view, considering forestry 
only in terms of the export of coast mangrove timber, an already established trade, and that rather 
than developing a large timber export sector, as in India, the future of the East African economy 
rested with agriculture and industry.123 
The Protectorate’s first governor, Sir James Hayes Sadler, saw the role of the forests as 
supporting agricultural development stating that, “the Forests play a very important part in the 
economic conditions of the country by maintaining the regular supply of water to the rivers.”124 
Under Sadler’s successor, Sir Percy Girouard, this view intensified to one in which the only role of 
the forests was to support agriculture. A firm believer in establishing the Protectorate as a white 
colony, Girouard was intent on abolishing what he saw as “a very much overloaded and expensive 
[Forest] Department”, although was stopped from doing so by the Earl of Crewe, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies.125 For Girouard, the utility of forestry lay in its ability to aid European settler 
agriculture, both in terms of protecting water supplies but also providing a cheap timber resource 
to settlers. This opinion was not novel or confined to official circles. In a 1903 Royal Geographical 
Society debate on the subject of colonisation, Richard Crawshay, who had resided in Kikuyu country 
for three years, gave his opinion that the abundance of timber there was one of the three great 
advantages that the territory had over South Africa for European settlement.126 The paramountcy 
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Figure 1-2. Crown Forest, c.1924-1925. Sources: Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa; L. 
Carpenter (Statistical Officer, Department of Agriculture), ‘The Colony and Protectorate of Kenya’ (London: 
Stanford’s Geographical Establishment, 1925), Map.1.8.46, NLS. 
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of European interests meant that the Forest Department, according to Girouard, should confine its 
activities to preservation. Furious at the department’s growth, he confidentially stated in 1909: 
Instead of a policy of holding on to what we have, there is substituted one of most elaborate 
survey, afforestation, nurseries of fifty or sixty acres, and an equipment and staff which no pioneer 
country could possibly maintain if it was governing itself. … and in this view I have the support 
not only of the Executive, but of everyone of importance, official or unofficial, I have consulted up 
to now.127 
Such a statement speaks of a deep rift in knowledge between foresters, administrators, and if 
Girouard was correct, the unofficial community of the Protectorate. Kenya’s Forest Department 
followed the approach as set by Schlich: it had the objectives of sustainable utilisation of forest 
products and, in some cases, protection of forests for climatic reasons.128 But for Girouard, who 
could not “pretend to be a forest expert”, forestry should have started and ended with the 
protection of the existing forests of Kenya and certainly should not have sought to expand those 
forests or create new ones and so take away potential agricultural land.129 Forestry was seen as a 
means of supporting the specific colonial project of white settlement and maintaining the vital 
communication artery of the railway. 
 
1.3.1 The Railway 
The Uganda railway was at the heart of Britain’s colonial project in East Africa. Winding its way 
from coastal Mombasa to the shores of Lake Victoria, and eventually on into Uganda, the initial 
purpose of this costly endeavour was to access the supposed riches of Uganda but it rapidly became 
the means by which the colonial economy and security of the East Africa Protectorate was 
maintained. The central highlands of Kenya were identified by explorers and administrators as 
ideal for white settlement and agriculture.130 The location of these highlands, 400 km from the 
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vegetables as thrive only in the extreme heat of the low enervating coast.” (O’Callaghan et al., ‘Colonization and 
Irrigation in the East Africa Protectorate’.) 
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coast, coupled with the importance of developing the colonial economy in Uganda, made the railway 
essential to colonial development; it was the only means of accessing this region.  
Keeping the railway running was therefore of considerable importance to the success of the 
Protectorate. In 1901 the railway spent more on fuel than it did running its entire Locomotion and 
Carriage Department in 1905-06. This excessive cost, Rs. 849,962, resulted from the use of coal 
rather than wood and prompted new emphasis to be placed on woodfuel.131 Consequently, the cost 
of fuel for the railway in 1902-03 fell to Rs. 488,975, due to wood comprising the majority of the 
fuel consumed.132 If the railway was to be economically viable it was clear that it must rely on local 
woodfuel not imported coal. It is within this context that the Forest Department was begun in 1902. 
Indeed the official history of the department claims that it was the needs of the railway that led to 
the creation of the “first up-country forest reservation and to the first plantations of eucalypts for 
fuel.”133 After touring East Africa in 1907, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Winston 
Churchill emphasised the importance of the railway and the place of forestry within this: 
It is of vital importance that these forests should not be laid waste by reckless and improvident 
hands. It is not less important that the Uganda Railway should have cheap fuel. … now that an 
elaborate Forestry Department has been established on the most scientific lines, there is a danger 
that forestry will be the only object, and the cost of fuel so raised by regulations, admirable in 
themselves, that the economy of the Uganda Railway may be impaired. And let us never forget 
that the Uganda Railway is the driving-wheel of the whole concern. What is needed here, as 
elsewhere, is a harmonious compromise between opposite and conflicting interests. That is all.134 
His message was clear: forestry should exist to serve the railway. Churchill’s concerns were linked 
to fuel shortages that the railway had experienced since 1903. An attempt to forestall fuel shortage 
for this most vital transportation link was begun as early as 1897, when one mile either side of the 
growing railway was proclaimed a railway zone with the dual purpose of ensuring a steady fuel 
supply and providing a land asset for the railway which could be sold at a later date.135 Despite 
these measures, the railway suffered woodfuel shortages that meant it routinely imported coal in 
the first decade of its operation.  
In 1902-03 the railway consumed 34,469 tons of woodfuel, all extracted from the railway 
forest zone, but by 1904-05 this had fallen to 14,658 tons; indeed, woodfuel consumption would 
                                                                
131 C Sandiford, East Africa Protectorate Administration Reports, 1905-06, Railway (Uganda Railway Press, Nairobi, 
1906), 38. 
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134 Winston Spencer Churchill, My African Journey (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908), 78–79. 
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Final Report of the Uganda Railway Committee’, 1904, 13–14, [Cd. 2164]; The Ukamba Woods and Forests 
Regulations, No. 14 of 1901, 1901.  
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only start to reach 1902 levels again after 1908.136 The fall was an issue of supply rather than 
reduction in railway activity, with the fuel shortfall compensated by importing coal. This shortfall 
in woodfuel appears to have been caused by labour shortage. Woodfuel extraction was remarkably 
inefficient; without automation labour gangs of up to 900 people were required to work long, 
arduous hours of cutting before carrying their fuel potentially several miles to a collection point.137 
Concurrent to the fuel shortages were complaints from settlers regarding the difficulty in getting 
large numbers of African workers; it seems likely, therefore, that the nature of woodfuel extraction 
provided few incentives for Africans.138  
It was because of this situation that Churchill made his statement in 1908 on the importance 
of forestry not interfering with the running of the railway. Subsequently, in 1909, Hutchins 
published his report outlining the closer cooperation of the Forest Department and Uganda 
Railway. Prior to this cooperation, the Railway’s fuel contractors had apparently felled 
indiscriminately. The Forest Department predicted this would result in the railway fuel zone being 
fully depleted by 1917. Several plantation sites with the express purpose of supplying the railway 
with fuel were subsequently created. The tree of choice for these sites was the eucalyptus, a darling 
of forestry whose fast growth and ecological adaptability made it the ideal choice for fuel supply.139 
Eucalyptus would go on to be a major plantation tree throughout the colonial period and beyond, 
marking this early need for a reliable railway fuel supply as a defining point in the development of 
forestry in Kenya.  
 
1.3.2 German East Africa 
Regional competition with Germany also influenced the formation of the Forest Department in 
Kenya, as it of course did with the overall development of British East Africa. This factor was also 
intrinsically linked with the importance of the railway, as securing the British East Africa 
Protectorate was part of the wider issue of power and security across eastern, central, and northern 
Africa. Sir Edward Grigg, the governor of Kenya Colony from 1925 to 1930, argued: 
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The Uganda Railway was built through that country [Kenya] without any thought of the 
Highlands, and simply as the easiest road to Uganda, where we went to secure our safe position 
in the Congo Basin, and to make safe for ever for the Sudan and Egypt the sources of the Nile.140 
With regards to forestry and scientific development, from its inception British East Africa lagged 
behind German East Africa. The situation existed across most areas of administrative and economic 
development. By 1904 there were 280 administrative personnel across all departments in German 
East Africa, compared to 135 in the British Protectorate.141 The result of greater German 
investment, both material and human, in its colony was that “Elaborate accounts have been 
published of the resources of German East Africa, of its fauna, flora, and mineralogy; no effort has 
been spared to cultivate the natural products of the country and to introduce whatever plants or 
animals seem likely to thrive.”142 In conducting such research, “they have created for themselves a 
commercial position in this part of the world which threatens to undermine our trade.”143 Scientific 
research, specifically into the potential resources of a country, was linked directly with the ability 
to develop that country’s economy.  
German East Africa also led in research and experimentation in rubber tree cultivation in 
eastern Africa, a situation which particularly caught the attention of administrators in British East 
Africa.144 With the young British Protectorate struggling to identify a core export product, attention 
was turned to numerous candidates not the least of which was rubber. Forestry was identified as a 
way to establish British East African exports and compete with the apparently rapidly advancing 
German colony. A 1901 report, a year before the Forest Department was formed, thus urged: 
The first necessity is to appoint a rudimentary Woods and Forests Department, which would 
examine the resources of the country and offer advice on such questions as the best means of 
preserving rubber and mangrove trees, and the probabilities of success in cultivating coffee, tea, 
tobacco, and vanilla.145          
Coffee, tea, tobacco, and vanilla would clearly fall outside of the remit of a forest department, yet 
the preservation of wild rubber and mangrove became a goal of the Forest Department. Although 
by the 1910s the department did little more than issue wild rubber tapping licences and the boom 
was very much over for the Protectorate by 1914, it initially was involved in the development of 
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this crop.146 It is notable that of the Forest Department’s skeleton staff of a single conservator and 
three European assistants in 1902 one of these was L.H. Seaford. An American with no education or 
experience in forestry, indeed most of his career had been spent in a dental company, what Seaford 
did possess was two years’ experience in the rubber trade.147 Experience in farming seems to have 
prompted the department to employ T.O. Morgan in 1907, who also had no forestry education. 
Morgan came to Kenya to farm before taking up a position planting rubber trees for the 
department.148 Although no details of the recruitment processes for these officers exist, it seems 
probable that it was their experience outside forestry which made them suitable for employment, 
reinforcing the idea that the Forest Department was indeed conceived as a vital component of 
developing an economy that was being outpaced by its southern neighbour. 
 
1.3.3 Forestry to what end? 
It can be argued that a forest department was established in the East Africa Protectorate simply 
because forestry had become one of the many essential strings that now comprised the bow of 
British imperialism.149 However, this argument obscures the nuances that shaped the precise 
establishment and operation of forestry in Kenya. Economic considerations clearly paid a 
significant role in supporting the case for Kenyan forestry, beginning in the 1890s with the potential 
that was perceived to exist within the forests of the territory, which drove the early legislative 
moves to protect the forests. The economic argument was given added urgency by the 
environmental argument: Africans were perceived (incorrectly) to be destroying the forest. 
Government control to ‘save’ the forests was thus cast as necessary and legitimate. The view that 
Kenya possessed forests ripe for exploitation and profit was particularly taken up by investors. In 
1907, for example, a proposal was made for the exploitation of the forests of Mount Kenya by Lord 
Winchester, Lord Warwick, Lord Brooke, and Lord Dudley. In this, specific and repeated reference 
is made to similarities with certain very profitable forests in India, where forestry was established 
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to an advanced degree.150 Their view was clear: if money was being made out of lumber in India 
then why not Kenya? 
The opinion taken in the nascent colonial government of British East Africa was more complex. 
The Protectorate was indeed searching for valuable export commodities, yet official documents 
produced outside of the Forest Department reveal that Kenya’s forests were not seen as having 
great productive potential. Instead, forestry was envisaged as a device in supporting the twin pillars 
of colonialism in Kenya: white settlement and the railway. The forests were essential not for the 
export potential of their timber, but as fuel, building materials, and for their protection of 
watersheds: all to allow settlement. Wider economic and security concerns, locally expressed as 
competition with the rapidly advancing German East Africa, reinforced and explain this attitude.151 
To the early commissioners and governors of the East Africa Protectorate, forestry was there to 
support development but not evolve along lines that interfered with this development. As hinted at 
by comments from Girouard reproduced above, and explored in more detail below, clashes in vision 
were all too common within the context of this framework.  
 
 Replacing African Forestry 
Having established itself within the colonial apparatus of development, it was essential for the 
Forestry Department to assert its position of dominance over the Africans it saw as threatening 
forestry and in turn the entire process of development. The demonization of African farming 
methods and tree uses, such as rubber tree exploitation, typified the view adopted by the Forest 
Department in this period. The view softened toward those, predominantly Kikuyu, who were 
employed by the Forest Department in its shamba agroforestry scheme after 1910, yet it persisted 
for the majority of Africans living in the main forest zones in the highlands and coastal hinterland.152  
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If the hydraulic effects of forests on African agriculture, hugely significant as they are, are set 
aside it can be seen that the Forest Department had little concern for the role of forests or forestry 
in the lives of Africans. The simplistic view of Kikuyu peoples as forest destroyers completely 
ignored the multiple roles that the flora of the forests had in their lives. In research done by Leakey 
in the interwar years, an extensive list of hundreds of forest products used by Kikuyu is revealed, 
covering numerous tree species whose timber had specialised uses based on its properties, for 
example only Polyscias kikuyuenis (muthai) or Trichilia roka (mururi) were used to make beehives, 
while dozens of other plants had medicinal uses.153 Sacred groves played important roles in Kikuyu 
religion, being conduits through which the spirits of ancestors could be contacted or offerings made 
to Ngai, the supreme being.154 Furthermore, Kikuyu practised both forestry and agroforestry 
techniques. The value placed on timber trees for hut building meant that the Kikuyu left patches of 
forest during land clearances “ranging in size from a few acres to many square miles, which were 
set aside deliberately for timber cutting only. The trees in these areas could not be felled to make 
room for cultivation.”155 These were, effectively, forest reserves. Moreover, Castro argues that such 
practices were common across central Kenya.156 Indigenous agroforestry practices, the planting or 
retention of trees in close proximity to crops, also existed before the arrival of colonialism and 
remain, in modified forms, today.  Cordia abyssinica, for example, is and was interplanted with 
maize and other crops for its shade-giving and mulch value.157 However, Castro’s extensive 
research indicates that Kikuyu did not plant large numbers of trees in groups, for example to 
reforest farmland, akin to the plantations that would be established under colonial rule.158 
Ultimately, Kikuyu forestry was designed to meet local economic and cultural needs.   
The Forest Department was aware of the indigenous uses of at least some trees in the 
Protectorate, as shown by botanical listings that include local names and occasionally uses for 
plants.159 It was also aware of Kikuyu forestry practices, to the extent that it modified indigenous 
forest reserves into government forest reserves. In evidence given by an elder from Kiambu during 
the Kenya Land Commission in 1932 it is clear that there was an established Kikuyu system of forest 
guards and forest reserves that was effectively take over by the Forest Department: 
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In the past there were places where there was forest where I myself took my young warriors and 
told them to protect this piece of forest from being cut down, so that we might retain building 
material. The Forest Department came and took that land and put in their own guards, sending 
away my own people who were in charge preventing the forest from being cut down. And now I 
dare not cut a leaf or graze my cattle because I am not allowed, and it was mine. Why should there 
not be equality? Why should you come in and take a piece of forest which I set aside as reserve 
forest?160 
Indigenous forestry institutions were swept away, curtailing African rights of access, and replaced 
with their colonial counterparts: 
In the years 1903 and 1904 the Kikuyu chiefs and elders had their own forest guards to protect 
the forest. After that year, Mr. John Ainsworth and his officers told the chiefs and elders to remove 
their forest guards, because they were not protecting the forest well, and instead they said that 
they were going to replace their own askaris, with a special uniform, who would protect the forest 
better than those.161 
The African-controlled system of forest guards was replaced by a system of uniformed Forest 
Department-controlled guards. By the Chief Conservator of Forests own admission, however, the 
forest guards employed by the department were far from effective in this period, and indeed seem 
to have been only barely under the control of the department. Carrying firearms provided by the 
Forest Department but not authorised by the government, some forest guards engaged in criminal 
activities resulting in the official statement in 1910 that “cases of extortion and rape are not 
infrequent” while they “fired shots and otherwise exceeded their duties.”162 
There are few extant records regarding these forest guards before the 1920s, when the 
department began to regularly publish its annual reports and maintain more thorough archives of 
its activities; however in 1910 the department employed 100 guards across the Protectorate, 
although predominantly in the central highland region.163 The majority of these guards came from 
two sources: either retirees from the King’s African Rifles (KAR) or the “Wanderobo” (Ogiek 
peoples).164 The extensive forest knowledge that Ogiek peoples possessed made them ideal 
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employees of the Forest Department, however they were considered “little reliable” and therefore 
it seems safe to assume employed on a lesser scale in contrast to the “thoroughly disciplined” 
recruits from the KAR.165  
Quite in what way the ex-soldier forest guards were disciplined is unclear; while they may 
have consistently obeyed the orders of their European forestry overseers, it is quite possible they 
had no respect for the rights of the Africans they policed. At this point, in approximately 1910, the 
vast majority of the forest guards coming from the army would not have been local to the area in 
which they were posted by the Forest Department. Prior to 1912 the only large contingent of local 
East African soldiers in the KAR came from the Masai, although their regiment was disbanded in 
1907, being deemed “idle rich” and unsuitable to military life. Instead, the KAR recruited either 
from the coastal Swahili caravan trading community or from Egypt, the Sudan, Belgian Congo, 
Ethiopia, and Somaliland. Often press-ganged from famine-stricken villages or the slums of cities 
like Cairo, the majority were Muslim and semi-pastoralists deemed to have martial qualities.166 The 
colonial view was that “it is clearly of advantage to have in the Protectorate a force recruited in 
other parts of Africa which is not likely to be affected by local sympathies in case of trouble 
making.”167 The same attitude clearly existed within the Forest Department. The recruitment of 
forest guards from two sources, Ogiek hunter-gatherers and KAR, isolated them culturally, 
politically, and economically from the (at this point predominantly Kikuyu) people they policed in 
the forests. Just as Parsons argues that Kikuyu peoples were deliberately not recruited into the KAR 
because their land losses to the Europeans made them “politically unreliable”, so too was it 
unofficial Forest Department policy to prohibit Kikuyu from policing Kikuyu.168 Instead, forest 
guards were employed who were essentially outsiders and were not invested, culturally or 
economically, in the forests they governed, thus reinforcing their sole allegiance to the department. 
No doubt intended to make the forest guards impartial in matters of forest policing, the effect of the 
policy was to create a force so corrupted by the powers bestowed on it that it was deemed, in the 
restrained language of Edwardian colonial reports, a “very unreliable, undisciplined force” that 
violated colonials laws to the extent that a police investigation was launched into it in 1910.169  
Reform and formalisation of the forest guards were clearly needed, and the Forest Department 
began to do this with The Forest Amendment Ordinance, 1915, the sole purpose of which was to 
regulate the forest guard force. This laid out 12 points on which a forest guard would face 
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disciplinary measures.170 It highlighted those areas the department had trouble with in the past but 
also its desire to create an effective and efficient force. Forest guards were given wide-ranging 
powers, a necessity if they were to police the forests with minimal supervision from the 
overstretched white senior members of the department. Guards thus had the power of arrest 
without warrant in any case where they suspected a forest offence had taken place (typically the 
taking of forest produce without permission) and the power to decide what a “satisfactory” reason 
was for possessing forest produce.171 It was within these powers that scope for corruption existed. 
In particular, if any person was found with forest produce and could provide the forest guard with 
sufficient reason for this then no offence would be recorded, thus the opportunity for the bribing of 
forest guards in lieu of a reason existed.  
Offences by forest guards continued after the 1915 act. After the department began to get rid 
of several “old hands” among the guards in the interests of efficiency in 1921, it still was forced to 
dismiss three guards after they were convicted of unnamed offences.172 While in 1924 four guards 
were dismissed for “criminal breach of trust” and ten dismissed for incompetence; combined, those 
dismissed in 1924 represented 13 per cent of the entire forest guard force.173 The situation 
deteriorated further in 1925. As well as four guards being convicted of criminal breach of trust, one 
was convicted of murder, and a “Probationary Guard deserted, stole a police rifle and ran amok, 
committing two murders.”174 The sense of relief is almost palpable when the department reported 
only two forest guard convictions in the following year and that the force had “perhaps somewhat 
increased in reliability owing to more rigid selection and closer supervision.”175  
Ultimately the problems of the forest guard force appear to have stemmed from the poor 
selection process. Unwilling to trust local Africans, even those with experience in their own 
indigenous forestry systems, the department chose ex-soldiers and ex-police. A significant minority 
of these were ill-suited to the responsibilities and absence of close supervision that employment by 
the department required, not to mention their lack of interest in forestry work. The department 
itself was extremely frustrated by its guards. It had hoped that within the guards might be found a 
pool of willing and able future forest rangers/assistant foresters (the highest positions Africans 
could hold within the department) but this was not so. The guards, the department reported, lacked 
                                                                
170 These points were: Absence without leave, failure to report a forest offence, aiding or abetting a forest offence, 
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171 An Ordinance to Amend the Forest Ordinance, 1911, for the Purposes of Making Provision for the Enlistment and 
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172 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest Department, 1921 (Nairobi Government Printer, 1921), 1. 
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173 Kenya Forest Department, Abridged Annual Report of the Forest Department, 1924 (Nairobi Government Printer, 
1924), 1. 
174 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest Department, 1925 (East African Standard Ltd., 1925), 2–3. 
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ambition, initiative, ability to learn, and were mostly illiterate, making them poor choices for the 
job of assistant forester.176       
              
1.4.1 Alien Forestry 
The creation of the forest guard force was symptomatic of the attitude the Forest Department took 
toward the indigenous inhabitants of the Protectorate in this period. Kikuyu forestry and 
agroforestry practices, complete with their own system of forest reserves and forest guards, were 
swept away rather than built on. Local Africans were to have no say in the governance of the forests 
and their forest knowledge was ignored except in those cases, such as Ogiek recruitment into the 
forest guards, where it could be appropriated into the new forest governance regime. The 
department made no attempt to use forestry to the advantage of the inhabitants of the Protectorate, 
for example by cultivating trees with established African uses, aside from maintaining forest 
reserves that protected the water catchment on which agriculture, African and settler, relied. In 
erasing pre-existing forestry practices, specifically those of indigenous forest reserves and forest 
guards, and demonising African agriculture as destructive to forests, the Forest Department 
established itself as the sole authority and arbiter of how the forests of the Protectorate were to be 
run, taking away any claim indigenous peoples had to the ability to manage the forests themselves. 
Kenya provides a perfect example of how colonial forestry was an endeavour founded on European 
knowledge to the ignorance of indigenous knowledge; it was insular in nature, excluding or simply 
refusing to see other viable or potentially viable forest management practices. 
 
 The Struggle for Colonial Forestry 
Forestry in Kenya would face significant hurdles in the form of opposition from settlers, particularly 
from a core of especially powerful settlers, and from within the colonial government itself. While 
African protest against forest reservation existed, particularly after African elites obtained more 
political power through Local Native Councils, it had little impact on the course of government 
appropriation of forest before the 1930s.177 The development of most of the Forest Department’s 
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177 Castro has identified that Embu and South Nyeri Local Native Councils protested about forest reservation and 
the expulsion of their rights to forest products from the mid-1920s onwards. Castro, Facing Kirinyaga, 54. Individual 
cases of resistance also occurred, although few records exist that allow the tracing of these. In 1904, for example, 
C.F. Elliot, the Conservator of Forests, ordered that Kaboora, a Kikuyu farmer who had built huts and begun 
cultivating within the already reserved Karura forest near Nairobi, be evicted. ‘C.F. Elliot, Conservator of Forests to 
Sub-Commissioner, Nairobi’ 12 September 1904, DC/MKS.10a/3/1, KNA; ‘C.F. Elliot, Conservator of Forests to Sub-
Commissioner, Nairobi’ 15 November 1904, DC/MKS.10a/3/1, KNA. Further correspondence from 1904 and 1923 
indicates that African farmers who refused Forest Department orders were in some cases summarily evicted and 
had their farms grubbed up; measures which sometimes exceeded the authority of the forester who committed 
them.  ‘Sub-Commissioner to Collector, Dagoretti’ 6 April 1904, DC/MKS.10a/3/1, KNA; ‘Sub-Commissioner to C.F. 
Elliot, Conservator of Forests’ 4 November 1904, DC/MKS.10a/3/1, KNA; ‘L.R. Weeks, Acting Senior Commissioner 
to Chief Native Commissioner’ 9 October 1923, FOR/1/227, KNA. Isolated incidents did occur that could warrant 
the classification of protest. In 1909, an Ogiek was punished with one year’s hard labour for firing a poisoned arrow 
at a forest guard. It is possible this act was in retaliation to forest demarcation or the forced movement of Ogiek 
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operations in Kenya was therefore not dependent on acceptance or opposition by the Africans 
affected. Rather, achievement of the department’s goals rested with the attitude taken toward 
forestry, the Forest Department itself and those it employed, by others in government, and 
influential members of the settler community. Neither was it purely an issue of forestry being an 
expensive venture “for such a poor Colony”, although this was undoubtedly extremely important, 
since very rapidly after its creation the Forest Department would find itself in conflict with 
settlers.178 
 
1.5.1 Constraining the Budget  
Under the first Conservator of Forests, C.F. Elliot, between 1902 and 1905 the Forest Department 
had a modest expenditure of less than £4,000 per annum; representing less than 1 per cent of the 
entire expenditure of the Protectorate. The other major technical department with a focus on land, 
the Agricultural Department, also had a low expenditure. Significantly, however, while the 
expenditure of the Forest Department would frequently fall below 1 per cent of total Protectorate 
spending for the period from its inception to 1921, Agricultural Department spending only fell 
below 2 per cent between 1905 and 1908.179   
The arrival of Hutchins as the newly restyled Chief Conservator of Forests in 1907 signalled a 
new interest in forestry in Kenya. Under Hutchins the department was immediately able to increase 
its expenditure by 160 per cent, indeed it spent £1,600 more than the Agricultural Department in 
1907/08; the only time within the period this would happen. The pattern of increased expenditure 
was allowed to continue for a further two years until it drew the considerable ire of Girouard. The 
intervention of the new governor would see the expenditure of the Agricultural Department allow 
to rise 20 per cent, since “it works to a large extent for the benefit of the white population of the 
highlands.”180 Conversely Girouard considered the Forest Department an unnecessary drain on the 
Protectorate, particularly because it was engaging in programmes of afforestation while Africans 
continued to cause “immense waste” of the forests through the use of fire to expand cultivation into 
the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests. For Girouard, the Forest Department existed only to 
consolidate and demarcate what forests the Protectorate already had.  
                                                                
peoples from the forests, however it is equally possible the incident was a personal attack on the forest guard, which 
have already been shown as a corrupt force. The possibility also exists that the forest guard was also Ogiek, in which 
case the attack could be unconnected to forestry work or represent an attack on a ‘traitor’. The lack of other evidence 
concerning the incident, which is a statement representing the vast majority of forest crime cases appearing in the 
official records, restricts our ability to draw conclusions from them. Overall, such incidents may have occupied the 
time and energy of forestry personnel, more so when cases were taken to court, but they did little to hold up the 
progression of actual forestry work. Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910, 8. 
178 Girouard, ‘Enclosure - Report Upon the British East Africa Protectorate’, 83. 
179 ‘East Africa Protectorate Annual Reports 1903-18’, n.d.; ‘Finance Ordinances 1908-1922’ n.d., CO 630/1 - CO 
630/4, TNA. 
180 Girouard, ‘Enclosure - Report Upon the British East Africa Protectorate’, 73. 
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The hostility displayed by the executive toward forestry would see a reduction in forest 
expenditure of nearly 50 per cent when rises in the overall expenditure of the Protectorate are 
taken into account after 1910. In the first year of the First World War, the Forest Department was 
able to spend only £11,892, less than it had at any point since 1908, while the expenditure of the 
Agricultural Department had risen to £43,923 (Figure 1-3). Forest Department expenditure barely 
rose in comparison to other major departments throughout this whole period until 1925. Based on 
this, it seems that Churchill’s recommendation to find a “harmonious compromise”181 between 
forestry and the developmental needs of the Protectorate was achieved by allowing the Forest 
Department to stagnate while most other departments grew.182 
Girouard was certainly not alone in his condemnation of forestry spending, enjoying the 
support of several powerful settlers. In relation to their effect on the practical ability of the Forest 
Department to engage in its work, none were more significant than Lord Delamere. Upon taking up 
                                                                
181 Churchill, My African Journey, 79. 
182 In 1919/20 the Forest Department reported a larger expenditure than the following respective departments: 
Pensions, Official Gazette, Treasury, the Governor’s Office, Port and Marine Department, Transport, Secretariat, 
Audit Department, Government Laboratories, Coast Land Settlement, Game Department. See Table 1.1. for average 
departmental expenditures between 1910 and 1920.    
Figure 1-3. Expenditures of the Forest Department compared to other key government departments, 1904 to 
1925. Note that expenditure on the Uganda Railway has been left off this chart because it dwarfed all other 
spending; in 1906 railway expenditure was £ 194,155 and by 1925 this had risen to £ 2,794,711. Sources: 
compiled from the Annual Reports of the East Africa Protectorate, 1903-25. 
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a seat with the Legislative Council in 1907, Delamere made it his mission to curtail the spending of 
a government he saw as rapidly expanding beyond its means: 
I have a good deal of business of my own and my only object in taking a seat on the Legislative 
Council was, above all, to try and bring down the expenditure to meet the revenue. My Sincere 
conviction is that this can be done in the very near future only in one way, and that is by arbitrarily 
cutting down or rather keeping down the expenditure on the non-productive departments to 
their present figure.183 
His actions corroborate his rhetoric. Minutes of the Legislative Council debates of November 1907 
on the 1908 Appropriation Bill show that it was Delamere who moved to reduce the proposed 
budget for the Forest Department by 22 per cent to £16,275, a far larger reduction than was 
proposed for any other department on the bill.184 Delamere was supported in this by all members 
of the Legislative Council with the notable exception of the General Manager of the Uganda Railway. 
The suggestion is that only the railway saw the importance of the Forest Department; this debate 
notably occurred during the period of cooperation between the Forest Department and Uganda 
Railway that would lead to Hutchins’ policies on plantation establishment for the express purpose 
of supplying the railway.185 However, this concern was not enough to restrain Delamere and the 
other non-official members of the Council. Governor Sadler was known for his indecisiveness over 
whether to fully support white settlement, and was therefore extremely unpopular with the 
settlers.186 In 1906, when Sadler was a Provincial Commissioner, he had supported proposals for 
large logging concessions on Mount Kenya and it is possible his later support for the reduction of 
the Forest Department budget represented a belief that the forests should be exploited rapidly and 
did not warrant a large Forest Department.187 Equally, it may be that Sadler was attempting to ease 
tensions with the settlers by appeasing Delamere on an issue that would affect the government only 
slightly. 
The period from 1902 through to the early 1920s was one of great financial constraint for the 
Forest Department. Although this was a period when the budgets of many other branches of 
government saw sporadic cuts it is clear that throughout its second decade of existence, the 
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Kenya, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1935), 211. 
184 East Africa Protectorate Minutes of Legislative Council 1907-1909 (Nairobi, 7 November 1907), 110–14, CO 
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185 Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa, 48. 
186 Bennett, Kenya, a Political History, 1:26; Robert G. Gregory, India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations 
within the British Empire, 1890-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 86. 
187 Castro, Facing Kirinyaga, 41. 
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department’s expenditure can at best be described as modest in comparison to the other main items 
of government expenditure (Table 1-1). The expenditure of the department confirms that forestry 
was a low priority for the government. Hutchins and his optimistic 1907 and 1909 reports on the 
forests of Mount Kenya and the Protectorate as a whole, respectively, were successful in loosening 
government purse strings to a limited extent, but growth in expenditure was largely forestalled in 
this period. 
 
1.5.2 Settlers in the Forest 
Lord Delamere had stated that he desired to reduce government spending on “unproductive” 
departments and that such actions were therefore arbitrary. However, the particular interest that 
Delamere and other settlers had in the forests indicate that this was far from arbitrary. Settler 
reaction against state forestry in the East Africa Protectorate was a significant dimension of the 
general grievance the settler community had against alleged overzealous government interference 
in the operation and economic development of the Protectorate. 
Branch of government 
Average annual 
expenditure, 
1910-1920 in £ 
Railway Department  446,218 
Provincial Administration 135,204 
Public Works Department 121,416 
Military 107,525 
Police 57,984 
Post Office and Telegraphs 57,837 
Medical Departments 49,375 
Agricultural Department 41,415 
Survey Department 28,122 
Prisons 18,984 
Legal Departments 18,620 
Customs Department 17,055 
Forest Department 13,067 
Hospitals and Dispensaries 12,845 
Land Department 11,930 
Education 10,409 
Treasury 10,056 
His Excellency the Governor 7,823 
Port and Marine Department 7,731 
Official Gazette and Printing 6,720 
Secretariat 6,501 
Audit Department 4,330 
Transport 4,319 
Government Laboratories 4,316 
Game Department 3,973 
Mineral Survey Department 1,000 
Table 1-1. Average annual expenditure of branches of government between 1910 
and 1920. Source: compiled from the Annual Reports of the East Africa 
Protectorate, 1910-18, and Finance Ordinances, 1908-1922. 
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The most extreme settler view of the colonial government of Kenya was summarised by 
Elspeth Huxley: 
Before the Russian revolution the British colonial system as exemplified in East Africa probably 
represented the most advanced form of state ownership and control in the world. The state was 
supreme and its servants, like the Communist party, were absolute dictators of the country’s 
economic life. All actual or potential sources of wealth–land, minerals, forests, rivers, lakes–
belonged to the state. 188  
The role of the state was at the heart of settler grievances in Kenya. As Kennedy has argued, with 
little mineral wealth, land was the Protectorate’s primary attraction. If money was to be made, it 
would come from farming.189 Settler control and exploitation of land and labour were therefore 
essential for their economic survival, and, as Good has argued, this was largely achieved by the 
1920s.190 Observing this situation in 1930, Evelyn Waugh characterised it as a virtual recreation of 
a traditional England lost to industrialisation and the wealth of the middle classes: white, gentrified, 
and almost feudal in its relationship with labour.191 Within this context it is clear why as a bastion 
of state not private land control, the Forest Department would be a particular cause of settler 
discontent. By the time of the Forest Department’s creation, state custodianship of forests had 
formed the heart of the scientific forestry creed; while private enterprise was seen as a necessity in 
forest exploitation, it had to be kept on a short leash or else the forests of the colonies ran the risk 
of becoming dominated by the private landlord, just as they were in Britain.192  
This principle of the state control of forests was expounded on by Robert Scott Troup, head of 
Oxford’s School of Forestry, in his Forestry and State Control, in which he stated, “where the welfare 
of the general community is affected, restrictions should be placed on the rights of the few.”193 
These restrictions were necessary because “continuity of action extending over a long period of time 
is an essential condition for successful forestry.”194 This was a consequence of the long maturation 
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periods that forest products, and for scientific forestry this meant timber, required in comparison 
to the crops sowed by farmers. Hutchins summarised the situation as he saw it in Kenya: “To 
cultivate the soil however requires patience, skill, and hard work. To obtain a forest concession and 
float a company is an easy road to fortune!”195 Even the wealthiest settlers, epitomised by Delamere, 
went through a long initial period of agricultural trials before they managed to turn their farms into 
success and profit, and the majority of settlers continually struggled to farm successfully.196 The 
cost of Delamere’s experiments in livestock breeding and crops, particularly repeated failed wheat 
harvests, meant he had to re-mortgage his estate in England before he finally found success with 
cattle.197 As Hutchins’ identified, the forests must have constituted an irresistible lure for the 
settlers. Forests could be rapidly converted into timber and the product sold on a local market that 
was demanding large quantities of timber; by contrast, agriculture and livestock had to be adapted 
for local conditions.198   
                                                                
195 Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa, 63. Hutchins is most likely making reference to the 
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development. Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910; Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest 
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Very soon after the creation of the Forest Department in Kenya it found itself facing the 
conversion of forest to private property, reinforcing its defensive posture. After wooing the support 
of Sir Charles Eliot, the Protectorate’s High Commissioner, in 1904 and 1905 E.S. Grogan and F.R. 
Lingham secured a large concession of 128,000 acres of Mau and Lembus forest near Eldama 
Ravine, some 180km west of Mount Kenya (the concession additionally included 80 acres of 
extremely lucrative harbour space in Mombasa).199 Grogan would become president of the 
Colonists’ Association and chair of the Convention of Associations that sought to unite the settler 
community into an effective force against government. He was also certainly not afraid of testing 
the authority of the government, as he did when he asserted what he believed to be his rights by 
illegally flogging two Africans in front of the Court House in Nairobi in 1907.200 His business partner, 
F.R. Lingham, was a Canadian with considerable expertise in the Canadian and South African timber 
industry.201  
Lingham and Grogan had secured the single largest alienation of government forest in the 
colonial period, although their neglect of it allowed the Colonial Office (after it took over 
administration of the Protectorate in 1905) to renegotiate its extent in 1908 to 94,944 acres, 
desperate as it was to claw back at least part of this huge concession. So alarming was the situation 
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 State Ownership Other Ownership  
 
Dedicated 
to timber 
production 
Other forest Total 
Corporate 
bodies 
Private 
individuals 
Total 
Square 
miles 
2,200 2,800 5,000 O 100 5,100 
Percentage 
of total 
forest area 
43.14 54.90 98.04 - 1.96 100 
 
Table 1-2. Estimated forest area by ownership type, 1920. The Forest Department had no accurate data on the size 
of the Protectorate’s forest area nor on the amount of forest in private hands. Estimates were done in 1920 by the 
department. The Lingham and Grogan concession is included in State forest dedicated to timber ownership. 
Source: The Forests and Timber Resources of British East Africa (London, Waterlow and Sons Ltd., 1920), 10. 
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to the colonial authorities that the case would eventually lead to several lawsuits.202 At no stage of 
this negotiation were the concerns of the Forest Department adequately considered and Grogan 
secured terms that allowed extremely low royalties to be paid to the department on timber 
harvested. The terms were so favourable to Grogan that the department was obliged to spend more 
money administering the concession than it received in return as royalties.203 As the Commissioner 
of Lands for the East Africa Protectorate lamented concerning the original lease: “In those days land 
grants were not very carefully scrutinised.”204 Lord Cranworth, who himself attempted to secure a 
lease on part of the Mount Kenya forests, summarised the concern in the Colonial Office at this 
concession when he stated, “no stone has been left unturned and no process of law or bluff omitted 
to re-obtain possession” in the Colonial Office’s quest to cancel the concession.205   
Lord Cranworth stated of the Lingham and Grogan Mau forest concession, “It was here that 
private enterprise won its greatest victory, when 300 square miles of forest were alienated to 
Messrs. Lingham and Grogan.”206 Lord Hindlip, who was engaged in sawmilling operations in 
Kenya, shared the attitude toward the government, stating that in the first years of the Protectorate 
the government was one which believed “that every one should be kept in abject subjection, and 
not be allowed to call anything his or her own.”207 In securing their lease, Lingham and Grogan were 
seen by other settlers as keeping land from “the talons of the government”.208 Fully aware of the 
Forest Department attitude to private ownership, the government was seen by Cranworth to 
“hoard” and “waste” valuable forest land out of “fear lest private individuals or companies, or, worse 
still, a speculator should make a profit, and also, no doubt, by the feeling that every year the forests 
get an enhanced value.”209 This attitude seems to have been common among the settlers, or at least 
those with means and a desire to speculate. The belief that the Forest Department was anti-
enterprise led to T.A. Wood, unofficial member of the Legislative Council, raising the issue of the 
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lack of assistance the department had given to economic development, as reported in a 1911 
session: 
He said he thought he was right in saying there was a considerable section of the population of the 
country dissatisfied with the Forest Department… [,] he had personally looked for results of the 
expenditure which had been incurred and it was rather difficult to discover anything more than 
the protection of forests which he thought could have been made a branch of the Police Service 
more economically.210  
Settler grievances were exacerbated by land and forestry regulations that restricted their ability to 
exploit and develop their land. The Crown Land Ordinance of 1902 laid out that a settler should 
never completely exhaust any supply of timber on the land, if timber exploitation had been the 
purpose of the lease.211 Rules made under this ordinance in 1903 also reflected colonial attitudes 
to re-ordering and enclosing land and animal control that were well established in Cape Colony, for 
example. Specifically, settlers were compelled to fence land that contained livestock and to mark 
boundaries.212 In contrast to Cape Colony, where enclosure represented a victory for private 
property and the literal representation of the boundaries within capitalist labour relations, within 
Kenya the attitude from the settlers to fencing was openly hostile.213 The issue for the settlers was 
one of practicality. The Forest Department apparently refused to supply fence posts to settlers, 
requiring settlers to buy imported poles.214 By 1909 the department was certainly providing poles 
free of charge, although who received these is unclear. Huxley quotes Lord Delamere as 
complaining about this issue, as it caused great expense “in a country abounding in forest”.215 In 
1905 Lord Hindlip thought the issue worthy of complaint in his book on the Protectorate, 
particularly as he saw it as exemplifying a government that was disinterested in supporting white 
settlement.216  
For the Forest Department this may have been an issue of practicality: its meagre staff had 
priorities of forest reservation and railway supply, not administering the cutting and free allocation 
of fence posts to settlers at its own expense. Yet there seems also to have been the desire to try to 
                                                                
210 T.A. Wood, East Africa Protectorate Minutes of Legislative Council 1907-1909 (Nairobi, 18 September 1911), 10, 
CO 544/2, TNA. Emphasis added. 
211 The Crown Lands Ordinance, 1902, No. 21 of 1902, 1902. 
212 ‘Rules for the Purchase of Land under the Crown Lands Ordinance 1902’, Kenya Gazette 5, no. 76 (1 January 
1903): 24–25. If the land had no forest when the lease began the settler was expected to plant 2 per cent rather than 
10 with forest. 
213 Lance van Sittert, ‘Holding the Line: The Rural Enclosure Movement in the Cape Colony, C. 1865-1910’, The 
Journal of African History 43, no. 1 (2002): 95–118; Lance van Sittert, ‘“Keeping the Enemy at Bay”: The 
Extermination of Wild Carnivora in the Cape Colony, 1889-1910’, Environmental History 3, no. 3 (July 1998): 333, 
doi:10.2307/3985183; Beinart, ‘The Night of the Jackal’. 
214 Anderson also found that settlers were reluctant to fence in their land due to the costs of doing so. Anderson, 
Eroding the Commons, 63. 
215 Huxley, White Man’s Country. Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya, 1:89. Lord Hindlip also complained that 
the Forest Department was unwilling to supply fence posts and that he and others were forced to import fence posts. 
Allsopp, British East Africa, 85. 
216 Allsopp, British East Africa, 84–89. Hindlip explicitly stated, as did Delamere, that “Tenants must be prepared to 
import their fencing, as the Government will not ordinarily supply timber from the forests for the purpose.” Ibid., 
85. 
64   The Struggle for Colonial Forestry 
instil within the settlers the need to conserve forest and not treat the Forest Department as their 
servant. The same 1903 rules also mandated that settlers maintain at least ten per cent of their land 
as forest, at his own expense.217 This was a point that again raised the ire of Delamere and Hindlip, 
yet Hutchins maintained that reality the department practical inability to police the regulations 
meant they were effectively “a dead letter up to now [1909].”218 On the issue of fencing, however, 
antagonism lingered until at least 1925, when the settler H.S. Nightingale complained of a lack 
assistance in fencing after the government refused to share the cost of fencing his livestock land in 
order to keep his and African cattle separate.219  
Lord Cranworth made light of the general attitude the department held toward settler forest 
exploitation by recounting a perhaps apocryphal interview with a prospective concessionaire:  
A somewhat unsophisticated settler applied for a little concession in the camphor belt. A fairly 
high rent was proposed, but otherwise, to his surprise and gratification, the interview went 
smoothly enough. Not until he was leaving the door did any remark occur to damp his ardour. As 
he made his exit, however, a few disconcerting words reached him: 'Of course we shouldn't let 
you cut the trees'!220  
Despite the legal and bureaucratic hindrances, forest exploitation remained an attractive 
proposition to the settlers or their representatives in the Protectorate. In addition to the 
exceptional case of Lingram and Grogan, Lord Cranworth, Lord Warwick, Lord Brooke, Lord 
Winchester, Lord Dudley, Lord Delamere, and his close friend Dr Atkinson all attempted to secure 
or were successful in securing leases on forest land for the express purpose of timber exploitation; 
a trend which accelerated after Hutchins’ optimistic 1907 report on the potential of the Mount 
Kenya forests.221 Dr Atkinson in particular was influential in being one of the first to establish a 
sawmill in the Protectorate. Letters written by Lord Delamere indicate that Atkinson’s venture was 
such a success that it directly motivated him to also begin a sawmill enterprise for clearing forest 
from his land in 1903. The reason, he explained, was that as opposed to agriculture, “the return [on 
investment] begins at once.”222 At this time Delamere was already experimenting in numerous 
agricultural areas: sheep, cattle, pigs, oranges, tobacco, oats, barley, potatoes and most particularly 
wheat. Although he eventually achieved considerable success in wheat and dairy, numerous failures 
and the cost of experimentation eventually cost him his estate in Cheshire and forced him to borrow 
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at least £80,000.223 The appeal in sawmilling thus seems to have been that it created a financial 
support to settlers with rapid revenue-generating abilities.  
The sawmilling enterprise was so popular that by 1910 nine such facilities were in operation, 
all privately owned apart from one,224 and by 1920 the number had risen to 24,225 when there were 
so many that their output of timber exceeded the demand for it.226 The Forest Department would 
later admit that it was these sawmills, almost all operating in forests leased to settlers rather than 
government forest, that were responsible for the majority of the timber produced in the country.227  
The Forest Department therefore positioned itself against a considerable group of settlers and 
speculators and the interests they held. Its greatest fear was that private enterprise would increase 
its holdings of Kenya forests; in essence, it fought to stop any more Lingrams and Grogans. The 
Forest Department became determined to maintain a tight grip over the remaining forest areas of 
the Protectorate and ensure they could only be utilised under the strict guidance of the department 
according to the tenets of scientific forestry. The attitude was evident in subsequent applications 
for concessions. When Moreton Frewen, a Canadian with experience in the timber industry there 
and the representative of Lord Warwick, sought a timber concession on the slopes of Mount Kenya 
the Conservator of Forests, Ernest Battiscombe, fought against it. Battiscombe criticised Frewen’s 
assertion that the mixed-species Mount Kenya forests were comparable to the largely single-
species forests of British Columbia that could be clear felled and vehemently opposed any idea of a 
concession that would not be worked on proper forestry principles, that is sustainable exploitation: 
Mr. Moreton Frewen objects to the forest being working on sylvicultural principles under rigid 
supervision; no concession should be made to him or any other lessee for these principles to be 
modified.228        
The Forest Department was indeed largely successful in its goal of preventing settler dominance of 
the forests in the second decade of its existence. It reported in 1920:  
Latterly, the policy of the Government of retaining ownership of the natural forests has been more 
strictly adhered to, but not without considerable criticism, and the areas alienated in recent years 
are negligible.229 
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Large forest concessions were therefore generally rejected after the Lingram and Grogan case. 
Instead, the Forest Department micromanaged the extractive process by seeking or considering 
applications for licences to fell only those trees in coupes it had marked out according to its 
principles of sustainable exploitation.230 This policy could lead to delays and licensee and 
department frustrations. J.W. Sterling’s application for a licence to fell near Londiani on behalf of 
Londiani Farms Ltd., the principle shareholder of which was Lord Cranworth, was initially rejected 
in 1913. After delays caused by the First World War, this licence was, in principle, accepted by 1917. 
By 1920, however, the licensee had not commenced work. The Forest Department suspected 
Londiani Farms Ltd. of stalling to prevent other potential licensees from accessing the forest while 
it still had forest to exploit on its own land, although the wider economic slump experienced in East 
Africa must have made exploitation far less attractive than it had been seven years earlier. This 
prompted the Forest Department to threaten to put the licence out to tender again, a threat 
reiterated when it transpired that the agent to Londiani Farms Ltd., a Nairobi-based timber 
merchant, had been felling trees that had not been marked by the department within its licensed 
area. A subsequent change of agents allowed exploitation to begin proper, but the whole affair failed 
in November 1927 when Londiani Farms Ltd. liquidated.231 The case speaks of the strained 
relationship between settler and Forest Department and the lack of a clear, formal process for 
acquiring a forest exploitation lease. However, the trend of waiting for applications for forest leases, 
which typically came from consortia of well-connected or aristocratic settlers or speculators, and 
then a protracted negotiation process that often involved the highest levels of authority, notably 
the Secretary of State, was practically over by the mid-1920s. Instead, the Forest Department 
increasingly took the initiative: selecting the areas it wanted felled, putting the lease out to tender, 
and strictly enforcing its control. Although aristocratic settler-led timber operations continued, by 
1926 they were being joined by Indian-owned sawmills and their agents.232 
 
1.5.3 Surveying 
One of the most vital branches of scientific forestry, the surveying of forest, was clearly affected by 
the constraints placed on the Forest Department in this period. In 1908, six years after the 
department had been formed, no forest area had been fully surveyed and large parts of the Mau 
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forest had not even been seen by a forester; Hutchins stated that surveys should be conducted 
before any more demarcation could take place.233 By 1910 the priority in surveying and 
demarcating continued to be in those areas “exposed to destruction by natives.”234 It is indicative 
that eight years after the creation of the Forest Department it was still dealing with the issue of 
demarcating forests, often incorrectly, in its quest to stop their use by Africans.  
Even after Hutchins’ statement, forest reservation continued before surveys were conducted. 
By 1925 a further 370,000 acres had been declared Crown forest (government forest), bringing the 
total to 2,370,000 acres. Yet because of the department’s inability to survey its land, it habitually 
took a ‘fortress forestry’ approach: it reserved all forested or indeed unforested land it was able to 
and refused what it considered “specious” pleas for agricultural access to forest land.235 Indeed, 
approximately 19 per cent of the land reserved as Crown forest by 1925 was not forest at all, instead 
being grass, moorland, and rock.236  
                                                                
233 Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa, 23; Hutchins, Chief Conservator of Forests to Secretary 
30 January 1908, QB/1/204, KNA. Demarcation was a process dependent on accurate surveys. It involves the clear 
signing of the boundaries of forest reserves, typically done through the planting of exotic trees or the use of 
posts/stakes as markers, the clearing of lines within forests, or fencing. 
234 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910, 6. 
235 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1925, 4–5. The department considered requests to utilise forest land 
for agriculture as false because it considered such claims were only based on a short-term return motive and failed 
to take into account the need for forestry “to look ahead for a least 100 years”. That is, even though 734,000 acres 
of Crown forest were classified as unmerchantable forest and scrub by this point, this land was retained in 
department control because it had the potential to be converted into merchantable forest in the future (most likely 
through its shamba squatter forestry system, discussed below. Note that with having 31 per cent of Crown forest 
merchantable, Kenya was only slightly below the empire-wide average of 37 per cent merchantable forest according 
to data in Robinson, ‘Forestry in the Empire’, 12.). Interestingly, the department does not make the conservation 
argument related to rainfall in its 1925 annual report, perhaps suggesting that the land claims it was receiving were 
in areas it knew or suspected were unimportant for water catchment. Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 
1925, 4–5. The term ‘fortress forestry’ is here used in the same manner as the term ‘fortress conservation’, that is a 
protectionist model of conservation that aims to achieve its goals through the exclusion of people from, for example, 
a nature reserve. A fortress approach thus typically characterised forestry across the empire, in that colonial forest 
departments alienated forests and sought to exploit them for colonial goals (i.e. timber exploitation and 
preservation of water catchment). However, the meaning of the term in its use here is broader, in that the Forest 
Department was putting up walls to keep both Africans and white settlers out, as well as putting up what might be 
considered speculative walls: reserving any land with forestry potential in the hope of forestalling attempts to 
subvert its authority. For an example of how the colonial fortress forestry mentality has played into modern forestry 
policy see Arvind Khare et al., ‘Joint Forest Management: Policy, Practice and Prospects: India Country Study’, Policy 
That Works for Forests and People (United Kingdom), No 3 (2000), http://pubs.iied.org/pubs/7535IIED.html; Paul 
M. Guthiga, ‘Understanding Local Communities’ Perceptions of Existing Forest Management Regimes of a Kenyan 
Rainforest’, International Journal of Social Forestry 1, no. 2 (2008): 145–166.   
236 In some cases the Forest Department was willing to excise grassland from its reserves after proper surveying 
had taken place, as occurred with the removal of 7,700 acres of grassland from the East Elgon forest reserve in 1925. 
Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1925, 23. This supports the argument that the inability of the department 
to survey land pushed it into taking a more radical fortress forestry approach than it otherwise would have done. 
The approach predictably led to resentment and conflict with Africans. This became evident during the Kenya Land 
Commission hearings of 1932, when, for example, Chief M’Ngaine of the Meru highlighted that after the Meru Native 
Forest Reserve was created in Meru District in 1927, “We complain that when the Meru Native Reserve Forest 
Reserve was demarcated, much grazing land was included in the forest. We ask for adjustment to be made in such 
a way that our grazing land would be returned to us.” Evidence given by Chief M’Ngaine in Evidence and Memoranda, 
1:89. Aside from limiting and criminalising African grazing in grassland within the Meru forests, this reservation 
had the unexpected consequence of pushing elephants and other large herbivores to invade farmland, creating 
farmer-wildlife conflict, as they fled their forest habitats that were being felled for timber, see: James Mwiti Mutegi 
and Paul M. Kyalo, ‘Origins of Human-Wildlife Conflicts in Meru District’, International Journal of Academic Research 
68   The Struggle for Colonial Forestry 
The lack of surveys had a serious effect on the department’s ability to form forest working 
plans, which lay at the heart of scientific forestry operations. A working plan was, and remains 
today, a thorough plan for the management and sustainable exploitation of a precisely defined 
forest area for a set period (for example, 10 to 20 years). It required complete surveys of the forest 
resources of the area to be managed if accurate annual yields and yearly increments in timber were 
to be calculated. In 1921 Troup conducted a thorough survey of the Forest Department and the 
state of forestry in Kenya. His report concluded that, "In no branch of work is the Forest Department 
of the Colony so backward as in the preparation of forest working plans, of which none exist at 
present."237 This situation was not unique to the Protectorate of course. In neighbouring 
Tanganyika, German and subsequent British rule after the First World War apparently resulted in 
no working plans being made before the 1940s, precisely because (at least in the case of British 
rule) of the lack of survey officers.238 
An exhaustive search of the colonial archive indicates that the first, and apparently only, 
working plan created by the department before 1925 was in 1905 for Karura forest, adjacent to 
Nairobi. By the time of Troup’s visit this plan had either been concluded or had simply been 
neglected; there is no extant record of it.239 The first working plan for forests within Londiani, the 
site of two working sawmills in the 1920s, was not begun until 1949.240 In 1914 it was reported 
that all forests were being worked on the basis of a 40-year rotation, but no further information is 
available.241 Such a statement also indicates that proper working plans were not in force as a simple 
40-year rotation would hardly suit all of the diverse forest types, from coastal mangrove to montane 
evergreen, that existed within the Protectorate. The statement on 40-year rotations even 
contradicted an earlier statement on the matter. The 1909-10 department annual report, written 
by Hutchins, does maintain that ‘working plans’ existed for forests outside the railway forest zone. 
However, there is no evidence of the coverage of these plans other than 20-year rotations being 
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stipulated as the norm.242 Troup’s apparent ignorance of these in his report suggests that he felt the 
plans were not sufficiently complete to warrant the title ‘working plan’.  
Without working plans the department was handicapped in its long-term predictions of forest 
production. Concurrently, the security of the forest reserves was endangered by the inability of the 
department to precisely say where its forest reserves were and what they contained. The survey 
issue was thus of tremendous importance to the department. At the heart of the problem was the 
lack of staff able to complete the work. This resulted partly from the constraints placed on the 
department’s finances by a government intent on reigning in spending and a settler community 
eager to limit the ability of the department to further expand its holdings. Although by 1914 the 
East Africa Protectorate was actually well-staffed with survey officers, their main role was to assist 
the extensive programme of land alienation and the establishment of settler farms to take place.243 
Rather than aiding forestry, the speed in which alienation took place meant that the edges of forests 
were lost to settler farms. By 1921, this irked the department to the extent that it made the 
statement that officers of the Survey Department “were anxious to secure good boundaries on 
paper without reference to the lie of such boundaries on the land.”244  
The Forest Department did, in theory, have its own forest survey officer. In 1910 the forest 
surveyor, A.G. Baker, completed a survey of 280,176 acres of forest; all in connection with 
demarcating the boundaries between forest reserves and native reserves.245 Baker’s progress 
would not continue past that point, however, since in the same year he was transferred to the 
Survey Department.246 This transfer was the beginning of a larger reorganisation of the Forest 
Department that saw Hutchins replaced by Edward Battiscombe as Conservator of Forests in 
1911.247 Prompted by the complaints of Governor Girouard concerning the unnecessary excess of 
forestry, the reorganisation was designed to curb the ability of the Forest Department to engage in 
practices he considered wasteful, such as afforestation. Girouard was further critical of any work 
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done by the Survey Department that did not support settlement, which excluded forest 
surveying.248 The governor directed particular anger toward the inefficient and unnecessary survey 
work the Forest Department had so far conducted, indicating his alarm that in five years’ work only 
3.5 per cent of the forests had been surveyed while the effort, lacking proper demarcation, had done 
little to stop Africans encroaching onto forest reserve. The governor’s particular interest in surveys 
was connected with his greater goal: to aid settler development. His reaction may be seen as 
responding to a settler grievance that went back to at least 1905 over the issue of surveys holding 
up settlement. Lord Hindlip complained in 1905:  
The Administration is under-staffed throughout, and especially in the Survey Department and 
Land Office. Great dissatisfaction has been caused by the failure of the Administration to provide 
for a survey of the country.249 
Girouard’s response to this standing grievance was to take the matter directly into hand, using the 
Provincial Administration to encourage chiefs to clear boundaries along forests, apparently with 
rapid results.250 In particular his “personal instructions” were carried out by the Forest Department 
when it conducted a “special survey” of the boundary between the Mount Kenya forests and 
potential alienated land in 1910.251 The governor was pushing for a simpler method of demarcation 
done largely without survey. He argued in 1910: 
I fail entirely to grasp the necessity for trigonometrical and plane-table survey on an elaborate 
scale, and in defiance of ordinary survey rules, to effect a purpose which can be accomplished a 
hundred times as quickly and economically by the simpler course I have outlined.252    
Upon enquiry into why the more practical method of liaising with the Provincial Administration to 
have boundaries cleared without survey, Hutchins maintained that it was Provincial Officers who 
had been uncooperative in the matter, something that they denied completely.253 The result for the 
development of forest surveys was Girouard’s ‘recommendation’: “The first duty of Forestry 
Department to be that of making its boundaries known without elaborate surveys and of protecting 
existing forests.”254 The effect of this was sudden and dramatic. By the beginning of 1910 73,000 
acres of forest had been demarcated, just four months later this had risen to 280,176 acres.255 
Hutchins’ reaction to Girouard’s intervention into the operation of the department seems to have 
been one of submission, perhaps motivated by interest in his own survival. Continuing on the same 
tack that he was not responsible for the current state of affairs, he described the arrangements 
brought in by Girouard as “excellent” and agreed with the governor’s criticism of the high cost of 
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surveying.256 With these changes, and via the transfer of the survey officer and constraining of its 
budget, the Forest Department was effectively forced to place the development of surveys and 
working plans on hold.  
The situation remained much the same until the late 1920s. In 1920 E.H. Pickwell, a forester 
who had worked with the department since 1910, was made forest surveyor. Even with this, little 
survey work could be done. In relation to surveying in 1921, but summing up the whole period 
covered by this chapter, Battiscombe stated: 
Surveys are out of the question these days; not only are there very few surveyors but there are so 
many arrears of land surveys to be made up that any special work had to go by the board.257 
 
1.5.4 Staffing 
The issues that the Forest Department had with surveying were a reflection of its general personnel 
situation. The problem of a deficiency in staff numbers plagued the department from its inception 
until the early 1950s, but the effect of this in terms of the detriment to the establishment of forestry 
was particularly marked before 1925. 
After the appointment of C.F. Elliott, a retired forest officer from India, as Conservator of 
Forests on a three-year contract in 1902, the department expanded in 1904 to make provision for 
four assistant conservators of forest. By 1906 one of these was invalided to England, never to 
return, while another, E.B. Battiscombe became temporary conservator until Hutchins arrived from 
South Africa. Under Battiscombe’s temporary leadership the two further assistant conservators 
preceded on leave, leaving the department with a conservator and five European foresters.258 Three 
years later, Hutchins used comparisons of his own Forest Department to those in India, German 
East Africa, and Cape Colony. As shown in Table 1-3, when an enumeration is made of staff size and 
area of forest reserved it is clear that although the East Africa Protectorate’s Forest Department 
saw rapid growth under Hutchins, it was comparatively understaffed and therefore overworked.  
Forestry work in Kenya was thus time consuming and arduous. This was a position that barely 
changed through to the early 1920s, illustrated by an account by Assistant Conservator R. St Barbe 
Baker. When he conducted a safari of his territory in the early 1920s, it took him three months to 
cover the required 1,200 miles with the help of 40 porters.259 The weekly diaries of the forest officer 
stationed at Karura forest, primarily used as a source of woodfuel for Nairobi and for plantation 
experimentation, also reveal that the workload placed on foresters meant that it was typical that 
they worked every day of the week.260 This ‘thin white line’ of European officers was not unusual 
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or unique to forestry of course; European staff levels were low in proportion to the Africans they 
administered across the country.261 As argued by Berman, British dominance of Kenya was based 
on fear and the prestige of European rule, built on and supported by the threat of overwhelming, 
mechanised violence. The idea of prestige was deeply rooted in the British imperial psyche, finding 
expression in the white settlers' refusal to learn vernacular tongues and the segregation of races in 
Nairobi. It was intrinsically linked to the racist and paternal attitude of British imperialism, and the 
sense of superiority it gave colonial personnel allowed them to impose colonial law, administer 
justice, and forge links with politically ambitious Africans.262 Forestry and European forest 
personnel should very much be seen as part of this phenomenon, relying on their prestige to extend 
the power of the colonial state across vast acreages of forest. 
Despite its shortage of European staff, this was a period when the department was reluctant 
to employ Africans in positions above that of forest guard. The reason the department gave for this 
was the difficulty in finding Africans from within its forest guard force who were educated 
sufficiently to take up positions as assistant foresters, although the importance of maintaining the 
racial prestige of European officers was surely also a key factor.263 The department’s own insistence 
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Territory 
Reserved forest 
(acres) 
Conservators* Foresters⁺ 
Area per forester 
(acres) 
British East Africa 1,912,269 3 17 112,486 
German East Africa 617,500 4 15 41,167 
Cape Colony 1,208,923 20 100 12,089 
India 152,960,000 200 11,000 13,905 
* Conservators is here used to mean the administrative core of the departments, such as Chief Conservators, 
Conservators, and Assistant Conservators. 
⁺ Foresters is here used to refer to the field staff of the department, normally referred to as Foresters or 
Rangers. 
 
Table 1-3. Comparison of selected staff sizes and approximate area of governance per forester, c.1909. Nb. 
Although these data are all drawn from Hutchins, he does not make comparison of staff sizes to the area 
governed. The Protectorate’s Blue Books indicate that there was actually 15 foresters in the territory and 6 
senior staff, rising to 19 foresters and 6 senior staff in 1910. Temporary appointments could be the explanation 
for this discrepancy. Because of these issues these figures should be taken as approximately indicative of the 
workload of foresters rather than definite. Source: D.E. Hutchins, East Africa Protectorate. Report on the Forests of 
British East Africa by D. E. Hutchins. With a Map and 25 Photographs., Parliamentary Papers: Command Papers, 
Cd. 4723, LX.1, 1909, 4, 29, 61–62, 72. 
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that Africans work their way up from the bottom by first becoming forest guards or headmen from 
its squatter labour force acted as a deterrent. Those of ability, it complained in 1925, were unwilling 
to start employment in such low positions.264 This departmental policy was in part motivated by a 
general reluctance to allow Africans to pass through the type of training that European forest 
officers received. In his 1922 report on forestry in Kenya and in reference to creating a forestry 
school for Africans, Troup conveyed his view that “it is doubtful if the time has yet come for the 
establishment of such an institution.”265 The policy, then, appears to have been racially motivated 
and in line with the general neglect of African education by the colonial state in this period. 
Educational provision came entirely from mission schools before 1919; after this, Africans began 
to establish their own schools in tandem with those of the missions.266 In the case of forestry, rather 
than going through formal education, Africans had to prove their worth, their ambition, and their 
character by working their way up.  
The department only began reporting on its African assistant foresters in 1921. In that year 
seven Africans were employed as assistant foresters, with at least five of these in sole charge of 
their respective forest stations; that is, because of the severe shortage of European staff these 
African assistant foresters operated without any direct European oversight and apparently did so 
without issue, as the department does not record any cause for complaint.267 Indeed, in 1924, the 
department reported a slight reduction to six African assistant foresters but all of these were 
operating in forest stations without European supervision.268 Perhaps motivated by the ability of 
these assistant foresters, by mid-1925 the department began a “native apprentice forestry scheme”, 
which engaged three Africans as assistant foresters, second grade in 1926.269 Notably, however, the 
annual report of 1926 does not cite the success or failure of the scheme. Indeed, it barely recognised 
it all. Instead, the report considered that the main staffing deficiency of the department was in the 
area of highly trained scientific experts; positions, of course, that Africans would not be able to fill 
because they were provided with only rudimentary education and prevented from progressing to 
higher levels of the department even when, as the six assistant foresters in the 1920s show, they 
were apparently quite able and responsible enough to operate without supervision.                
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Several of the Forest Department’s staff were indeed fully trained European foresters. This 
was certainly the case with the conservator Elliott’s successors, Hutchins and Battiscombe. 
Hutchins had served as a conservator in South Africa and was educated in forestry in France and 
India, while Battiscombe received his forestry training at the University of Edinburgh, where he 
was awarded the Medal for Forestry, and in Germany.270 However, the majority of the staff under 
them appear to have lacked forestry qualifications, instead having “general” qualifications and who 
had come to East Africa to earn any living they could find.271 These were men such as L.H. Seaford, 
an American appointed as a forest ranger (forester) in 1904 whose closest experience of forestry 
was the rubber industry, and W.P. Fitzgerald who was appointed in 1906 not for his forestry skills, 
for he had none, but for his experience as a road surveyor.272 The general policy was to replace such 
officers with qualified foresters at the earliest time, which was the case with Seaford. However, 
qualifications and experience did not guarantee good service. Max Sehof, for example, had served 
in the Natal Forest Department for two years before joining the Kenya Forest Department in 
December 1907, but within a year his performance was assessed as poor and in July 1909 he left to 
become a gardener in Nairobi.273  
With a lack of available men with education in forestry, in 1909 Hutchins wrote of about those 
with the right background and character for the job. Foresters should be young, married, working 
class, and from the country as “men who have led a town life are quite unsuitable.”274 The same 
mindset that identified African ethnic groups with ‘martial’ characteristics as suitable for the role 
of forest guard also sought related qualities in its foresters. A working class outdoorsman, a man 
used to hard physical work but with the stability of family life, was preferable to a sedentary middle 
class clerk. These criteria certainly gave no guarantee that the best man for the job would be 
employed. When seeking a temporary forester in 1907, Hutchins’ complained:  
Of the four temporary foresters selected [as candidates] not one is suitable for permanent 
employment and only Greetham comes from the class of man indicated to the Secretary of State 
in my report on the organisation of the department.275 
Greetham also had “not the command of his temper”276 but was employed despite Hutchins 
considerable reservations, such was the scale of the personnel problem within the department. By 
1911, after two prospective foresters trained in Britain declined offers of employment in Kenya, for 
unknown reasons, Battiscombe began pleading to the government the very urgent need for 
“thoroughly trained” and “competent” foresters, particularly from the Forest of Dean School of 
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Forestry in England.277 Settlers could also be appointed, sometimes on a seasonal basis. No doubt 
driven by the economic slump of the early 1920s that resulted from a global depression in prices 
and subsequent decline in demand for goods from East Africa, the farmer H.C. Money sought and 
was given a post with the department in February 1921. Put on a two-week notice period, Money 
was dispensed with at the end of July of the same year after his work assisting with the nurseries 
in Karura forest during planting season was complete.278 John Adam similarly faced rapid dismissal 
after his services were no longer required, serving with the department for just six months in 1919. 
Adam’s case is indicative that the department’s immediate needs could outweigh any criteria it set 
for recruitment; Adam had served in the military, hardly unusual at the time, but he was by career 
a clerk in desperate need of employment.279 
Forest officers without forestry training could sometimes have the option of receiving this at 
the Forest of Dean School of Forestry; this was notably the case with Guy Sandbach Baker. Joining 
the department in August 1902, Baker was one of the most prominent members of the Forest 
Department in its early period. For 13 years he acted as verderer, assistant conservator, of Nyeri 
Forest Division consisting of the forests of the Aberdares and Mount Kenya, some of the most 
economically and environmentally important forests in the Protectorate. He was senior to the two 
other prominent assistant conservators who joined the department in its first wave of recruitment: 
E.B. Battiscombe, who joined in 1904, and W.B. Jackson, who joined in 1903.280 Despite this 
seniority, he would never take on the role of acting conservator of forests when the conservator 
was out of the country, as both Battiscombe and Jackson did, or ascend to the highest position of 
conservator, which Battiscombe would go on to hold between 1911 and 1925. This was a situation 
that Baker was all too aware of, and it was Battiscombe’s promotion to conservator that brought 
Baker’s grievances to a head. In 1910 Baker wrote to Chief Conservator Hutchins, threatening to 
resign if he was passed over for promotion once again. He had, he argued, served longer than 
anyone else in the department and his work had never been a cause for complaint.281 Despite not 
being promoted, Baker seems to have remained with the department, at least until 1913.282 He 
proceeded on leave in January 1911. While on leave, Baker toured forests in the United States and 
Canada, a trip that the department refused to fund.283 While this might appear to have been a move 
by Baker to increase his forestry knowledge, it is equally likely that he was investigating sawmilling, 
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a way to put his forestry knowledge to use but escape the department, as he became a partner in 
Londiani Saw Mills in 1914.284 For unknown reasons, he left the mill in 1918, and was actually able 
to rejoin the department. Finally, this “temporary appointment” ended in 1920.285  
Baker’s case highlights a significant aspect of the culture of the department: to be truly part of 
it, one had to be a fully trained forester. Baker was not. Indeed his only academic training in forestry 
came with the six months he spent at the forestry school at Parkend in the Forest of Dean, otherwise 
being educated at Owen’s College, Manchester, and the Cheshire County Agricultural College.286 He 
was, moreover, a settler. Baker had moved to the East Africa Protectorate with his parents in 1901. 
His father, F. Sandbach Baker, had served on the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and was firmly 
behind its recommendation to construct a railway through the Protectorate based on his belief that 
cotton could be grown there. It was for cotton growing that the Bakers initially took up residence 
on their 500 acres in Kenya, before becoming the first to try and succeed in raising and breeding 
dairy cattle in the Protectorate. Their success was the direct inspiration for Delamere’s move into 
the dairy business, and their farm was held up by the Colonial Office as the perfect example of 
Kenya’s future as a white man’s country. F. Sandbach Baker would claim: “We are the pioneers of 
British East Africa in the truest sense. We hold the first settler’s lease ever given out there.”287 Baker 
was thus a settler as well as being directly involved in the economic exploitation of the forests, a 
position that may have been seen by the department as putting him at odds with the interests of 
forestry that sought to remain detached from concerns of profit. It would seem that G. Sandbach 
Baker was passed over time and again because he did not, and could not, completely fit into the 
Forest Department.  
Despite Hutchins’ insistence that only people with “special forest qualifications”288 should 
remain in the department, Baker did remain; such was his apparent ability to succeed in the 
position. The typical treatment of resignations in the annual reports of the department was to 
devote one or two lines extolling the career of the outgoing officer. It is notable that no such 
statement was made of Baker despite his long career with the Forest Department, perhaps because 
of his troubled history with Battiscombe, his status as an outsider, and his brief flirtation with an 
industry that the department was trying to contain. Moreover, Baker’s case illustrates the diversity 
of settler experience and positions within the Protectorate. Settlers were a vital source of 
manpower to the department while, of course, an opposing force to the operation of forestry in the 
Protectorate. To the settlers, the department was a means of employment for sons and those whose 
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enterprises had failed, even if they were hardly qualified for forestry work. The setters did indeed 
meet some aspects of Hutchins’ criteria in that to succeed as a settler one had to be willing to put 
up with the discomforts of living in the African bush and relish the outdoors life. 
The department’s personnel issues also extended to its management. These issues impacted, 
at differing points, the relationship the department had with other parts of the colonial government 
and within the department itself. In relation to the first impact, Chief Conservator of Forests 
Hutchins amplified tensions between his department and the rest of the colonial government. 
Indeed, as argued by Bennett and Kruger, Hutchins was well known as an eccentric and rather 
outspoken, being passed over for promotion in Cape Colony because of his lack of diplomacy in 
dealing with other government departments.289 Girouard reported that the executive staff of the 
Protectorate considered Hutchins “frankly impossible” to deal with.290 It is likely that Hutchins’ 
stubbornness was a factor in the lack of cooperation between the Forest Department and Provincial 
Administration over the issue of demarcation before Girouard personally pushed the matter 
forward. This characteristic also incited Girouard to push for Hutchins’ retirement and replacement 
by Battiscombe in 1911 and his suggestion that foresters be put under the authority of the 
Provincial Administration. Clashes of personality seem to have been common, with Girouard 
describing members of the Provincial Administration as being “supine”, “self-satisfied, pigheaded, 
and highly unpopular.”291 The effect on the government’s relationship with the settlers was 
particularly marked: 
I will say that none of these officers [of the Provincial Administration] … have the social 
qualifications necessary for the handling or entertaining of a white community. This is most 
unfortunate, and has been a very potent factor in accentuating the situation [of government-
settler conflict].292 
Within this context, Hutchins’ leadership shaped a department that was, Girouard believed, “too 
ambitious and self-centred”, which conducted its work “quite independently of all Provincial 
authority, guidance, or assistance.”293 The Forest Department thus existed within an environment 
antagonistic to cooperation, a situation that Hutchins exacerbated by steadfastly defending the 
principles and operation of forestry in the Protectorate. The replacement of Hutchins with 
Battiscombe had a rapid and dramatic positive effect on this situation. In 1912 Girouard’s next 
report on the administration of the Protectorate concluded there would be no need for the 
supervision of forestry by the Provincial Administration, as Battiscombe had ensured the two 
departments “are now working in complete harmony.”294 Battiscombe’s influence was effective; 
while the department, under his leadership, successfully fought against the granting of large 
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concessions to settlers he did this without generating the level of antagonism that existed under 
Hutchins. There is also no evidence to indicate hostility between the Forest Department and the 
Provincial Administration or other departments during Battiscombe’s tenure. If anything, 
Battiscombe may have been all too willing to acquiesce to the wishes of the executive and declined 
to push for, or have been ineffective in pushing for, more funding for forestry. It is telling that while 
many government departments reported a rise in spending between 1910 and 1920, there is barely 
any change in the expenditure of the Forest Department (Figure 1-3). 
Further evidence suggests that Battiscombe’s dedication to forestry may have in fact been 
considerably less than that of his predecessor. After R. St. Barbe Baker took up a post as assistant 
conservator in 1921 he set about the unique venture of creating a Kikuyu forestry organisation, the 
Men of the Trees, on his own initiative. This organisation allegedly took a distinctive approach to 
forestry in that it adapted existing Kikuyu custom to direct the energies of warriors toward tree 
planting.295 The support St. Barbe Baker claimed he received came not from his superior but from 
the American Consul General, an Italian missionary, a missionary doctor, and a British settler.296 St. 
Barbe Baker would later write: 
My superior officer [Battiscombe] was a puppet who danced to the tune of the régime which had 
done virtually nothing to protect the soil, forests or wild life. He had studied a little botany, but 
though I was the first fully-trained silviculturist to be posted to Kenya, he had never been 
sufficiently interested to come and see my work in this field.297   
St. Barbe Baker had clear animosity toward Battiscombe, but the validity of his criticisms has to be 
tempered when seen in the context of St. Barbe Baker’s eventual dismissal from the colony for 
insubordination, in 1923, after apparently taking a blow from Battiscombe’s riding crop intended 
for a Kikuyu.298 There are no other records of this incident and Battiscombe left no diaries or 
correspondence to illuminate it. Furthermore, St. Barbe Baker’s account was only published after 
Battiscombe died in 1969.299 Although it seems impossible to prove the authenticity of this account, 
St. Barbe Baker’s statement that Battiscombe had “studied a little botany” can be seen as an 
accusation that the conservator had a lack of interest in forestry work and is supported to an extent 
by a statement published in the Forest Department annual report after Battiscombe had retired in 
1925. H.M. Gardner, his successor, would describe Battiscombe’s forestry achievements only to the 
extent that the department had followed a “sound and conservative forest policy”, while 
Battiscombe’s botanic work warranted “special cause for gratitude.” Gardner continued: “It is 
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entirely due to his personal enthusiasm and hard work that the Colony’s forest flora is so 
comparatively well known.”300 Extensive praise, then, is reserved not for Battiscombe’s work in 
pushing forestry forward but for what appears to have been his great passion, botany; although, of 
course, botanical knowledge of the forests was a key foundation for further forestry work.301 While 
there are no overt statements saying as such, these accounts do hint that Battiscombe was not fully 
respected as a forester and that perhaps this was, as St. Barbe Baker argued, because he was too 
closely aligned with a colonial administration that neglected the department. It is also telling that 
while Hutchins would receive a knighthood for his contribution to empire forestry and H.M. 
Gardner would receive an OBE for his forestry work in Kenya, Battiscombe received no such 
recognition.302     
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department. In correspondence between Adams, Battiscombe, and H.M. Gardner (the acting conservator while 
Year Senior Staff* Foresters Total 
1904-5 5 3 8 
1906 7?  7? 
1907 4 6 10 
1908 6 14 20 
1909 6 15 21 
1910 7 19 26 
1911 7 15 22 
1912 5 14 19 
1913 7 15 22 
1914 6 14 20 
1915 6 17 23 
1916 8 14 22 
1920 12? 13? 25 
1925 10 13 23 
* Senior staff includes the positions of Chief 
Conservator of Forests, Conservators of Forest, 
Assistant Conservators of Forest, Verderers, 
Surveyers, and Seedsman. 
 
Table 1-4. Forest Department staff levels, 1904-1915, 1920, and 1925. Gaps in years indicate absence of data. 
Question marks indicate estimations based on staff mentioned in correspondence and other publications, as 
reports do not provide actual staff levels in those years. Annual Sources: East Africa Protectorate Blue Books, 
1904-1915; Forest Department Annual Reports, 1909-10,  1914-15, 1920-1925; Correspondence by the Forest 
Department, 1904-1916, KNA.  
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The recruitment of settlers and men of the empire seeking any work they could in the new 
Protectorate is probably what enabled the department to maintain relatively stable staff levels 
between 1910 and 1925, although absence of blue books and department annual reports prevents 
a definite conclusion in this regard (Table 1-4).303 Extant data also indicates the First World War 
had an effect on the department, with approximately a fifth of its staff leaving, temporarily or 
permanently, to serve in the forces. Again, absence of departmental records from the years of the 
war prevents proper evaluation of the effect of this on forestry operations.304 Despite the probable 
setbacks of the war, the department had regained a staff of 25 by 1920, most of whom had been 
educated (if not all in forestry) at the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, or Edinburgh, or from the 
Forest of Dean school. However, this figure was four short of the sanctioned provision for the 
department.305  
Despite the environmental conditions of East Africa making it eminently suitable for white 
settlement, this was a fact that seems to have been poorly communicated to potential colonial 
forestry candidates in England. Sir Ralph Dolingnon Furse, the Assistant Private Secretary 
(Appointments) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, argued that recruitment to the East 
African colonial service suffered merely by its association with what was considered to be 
‘unhealthy’ West Africa.306  
                                                                
Battiscombe was on leave) Adams reveals his clear anger at this and suggests his dismissal was down to antagonism 
between himself and Battiscombe. Such a case was rare within the department, although this may of course be a 
case of records of other employment disputes being lost, but it adds to the theory that Battiscombe was not greatly 
liked by his own foresters. See correspondence and files within, W. Adams Personnel File 1914 to 1923, FOR/1/385, 
KNA.  
303 There are significant gaps in the department’s annual reports from this period, with surviving copies in the Kenya 
National Archive (or the National Archive of the UK) for 1909-10 and 1914-15 and 1920-21, but not for years 
between those dates or for 1922-23. Clearly the First World War is a part explanation for some of these years; but 
it is unclear why records were either not made or were lost between 1910 and 1914. It can be speculated that this 
was indicative of the manpower pressures the department was under, and possibly also affected by Battiscombe’s 
leadership. Blue Books were published for the Protectorate between 1901 and 1916 (and then only resumed in 
1926), apparently due to a backlog at the Government Printers in Nairobi. Henry F. Morris, Government Publications 
Relating to Kenya (Including the East Africa High Commission and the East African Common Services Organisation) 
1897-1963, Publication no. R96995 (Microform Academic Publishers, 2006), 
http://www.microform.co.uk/guides/R96995.pdf. 
304 The Blue Book for 1914 lists three members of the department’s staff as having joined the armed forces: Charles 
William Webber, Ernest Harrison Pickwell, and George Ernest Williams. Webber and Williams both left the 
department permanently, Webber in November 1913 and Williams in March 1914. Departmental records also 
indicate another who went to war (who are not mentioned in the Blue Book): James Whittet Newton joined the 
department as an assistant conservator of forests in 1912 after completing his BSc in forestry at Edinburgh. He 
joined the military in England in 1915 and is not listed as serving with the department when records recommence 
in 1920. East Africa Protectorate Blue Book (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1914), 245–48; J.W. Newton Personnel 
File n.d., FOR/1/374, KNA. 
305 Troup, ‘Forestry in Kenya’, 40. 
306 Ralph Dolingnon Furse to Mr Ellis 4 January 1920, 3, Correspondence and Diaries of Furse (Sir Ralph Dolingnon 
Furse), Colonial Office. MSS.Afr.s.415, Bodleian Library Special Collections. Furse was making reference to the 
popular conception that West Africa was “the white man’s grave” owing to its combination of heat, humidity, and 
notorious diseases. For an introductory examination of the emergence and growth of this concept, see: P. D. Curtin, 
‘“The White Man’s Grave:” Image and Reality, 1780-1850’, Journal of British Studies 1, no. 1 (1 November 1961): 94–
110. 
The Struggle for Colonial Forestry   81 
Recruitment for forestry across the colonies was, in comparison to other fields, low (Table 
1-5).307 A post-war boom from 1919 to 1921 is also evident, although it is quite likely that forestry 
would not have benefited from this were it not for greater cooperation between the Colonial Office 
and the forestry schools in Britain: 
In 1919 we found it impossible to get enough trained men. We therefore got into personal touch 
with the professors at the principal Forestry schools and got them interested in our services. We 
brought in a scheme of probationary selection of recommended students, giving them assistance 
with their training.308 
By the 1920s forestry as a discipline was becoming increasingly professional and dependent on 
university-level education. The increased cooperation between the Colonial Office and educational 
institutions mentioned by Furse, which culminated in the establishment of the Imperial Forestry 
Institute at Oxford in 1924, is an example of this. To Furse, such developments were the natural 
reaction to the problem of having under- or unqualified staff in forestry institutions. He argued: 
[W]e must have suffered in earlier days [i.e. before 1910] from having often to take what we could 
get in view of the conditions of service and the climatic reputation of many protectorates. … 
though we have certainly had to take on several men since [the First World War] (and still have 
to) whom one would much rather not see get a place.309 
Within the context of this, the recruitment of settlers into the Kenyan Forest Department 
represented both a solution to the lack of interest potential recruits in Britain had in African 
forestry and a cause for concern because it delayed the department’s ability to engage in scientific 
                                                                
307 Note that Furse’s figures appear to be applicable to those appointments made through the Colonial Service of 
university-educated men for, in the case of forestry, more senior positions such as assistant conservator of forests. 
Foresters, as discussed above, were often recruited locally or through informal channels on an ad hoc basis. 
308 Ralph Dolingnon Furse, ‘Main Lines of Improvement’ No date (likely 1921, 3–4, Correspondence and Diaries of 
Furse (Sir Ralph Dolingnon Furse), Colonial Office. MSS.Afr.s.415, Bodleian Library Special Collections. 
309 Ralph Dolingnon Furse, ‘Note to Colonel Avery on Work of Appts. Branch (Confidential)’ 19 February 1921, 5, 
Correspondence and Diaries of Furse (Sir Ralph Dolingnon Furse), Colonial Office. MSS.Afr.s.415, Bodleian Library 
Special Collections. 
 1913 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 Total 
Administration 82 108 179 90 16 67 72 85 699 
Educational 19 13 37 43 59 30 45 46 292 
Financial & Customs 15 27 31 21 4 12 9 10 129 
Legal 10 11 21 10 3 8 11 12 86 
Police 13 44 45 32 17 14 32 19 216 
Medical 67 44 73 63 41 49 84 129 550 
Agricultural 11 15 46 40 17 16 35 35 215 
Forestry 1 4 33 26 3 11 20 16 114 
Other Scientific 9 3 5 7 2 2 7 8 43 
Survey & Geological 2 0 30 32 9 5 12 15 105 
Other Appointments 12 22 28 13 14 12 22 25 148 
Table 1-5. Total colonial appointments between 1919 and 1925. No data is given for appointments between 1913 
and 1919, however the figure is likely to be extremely low owing to military recruitment. Source: Colonial Office, 
Colonial Office Appointments Committee, 4 July 1929, Correspondence and Diaries of Furse (Sir Ralph Dolingnon 
Furse), Colonial Office. MSS.Afr.s.415, Bodleian Library Special Collections. 
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forestry. People like Sandbach Baker, who was both a settler and an ‘informal’ forester able to 
perform his duties to a high degree, would seem to have been the exception. Certainly, Furse’s 
attitude supports the idea that the settler forester would never be truly able to become part of the 
department. Within the East Africa Protectorate, Battiscombe’s leadership, if it indeed was 
disinterested and more concerned with placating the government than scientific forestry, only 
served to exacerbate the situation. 
 
1.5.5 Plantation Forestry 
The core forestry practice of the Forest Department in this period was the establishment of 
plantations, necessary to provide woodfuel to the railway. The creation of plantations, orderly in 
arrangement, highly productive, and largely monocultural would continue to be the primary policy 
of the department throughout the colonial period and beyond, just as they are in modern scientific 
forestry systems across the world. In Kenya, they had particular relevance in relation to their 
method of establishment and maintenance, which involved employing African agriculturists to 
reside within and tend the young plantation forest. 
Before large-scale plantations could be established in the Protectorate several years of 
research with various tree species was required to determine what would be the most suitable 
species for further development. This period, approximately running from 1902 to 1910 involved 
the planting of small plantations, typically a few acres, along with the creation of the Nairobi 
Arboretum, where numerous native and exotic trees were grown experimentally.310 Major 
nurseries were established in Nairobi, Dagoretti, Londiani, and near Mount Kenya in the highlands 
and at Muhoroni in Nyanza with the express purpose of propagating trees for plantations.311 By 
1909 these nurseries were very successful, producing approximately 1.25 million trees annually, 
which the Protectorate’s annual report stated were “nearly all” being used in plantations within the 
Uganda railway zone to supply railway fuel, although the department’s own records indicate 
                                                                
310 Battiscombe and Hobley, List of Plants and Trees in V.C. Garden in Nairobi. For example, the following trees were 
planted (in blocks of 50) in the arboretum in 1909-10 (common names and botanical names as given in the report): 
Sydney blue-gum (Eucalyptus saligna), Forest mahogany (Eucalyptus resinifera), Iron bark (Eucalyptus 
siderophloia), Crimson Gum (Eucalyptus ficifolia), Meditterranean Cypress (Cupressus sempervirens), Mexican 
Cypressess (Cupressus benthami lindleyi), Macrocarpa Cypress (Cupressus macrocarpa) Guatemala Cypress 
(Cupressus sp. from Guatemala), Portuguese Cypress (Cupressus lusitanica). Sandal or m’Hugu (Brachylaena 
hutchinsii) a Guatemala Pine (Pinus sp. from Guatemala), Yellowwood (Podocarpus gracillior), various Japanese 
species, Native timber (m’Karàra), Crimson Spathodea (Spathodea nilotica), Japanese Cedar (Cryptomeria japonica, 
Albizzia molluccana), Thuya (Thuya occidentalis), Casuarina (Casuarina quadrivalvis), and Blackwood (Acacia 
melanoxylon). Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910, 4–5. 
311 ‘Colonial Reports--Annual. No. 592. East Africa Protectorate. Report for 1907-08’, 1909, 14. Several other nursery 
sites were also in use by 1907, however details of these are never given suggesting they were on a lesser scale or 
temporary. 
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approximately 42 per cent of planting had the ultimate objective of timber supply.312 Nevertheless, 
planting in the railway zone clearly dominated up to at least 1916 (Table 1-6). 
The emphasis on establishing a woodfuel supply to the Uganda Railway continued throughout 
the 1910s. This was founded on Hutchins’ heavy emphasis on building up forestry in Kenya on the 
back of the railway’s fuel demands and expected future fuel use. Even when, as in 1910, the railway 
discussed switching to coal for the Mombasa to Nairobi stretch of the railway because of the rapid 
depletion of the indigenous forests near the track, Hutchins continued to emphasise woodfuel 
because he believed it had the potential to compete with coal in the future.313 Governor Girouard 
maintained that it was his pushing of the issue of the railway supply that effectively created the 
policy of favouring fuel development over timber.314 This is undermined by the agreement reached 
by the Forest Department and the Uganda Railway in 1909 as well as the considerable prior interest 
the department had in the railway fuel situation, which indicate that plantations in the railway zone 
would have been established regardless of Girouard’s intervention.315 Indeed, rather than executive 
                                                                
312 ‘Colonial Reports--Annual. No. 669. East Africa Protectorate. Report for 1909-10’, 19; Kenya Forest Department, 
Annual Report 1910, 2–3. Timber trees are listed as being grown in Dagoreti (in proximity to present-day Ngong 
Road Forest) and at a location in Kiambu (possibly Karura Forest).  
313 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910, 14–15. 
314 Girouard, ‘No. 19. Report on British East Africa’, 193. 
315 Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa, 48. 
 
Plantations 
created (acres) 
                      Comprising (acres): 
Indigenous trees Exotic trees 
1909-10 114  Majority in railway zone 
1910-11    
1911-12 575   
1912-13 457  Railway zone and Karura (Nairobi supply) 
1913-14 476 139 337 (railway zone) 
1914-15 558 84 474 (railway zone) 
1915-16 561 119 442 (railway zone) 
1916-17 1,079   
1917-18 1,126   
1918-19    
1919-20    
1920-21 1,045   
1921 1,173   
1922    
1923 1,806   
1924 2,127 1,479 648  
1925 2,177 1,480 697 
Table 1-6. Acreage of plantations established between 1909 and 1925. Omissions indicate those years when no 
data are available. Source: Forest Department Annual Reports 1909-10 to 1925, East Africa Protectorate Annual 
Reports, and Forest and Timber Resources of the British East Africa (London, 1920). 
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orders, it would be Hutchins’ Report on the Forests of British East Africa that would guide forestry 
implementation after its publication in 1909 to at least the mid-1920s, when H.M. Gardner 
succeeded E.B. Battiscombe as conservator.316 
By the mid-1920s there was a marked change to the planting of indigenous species, away from 
the railway zone (Table 1-6). Experiments had been conducted on the various properties of 
indigenous timbers and nine sawmills were processing such wood by 1910.317 Notably, the settlers, 
eager for sources of revenue, were keen to develop the use of indigenous timbers. It was E.S. Grogan, 
not the Forest Department, who took the initiative to send samples of Kenya’s most promising 
timbers, podocarpus (Podocarpus gracilior, hereafter podo)318 and cedar (Juniperus procera), to the 
                                                                
316 Notably, a 1903 report by Hutchins had inspired a similar surge of state plantation activity in the Transvaal, also 
with eucalypts. Bennett, ‘The El Dorado of Forestry’, 34.   
317 ‘Colonial Reports--Annual. No. 669. East Africa Protectorate. Report for 1909-10’, 20. 
318 Podocarpus gracilior has now been reclassified as Afrocarpus gracilior and was generally known within the 
colonial period in Kenya as 'podo' or 'East African Yellowwood' (with these names still in use today). The term 'podo' 
is used throughout this thesis to refer to this species as it was the most commonly used name by the Forest 
Department. Podo is considered conspecific with Afrocarpus falcatus (largely found in southern and southeastern 
Africa) by some botanists today, although it should be noted that this is disputed due to morphological 
 
 
Figure 1-4. Tree nursery described as being at Kikuyu, c.1924. The men working in the nursery are cited as being 
Kikuyu from Richard St Barbe Baker’s Men of the Trees organisation. Presumably, it is Baker overseeing them. 
Image copyright and reproduced with permission of Commonwealth Forestry Association. Source: R. St. Barbe 
Baker, ‘The Men of the Trees (or African Forest Scouts)’, Empire Forestry Journal 3, no. 1 (1924): 87–92. 
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Imperial Institute in 1905.319 Despite this, the department was keenly aware of the value of cedar, 
an awareness that was born out of a reaction to the railway’s history of fuel use between 1900 and 
1910, which was largely based on exploiting the indigenous forests in proximity to the railway. The 
effects of this exploitation were doubly alarming to the department as the principle wood being 
exploited was the potentially most profitable tree in the Protectorate: cedar. Following the Imperial 
Institute report of 1906, the indigenous variety of cedar found in Kenya, Juniperus procera, was 
confirmed as a viable alternative to the American cedar commonly used in pencil manufacture. 
Expectations that the American supply would be depleted by approximately 1930 gave the 
department hope that it might be possible to establish Kenyan cedar within the international 
market. With the establishment of exotic plantations the department was therefore hoping to 
reduce the railway’s average annual usage of 100,000 cubic feet of cedar and preserve a potentially 
extremely valuable export timber.320     
The policy established by Hutchins and carried out under Battiscombe was one which 
prioritized the conversion of existing forests or the creation of new forest plantations using exotic 
trees rather than indigenous species. However, in the early 1920s (Table 1.5) there was a dramatic 
shift toward the planting of indigenous trees in plantations. The shift occurred under Battiscombe, 
                                                                
differences. Podo is native to northeast and east Africa, specifically Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. It grows at altitudes between 1,500 and 2,600 metres. 
Like other conifers, podo is classified as a softwood for timber purposes. Streets' 1962 account of trees within the 
Commonwealth describes its timber characteristics as "soft to fairly hard, light to fairly heavy, with a straight grain 
and fine texture, working well to a good finish and taking nails better than most Podocarps, but not very durable; 
used for interior construction, such as doors and flooring, and for furniture." It is generally used for similar purposes 
to pines, but is notably much slower growing that most species of pine introduced into Kenya as timber trees and 
required careful seasoning. Podo is sometimes considered the same as Podocarpus latifolius ('Real Yellowwood' or 
'True Yellowwood'), the national tree of South Africa, but is less durable and therefore less valued. Khare et al., ‘Joint 
Forest Management’, 139–40; R. J. Streets and Robert Scott Troup, Exotic Forest Trees in the British Commonwealth 
(Clarendon Press, 1962), 617; Aljos Farjon, ‘Afrocarpus Gracilior: The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2013: 
e.T42439A2980350’, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2013-1.RLTS.T42439A2980350.en; Aljos Farjon, 
‘Afrocarpus Falcatus. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2013: e.T42438A2980290’, 2013, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2013-1.RLTS.T42438A2980290.en; Aljos Farjon, W. Foden, and L. Potter, 
‘Podocarpus Latifolius. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2013: e.T42510A2983787’, 2013, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2013-1.RLTS.T42510A2983787.en; Aerts, R, ‘Afrocarpus Falcatus (Thunb.) 
C.N.Page. Record from PROTA4U. Louppe, D., Oteng-Amoako, A.A. & Brink, M. (Editors). PROTA (Plant Resources of 
Tropical Africa / Ressources Végétales de l’Afrique Tropicale), Wageningen, Netherlands’, 2008, 
http://www.prota4u.org/protav8.asp?h=M4&t=Podocarpus&p=Afrocarpus+falcatus#Synonyms; J.M. Okeyo, 
‘Podocarpus Latifolius (Thunb.) R.Br. Ex Mirb. [Internet] Record from PROTA4U. Louppe, D., Oteng-Amoako, A.A. & 
Brink, M. (Editors). PROTA (Plant Resources of Tropical Africa / Ressources Végétales de l’Afrique Tropicale), 
Wageningen, Netherlands’, 2008 
 http://www.prota4u.org/protav8.asp?h=M4&t=Podocarpus&p=Afrocarpus+falcatus#Synonyms. 
319 Imperial Institute, ‘Timbers from the British East Africa Protectorate’, Bulletin of the Imperial Institute (London: 
Imperial Institute, 1906), 15. By 1909 the department was predominantly recommending as profitable (and 
planting in the lower highlands between 5,500 and 7,000 feet): exotic Guatemala cypress (cited as Cupressus 
benthamii, commonly now known as Mexican cypress but possibly the same as Cupressus lusitanica), the exotics 
Grevillea robusta, Syncarpia glomulifera, and Tristania conferta, sandal (no botanical name is given for this but the 
African of m’Nderundu is; no records of such a tree can be found but it is assumed it was indigenous), and the exotic 
“Ironbarks and Casuarina in mixture” (Eucalyptus and Casuarina, respectively). In higher forests, between 7,000 and 
8,500 feet, the department recommended the most profitable trees as Guatemala Cypress and Ironbarks, although 
the indigenous Juniperus procera is also cited. Notably, the department reported no success in growing pines (see 
chapter 3 for discussion of the eventual propagation of pines in Kenya). Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 
1910, 3–4. 
320 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910, 15. 
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and his influence in this policy should not be ignored as his extensive knowledge of botany and 
botanic research in Kenya suggest a keen interest in developing the colony’s indigenous tree 
species. Battiscombe was personally responsible for sending several hundred specimens for 
botanical research to Kew between 1909 and 1913, while samples were also sent to Königl 
Botanischen Gartens in Berlin in 1911. The process of analysing such samples was, however, long 
which inevitably delayed the ability of the department to pursue planting. No doubt delayed 
considerably by the First World War, feedback on specimens sent to Kew in 1914 for analysis was 
not received until 1916.321   
Before this new emphasis on indigenous planting in 1924 the department’s focus was on 
exotic plantations. The general policy as laid out in 1910 was for 66 per cent of all plantings to be 
of exotic species, with the majority of these being from the genus Eucalyptus, most commonly blue 
gum (Eucalyptus globulus) or Acacia, most commonly black wattle (Acacia decurrens).322 Hutchins’ 
experiences in forestry in India and South Africa were influential in his exotic plantation policy, as 
was research conducted by others in Europe and America.323 In his assessment of the productive 
ability of the highland forests of Kenya, Hutchins’ optimism came not from observations of the 
country’s indigenous species but from a comparison to the similar conditions found on sites of 
eucalyptus plantations he had witnessed in India. Similarly, he drew comparisons between Kenya’s 
forests and the undeveloped, low yield and unprofitable forests in South Africa which he had 
transformed into profitable high-yield forests through the use of exotic plantations, specifically of 
varieties of Acacia.324 The unreliable natural regeneration of indigenous tree species further pushed 
the department toward the use of reliable, propagated exotic trees.325 In contrast to the priorities 
in South Africa and India, Hutchins pushed not for the cultivation of black wattle, but for eucalyptus 
because it could be harvested for woodfuel after just ten years or, according to his original plan, the 
tree could be successfully coppiced after six to eight years and continue producing fuel in the form 
of poles for up to 75 years. This was, Hutchins argued, clearly the prudent policy and it ideally met 
the increasing and urgent fuel needs of the Uganda Railway.326 It was Hutchins own research in 
                                                                
321 Correspondence and documents within Economic Products - Specimens sent to Kew n.d., QB/1/306, KNA. 
322 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910, 3–4. The first major plantation of Eucalyptus globulus was 
established, at Elburgon, in 1913: ‘The Planting and Management of Eucalyptus for Fuel (Bulletin No. 27)’ (Forest 
Department of Kenya, 24 March 1936), 2. However, Eucalyptus globulus was first planted in Kenya not by the Forest 
Department but Frederick Jackson, the explorer and later Lieutenant-Governor of the Protectorate, at the 
government station in Eldama Ravine in 1897. This planting is described as being in rows and it is possible that it 
was planted there to act as a marker to distinguish the government station rather than for its fuel or timber 
potential, see: Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa, 118.  
323 For the history of the popularity of Eucalyptus with foresters see Bennett, ‘The El Dorado of Forestry’. 
324 Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa, 10, 11, 25–31. For discussion of Hutchins’ work in 
South Africa, see Bennett and Kruger, Forestry and Water Conservation in South Africa, 2015. 
325 ‘Colonial Reports--Annual. No. 705. East Africa Protectorate. Report for 1910-11’, 1913 1912, 23. 
326 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910, 14–15; Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa, 
50. Hutchins describes Eucalyptus globulus as also being extensively planted in South Africa, indeed he states it was 
the most commonly planted tree on farms. However, its timber under the South African climate was reportedly of 
“inferior quality”, leading to the Forest Department there preferring wattle. Wattle also had the advantage of 
producing a great number of poles that were suitable as pit props in the numerous mines of South Africa, see: Ibid., 
118. 
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India going back to 1883, backed up by more recent research done in Australia that convinced him, 
and therefore the department, that eucalyptus would be the fuel of choice for the railway. “No other 
tree in the world” he argued, “can produce 10 tons [of woodfuel] per acre, per year, as an average 
over a long term of years.”327 The department further argued, and was supported by the railway, 
that wattle was an inferior woodfuel for the railway in comparison to eucalyptus, apparently 
burning too quickly.328 Although the railway did enter into contracts with settlers who grew wattle 
on their farms for the export of bark (used to produce tannin) for the use of the harvested wattle as 
fuel, this was small in scale, being limited to farms in close proximity to the railway.329 The Forest 
Department’s research further indicated that wattle only grew well as a fuel at altitudes between 
approximately 1,980 and 2,280 metres, putting the environs of Nairobi and all the railway between 
the colonial capital and Mombasa out of the optimal growth zone.330 The department did continue 
to plant wattle after 1910, but all of these factors combined to make it follow a policy of extensive 
eucalyptus planting for the railway; a policy that was confirmed and supported by Troup’s 
assessment of forestry in Kenya in 1922.331   
Wattle was extensively planted in Kenya, however, because its bark produced excellent tannin. 
The tree became a popular crop planted by settlers between 1910 and 1920, with Lord Delamere 
leading the way by planting 2,000 acres of wattle on his farm in 1911 and being the principle 
shareholder in a company that had planted a further 3,000 acres. He also owned a small factory for 
processing the wattle bark, which apparently ran at a profit until 1921 when the market price 
dropped.332 The Forest Department assisted this industry by initially experimenting with the ideal 
growing conditions for the tree and by liaising with the Imperial Institute in its 1909 assessment of 
the tannin potential of wattle’s bark.333 Beyond this, the department took little interest in the 
development of the industry, and appears to have had no involvement in the planting of wattle by 
settlers and, by the late 1920s, Africans as a cash crop, instead allowing the Agriculture Department 
to take over this role.334     
                                                                
327 Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa, 50. 
328 Cranworth, A Colony in the Making, 118; W.G. Leckie, ‘The Growing of Wattle and the Production of Wattle Bark 
in Kenya (Bulletin No. 5)’ (Nairobi: Department of Agriculture, 1933), 1. 
329 Hill, Permanent Way: The Story of the Kenya and Uganda Railway: Being the Official History of the Development of 
the Transport System in Kenya and Uganda, 1:295; H. F. Ward and J. W. Milligan, Handbook of British East Africa, 
1912-13. Illustrated and with Two Maps (Nairobi: Caxton Printing & Publishing Co., Ltd., 1912), 104. 
330 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910, 20–22. 
331 Troup, ‘Forestry in Kenya’, 31–32. 
332 Huxley, White Man’s Country. Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya, 1:167.  
333 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1910, 20–22. 
334 Leckie, ‘The Growing of Wattle and the Production of Wattle Bark in Kenya (Bulletin No. 5)’; Robert M. Maxon, 
‘Where Did the Trees Go? The Wattle Bark Industry in Western Kenya, 1932-1950’, The International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 34, no. 3 (1 January 2001): 565–84, doi:10.2307/3097554; Peter A. Dewees, ‘Social and 
Economic Incentives for Smallholder Tree Growing: A Case Study from Murang’a District, Kenya’, 1993, 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/U8995E/u8995e00.htm#Contents Chapter 5: The case of black wattle; Kitching, Class 
and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite Bourgeoisie 1905-1970, 62, 121, 320; Mackenzie, 
‘Contested Ground’, 703; David Anderson and David Throup, ‘Africans and Agricultural Production in Colonial 
Kenya: The Myth of the War as a Watershed’, The Journal of African History 26, no. 4 (1 January 1985): 337. 
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By 1910 the Forest Department’s plantation policy was in place. It would plant fast-growing 
exotic tree species within the railway forest zone to provide fuel for the Uganda railway. However, 
given the department’s lack of resources, both monetary and personnel, carrying out this policy 
was difficult. Plantation establishment and management was extremely labour intensive, requiring 
that land be first cleared, then prepared, planted, and tended for several years. Hutchins initial 
answer to this problem was to suggest that qualified white South African workers be employed, 
although whether this was to be in a purely supervisory role or also as the main labour force is 
unclear. While it seems more likely that Hutchins was envisaging a white, South African force of 
supervisors it is also possible he saw forestry in Kenya as an outlet for poor whites.335 This was a 
solution that ran afoul of an important distinction of white settlement in Kenya: it was to be the 
settlement of a white ruling class whose power rested on the African perception of this class as 
rulers. The introduction of a white labouring class risked undermining this hierarchy.336  
Kenya’s forest labour problem would instead finds its solution via the imperial forestry 
network that was by the early twentieth century coming to define forestry. There appears to have 
been little official communication between the Protectorate’s Forest Department and those in other 
British territories, evidenced by a lack of extant correspondence between 1902 and 1925. Certainly, 
communication must have existed, as the department was receiving tree samples from across the 
world and working with Kew and the Imperial Institute in Britain, and, after 1920, attending the 
British Empire forestry conferences.337 Kenya’s network seems to have been rather dependent on 
the same types of patronage and personal relationships that underpinned the British social system 
of the time. Thus, the solution to the plantation problem came from an exchange of personnel who 
carried knowledge and experience of forestry elsewhere with them; in this case, it was Hutchins’ 
prior experience in both India and South Africa. 
Hutchins had no doubt learnt of taungya while serving in the Indian Forest Service, as Indian 
forestry had utilised, although was by no means dependent on, the employment of agriculturists 
who would reside within the forest and act as forest labourers. Such labourers, known within Kenya 
for most of the colonial period as forest squatters, practiced what was referred to as “Agriculture-
                                                                
335 Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of British East Africa, 77. There are no available details of quite what 
Hutchins’ reasoning behind or meaning in his suggestion was. It is possible to speculate that he was influenced by 
the use of poor, white, predominantly Afrikaner workers for plantation establishment by the South African Forest 
Department, which was occurring concurrently to his statement (these being the Knysna forest woodcutters, who 
numbered 1,269 in 1913). Possibly, Hutchins’ envisioned Kenya to be an outlet for the problem of poor white South 
African employment. If this was so, it is notable that both the labour policies of forestry in South Africa and Kenya 
were influenced by the perceived dangers of having a population of poor white settlers. Although relatively 
insignificant, a part of South Africa’s policy to address the poor whites problem was by employing them in the 
forests; conversely in Kenya the fear of the creation of this problem cut short the importation of white labour. For 
discussion of the use of white labour for plantation establishment in South Africa see Brett M. Bennett and Fred 
Kruger, Forestry and Water Conservation in South Africa (Acton: The Australian National University Press, 2015), 
106–16.  
336 Kennedy, Islands of White, 44. 
337 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1915, 27–28; J. M. Powell, ‘“Dominion over Palm and Pine”: The British 
Empire Forestry Conferences, 1920–1947’, Journal of Historical Geography 33, no. 4 (October 2007): 852–77, 
doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2006.07.001. 
The Struggle for Colonial Forestry   89 
cum-Forestry” in India or, in modern forestry terminology, agroforestry.338 British forestry first 
became aware of this system in 1856, when it was demonstrated by forest agriculturists in Burma, 
where it was known by the still widely used term of taungya forestry.339 After Hutchins moved to 
the Cape Forest Service in 1882, where because of the colony’s emphasis on afforestation with 
plantations he experimented with taungya. However, within the Cape, this “did not prove a success 
and was later abandoned.”340 Possibly, this was because of larger labour problems within South 
Africa and resistance to allowing black Africans access to reserved areas.341 In Kenya, Hutchins 
would remember his experiment and again attempt it, beginning in 1910 under the name shamba 
(Swahili for farm, field, and plantation) at either Dagoreti or Karura (what is today Ngong Road 
Forest, approximately five kilometres west from Nairobi, or Karura forest, today on the northern 
outskirts of Nairobi, respectively).342 This time the system would be very much a success. In a 
further case of the transfer of forestry knowledge outside of formal networks of information 
exchange, taungya appears to have been transferred into Burma by migrating agriculturists who 
had practised the system in China for approximately 500 years.343  
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Year 
Number of 
squatters  
1909-10 191 
1914-15 561 
1916 1500 
1917  
1918  
1919  
1920-21 1500 
1923 1458 
1924 1539 
1925 1526 
 
Table 1-7. Number of forest squatters employed by the Forest Department. Blanks indicate a lack of data. 
Source: Forest Department Annual Reports, 1909-10, 1914-15, 1920-1925. 
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Within this system as it was used in Kenya, the forest squatters, as they were usually known, 
were employed by the Forest Department to clear an uneconomic forest area, that is one of 
sufficiently mixed-species and poorly developed growth to not warrant exploitation or one in which 
the economically valuable trees had already been cleared.344 After clearance, the squatters planted 
both their own crops and the trees of the department, for which they were responsible for tending 
for approximately five years, by which point the trees would be of sufficient growth to not require 
regular tending and would shade out the crops below. Then, squatters were moved by the 
department to a new area to begin the process of plantation creation afresh. Although there are no 
existing documents that describe the operation of shamba in this early period, there is no indication 
that the core practice changed; thus the following description of its operation from the 1930s can 
be considered reliable: 
When a block of forest was earmarked as a future timber plantation, the standing hardwood was 
sold to a local sawmill which was responsible for the felling and extraction of any trees the owner 
wanted. When that operation was completed, Kikuyu squatters were brought in to finish the job. 
They felled the remaining trees, cut and burnt off the undergrowth, and for three years planted 
crops between the felled and charred tree trunks which gradually rotted away or were destroyed 
by termites.345 
The shamba system would become the core of forestry operations in colonial Kenya. Already in 
1910, it was responsible for 42 per cent of the planting done by the department and by 1914-15, 
96 per cent of the planting was done by the forest squatters. By 1925, the department considered 
its forest squatters “invaluable”.346 The point that the establishment and tending of plantations, as 
well other manual forestry work such as the clearing of creepers from young trees in indigenous 
forest, would be economically impossible without the department’s forest squatters was frequently 
made by the Forest Department, as illustrated by James Rammell, Senior Assistant Conservator of 
Forests, in 1930: 
It is I think well known that this Department is only able to plant the large acreage that it does 
owing to the availability of Kikuyu squatters who clear, cultivate and maintain the land in which 
we plant, making available and keeping clean considerable acreages. Without this system our cost 
would go up by 400% or 500% and acreages planted could decrease by a similar figure.347 
The programme of plantations begun in the department’s second decade would seem to have been 
impossible without the use of this forest workforce. Where data exists, it indicates that the system 
rapidly became a popular form of employment for Africans, with a 193 per cent increase in the 
number of squatters employed in the five years after shamba became operational in 1910 (Table 
1-7). 
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The success and longevity of the shamba system in Kenya was of huge significance to forestry 
and those Africans engaged within in; a theme that will be explored in detail through chapters two 
and three. During the initial period of forestry development in Kenya, until approximately 1925, 
the establishment of shamba is notable not just for allowing the department to carry out a 
plantation programme that would have likely been simply impossible without it but also for the 
effect this had on forestry in other British colonies. The convening of the first Empire Forestry 
Conference, in 1920, allowed the increasing formalisation of the British Empire’s forestry network. 
A forum was created for debate and dialogue between imperial foresters who had hitherto been 
largely isolated in their respective territories.348 It was at the second such conference, held in 
Canada in 1923, that debate over taungya-style forestry systems would emerge. 
Of the many debates held at the Second Empire Forestry Conference it was that on the topic of 
shifting cultivation that was of highest importance to forestry in Kenya. The practice of clearing 
forest, typically by fire, the establishment of crops on the cleared land, and the repetition of this 
process after the fertility of the soil was depleted – a process referred to as shifting cultivation – 
was demonised by forest departments across the empire. E.B. Battiscombe, Kenya’s delegate to the 
conference, however raised the pertinent point that in Kenya shifting cultivation had been tamed 
under the shamba system. Rather than being an agent of simple forest destruction, shifting 
cultivation could, he argued, be transformed into an incredibly efficient and economical way of 
preparing indigenous forests for plantation establishment, just as it was in the shamba system of 
Kenya. After heated debate and the establishment of a special committee on the issue, a resolution 
was passed that approved of the use of shifting cultivation in a controlled manner to aid forest 
development in West and East Africa, Ceylon, India.349 Here, then, was a key evolution of forestry 
practice within the empire. A process previously considered antithetical to the doctrine of modern, 
scientific forestry was embraced, controlled and transformed. Just as Lugard’s doctrine of indirect 
rule dictated the usurpation of indigenous political systems to allow economical governance of the 
peoples of the empire, so too would an indigenous agricultural system be redirected to provide 
economical forest development. While retaining its core mission and creed, scientific forestry was 
thus able to be pragmatic, local, and above all adaptable. The success of shamba in Kenya was 
therefore hugely influential in advancing the ability of forestry to meet its goals within the strained 
economic contexts that forest departments typically existed. 
Immediately after the conference in 1923, an article appeared in the Empire Forestry Journal 
written by H.M. Gardner, assistant conservator of forests Kenya, outlining how shifting cultivation 
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could be utilised in plantation creation.350 The debate and resolution at the conference and the 
publishing of this article represent an important turning point in the adoption of agroforestry 
within the empire. Subsequently, taungya/shamba would begin to be used in the Gold Coast, and 
continues in Ghana today, and in the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1927.351            
Within Kenya, the Forest Department would not clarify in writing the precise operation of the 
shamba system until 1939, however it is clear that the department occupied the effective position 
of landlord and patron to the African cultivators it employed. The forest squatter had no ownership 
or right of tenure of the land upon which he worked. The system afforded the squatter land to 
cultivate but did not provide any guarantee that the squatter would have this land, or land in 
another area, once the plantation had been established. The squatter could also be evicted if his 
farm did not meet the strict standards of tidiness set by the department, a rule designed to 
maximise the potential success of the tree plantation while reinforcing the clear paternal role of the 
forest officer over his workers.352 There are no Forest Department records from this early period 
indicating any resistance to the system or difficulty in recruiting squatters for it. The apparent ready 
acceptance of this system by Africans is indicative of both the opportunities it offered and the socio-
economic position of those who sought engagement within it. The same motivation that pushed 
African farmers to extend cultivation into the forests, driving the African forest destruction 
narrative upheld so strongly by the Forest Department, also encouraged them to seek employment 
with the department as squatters: the worsening shortage of land within the native reserves. This 
situation would become abundantly clear during the recruitment process for new forest squatters 
from the late 1920s through to the end of colonial rule in Kenya. 
 
1.5.6 Settler opposition to shamba 
The first major interaction between the settlers and the department over the issue of forest 
squatters occurred under E.B. Battiscombe’s leadership in 1918 and continued under H.M. Gardner. 
The initial sources of settler agitation were Tinderet forest, located approximately 30 km north of 
Kericho and between the main transport corridors that led to Lake Victoria to the west, and the 
Uasin Gishu plateau, a major site of white settlement, to the north, and Burnt forest located within 
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Uasin Gishu District. The matter the settlers took issue with was the grazing of cattle in forests by, 
they maintained, Africans who had been given permission to do so by the Forest Department. The 
Southern Uasin Gishu Farmers’ Association was the first to lay out its position in an appeal to the 
Director of Agriculture in 1918; in reference to Africans in Burnt forest, the association maintained: 
… these people are practically under no control, and owing to the many diseases, they are a source 
of great danger to the cattle industry on Uasin Gishu Plateau, and this Association requests the 
Government to return them into the Native Reserves, as soon as possible.353 
The Association continued that the Forest Department had given permission to these Africans to 
reside within the forest, an accusation the Forest Department denied. Indeed, the department had 
no squatters in Uasin Gishu, had consistently failed to recruit any in the district, and had, one month 
before the Association’s complaint was made, identified the cattle as most likely being the property 
of one of the several licensees who operated there. Londiani Saw Mills, for example, kept 120 oxen 
in the forest to haul logs.354 The fate of these Africans and their cattle, mistaken for shamba 
squatters, is not recorded but it is clear this established a pattern of settler agitation against 
Africans inhabiting forests. Youé has argued that the cereal boom of the early 1920s meant that 
settlers of Uasin Gishu were desirous of large amounts of cheap labour and were less concerned 
with stock diseases, and were therefore content to allow their farm-resident squatters to continue 
accumulating stock in the early 1920s.355 Yet, attacks upon the forest squatters indicates that the 
settlers’ fears of cattle disease and competition never went away, being instead redirected toward 
the forests.  
By the closing months of 1919 another association of settler farmers, this time the Lumbwa 
Farmers’ Association, began directing complaints to the Forest Department about African-owned 
cattle in Tinderet forest. Africans who had been given permits by the Forest Department were, the 
association maintained, hiding stolen cattle in the forest and, moreover, these represented a 
veterinary risk.356 The linking of African cattle to diseases by the Southern Uasin Gishu Farmers’ 
Association and to veterinary issues by the Lumbwa Farmers’ Association was no coincidence. 
African cattle were seen by settlers and government as carriers of disease, a view which led the 
government to label areas where African-owned cattle predominated as ‘dirty’, that is, a potential 
source of disease. The disease made reference to was almost certainly East Coast Fever 
(theileriosis), a bovine infection carried by ticks with an extremely high death rate, especially 
among imported European cattle. First identified by science in East Africa in 1904, although almost 
certainly endemic to the region for generations before, theileriosis was found widely among cattle 
in Nairobi, Kiambu, Machakos, and as far west as Nandi district (bordering Uasin Gishu and 
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Lumbwa) by 1914. The settlers were painfully aware of the damage East Coast Fever could cause. 
Famously, it had practically wiped out Lord Delamere’s early attempts at cattle rearing.357 
Quarantine and small-scale dipping of settler cattle was begun before 1914 but the large-scale use 
of transportation oxen and meat cattle during the First World War appears to have tipped the 
balance in favour of the disease, allowing it to spread through the Protectorate. Uasin Gishu, for 
example, was considered ‘clean’ before the war, but became ‘dirty’ before hostilities ended.358  
Within the context of what must have been intense settler fear of livestock disease, Africans 
residing within or grazing their cattle in forests, whether they were Forest Department employees 
or not, were seen as a threat. A 1920 statement from the cattle farmer Thomas Russell shows that 
the attitude was not just confined to western areas of the Rift Valley, as Russell’s farm was at 
Kiambu, close to Nairobi and an area also infested with theileriosis. “Some beast has been across 
my farm and dropped some infected ticks”, Russell maintained in a complaint to the Director of 
Agriculture, he continued, “the squatters in it [the neighbouring forest reserve] have been allowed 
to bring cattle into it and I am convinced that trafficking in cattle goes on between it and the Kyambu 
Reserve.”359 Just as theileriosis became endemic to the majority of areas in Kenya suitable for cattle 
rearing, so too did the general mistrust and almost paranoid fear of Africans who owned cattle 
become endemic to the cattle-owning settler community. 
It was a fear that the colonial government was responsive too. In July 1918, the same month 
as the Uasin Gishu Famers’ Association had made its complaint, John Ainsworth, the Chief Native 
Commissioner wrote to Battiscombe with a virtual demand that: 
Native owned cattle in Forest Reserves areas should also be removed if it is desired that illicit 
movement of cattle should be checked. … for veterinary reasons it is desirable that action should 
be taken in connection with such cattle.360 
In 1924 the government sought legislation to support this by introducing the Trespass 
Amendment Ordinance into the Legislative Council. Superseding the 1913 and 1914 trespass 
ordinances, the new ordinance, which became law in 1924, also went further than the Crown Lands 
Ordinance of 1915. Under the previous ordinances, a person could have been evicted for trespass 
only if they had been served with a summons or arrested by a government officer. The 1924 
Trespass Amendment Ordinance diluted this requirement by allowing the landowner himself to 
arrest and evict the trespasser, and then for the government to confiscate any cattle owned by that 
trespasser as a means to deter them from trespassing again. As the Chief Native Commissioner 
explained during the debate over the ordinance: 
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… this bill has been framed on applications by settlers to Government … [which] wants this extra 
power to keep these people from forests so that when a family is found they can be told definitely 
they have got to get out of it [the land] or their stock will be confiscated.361 
E.B. Battiscombe explained during the debate that the Forest Ordinance 1912 allowed the 
Forest Department to evict trespassers from declared forest areas. The implication was that the 
Trespass Ordinance was needed to evict trespassers from forests classified as Crown Land (as all 
forests not private property were) but not declared forest areas. These were those areas that 
because of the Forest Department’s deficiency of resources had not yet been demarcated. The 
Trespass Ordinance was not needed in the case of Tinderet forest, Battiscombe assured the 
unofficial (settler) members of the Legislative Council, because although most of the Africans in that 
forest had permission to be there “steps have now been taken to have them all removed.”362       
Battiscombe’s statement to the Legislative Council concerning his attitude to Africans in 
Tinderet was a hardening of the stance he had held in 1919 when the Lumbwa Farmers’ Association 
had first complained of their presence in the forest. In a letter to the Provincial Commissioner of 
Kisumu in 1919, Battiscombe stated he would “be very glad” to have Africans within Tinderet 
evicted “who are there without permission.”363 Over the next five years Battiscombe would 
therefore go from wanting evictions of only those present without permission to all Africans within 
the forest.  
The Forest Department position was, perhaps, initially softened by the utility of having cattle 
in the forest. The Acting Chief Veterinary Officer explained the Forest Department’s defence of the 
Lumbwa Farmers’ Association accusation to the Acting Chief Secretary in 1919: the Forest 
Department needed cattle in the forests in order to keep grass in check and therefore reduce the 
chance of forest fires starting and spreading.364 Equally likely is that the department’s defence of 
cattle in the forest was a reaction to an accusation by the District Commissioner that the Tinderet 
forest officer had been illegally and “indiscriminately” issuing forest grazing permits to Africans.365 
Whether there was any truth in this accusation has now been lost, but it is possible the forest officer 
was exceeding his remit in issuing permits with the aim of reducing the chances of forest fire. What 
is clear is that as the department began to take a closer interest in activities within Tinderet its 
attitude to African cattle hardened. 
In 1919 Battiscombe admitted that his department had not the resources to control the 
movement of illicit cattle in Tinderet.366 The inability of the Forest Department to adequately patrol 
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and police its forests was well known in the colony. During the debate over the 1924 Trespass 
Ordinance the settler Conway Harvey argued this inability was one of the core reasons why more 
powers over trespass were needed.367 This inability to maintain adequate control over the forests 
was reflected in the department’s reaction to the Africans in Tinderet. The department argued the 
majority of the Africans in Tinderet were Dorobo (that is, Ogiek) and therefore traditionally led a 
hunter-gather lifestyle; this was changing as these Africans began exploiting the large colonial 
market for animal skins in order to purchase livestock. Working with the Department of Native 
Affairs, the policy was one to “attach” Ogiek to pastoral ethnic groups “to which they show the 
nearest affinity, and to encourage them to get their own cattle and settle down as members of the 
community.”368 This policy was justified by Battiscombe because the Ogiek “will never become 
useful members of the community until they are brought into touch with civilisation.”369 The issue 
of making Ogiek ‘useful’ was key in the hardening of the Forest Department stance toward them. 
The department repeatedly made attempts to employ Ogiek of Tinderet as forest guards but 
Battiscombe argued “they are quite useless and time and again fail to report offences.”370 The 
combination of settler demands that something be done about the economic threat posed by 
African cattle in Tinderet and the department’s inabilities to either incorporate those Africans into 
its governance regime or otherwise keep watch over them led Battiscombe to state to the Resident 
Commissioner of Eldoret in April 1924 that: 
As long as there is a nucleus of native owned stock in the forest I am convinced that it will always 
serves as an attraction to other stock to be brought in and I am sure that the only possible way of 
dealing with the matter is to allow no native stock at all in the forest reserve.371 
The fate of the Ogiek of Tinderet was thus sealed by mid-1924 but continued delays in 
implementing this policy yet again led to complaints from the settlers. In July 1924 the Londiani 
Association of farmers passed a resolution calling for the government to carry out its decision to 
remove cattle from Tinderet, citing a heightened risk of East Coast Fever, and then demanding that 
all African-owned cattle be removed from the Kisumu Londiani Extra Provincial District because 
stolen stock could be hidden amongst them.372 It would be Battiscombe’s successor, Harold 
Gardner, who would take the matter in hand. By the end of 1925 Gardner reported that the majority 
of the Ogiek had been evicted. He had allowed nine men and their families to stay, each allowed up 
to five cattle. They were expected to collect seeds, patrol, act as fire guards, and generally use their 
knowledge of the forest to the advantage of the department. Gardner declared, “if they fail to do so 
they will be turned out of the forest forthwith.”373 In making this statement, Gardner made it clear 
that in Tinderet at least an African presence would only be tolerated where it conformed to the 
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governance regime laid out by the Forest Department, that is, ultimate control over the Africans’ 
most prized possession – cattle.374
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is provided in Towett J. Kimaiyo, Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices, 1902-2004 (Ogiek Welfare Council, 
2004). This book provides a vivid account of various land grievances held by Ogiek although it unfortunately largely 
lacks evidence to support these claims. Ogiek grievances against the government and present Kenya Forest Service 
continue today, see, for example, media coverage by Rachel Savage, ‘Kenya’s Ogiek People Are Seeing Their Land 
Rights “brutalised”’, The Guardian, 18 August 2016, sec. Global development, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/aug/18/kenyas-ogiek-people-are-seeing-their-land-
rights-brutalised?CMP=twt_a-environment_b-gdneco. 
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Consolidation and Opposition  
c.1925 to 1945 
 
 Introduction 
The period covered by this chapter, from the early 1920s to circa 1945, was one in which the Forest 
Department sought to develop Kenya as an exporter of timber, a move that was spurred on by 
metropolitan support for the advancement of timber exports from all the African colonies. 
Significant progress was made in the development of the timber industry and limited moves made 
to advance both the domestic and export markets for Kenya’s timbers. The assertion by Logie and 
Dyson in the official history of forestry in Kenya that “little development”375 took place in the 
industry in this period is thus very much an exaggeration. However, this attempt to establish Kenya 
timbers on the international market does reveal key deficiencies within the department and 
highlights the state of its relationship with private enterprise in the colony.  
The expansion of forestry activities also caused the Forest Department to face continued 
opposition from settler farmers. Settler agriculture developed greatly in this period with a clear 
focus on livestock and export crops, such as coffee, which relegated the importance of the timber 
industry in the economic survival of the settlers. Opposition stemmed not from the Forest 
Department’s animosity to settler activity in the forests but from that aspect of forestry that was of 
supreme importance in Kenya: the shamba system. The operation and success of this system will 
be explored in detail in this chapter, revealing its capacity to serve forestry and local agricultural 
needs while also exhibiting colonial exploitation. 
 
 Development and Exploitation  
Forestry continually strives to meet the current needs of the markets it serves whilst also 
implementing plans that predict and so satisfy those needs decades into the future. This process is 
complicated by the sometimes multiple decades that trees require to mature to the point of 
harvesting. As J.W. Nicholson, the colonial forest advisor who visited East Africa from 1928 to 1930, 
stated: “…national forest policies must be based on a far-sighted statesman-like appreciation of the 
requirements of the future.”376 Balancing the real needs of the present with the predicted needs of 
                                                                
375 Logie and Dyson, Forestry in Kenya, 13. 
376 J.W. Nicholson, ‘The Future of Forestry in Kenya’ (Nairobi: Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1931), MSS 
115/37/6, KNA. 
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a colony that might undergo rapid economic progress was extremely difficult for the Forest 
Department in Kenya and contributed to the retardation of scientific forestry and the timber 
industry. 
 
2.2.1 Planting policy 
It was the dual concern of current and future need that led the Forest Department to pursue the 
planting programme that it did: a heavy reliance on the exotic species of Eucalyptus globulus and 
Eucalyptus saligna together with a smaller amount of black wattle, which were planted primarily 
for fuel, while Monterey cypress (Cupressus macrocarpa) was the primary exotic choice for 
timber.377 Experimental plantings of all these species had begun before 1910 and their success 
within the environmental conditions of Kenya secured their place in the planting policy of the 
department. As harvests from eucalypt plantations could begin just eight years after planting they 
                                                                
377 Cypress reportedly arrived in Kenya after seeds (notably, no cypress plants in Wardian cases were used) were 
sent from Guatemala, the Imperial Forest Research Institute (Dehra Dun, India), Capetown, the Transvaal, Paris, and 
the United States between 1909 and 1920. Forest Department, ‘The Management of Cypress Plantations in Kenya’, 
1945, 2–3. All species of pine, important plantation trees in South Africa, were noted in 1924 as growing poorly in 
Kenya, explaining why this versatile and commercially very significant softwood was not planted commercially in 
this period. However, experiments seem to have been continuous in regard to this species, with limited success 
achieved in the early 1930s. Pines would, after the Second World War, come to dominate the planting policy of the 
department. For detailed discussion of why pine propogation was difficult in Kenya, how the department eventually 
overcame this, and how this is revealing of the relative state of the empire forestry network (in the 1930s and 1950s) 
of which the department was a member, see section 3.1.2, chapter 3. Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1924, 
12; Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1929, 1931, 16; Streets and Troup, Exotic Forest Trees in the British 
Commonwealth, 35–40. 
 
Figure 2-1. Annual acreage of indigenous and exotic tree planting carried out by the Forest Department. Source: 
Annual Reports of the Kenyan Forest Department, 1924-1944. 
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were ideally suited to the fuel needs of the colony, particularly the railway,378 while cypress was 
favoured as a timber crop because it matured in 30 years in comparison to the 100 years that the 
department estimated for indigenous timber species.379 It was a general policy that Nicholson fully 
supported.380 In 1924 the department admitted that some indigenous species produced finer 
timbers than cypress, yet their long maturation periods coupled with the unpredictability of when 
their seeds would ripen, which prevented accurate planting plans to be formulated and 
implemented, made the exotic species far more appealing to scientific forestry in Kenya.381 The 
difficulty in raising seedlings of indigenous species seems to have been especially marked in years 
of poor rains, when exotic plantings were comparatively more successful, although whether this 
was only due to the foresters’ greater experience with exotics or not is unclear. The very dry year 
of 1927, for example, saw a huge dip in the area of indigenous planting established.  
The emphasis on planting indigenous species in the early 1920s, referred to in chapter 1, lasted a 
mere three years. For almost the entire period covered by this chapter, the annual acreage of exotic 
planting exceeded that of the indigenous (Figure 2-1). Across this period, 43,972 acres of exotic 
plantation were created compared to 21,899 acres of indigenous plantation.382 Having said this, the 
later years of the 1920s did see a slight increase in the planting of indigenous species, especially the 
potential export timber Juniperus procera (pencil cedar),383 the significance of which will be 
explored below. 
                                                                
378 ‘The Planting and Management of Eucalyptus for Fuel (Bulletin No. 27)’; Hutchins, 1909 Report on the Forests of 
British East Africa, 118; Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1925, 11.  
379 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1925, 18. 
380 Nicholson, ‘The Future of Forestry in Kenya’, 36. Nicholson also rejected any concerns, apparently raised by 
settler farmers, about desiccation of surrounding land caused by eucalypts as he contested that any adverse effects 
would be “purely local.” 
381 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1924, 12. The Forest Department planted a range of indigenous species; 
of these, only acreages of pencil cedar (Juniperus procera) were recorded separately and this one species accounted 
for 62 per cent of all the indigenous plantations between 1924 and 1944. The other main species planted were (local 
names used, spellings as commonly used by Forest Department): mueri (Pygeum africanum), podo (Podocarpus 
gracilior), muhugu (Brachylaena Hutchinsii), mukeo (Dombeya Mastersii), and mutate (Panax Pinnatum). 
382 These figures come from tallies of the yearly acreages planted. Between 1909 and 1944 the department 
established 78,918 acres of exotic and indigenous plantations combined. The department occasionally gave in its 
annual reports total acreages which differ from this number by a small amount, perhaps because of losses of plants, 
extensions to plantings, or harvesting not recorded at the annual, colony-wide level. The cumulative total of 
plantations established is used throughout this research for consistency although it must be remembered that no 
statistic from the colonial period is irrefutable.  
383 The planting of pencil cedar may have also been dependent on discovery of a satisfactory method of propagating 
seedlings. Richard St Barbe Baker was apparently given the task of investigating this matter in the early 1920s. He 
stated that there was typically only a 5 per cent germination rate for pencil cedar in the nurseries and he had 
overcome this problem through observation of the natural method of germination. The cedar seeds were, he stated, 
eaten and then passed by pigeons. Replication of this process using water and sulphuric acid was successful in 
bringing on germination of cedar trees and allowed the species to be widely propagated in nurseries. No Forest 
Department documents exist that corroborate this account, however, and doubt over its accurateness exists as 
Baker also stated that it was he who discovered pencil cedar in Kenya, realised its potential, and had it tested in 
England (effectively claiming for himself the success of pencil cedar exports), yet pencil cedar was recognised for 
its economic potential and tested in England as early as 1906, 15 years before he arrived in Kenya (see: Imperial 
Institute, ‘Timbers from East Africa’.). If his account of the propagation of pencil cedar is true, it highlights the 
importance of personal initiative rather than concerted policies of development in spurring on forestry. See: Baker, 
Men of the Trees, 27–28, 44–45.   
102   Development and Exploitation 
Of the exotic plantations between 1926 and 1933, 59 per cent were classified by the 
department as fuel plantations; thereafter cypress dominated. Nicholson stated in 1931 that “… the 
Forest Department was at one time inclined to go nap on gums but it is now on the high road to 
complete recovery from any complaint of Eucalyto mania.”384 Nicholson was either unaware of the 
department’s current plans, as the planting policy at that time was clearly focused on eucalypts, or, 
more realistically, in this statement he was trying to deflect criticism from what he thought a sound 
plan. This reversal of the planting policy to exotic fuel was in fact motivated by pressure from the 
Chamber of Commerce who voiced their concerns in 1925 about possible future shortages of fuel 
for both domestic and industrial use.385 The Uganda Railway significantly added to these complaints 
by citing that approximately 18 per cent of its expenditure in 1925 was devoted to fuel, as compared 
to 5.17 per cent for South African Railways. The cost was largely due to the necessity in using coal 
rather than woodfuel because of supply issues.386 Thereafter, the Forest Department sought to 
expand the amount of fuel it was producing and supplying to the railway; a policy spurred on by 
assurances made in 1925 from the Uganda Railway that it would rely on woodfuel as long as it was 
forthcoming.387     
This objective, however, was never really met. Government forest reserves, particularly the 
fuel plantations established in proximity to the railway, were not the sole source of woodfuel to the 
railway. Woodfuel destined for railway use was also drawn from forests on private land, forests 
within native reserves and from the bush land between the coast and Nairobi. In 1925, only 17 per 
cent of the railway’s woodfuel came from the forest reserves. With the provision of fuel to the 
railway being one of the main rationales behind maintaining a Forest Department within the colony, 
the department became determined to increase this percentage. By 1930 the proportion of 
woodfuel delivered to the railway from government reserves had risen to 55 per cent, yet it then 
fell, wavering between 44 and 49 per cent for the next several years. It did not rise again until the 
massive level of forest exploitation during the Second World War, coupled with the unavailability 
of coal, made the reserves the main source of woodfuel to the railway.388 The Uganda Railway was 
never fully committed to wood as its primary fuel and by the 1930s it was spending significantly 
                                                                
384 Nicholson, ‘The Future of Forestry in Kenya’, 37. The phrase “go nap” would here appear to be related to the 
equestrian use of the phrase to denote a disobedient horse, therefore the Forest Department was previously 
somewhat out of control in its planting policy. Alternatively, Nicholson may have been using the phrase to suggest 
the department was risking its future on a single policy (the phrase being a back formation from ‘Napoleon’). His 
extension of the metaphor with “high road” suggests the first meaning.   
385 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1925, 11. 
386 ‘Legislative Council Debates, Vol. 2, 1925’ (Hansard, Nairobi, 29 October 1925), 798. 
387 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1925, 18. 
388 Forest Department Annual Reports, 1925-1936. After 1936 the Forest Department did not provide complete 
statistics on this issue. The annual reports of the Uganda Railway only present actual woodfuel use rather than 
amount received which does not allow extrapolation. 
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more of its expenditure on importing coal from South Africa than it was on woodfuel.389 Despite the 
railway’s earlier assurance that it could absorb the fuel output of the forests, by 1930 it was 
increasingly procuring and deploying heavier, more powerful engines that were more suited to coal 
than woodfuel.390  
The early recession years of the 1930s were a reprieve in terms of fuel sales for the Forest 
Department. Faltering coal supplies forced the railway to fall back onto using woodfuel. This 
reprieve was repeated during the Second World War, but it did not stop the overall trend away 
from woodfuel use by the railway and in 1945 the Uganda Railway announced the total switchover 
of its engines to oil.391 In 1938 the Forest Department complained that the railway would give no 
                                                                
389 Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours, ‘Report of the General Manager on the Administration of the Railways 
and Harbours’ (Nairobi Government Printer, 1939), 48, CO 544/54, TNA. In 1933 the railway was spending £71,633 
per annum on coal compared to £46,436 on wood. By 1938, a year when there were no problems in fulfilling all of 
the railway’s contracts for woodfuel, the expenditure on wood was £55,523 whereas coal had reached £182,312.  
390 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest Department, 1930 (Nairobi Government Printer, 1930), 6. 
The engines in question were most likely of the Garratt type, a large, articulated, and very powerful engine suited to 
narrow gauge railways such as Kenya’s.  
391 Kenya Forest Department, Report of the Forest Department for the Years 1945-1947 (Nairobi Government Printer, 
1947), 28. The railway would begin the total switchover of its engines to oil rather than coal or wood in 1948, a 
change it announced in 1945. 
  
Figure 2-2. Sales of timber and fuel that accrued to the Forest Department. Source: Annual Reports of the Forest 
Department. Discrete data on timber and fuel sales are limited in the records to 1928-1942. 
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estimate of its future requirements or whether, indeed, it planned to continue using woodfuel.392 
With between 60 and 80 per cent of the fuel extracted from the forest reserves being utilised by the 
railway during the 1930s (figure 2.2), a reduction in the railway’s demand for fuel would have 
resulted in large acreages going unexploited. The department was clearly aware of the danger of 
over-reliance on the railway as a customer for its woods, and the switchover in the planting policy 
to cypress for timber rather than eucalypts for fuel in 1934 should be seen within this context; the 
Forest Department had to increasingly turn its attention toward the timber markets if its operations 
were to remain relevant.  
 
2.2.2 Timber industry 
The new emphasis on exotic softwoods was officially announced by the department in 1936. The 
hope was that as it was a general utility softwood, cypress might find a local market by replacing 
indigenous podo, which was found to be brittle in working, liable to splitting, and slow to grow.393 
As figure 2.2 illustrates, this change in planting policy, which would remain in effect until the end 
of this period, coincided with an upturn in the revenues the department collected from the sale of 
timber from its forests. This rise in sales represented a gradual recovery from the years of 
depression that had plagued the timber industry within Kenya.  
The laissez-faire approach of the colonial government and the Forest Department toward the 
development of the timber industry decreased its ability to weather the depression. Prior to the 
1930s the Forest Department took a minimal role in the timber industry; its main responsibility 
was ensuring sawmills were only taking those trees designated by forest officers in forest reserves 
and on private land and granting sawmilling licenses. By 1928 there were 35 sawmills operating in 
forest reserves and a further ten in private forests (outside department oversight), owned by 22 
firms. In that same year two sawmills ended their operations because of the intensity of competition 
between the mills.394 The ultimate problem in the second half of the 1920s was of massive 
oversupply within the timber industry, which compelled some mills to hold timber in stock in the 
hope of price increases. When the stock-retaining mills reached dire straits they dumped their 
timber on the local market at even lower prices. With the timber market flooded, mills operated at 
under capacity, suspending their operations or working on short time. By 1931, the Forest 
Department reported that many mills “had practically closed down.”395 Many mills could not afford 
to pay the required royalties on timber processed. The Forest Department had an outstanding 
account with British East Africa Saw Mills, for example, that rose from 7,795 Kenyan shillings in 
                                                                
392 H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests) to Chief Secretary (Nairobi), ‘Economic Development Programme’, 19 July 
1938, 8, VF/4/2, KNA. 
393 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest Department, 1935 (Nairobi Government Printer, 1935), 
14–18; Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest Department, 1936 (Nairobi Government Printer, 
1936). 
394 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest Department, 1928 (Nairobi Government Printer, 1928), 6. 
395 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1929, 1931, 5. 
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January 1931 to 10,400 Kenyan shillings eight months later.396 In 1935 the number of mills working 
in the forest reserves had fallen to 23, although the number of small mills operating in private 
forests had increased to 14. Clearly, the settler farmer owners of the small, private forest mills were 
using their forest resources to help bring their farms through the depression. As the Forest 
Department argued, the effect of these private forest mills was detrimental to the wider sawmilling 
industry, as the additional output of timber continued to restrain prices.397  
Problems within this industry, however, were compounded by the government. Prior to 1932 
there was little sense of coordination between sawmilling firms. The formation of the East African 
Timber Co-operative Society (widely known as Timsales) in 1932 under the leadership of 
Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck,398 the unofficial leader of the colony’s white settlers, marked the 
beginning of proper co-operation between the mills and gave new direction to the industry. 
Through this organisation, sawmillers’ frustrations regarding the government’s lacklustre support 
to their industry were expressed. Moreover, evidence from a 1938 meeting between Timsales and 
the government, reported by the Conservator of Forests, Harold Gardner, suggests that it had been 
the government that had “induced” the sawmillers to expand their operations and production with 
the aid of bank loans in the mid-1920s. Therefore, the problems of oversupply and competition that 
followed were linked to this directive.399 Whereas in their management of the forests they strove 
to be scientific, the Forest Department’s early involvement with the business of exploitation was 
simplistic. The department appears to have taken the view that, as long as production increased the 
output would be absorbed on the local and foreign markets: its goals were to increase exploitation 
and expand its revenue to drive its planting programme. Based on the estimated forest capital,400 
in 1928 the department argued:  
… we could well afford to double or treble our present rate of cutting, and, in fact, until this is done 
a large potential and legitimate revenue is being lost and capital is lying idle.401   
The sawmill owners were apparently blinded by a belief that simply extracting the natural wealth 
of a colony could lead to riches, and so they followed the government’s (mis)direction until it led 
many of them to ruin in the 1930s.  
The muted development of Kenya’s domestic timber market was symptomatic of the 
government’s general policy of non-interference with the timber industry and the industry’s own 
reluctance to engage capital in schemes of development or co-operation. Although the government 
                                                                
396 H.M. Gardner (Conservator) to Attorney General (Nairobi), 5 October 1931, FOR/1/346, KNA. 
397 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1935, 9. 
398 See section 2.3.3, below, for discussion of Cavendish-Bentinck’s opposition to forestry activities. 
399 ‘Minutes of a Meeting between C.R. Lockhart (Financial Secretary), H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests), F.W. 
Cavendish-Bentinck (Chairman – E.A. Timber Co-Operative Soc. Ltd.), W.J. Beeston (Director - E.A. Timber Co-Op), 
B.R. Hoddinott (Director - E.A. Timber Co-Op), A.Q. Roberts (Director - E.A. Timber Co-Op), and H.W. Gill (General 
Manager – E.A. Timber Co-Op)’ (Secretariat, Nairobi, 4 October 1938), 2, FOR/1/241, KNA. 
400 ‘Forest capital’ refers to the calculated quantity of timber in a forest that could be exploited. 
401 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1928, 6. 
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imposed an import duty on timbers to protect the local market from overseas competition, timber 
imported by or for the government (of Kenya and Uganda) was excluded from this tariff.402 
Statistics are sporadic, but between 1926 and 1929 this meant 34 to 45 per cent of all the timber 
imported into the colony was tariff-free. Rather than supporting an ailing sawmilling industry, the 
government was therefore directly undermining it.403  
Teak typically made up a large proportion of these imports (22 per cent in 1928), causing the 
Forest Department to argue, “teak is a luxury, not a necessity”404 and that local timbers could fulfil 
the same purpose. It called on the growing network of scientific knowledge to support its claims, 
with research at the Forest Products Research Laboratory at Princes Risborough in England on 
African olive (musharagi; Olea hochstetteri) and camphor (muzaiti; Ocotea usambarensis). Six years 
                                                                
402 The timber tariff stood at 50 per cent in 1922 but was reduced to 30 per cent in 1923, a rate that held for the rest 
of the period covered by this chapter. Significantly, plywood and similarly manufactured woods were excluded from 
this duty, making it unfeasible to develop local alternatives to these manufactured woods. The Customs Tariff 
Ordinance, 1922; The Customs Tariff Ordinance, 1923.  
403 The lack of development of eucalyptus as telegraph poles was also indicative of the low priority the Forest 
Department placed on fostering the local market. Eucalypts were extensively used by the army during the First 
World War as telegraph poles but this use did not continue after hostilities ceased. In 1922, Kenya Creosoting Co. 
Ltd. sought Forest Department cooperation in an experiment in creosoting eucalypts for pole use and experiments 
were begun in 1924. When the Chief Telegraph Engineer contacted the department in 1927 about the results of 
these experiments, the reply he received was that no one knew what had become of the experiment. In the same 
year Equator Saw Mills began supplying creosoted poles from the indigenous trees it cut, although the short life of 
these once erected meant that iron poles were beginning to be used by 1930. See correspondence within QB/1/291, 
KNA.  
404 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1928, 8. Teak was highly valued for its adaptability, strength, and 
natural durability in harsh climates and to pest attack. 
 
Figure 2-3. Import and export value per annum. Sources: Annual Reports of the Forest Department. 
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later, however, commercial tests of these woods were still ongoing and preliminary results 
disappointing. Olive suffered from shrinkage, while both timbers were susceptible to termite 
attack.405 Although government usage of imports did fall slightly in the early 1930s, 
overwhelmingly the government and private sector continued to rely on imported teak and other 
timbers during and after the recession (Figure 2-3). 406  
Development of the local timber market was an essential foundation to the building of market 
share for Kenya’s timbers on the export market. In his report on forestry in Kenya, Nicholson urged 
concentration on the domestic market, believing it to be the sole source of expanding revenue in 
the near future as preparing timbers for export would require a great deal of research.407 In 1934, 
five years after Nicholson had toured Kenya, Assistant Conservator Samuel Wimbush reported on 
the export market and determined that even if the market were to expand for good quality timber 
from Kenya, “the greater portion” of the output of the mills would have to be disposed of locally 
because that greater portion was of too low quality to export.408 Phillip Cunliffe-Lister, the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, also urged local development because of the assistance it would give to 
exports: 
…if a local market can be properly organised to make use of some of the lower grade timber, the 
cost of extraction of the higher grades can be reduced, which may enable them to compete 
successfully in the English market.409 
To the colonial secretary, establishing the internal market was a “necessary preliminary” to 
developing exports.410 The somewhat greater utilisation of local timber by the government in the 
early 1930s was part of this realisation.  
The Forest Department considered local demand to have been led by the colony’s white 
settlers only. Correspondence between the department and organisations such as Timsales makes 
                                                                
405 H.M. Gardner (Conservator) to Secretary of Lumberman’s Association of East Africa, 8 March 1933, FOR/1/239, 
KNA; Wimbush, Report on Possibilities of Export of Kenya Timbers to England, 2–4; Streets and Troup, Exotic Forest 
Trees in the British Commonwealth, 39. 
406 In 1931 Gardner drew public attention to the matter of timber imports in the East African Standard. Despite this 
the government utilised 19 per cent of imported timbers in that year, with the bulk (20 per cent) of these being teak. 
The principle users were probably the Uganda Railway and Public Works Department. Following this, between 1931 
and 1934 (after which records on government utilisation are no longer available), the government did make a 
concerted effort to increase its usage of local timber and its take of imported timber fell to single figures. Partly, this 
was because of its significantly curtailed public building programme owing to the general depression, but it was 
also representative of a government keen to reduce costs and make moves toward reducing the colony’s trade 
deficit, which stood at £1.9 million in 1935. Zwanenberg and King indicate that Kenya was running a trade deficit 
between 1923 (£1.3 million) and 1970 (£48.1 million). This did reduce in the late 1930s, being £500,000 in 1939, 
but rose rapidly thereafter, being £43.5 million in 1955. Although lack of data on government usage rules out a 
definite conclusion that the government was again turning to imports rather than domestic sources of timber after 
the depression, this rise in imports does indicate a general need for foreign timbers within the colony and therefore 
the continued failure of the local market to satisfy its customers. The Lumberman’s Association of East Africa, 
‘Bulletin No. 42’, 11 May 1931, QB/1/281, KNA. R. V. Zwanenberg and Anne King, An Economic History of Kenya and 
Uganda 1800-1970 (London: Macmillan, 1975), 194–97. 
407 Nicholson, ‘The Future of Forestry in Kenya’, 63. 
408 Wimbush, Report on Possibilities of Export of Kenya Timbers to England, 18. 
409 P. Cunliffe-Lister (Colonial Secretary) to Sir Joseph Byrne (Governor, Kenya), 4 March 1933, FOR/1/239, KNA. 
410 Ibid. 
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no mention of the timber needs of the country’s sizable Indian population and how this could have 
been developed. As regards the African portion of the local market, the only explorations to be 
performed were by the industry itself. In 1930 the Lumberman’s Association of East Africa 
conducted enquires into the state of the African demand for timber within South Nyeri.411 The 
response was not encouraging. The state of the economy meant, regarding sawn timber, boxes, and 
stools, “the demand for such things is not very effective.”412 It was a reflection of the wider African 
disinterest in products of the colonial economy; a trend that was bucked only by wealthier Africans 
such as Chief Nderi and Chief Murigo of South Nyeri, who both purchased timber from sawmills “for 
houses, or sheds and garages, of a primitive type of course.”413 African housing was marked by its 
continuity with traditional building methods that had little need for the products of the sawmills. 
From the timber industry’s perspective, an opportunity was lost as the government did little to 
push the development of African housing before 1945.414 Developing African interest in the 
products of the colonial timber industry depended not just on the economic status of Africans but 
on providing convincing arguments for the adoption of timber products over already cheap and 
plentiful materials that Africans were experienced in using. There is no evidence that the timber 
industry tried to make such arguments, and the Forest Department did not even try to push its own 
forest squatter employees to change their building habits.415 In short, as the majority of Africans in 
Kenya continued to use traditional building materials and colonial actors remained uninformed 
about their material needs, the local market for timber was largely restricted to demand from the 
government, settlers, and Indians living and working within Kenya.416  
                                                                
411 In contrast to the larger Timsales, the Lumberman’s Association of East Africa operated without capital or 
facilities to laisse between the major sawmilling firms and mainly served an advisory function on matters of 
government timber policy. It is unclear why the Lumberman’s Association conducted its enquiries in South Nyeri, 
and that location only. Speculatively, being situated close to the vast forests of the Aberdares and Mount Kenya, 
which were both of course being exploited, South Nyeri may have been seen as having the most developed African 
demand for timber. 
412 The Lumberman’s Association of East Africa, ‘Bulletin No. 26’, 24 July 1930, 2, QB/1/281, KNA. 
413 Ibid., 1. 
414 Wattle and daub or grass huts with thatched roofs dominated, even in areas directly exposed to colonial housing 
influences such as plantations and settler farms. Where ‘modern’ materials were employed, the still ubiquitous 
corrugated iron dominated over the wooden board and roof shingle. Alison Hay and Richard Harris, ‘“Shauri Ya Sera 
Kali”: The Colonial Regime of Urban Housing in Kenya to 1939’, Urban History 34, no. 3 (December 2007): 504–530, 
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This deficiency in local development was confirmed to the department by a report on forestry 
in India by James Rammell, Senior Assistant Conservator of Forests. Rammell’s tour of India in 
1933-34 and subsequent report were indicative of increasing metropolitan interest in developing 
empire forestry, although this interest did not always extend to financial assistance: Rammell’s tour 
was funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. In India, Rammell observed, internal demand 
for timber was large and steady, allowing a sustainable, predictable yield to be utilised each year 
and forming a solid foundation for forest development. He saw this as a fundamental difference to 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Natural pencil cedar, Juniperus procera, in the Kinangop Forest, southern Aberdares, c.1937. The figure 
at the base of the central tree indicates the scale of this mature forest. Photo by H.M. Gardner, copyright and 
reproduced with permission of Commonwealth Forestry Association. Source: S. H. Wimbush, ‘Natural Succession 
in the Pencil Cedar Forest of Kenya Colony’, Empire Forestry Journal, 1937, 49–53. 
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Kenya, where he complained that of the output of timber “the native [is] using little of it.”417 The 
timber industry in Kenya, Rammell argued, was tied to the European population, “whose varying 
fortunes it must follow. In good years it is high, and soon after may be almost non-existent.”418 
Rammell suggested that local demand, African demand, for forest products could be increased by 
looking beyond scientific forestry’s limited view of forests’ value that encompassed only timber, 
woodfuel, and water catchment. That is, investigating the many local African uses for plants and 
tree products and expanding on these.419 The Forest Department in Kenya, however, made no 
moves in that direction.  
Greater government and metropolitan interest in developing Kenya’s timber industry came 
with the Great Depression. The rhetoric of local market development and its implied modernisation 
of African lifestyles however were eclipsed by desire to encourage exports and trade within the 
empire. Important technical issues undermined this development, however, as Kenya’s mainly 
unseasoned timber was of notoriously poor quality. While some sawmills could profit by producing 
roughly cut, unseasoned timbers for the local market, the failure of some and overall poor financial 
performance of the sawmills indicates this was a state of affairs that could not continue indefinitely. 
The low cost of this timber when sold locally no doubt compensated the buyer somewhat for the 
poor quality of the product, especially when the timber would have to be replaced comparatively 
sooner because it was unseasoned. However, Nicholson argued this low cost, low quality approach 
meant that: 
… the timber industry may be heading to disaster as continuation on the same lines will lead to 
automatic self extinction or to revolt on the part of the public at having to bear the burden of 
supporting an industry which fails to supply their needs.420 
This was a situation reflected in Kenya’s principle export timber, pencil cedar (Juniperus procera), 
which determined the colony’s position as a timber exporter. The overall annual value of exports of 
timber closely paralleled that of cedar (Figure 2-3) since cedar comprised between 26 and 91 per 
cent of the total value of timber exports from the colony between 1925 and 1946. At the end of the 
1920s the market for cedar, which was primarily used in pencil manufacture in competition against 
timbers from the United States, suffered a decline. This was due to the sudden appearance of 
cheaper substitutes to the traditional cedar on the market and their uptake by pencil manufacturers 
in the UK.421 Although the export value of cedar recovered somewhat throughout the 1930s, it only 
returned to its 1925 level in 1938 after dipping again in 1935 following the liquidation of the 
London company that distributed Kenya cedar in England.422  
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Although export quantities of what the department classified as ‘other timber’ (all species 
except mangrove and cedar) often outstripped pencil cedar, in value they were typically lower. 
Between 1927 and 1939, when statistics are available on destination countries for exports of 
timber, the vast majority of this other timber was sent to Uganda and Tanganyika, compensating 
for the under-exploitation of forests in those colonies. By 1936 some of this timber had found a 
market in South Africa and the United Kingdom, with one and 2 per cent of exports of other timber 
going to those countries, respectively.423  South Africa had been held up as an ideal destination for 
Kenyan timbers as early as 1909, when Hutchins wrote on the potential market at length.424 This 
trade was due not to government action but the presence of Timsales in the East Africa pavilion of 
the Johannesburg Exhibition in 1936.425 Although some recipients in South Africa seemed pleased 
with the quality of East African timbers and wanted more,426 this was hindered by apparent 
protection of the existing South African timber market. This took the form of the refusal of the South 
African Railways and Harbours Administration to grant special transportation rates to East African 
timber and a similar rejection by the South African Department of Trade and Industries to lower 
timber import duties.427 
The failure to compete in South Africa was symptomatic of the reality that throughout this 
period Kenya was attempting to find a place within an efficient and competitive international 
timber market. As metropolitan forces in the form of the Empire Timbers Committee, backed by 
Cunliffe-Lister, sought to expand the contribution of timbers from the empire to the timber trade 
within Britain, it was realised that “the Empire is in the main competing against a highly organised 
foreign trade”428 dominated by the United States and Europe. Exports of Kenya timbers totalled just 
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£17,520 out of the £37,128,700 worth of timber that the UK imported in 1939.429 Attempts to 
establish pencil cedar in this market were dependent on it being of high enough quality to compete 
with the highly efficient, mechanised, and cheap industry in other countries. However, the pencil 
cedar produced in Kenya had numerous quality issues. After trial shipments were made to the US 
in 1924, the American manufacturers refused to process the timber or order more because of the 
considerable amount of warping that it had suffered.430 This was repeated in 1930, with Alpco 
Pencils Ltd., in England reporting it was “obliged to destroy a considerable proportion of the slats 
[of Kenya cedar],”431 because the cedar was either unseasoned or non-uniform in thickness. In 
1933, the director of the Forest Products Research Laboratory at Princes Risborough in England 
argued that issues such as this gave specific timbers and the colonies they came from a “very bad 
name”432 within the international timber industry. The creation of this negative reputation 
represented an almost insurmountable obstacle to the success of timbers like the pencil cedar. 
The Forest Department was aware of the quality issues of Kenya’s timbers. In the 1920s it 
sought to remedy this situation by urging the mills to build seasoning facilities; an initiative that it 
also stated in its annual reports, thereby publically shaming the mills and establishing that the 
department itself was not responsible for the poor state of production.433 The Uganda Railway and 
Public Works Department both began building their own seasoning facilities by 1927 in order to 
produce timber more suited to their uses and act as an example to the sawmillers. The dire financial 
condition of the majority of sawmillers from the late 1920s to mid-1930s meant, however, that few 
could follow suit. In 1931, the Public Works Department attempted to ease the situation by 
producing a report on kiln seasoning of timber based on its own experience, but the main issue 
remained the sawmillers’ lack of capital.434 The creation of Timsales in 1932 began to improve this 
situation.435 Timsales would build its own seasoning facilities, coordinate mills to handle larger 
orders, attempt to ensure consistency in cutting and sizing, and explore new markets (notably, 
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South Africa).436 By 1938, 85 per cent of the timber trade originating in the forests reserves was 
handled by Timsales.437 
It was metropolitan concern for the development of Kenya’s timber exports that drove greater 
Forest Department and wider government intervention in the industry. Secretary of State for the 
Colonies Cunliffe-Lister took a keen interest in the matter and believed firmly in the “exceptional 
opportunity of developing markets for Empire timbers in the United Kingdom.”438 Conditions for 
this were made even more favourable as Cunliffe-Lister was a supporter of tariff reform and 
ensured, as of 1932, that timber imported into Britain from the empire was tariff-free, while foreign 
timber was subjected to a ten per cent import duty.439 With the new interest of London in forest 
development within Kenya, the post of Forest Research and Utilisation Officer was created within 
the Forest Department. Initially planned to serve Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, the uneven 
development of the timber industry in these colonies (with Kenya’s industry being comparatively 
advanced) led to Kenya eventually being granted its own officer. Samuel Wimbush, Assistant 
Conservator, was promoted to the role in 1933 and began studying timber utilisation and the 
timber trade in England under the auspices of the Colonial Development Fund.440 On his return to 
Kenya in 1934 he set about disseminating the information he had gathered, published a report on 
the possibility of exporting Kenya timbers to England, and attempted to coordinate the timber 
industries across the East African colonies.441  
Greater government commitment to financially aiding the enterprises of the settlers occurred 
with the creation of the Land Bank in 1930. Loans given by the Land Bank, however, were more 
akin to financial aid to see farmers through the depression than sources of capital that settlers could 
use to modernise their operations, farm or sawmill.442 Government involvement in fostering the 
timber export industry was equally muted. In 1933, a 60 per cent refund was granted on the timber 
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royalty sawmillers’ paid to the department if that timber was exported. Such a policy fit well with 
the government’s disinclination toward aiding industrial development apart from tariff measures 
prior to the Second World War, a general colonial attitude stemming from a mindset of protection 
toward metropolitan industry.443 This expanded to a 100 per cent royalty rebate on exported 
timber in 1935. The timber industry complained, however, that this did little for the industry as the 
rebates were granted on processed timber whereas the royalty was paid on measurement of the 
log. In reality, the rebate received typically amounted to approximately a third of the royalty the 
mill had to pay the Forest Department. The failure of the rebate approach led to the creation in 1938 
of the Timber Export Development Grant of £1,000 per annum, paid to Timsales. With this, capital 
finally became available for more widespread uptake of seasoning facilities, although the outbreak 
of war and the huge military demand for timber of any quality delayed such development once 
again.444      
These moves to increase government assistance to the timber industry and position the Forest 
Department as a central source of guidance were only somewhat successful. Partly this was a result 
of the continued realities of the poor financial positions of the Forest Department and the timber 
industry. Wimbush, for example, was expected to split his time between the considerable duties of 
an assistant conservator and his new role as utilisation and research officer. His influence was 
therefore rather limited and it is not surprising that complaints of poor quality timber were still 
forthcoming in 1938.445 With little appreciation for the financial troubles of the sawmillers, a 1937 
Forest Department statement characterised the industry as backward and ungrateful: 
… as a whole the saw-millers are unwilling to take much trouble in this direction [of seasoning]. 
… It is often forgotten that the trade is protected by a high import duty and that when urging on 
Government the retention of this duty, one of the main arguments of the trade was that it would 
enable saw-millers to provide the public with seasoned timber.446 
Imports during the war were cut to virtually nil, as were exports of all timbers except for pencil 
cedar (Figure 2-3). All local domestic and military needs for timber were therefore met by the vastly 
increased production of timber from the sawmills, which benefitted from the fixed prices set by the 
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1939 Defence Regulations (Timber Control). The Forest Department benefitted from the war 
through the creation of a Forest Replanting Fund (later Forest Replanting and Development Fund) 
in 1941 that was initially intended just to cover the costs of reforesting the large areas clear-cut 
during the war. The department ensured that royalties were charged on timber sold to the military, 
which had priority over all other customers, with the excess revenue from these royalties being 
sunk into the fund. When the fund was finally closed after military need ended in 1947, its balance 
stood at £523,150.447 The fund would allow the department to pursue a forest development policy 
in the post-war period far in excess of simply replanting the cleared forest areas.448   
 
2.2.3 Enumeration and Expansion 
Though the Forest Department maintained throughout this period that the annual exploitation of 
the colony’s forests was not exceeding the rate of regeneration it did not in fact have anything like 
an accurate assessment of the quantity of timber contained in the forests. Its statements on 
exploitation being sustainable were, therefore, based purely on casual observation not scientific 
enumeration. The department was well aware of this situation and insisted in 1933 that a 
comprehensive timber survey “is essential before a real export trade can be developed with any 
confidence.”449 It was impossible, for example, for the department to estimate how much of a given 
indigenous timber could be exported or whether it was worth developing a market for it before the 
actual quantity of standing timber was known. It was a matter that Nicholson had also brought 
attention to in his assessment of forestry in Kenya, although he was adamant that a full forest survey 
must be completed to allow proper classification of conservation (for climatic reasons) forests, land 
to be afforested, and what was needed to meet the needs of the colony.450 Similarly, Cunliffe-Lister 
also realised its necessity, arguing in 1932 that failing an adequate survey being done “the interest 
in Colonial timbers, which is now developing amongst timber users in this country [i.e. the UK], will 
rapidly evaporate.”451 The following year, Gardner expressed to the colonial secretary that although 
“progress at present is slow”452 he had hopes of accelerating the matter. No such acceleration came 
in this period. By 1938, Gardner admitted, “the actual enumerations are very inadequate as yet.”453  
Piecemeal surveying was carried out, however this was prioritised to select forests only as the 
stretched resources of the department meant that the level of surveying truly required for scientific 
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forestry, such as the comprehensive national survey proposed by Nicholson, could never be done. 
This was connected to the larger issue of the continued inadequacies in the Forest Department’s 
working plans. Such plans, formed atop adequate surveys, would have allowed the ideal of scientific 
forest development to take place. At the end of the 1920s, “the whole position in Kenya is 
unsatisfactory as proper working plans have not yet been prepared.”454 Working plans, tellingly 
described as planting plans by the department, were created for the smaller, more easily worked 
and accessible forests such as Ngong and Karura near Nairobi, but for the majority of the forests 
there were none. The department itself argued that working plans should be secondary to surveys 
of standing timber as the level of exploitation was at such a low level, it maintained, that working 
plans to prevent over-exploitation were not strictly needed.455 In reality, this was a position that 
suited a department which was so deficient in staff levels that it was unable to carry out what 
Nicholson, and Troup before him, considered to be core, indispensable aspects of scientific forest 
management. In the early 1930s the department did have the services of two forest surveyors, 
employed in the Survey Department, who assisted with extending surveys in the most economically 
important forest areas and in areas that were scheduled to be redefined following the Land 
Commission report of 1934. Following the recommendations of the 1935 Select Committee on 
Economy, these surveyor positions were abolished, a move which the annual report for that year 
described as a “retrograde step.”456 The department would not have the services of a full-time 
surveyor again until 1939, and even then much of his time was engaged with re-surveying 
plantations that had been poorly surveyed by inadequately trained forest officers.457 
The Forest Department was therefore following a policy of expanding exploitation without 
adequate development of the local and export markets to absorb the results and without a 
comprehensive, scientific assessment of the country’s standing stock of timber. This was despite 
recommendations from forestry advisors (most particularly Nicholson) that such a survey must 
come first. It was perhaps because of this contradiction that the Forest Department continued to 
expand government forest reserves and, during the 1930s, the control of forests within the native 
reserves. 
Between the mid-1920s and the end of the Second World War the Forest Department 
expanded the area over which it had legal control by approximately 42 per cent, increasing from 
3,911 square miles in 1926 to 5,713 in 1944. This easily compensated for the reduction of 
approximately 31 square miles during the mid-1930s owing to redistribution of land in the wake 
of the Kenya Land Commission and moves to eliminate non-forested land (that is, grassland, 
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moorland, rocky ground) from departmental control.458 However, in 1928 Nicholson estimated that 
the colony as a whole only had 1,471 square miles of merchantable forest, which included forest 
land not already gazetted to Forest Department control, while ‘merchantable forest’ meant forest 
that contained trees that could be accessed economically and had utility as either timber or 
woodfuel. Once again, of course, these were estimates based on incomplete surveys of the actual 
composition of the forests. Nevertheless, based on his projections of population growth, Nicholson 
determined that Kenya would require 3,125 square miles of merchantable timber to meet its needs, 
although he did not state when needs would reach the level to necessitate this area of exploitable 
forest.459 While the figures Nicholson presented were never again reproduced in any publication of 
the Forest Department, the attitude behind them was. It was a core belief within the department 
that any and all opportunities for the expansion of exploitable or conservation forest should be 
taken. In 1938, Gardner drew the chief secretary of the colony’s attention to Kenya’s comparatively 
low percentage of forest cover, which amounted to approximately two and a half per cent of its land 
(8 per cent if the more arid northern areas of Kenya were excluded), when “it is generally 
considered to be desirable that for the healthy development of a country at least 15% of the area 
should be maintained permanently under forest.”460 His figure of 15 per cent was based on 
consideration that in “highly developed countries”461 such as Germany, France, and Japan the 
percentage was far above this (26 per cent, 18 per cent, and 55 per cent, respectively). His inclusion 
of these figures in an economic development report that dealt primarily with the timber industry is 
significant. Gardner’s argument was clear: if the local and export timber industry in Kenya was to 
be a success, let alone maintain the colonial apparatus that had used timber extensively, then the 
colony must push ahead and expand the forested area. Here, again, was the Forest Department’s 
response to the declining use of woodfuel by the railway; forestry was to remain relevant because 
it was essential in any ‘highly developed’ country. As well as afforesting denuded and forest-less 
areas, dealt with in the following discussion of the shamba system, Gardner stated: “This can be 
done … by reserving all remaining forest which is still undemarcated. This I consider urgent.”462 
Ultimately, this objective lay behind the extension of Forest Department control over forests 
found within the native reserves. The proclamation of native forest reserves increased significantly 
in the 20 years preceding the Second World War. By the time of preliminary surveys of the forests 
within native reserves, in 1930, the department was theoretically responsible for the management 
of 119 square miles of these. This figure would rise to 387 square miles by 1938, when native 
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reserve forests accounted for 7 per cent of government-controlled forests.463 This was a process 
accelerated in the 1930s by the Forest Department’s previous inattention to forests within the 
native reserves, the role of afforestation in soil conservation, increased government interest in the 
economic reality of forestry, and the Forest Department’s reinvigorated focus on securing control 
over forests. Such control had, in fact, been proposed as early as 1914 by John Ainsworth, future 
Chief Native Commissioner: 
Inasmuch as the Native do not, in the great majority of cases realise the great climatic and 
economic value resulting from the proper preservation of Forests, and as their methods, if left to 
themselves, are extremely wasteful, and harmful, and have no regard to the claims of posterity, 
such Forests must be subjected to a regular form of supervision and control.464 
Ainsworth’s memorandum set general government policy on the matter of forests within native 
reserves, but the Forest Department expended little energy toward putting this policy into effect 
under Battiscombe’s leadership. In 1924 the Native Affairs Department complained of the 
unsatisfactory position:  
Not only is there no organisation for the conservation and judicious exploitation of existing native 
forests, but there is no staff available to undertake or even to supervise the work of reafforesating 
denuded areas.465 
Such inattention was symptomatic of the Forest Department’s attitude toward the purpose of 
forestry. Despite deploying the utilitarian argument that forestry was for the benefit of the whole 
colony, the department largely ignored the needs of the African reserves and concentrated on 
meeting the needs of the colonial government. Realising that colonial needs required an even more 
extensive area of forest, and finding a government alert to the role of trees in countering soil 
erosion, Gardner began to reverse this situation, although he was no doubt reminded of this by the 
criticism Nicholson levelled at the department for allowing its focus to fall too strongly on Crown 
forests to the detriment of those in the native reserves.466 By 1930 the fundamentals of the system 
of Native forest reserves were in place: Forest Department expenditure was used for management 
and afforestation and it collected all royalties and licence fees, while any profit from these was 
returned to the respective Local Native Council.467 While the Forest Department was accused of 
inattention toward native reserve forests, the same certainly cannot be said of the system of 
                                                                
463 For an examination of how local politics played out in the formation of these reserves, including how African 
elites were able to exploit reserve creation for their own benefit, see Otieno, ‘Forest Politics in Colonial and 
Postcolonial Kenya, 1940-1990s’; Otieno, ‘Conjunction and Disjunction’. 
464 John Ainsworth, ‘Memorandum by Mr. Ainsworth Regarding Forests in Native Reserves’ 2 March 1914, 1, 
PC/COAST/1/2/49, KNA. This proposal fitted well with Ainsworth’s general attitude toward colonial rule, in which  
“Whatever our policy, whatever our ideal as regards the destiny of the native races there must and can be only 
fundamental as regards rule, and that is that the white-man must be paramount. From this axiom there can be no 
divergence.” (John Ainsworth, ‘The Black-Man and the White-Man in East Africa. Some Ideas and Suggestions for the 
Future Based on Past and Present Requirements and Experiences’ n.d., MSS.Afr.s.382, Oxford: Bodleian Library.)  
465 Native Affairs Department, Annual Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1924 (Nairobi Government Printer, 
1924), 23–24. 
466 Nicholson, ‘The Future of Forestry in Kenya’, 11. 
467 Native Affairs Department, Annual Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1930 (Nairobi Government Printer, 
1930), 55. 
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afforestation it developed to meet the goal of forest expansion and sustainable exploitation: the 
shamba system.    
 
2.2.4 The Economic Imperative of Shamba 
The success or failure of forestry within Kenya rested on the shamba system. If the Forest 
Department was to fulfil that most essential element of modern forestry, sustainable exploitation 
that involved compensation for the loss of forest capital via the establishment of new trees, it 
needed a large and inexpensive labour supply to carry out the very labour-intensive tasks of 
afforestation and reforestation.468 The financial trials of the first quarter century of the 
department’s existence had shown to foresters that the atmosphere of sometimes open hostility if 
not suspicion toward forestry that permeated through Kenya meant forestry within the colony had 
always to justify and prove its economic worth. This was only possible because the department was 
able to redirect indigenous shifting cultivation practices into a remarkably efficient form of 
reafforestation. Shamba made the core goals of forestry in Kenya economically feasible.  
The primary duty of shamba squatters employed by the department was the establishment of 
new plantations in government forest reserves that had already been exploited or were suitable for 
afforestation. Duties also included the repair and maintenance of existing plantations as well as 
assisting the natural regeneration of indigenous trees by clearing weeds and creepers, and the 
prevention and fighting of forest fires. The shamba squatters were the department’s primary 
workforce and, as shown in Table 2-1, the use of these squatters was remarkably economic in 
comparison to the employment of wage labour, which the department used in those areas (such as 
the coastal forests) where it was difficult or impossible to recruit Africans into the shamba system.
   
The cost of establishing plantations using wage labour between 1924 and 1936 averaged at 
27 shillings per acre. By comparison, the cost per acre for establishing a plantation in the shamba 
system was 7.80 shillings. Wage labour thus accrued almost four times the expense. Senior 
Assistant Conservator James Rammell’s statement that without shamba squatters the costs of 
creating plantations would increase 400 to 500 per cent may have been an exaggeration when he 
made it in 1930, but it holds true for the period as a whole.469 
                                                                
468 Afforestation is used to refer to the establishment of forest on land in which the preceding dominant vegetation 
was not forest, most often this was the creation of plantations on grassland. Reforestation is used to refer to the 
assisted natural or artificial regeneration of existing tree species in cutover forest or the establishment of new 
(exotic and indigenous) tree species in cutover forest. The Forest Department simultaneously referred to both of 
these processes with the term reafforestation. 
469 J.C. Rammell (Snr. Asst. Conservator of Forests, Londiani) to Secretary of the Molo Farmers’ Association, 10 March 
1930. 
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 Throughout the 1930s the department spent more on reafforestation than any other item of 
expenditure with the exception of personnel yet also had to reduce its annual expenditure owing 
to budgetary cutbacks in the wake of the Great Depression, which took effect in the 1932 budget. 
The direct budgetary effects of the depression lasted four years, reaching their lowest point in 1936. 
The majority of the budget was allocated to retaining personnel, as spending on personnel rose 
from 60 to 69 per cent of the total expenditure between 1931 and 1936, while spending on 
reafforestation fell from 13 to 7 per cent, the same level it had been between 1924 and 1926. The 
effect of this was a drastic fall in the amount of money available to the nursery and planting 
programme and therefore the number of shamba squatters who could be employed. Illustrated in 
Figure 2-5, by 1936 spending on reafforestation was £1,916, less than half the amount spent in 
1931. The effect on reafforestation was compounded by unfavourable weather conditions. The 
years 1932, 1933, and 1934 saw either erratic rainfall or the partial or complete failure of either of 
the two main rains of the year, the short rains (October to December) and long rains (March to 
May), creating drought conditions. Seedlings died in nurseries, further increasing costs, while more 
trees that were planted died. The slight increase in the acreage of plantations established in 1935 
was precisely because these drought conditions had lifted and good rains increased the success rate 
of planting.470  
                                                                
470 Annual Reports of the Forest Department, 1931-1936. 
 
Figure 2-5. Comparison of yearly acreage of plantations created with the number of squatter families engaged in 
the shamba system and the Forest Department’s yearly afforestation expenditure. Sources: Annual Reports of the 
Kenyan Forest Department. 
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The combined effect of the depression and drought was a dramatic reduction in the annual 
acreage of plantations created, which only showed a genuine upturn in 1938 (Figure 2-5). These 
events had the potential to effectively stall forestry operations in Kenya, yet their effects were 
greatly mitigated by the use of squatters rather than wage labour. The low cost of plantation 
establishment under the shamba system meant that more plantations could be created, albeit at a 
reduced rate during these harsh years. Moreover, the dramatic increase in efficiency of the shamba 
system between 1924 and 1936 that saw more than a 50 per cent reduction in costs (Table 2-1) 
further reduced the impact of the depression and allowed the department to continue with its 
planting programme. If wage labour had been used at a potential 400 per cent increase in costs it is 
very doubtful that large acreages of plantations would have been established during the recession 
years. Without the squatters in the shamba system it seems entirely likely that the creation of new 
plantations and adequate maintenance and repair of existing plantations would have been 
effectively impossible without a dramatic increase in budget or reduction in salaries. 
The shamba squatters continued to be vital to forestry after 1936. In particular, they had a 
very significant role in assisting the department to play its part in the war effort of the 1940s. The 
Second World War saw a fivefold increase in timber and fuel production from the forests of Kenya, 
with the bulk of this going towards the war effort.471 The revenue of the Forest Department clearly 
                                                                
471 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1944, 11. 
Year 
Plantation establishment cost using Plantation maintenance cost using 
Squatters Wage labour Squatters Wage labour 
1924 10.00 25.00 2.76 10.45 
1925 9.14 28.93 4.11 9.70 
1926 9.52 27.10 3.10 12.78 
1927 9.16 26.31 3.04 12.74 
1928 9.19 21.20 3.01 8.98 
1929 8.76  3.61  
1930 9.74  3.55  
1931 8.86  2.89  
1932 7.13    
1933 5.30  3.95  
1934 5.55  3.42  
1935 4.80 30.00 2.61  
1936 4.53 35.00 6.04  
All figures are in Kenyan shillings per acre 
Table 2-1. Per acre comparative cost in Kenyan shillings of the establishment and maintenance of forest 
plantations using squatter labour and wage labour. Data from before 1924 and after 1936 do not allow 
extrapolation of such statistics. Sources: Annual Reports of the Kenyan Forest Department. 
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illustrates the huge increase in forest exploitation that occurred during the war. Already rising 
before the outbreak of hostilities, revenues from the forests surged during the war (Figure 2-6).  
The already established timber and fuel plantations were vital in allowing the supply and 
revenue increase to occur. Already by 1940, they were the source of the supply of “the whole of the 
requirements for poles … and a considerable proportion of the fuel, thus reducing the demands on 
the natural forests.”472 Aside from these plantations being, of course, created using the shamba 
system, the shamba squatters also became instrumental in the expansion in forest exploitation that 
was occurring. In addition to its usual supervisory role, wartime necessity forced the department 
to become directly involved in exploitation. The squatters were key in this, as the 1942 annual 
report explained, “Poles and bamboos in vast numbers were supplied direct by the department and 
entailed very heavy work on the part of the staff and forest squatter force.”473  
The squatters were also expected to continue to contribute to forest fire fighting duties and 
provide labour for the expanded road-building programme. 474 The extra duties placed on the forest 
                                                                
472 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1940, 1. 
473 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest Department, 1942 (Nairobi Government Printer, 1942), 1. 
474 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1939, 1. The Forest Department believed the experience and training 
it gave its forest squatters in firefighting made them an ideal force for this duty. Compared to African soldiers within 
the King’s African Rifles, who were called upon to assist in firefighting in 1944, “the ordinary forest squatter is 
infinitely superior in work of this nature and is worth many of him.” J.C. Rammell (Snr. Asst. Conservator of Forests) 
to K.M. Cowley (Chief Secretary), 28 March 1944, VF/1/23, KNA. The frequent dry periods and droughts of the war 
 
Figure 2-6. Forest Department revenue and expenditure (in pounds) between 1924 and 1944. Sources: Annual 
Reports of the Kenyan Forest Department, 1924-1944. 
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squatters described above were in addition to the existing programme of plantation creation and 
maintenance. As shown in Figure 2-5, despite these extra labour requirements the reafforestation 
programme expanded during the war, returning to the level of yearly acreage increase that had 
existed before the impact of the Great Depression. Although forestry statistics published during the 
war are incomplete, they do indicate that the increased labour demands of wartime forestry and 
plantation establishment were at least partly achieved by recruiting more Africans into the shamba 
system. By 1944, the shamba system reached a new height with 3,018 families engaged, 
representing at the very least 6,000 individuals but more realistically over 12,000 individuals if a 
very conservative estimate of a household of a single man, woman, and two children is used.475   
 
 Settler Reactions 
Throughout the period under review by this chapter the Forest Department maintained an often 
tumultuous relationship with many of the white settlers within Kenya. Much of this section will 
focus on these conflicts, however, co-operation also existed and although limited is revealing of 
settler and Forest Department needs and attitudes. 
2.3.1 Co-operation and co-option 
In contrast to the lack of Forest Department assistance of settler farm development seen under 
Battiscombe’s leadership, within this period the department was willing to supply for free to 
settlers who resided on “timberless”476 farms a certain quantity of timber for up to five years after 
the start of the settler’s land grant.477 Between 1925 and 1939 the department gave away £7,638 
worth of timber and fuel, largely to settlers. However, the value and quantity of this fell between 
1925 and 1933 and then rose only in 1934 and 1935, presumably in response to the continued 
economic woes of many settler farmers.478 Generally, the Forest Department was extremely 
reluctant to grant free issues to anyone – settler, African, or other branch of the government – 
                                                                
years made this role imperative. In 1939, for example, the department reported that thanks to “stout work by forest 
squatters no really serious damage was done” by the extensive fires that swept through the forests in that year. It 
was the number of forest fires that occurred during the war, coupled with the heightened need for forest 
exploitation that compelled the department to begin an extensive road-building programme. Prior to the war, the 
department had typically only built roads to access its forest stations and for inspection of its plantations, otherwise 
relying on the sawmillers and others holding forest exploitation licences to put roads through forests. Although the 
majority of the labour for this road-building programme came from Italian prisoners of war during the Second 
World War, their “unsatisfactory” performance led the department to also use large numbers of its forest squatter 
workforce. Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1944, 9. 
475 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1944. The department did not archive records of its squatters and so 
ascertaining the total number of individuals engaged in the system is difficult. A list of squatters from Rongai Forest 
Station from 1918 (KNA QB/1/209) suggests that it was commonplace for a man to have two or three wives and up 
to five children. If it is estimated that each squatter in 1944 had two wives and three children, the total population 
would be approximately 18,000.  
476 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1928, 13. 
477 H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests) to W.E. Powys, 16 January 1931, FOR/1/293, KNA. 
478 Forest Department Annual Reports, 1925-1939. Statistics on the quantities of free issues are not available for the 
Second World War period. As the military had first call on any timber produced it is likely that no free issues took 
place. 
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because of the precedent it would set. In 1932, for example, the department refused to issue free 
timber to mission hospitals, despite the local district commissioner requesting this should be 
done.479 After multiple appeals from impoverished settlers, in 1934 the department began granting 
one-year extensions to free issue permits and lowered royalties on timber for those settlers that 
did not have permits.480 
This attempt to define the settler relationship on terms that suited forestry is also evident in 
the Learner Foresters Scheme, which existed under the auspices of the Local Civil Service Scheme 
begun in 1935. The Forest Department hoped that this scheme would allow the majority of future 
forest officers to be drawn from the sons of settlers and civil servants residing within Kenya, 
effectively providing a cheap and local solution to the department’s perennial staffing problems.481 
It would also have the effect of drawing settlers into the department, creating a voice for forestry 
within the community that most opposed it. Candidates were trained for 12 months at Karuma, 
Uganda and recruitment began with Eric Rundgren in 1935.482 However, by 1960 only seven men 
had been employed under the scheme, and out of these three remained in the job for less than two 
years. 
The department had more success with bringing settlers into touch with forestry via its system 
of honorary forest officers, which began in 1928. These officers were essentially volunteers from 
among the settler community who agreed to act as agents for the department in areas where the 
department’s staff was stretched thin or non-existent. At least 18 such officers worked for the 
department before independence, with the majority being recruited in the 1930s.483 Despite their 
lack of forestry training, these officers were occasionally given supervisory powers over African 
and Indian assistant foresters and squatters in the shamba system, even being allowed to issue fines 
for forest offences; their only qualification was their skin colour.484 Reports of the effectiveness of 
this programme, apparently also undertaken in Tanganyika, reached England, where R.S. Troup 
remarked it had been of great assistance to forestry in Kenya.485 The existence of honorary forest 
                                                                
479 Harrison-York (District Commissioner) to H.M. Gardner, 23 February 1932, FOR/1/293, KNA. 
480 S.H. Wimbush (for Conservator of Forests) to Asst. Conservator of Forests (Nyeri), 29 November 1937, 
FOR/1/293, KNA. 
481 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1935, 2. 
482 Holman, Inside Safari Hunting, with Eric Rundgren, 60. 
483 Honorary Forest Officers recruited in this period were: R.W. Ball, Esq. (Nabkoi), T.H. Barnley (Kapolet & 
Kapkanyan), W.J. Beeston, Esq. (Njoro), Gilbert Colville, Esq (Eburru), Capt. H.H. Cowie (South Ngong), E.J. Davies, 
Capt. R.E. Dent (Mtwapa), W.S. Lillywhite (Sokoke), W. Martin (Eburru), F. Nye Chart (Kipiperi), E.G. Powell 
(Thika/Garissa), Capt. K. Rawson-Shaw (Elgeyo), D. Ruben, Esq (Eldalat), H.J. Sankey (Njabini), Capt. J.F. Sherrard 
(Ndare), H.L. Squair, Esq (South Laikipia/Aberdare), Brig-Gen. A.R. Wainewright (North Aberdares), and Dr C.J. 
Wilson (South Kinangop). Compiled from Forest Department Annual Reports. 
484 C.F. Elliot (for Acting Conservator of Forests) to F. Nye Chart (Manager, Statimma Farm, Gilgil), 30 March 1935, 
FOR/1/243, KNA. 
485 R.S. Troup, Colonial Forest Administration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 286. 
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officers indicates a willingness amongst at least a minority of the settlers to engage with and 
support forestry work.486  
On first appearance, the formation of the Kenya Arbor Society in 1934 also seems to reflect 
this positive engagement with forestry.487 Established under the triple aims of protecting forests, 
encouraging tree planting, and conserving soil and water, the society boasted a membership of 
more than 300, including one African, by 1945.488 Composed largely of settlers before 1946, the 
society engaged itself mostly with tree planting in towns and along roads, aesthetic concerns also 
having a strong bearing on its views, as well as producing pamphlets on the utility of trees for soil 
conservation for distribution among the African population.489 The significance of this society 
becomes clear, however, in its criticism of the Forest Department. This reached a particular high 
after the numerous forest fires of 1944 threatened settler farms. The society felt: 
The steps taken by the Department have been quite inadequate to protect the forests of the 
country, and that ultimately responsibility for these disastrous fires must rest with the hand of 
the Department.490 
Although the society did work with the department and government, particularly in an advisory 
capacity during the drafting of forest rules, it also argued that the Forest Department was 
“neglectful of its high charge”,491 protecting the forests. Although they cut short of declaring so 
publically, the implication was that the department should either face dramatic change or be 
replaced by private bodies. The society was therefore far more than just an exemplification of 
growing settler understanding of the importance of forests in relation to soil and water 
conservation, as it represented the implicit settler belief that the forests would be better off in the 
hands of private landowners. By the close of the Second World War, the Forest Department seems 
to have suspected this motivation, refusing to approve of a scheme whereby a government grant or 
loan would be issued to the society to allow it to establish plantations of its own.492 In accordance 
with the principles of scientific state forestry, the department was determined that private 
enterprise would not encroach on its own activities, instead being allowed only to be involved in 
                                                                
486 It appears these honorary forest officers were also unpaid, as no records or statements of salaries for these men 
appear in the department’s annual reports, the Colony’s blue books, or in correspondence. It is possible, however, 
that they were paid informally from the budgets of forest stations or received other material benefits from their 
work, but again lack of records prevents proper investigation of this. 
487 Kenya Arbor Society, Annual Report and Balance Sheet for the Year 1945 (W. Boyd & Co., Nairobi, 1945), 3. 
488 Kenya Arbor Society, Wartime Progress Report, August, 1943-February, 1945 (W. Boyd & Co., Nairobi, 1945), 1. 
489 After 1946 many Local Native Councils also joined the society as corporate members. In 1946 representatives of 
the Forest Department also began sitting on its council, perhaps indicating awareness within the department of the 
importance of engaging directly with a potentially powerful pressure group. Kenya Arbor Society, Annual Report 
and Balance Sheet for the Year 1946 (W. Boyd & Co., Nairobi, 1946). 
490 Mrs R. Fane (General Secretary, Kenya Arbor Society) to Chief Secretary (Kenya Colony), 22 February 1944, 
VF/1/23, KNA. 
491 Kenya Arbor Society, ‘Forest Fires in the Aberdares’, February 1944, VF/1/23, KNA. 
492 Kenya Arbor Society, Wartime Progress Report, August, 1943-February, 1945, 6. 
126   Settler Reactions 
the exploitation and selling of forest produce. For its part, the society insisted that it “will not desist 
from its endeavours to get some plan of this kind adopted.”493 
 
2.3.2 Settlers and the shamba system 
The department faced criticism, largely originating with settler farmers, of its shamba system 
throughout this period. Much of this criticism has now been either lost or was not recorded 
originally and is only alluded to in documents retained by the Forest Department. For example, 
criticism of the department’s struggles to control its forests seems to have been common in 1926, 
as Gardner reported, “In spite of many assertions to the contrary it can be definitely stated that 
there are no unauthorised Natives in any of the Forest Reserves.”494 In 1929, an exceptionally dry 
year in which many wildfires spread through forests, grassland, and moorland, the department’s 
squatters were “often blamed, quite gratuitously”495 for carelessly starting such fires. The 
department defended its squatters, who carried out the bulk of the forest firefighting duties, and 
announced they “show very fine qualities indeed”496 in this endeavour. Gardner ended his report 
on fires in that year with a thinly disguised attack on those who disparaged the department and its 
workers: 
With a few noteworthy exceptions for which the Department was very grateful, little help was 
received from outside sources but plenty of criticism.497 
The department’s fire policy again came under criticism in 1936, when the preventative burning of 
grassland on Mount Elgon, bordering Uganda, was misunderstood as a forest fire. “Criticism was 
raised” over this, the department reported but the “fears of the uninformed members of the public 
were allayed by an explanation in the local Press.”498  
Sometimes it was not a case of the Forest Department versus the settlers, but an individual 
forest officer locked in conflict with a settler. In late 1931, several sheep and goats belonging to the 
settler farmer Dr Wetherall of Uasin Gishu were confiscated by a forest guard when they were found 
within Karati forest reserve. The guard handed the livestock over to the local forester, Basil Fuller 
who proceeded to keep them at the forest station where several of the sheep died. The confiscation 
was, Gardner alleged, carried out by the guard and Fuller in retaliation for a fine that Wetherall had 
made forest squatters pay for grazing their animals on his land.499 It was an unusual incident that 
was made worse by the disrespect Fuller paid Wetherall in firstly failing to reply to his letters and 
then replying with a “curt minute, … This is considered a discourtesy to a member of the public 
                                                                
493 Ibid. 
494 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1926, 21. 
495 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1929, 1929, 12–13. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid. 
498 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1936, 15. 
499 H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province, Nakura), 1 February 
1932, FOR/1/243, KNA. 
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which should not have been committed.”500 Fuller then insulted the acting provincial commissioner 
by failing to report to him to explain the matter.  
The case reveals the importance of formality and correct etiquette when dealing with 
members of the settler community. Had Fuller followed accepted standards of respect the incident 
could have been settled locally rather than requiring the intervention of the Conservator of Forests 
and Provincial Commissioner.501 Fuller could not balance the competing priorities of colonialism 
that his role required, blaming his “over-zealous pursuance of the Forest Department’s policy” for 
one dispute.502 The correct etiquette and cordiality were key to the maintenance of the 
department’s working relationship with the settlers. Where this collapsed the conflicting priorities 
of forestry and white settlement were laid bare.        
These competing priorities came to the fore of confrontations between the department and 
the settlers over the issue of forest squatters. This was a matter that intensified during the Second 
World War, reinforced by confusion over who in the forests the Forest Department actually 
controlled during a period of a huge surge in forestry activity by the department, its contractors, 
and the military, and a resurgence in settler campaigns to end the practice of resident labour on 
their farms.503 Complaints came from influential members of the settler community who were able 
to direct them at the governor’s office. By April 1944, Gardner felt it all amounted to “constant but 
ill formed and quite unjustified criticism of the Forest Department’s squatters.”504 One month 
before Gardner felt compelled to lodge his disquiet with the Chief Secretary, the Nakuru District 
Production and Manpower Committee had met and the farmers present argued that the forest 
squatters “were a menace to the timber grown in the forests owing to the fires which they started, 
the extensive cultivation they carried out and the amount of stock they were allowed to keep.”505 
As will be seen in section 2.4.4, below, forest squatters were sometimes responsible for the starting 
of destructive forest fires that threatened settler farms. While obvious and dramatic, such events 
                                                                
500 Acting Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province) to H.M. Gardner (Conservator), 18 January 1932, 
FOR/1/243, KNA. 
501 Basil Muncey Fuller’s background of a Cambridge education and experience working in Rhodesia and South 
African should have made him ideally suited for the task of working alongside the settlers, yet in his nine years with 
the Forest Department he worked at five different forest stations and caused numerous disputes. At Londiani in 
1936, the local saw mill refused to work with him, and he also clashed with the assistant conservator and Africans. 
Fuller was considered a “serious handicap to the department” by 1937 and was let go in 1938. H.M. Gardner 
(Conservator) to Colonial Secretary, 25 October 1937, FOR/1/377, KNA. The case of Basil Muncey Fuller appears to 
have been unique within the Forest Department. No other forest officer during the colonial period had so many 
complaints directed toward him. Yet, such was the need for officers, that the department retained him for nine years. 
Partly, Gardner’s decision to do so might have stemmed from the misfortune of Fuller and his wife in contracting 
sleeping sickness in 1929 while he was assigned to Kavirondo; his wife allegedly being the first white woman in 
Kenya to suffer from the disease. Fuller never appears to have completely recovered from this, and the ensuring 
dispute between him and the department over his desire for a ‘healthy station’ must surely have tainted his attitude 
to his work. Fuller’s case is detailed at length in numerous correspondence within FOR/1/377, KNA. 
502 B.M. Fuller (Forester) to H.M. Gardner (Conservator), 21 November 1936, FOR/1/377, KNA. 
503 Youé, ‘Settler Capital and the Assault on the Squatter Peasantry in Kenya’s Uasin Gishu District, 1942-63’, 395. 
504 H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests) to the Chief Secretary, 4 April 1944, VF/1/11, KNA. 
505 Nakuru District Production and Manpower Committee, ‘Proceedings of the Nakuru District Production and 
Manpower Committee’ 22 February 1944, VF/1/11, KNA. 
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were rare: the issues of forest squatter cultivation and stock were the real points of complaint the 
settlers upheld. Debate in the Nakura Committee further expounded on what was perceived to be 
the soft touch of the Forest Department in that it only required its squatters to work as labourers 
for 180 days per year (technically correct but in reality far from the actual practice during the war). 
The settlers wanted stricter control over their own squatters, including the ability to compel them 
to labour for 270 days a year, a tactic that wealthier settlers were pursuing to discourage extensive 
squatter cultivation on their farms in order to increase their own acreages of cultivation. As Youé 
has argued, this was part of a wider move to consolidate white production in the colony and 
ultimately make the prospect of white self-rule more likely.506 The farmers of Nakura feared that if 
the Forest Department maintained its current policy the settlers’ squatters would simply abandon 
the settler farms for the forests after the stricter rules were introduced, thus threatening the wider 
goals of the settlers. Gardner, present at the meeting, countered that the department was now 
adopting a policy of compelling its squatters to work 240 days per year and that, besides, the Forest 
Department would never be able to accommodate a mass exodus of squatters from the settler 
farms.507 Gardner’s arguments were ignored. A month later he found himself again defending the 
necessity of the forest squatter system, this time after an article had appeared in the Kenya Weekly 
News that disparaged the squatters.508 The paper was owned by F.J. Couldrey, member of the 
Legislative Council for Nakura, President of the Nakuru Chamber of Commerce, and holder of a seat 
on the Nakuru District Production and Manpower Committee.509 
The Forest Department was clearly facing criticism from powerful individuals within the 
settler community, but it fought back. In 1944 Gardner invited settlers sitting on the Nakura 
Committee to his forests, had them shown the forestry operation and made it clear that the forest 
squatters performed essential duties far beyond the days they were simply contracted as labour. 
One settler at least, H.G. Prettijohn was convinced and circulated a letter stating: 
Perhaps my greatest reaction, being such a violent anti-squatter, was that although I still maintain 
that the squatter system is an abomination of the first water on European farms, both from the 
point of view of wastage of labour and from the wrong use of land, and should be abolished as 
soon as possible, I do consider that the Forest Department should continue to use it, and extend 
it if necessary.510  
                                                                
506 Christopher Youé, ‘“A Delicate Balance”: Resident Labour on Settler Farms in Kenya, Until Mau Mau’, Canadian 
Journal of History 22, no. 2 (August 1987): 223–25. 
507 There were 38,492 squatters (including families) on settler farms in Nakura in 1948 versus 21,383 squatters 
employed by the Forest Department across the whole of Kenya. It is clear that the Forest Department would not 
have been able to take on even a relatively small percentage of these settler squatters. Figures given in RMA van 
Zwanenberg, Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya 1919-1939 (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975), 
219. 
508 H.M. Gardner, ‘Response to a Kenya Weekly News Article of 30 March 1945’ n.d., VF/1/11, KNA. 
509 Alice Amsden, International Firms and Labour in Kenya 1945-1970 (Routledge, 2013), 48; Government Notice No. 
502 The Official Gazette of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, vol. 47, 23 (Nairobi, 1945), 232. 
510 Extract from a letter by H.G. Prettijohn included in H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests) to the Chief Secretary, 
4 April 1944. 
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There is no evidence the other members of the committee were quite so hospitable. Despite strong 
criticism, the shamba system continued and grew to its largest extent in the 1950s. Clearly, then, by 
the time of the Nakuru District Production and Manpower Committee’s attacks in 1944 the 
government itself was largely supportive of the system. Nevertheless, the statements of the 
committee highlight the issue that the forest squatters were seen by the settlers as a threat to their 
economic position and ultimate goals. It was this that lay at the heart of numerous major incidents 
of conflict between the department and the settlers in the interwar years.  
 
2.3.3 Settlers and squatter cattle 
In contrast to his predecessor, Conservator of Forests Gardner appears to have placed considerable 
pressure on his forest officers over the issue of squatter-owned cattle; a point illustrated by the 
rapidity with which the number of legally-owned cattle was reduced after he assumed the office of 
Conservator of Forests. Battiscombe had attempted to reduce the number of cattle kept in Karura 
forest, a key fuel forest close to Nairobi, since 1921 when he identified the presence of cattle there 
meant that “some of the plantations are being ruined.”511 Seven years later, the number of cattle 
remained an issue. Gardner instituted a policy of ‘slow’ reduction to combat the problem. In this, 
the number of cattle would be reduced gradually each year until a target population figure was 
reached. After the forester at Karura reported a reduction from 280 African-owned cattle in 1927 
to only 39 in 1928, illustrating that the process was not always ‘slow’, Gardner congratulated him: 
The result of the policy of slow reduction is very excellent and I trust that it will continue. On no 
account should fresh cattle be allowed into the forests and natural increase must be disposed of 
by the owners.512 
By 1928 the slow reduction policy was being applied to African-owned cattle in forests across the 
colony, with Gardner reporting that cattle belonging to forest squatters remained only in Karura, 
Ngong Road, Kikuyu, Lari, Escarpment and Kinobop, and Tinderet (all areas the department placed 
within its Nairobi division) by May of that year. Gardner explained to the Attorney General of the 
colony in 1928 that this was a policy directly related to settler needs, as:  
This department is willing to exclude squatters’ cattle from Forest Reserves adjoining areas 
where such cattle are excluded from settlers’ estates and is in fact doing so in several areas where 
settlers are not yet excluding them, e.g. Laikipia.513      
As shown in Table 2-2, it was in 1928 that this policy of slow reduction of squatter cattle really took 
effect, with an initial change from 0.7 cattle per squatter to 0.5. In the following 11 years (until cattle 
numbers reached zero), the department was remarkably successful in either keeping cattle 
numbers down or reducing the total and reversing the upward trend in cattle ownership prior to 
                                                                
511 E.B. Battiscombe, Conservator of Forests, to Forester, Karura, 16 November 1921, QB/1/209, KNA. 
512 H.M. Gardner, Conservator of Forests to Forester, Karura, 20 November 1928, QB/1/209, KNA. 
513 H.M. Gardner, Conservator of Forests to Attorney General, 4 May 1928, QB/1/209, KNA. 
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1928. Even when numbers increased in 1930, 1931, 1935 and 1936 this was by a low amount. The 
overall trend is a clear, slow reduction in cattle, just as the Forest Department policy demanded. Of 
further note is the low level of cattle ownership among the forest squatters compared to the wider 
African population. Figures provided by Mosley based on Agricultural Department reports indicate 
a cattle ownership rate of 1.25 cattle per person in 1926 and rising thereafter until falling in the 
1950s.514 The low level of cattle ownership among the forest squatters, even before reductions, 
indicates that these squatters were materially poorer (as cattle represent stored wealth) than the 
colonial average.   
Correspondence from 1926 reveals just what the Forest Department was sacrificing by 
introducing this policy and the importance of settler opinion to the department. Responding to a 
request from his assistant conservator of forests in Laikipia to grant grazing licences to Africans in 
the forest there, Gardner conjectured that such grazing would actually benefit the department 
because licences would be sold and that “there is no legal reason why a grazing licence should not 
be granted to a native just as to Europeans and also to natives in other districts.”515 From this 
statement it appears that the department attitude to cattle was not so clear-cut in 1926. However, 
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Year Number of squatter 
families 
Number of cattle 
owned by squatters 
Cattle per squatter 
1923 1,458 786 0.54 
1924 1,539 718 0.47 
1925 1,526 867 0.57 
1926 1,669 1,065 0.64 
1927 1,762 1,355 0.77 
1928 2,105 1,164 0.55 
1929 2,202 799 0.36 
1930 2,239 1,027 0.46 
1931 2,410 955 0.40 
1932 2,466 918 0.37 
1933 2,184 624 0.29 
1934 2,237 434 0.19 
1935 2,116 537 0.25 
1936 2,047 507 0.25 
1937 2,279 421 0.18 
1938 2,444 169 0.07 
1939 2,604 0 0.00 
Table 2-2. Comparison of the number of squatter families to number of cattle owned by them. The third 
column represents the number of cattle each squatter would own if they were theoretically divided equally; 
this serves analytical purposes but is not intended to indicate actual ownership rates as in many areas 
squatters kept no cattle at all. Sources: Forest Department of Kenya Annual Reports. 
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the importance of maintaining a civil relationship overrode any concern about the apparent legal 
right of Africans to have cattle in the forests: 
But the granting of these licences in your district would certainly be criticized by Settlers some of 
whom would inevitably take the opportunity to blame this department for introducing disease 
etc. Such charges, however unfounded, would harm the department and the question is - is the 
revenue to be obtained and the chance of pleasing the Squatters worth the risk of arousing 
antagonism to the department among the Settlers of Laikipia.516 
Under the leadership of Battiscombe and Gardner the Forest Department was clearly highly 
concerned with maintaining a cordial relationship with the settlers, fully aware of the political 
power the settlers held in Kenya, the willingness of the government to sacrifice forestry issues to 
placate this volatile group, and the settlers’ turbulent relationship with their own squatters. The 
increasing amount of farm and forest squatter stock was also considered a problem by the wider 
government, and by 1927 there were calls from the Labour Department for an absolute limit on 
stock numbers.517 The issue of African rights was secondary to this colonial priority, as was the 
revenue concerns of the department. That Gardner was displaying this clear concern in 1926 is 
telling: it was the year before the department began following its slow cattle reduction programme 
in earnest. The programme should therefore very much be seen as a response to the necessity of 
maintaining a working relationship with the settlers in Kenya’s political climate. Gardner even went 
so far as giving an assistant conservator permission to discuss with the settlers in Laikipia whether 
they would tolerate African-owned cattle in that district, although he was emphatic that the 
assistant conservator’s discussions should not be construed as the department asking settlers for 
permission to keep cattle. Evidently, Gardner wanted to ensure that the department at least 
appeared to be holding the reins of power, even if the reality was less clear-cut.518  
The Forest Department cattle reductions of the 1920s also began before the Hall Commission 
of 1929 recommended a general policy on restricting and reducing in number the cattle owned by 
squatters on settler farms, a move designed to protect settler farming interests.519 Within this 
context, the ‘proactive’ policy of the Forest Department stands out as a result of the pressure the 
department was under from the settlers and government, and the necessity of maintaining forest 
squatters against this pressure. For Africans, the Forest Department policy meant a drastic 
reduction or total elimination of the cattle they could own and graze in the forests. Such an extreme 
policy was seen by the department as the only workable solution to ending settler grievances about 
African cattle because the department simply lacked the manpower and ability to effectively police 
its forests. A blanket ban on cattle or the maintenance of a low number of Forest Department-
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branded cattle allowed the department to more easily govern the forests as it made the presence of 
‘illicit’ cattle all the more obvious. 
In the midst of economic depression in the early 1930s, settler farmers were again alert to 
anything that they perceived as a threat to their economically fragile farms. This perception was 
further spread through the settler community as an increasing number of farmers were 
transforming their farms to a mix of arable and livestock, a move encouraged by the Land Bank to 
diversify the settler economy.520 In 1932, for example, H.H. Anstey, the forester assigned to the 
forest station in Kerita reported to his superior that a settler had been inspecting forest squatter-
owned cattle kept in the forest. The settler near Kerita subsequently made a complaint to 
government apparently about this stock straying over the forest boundary.521  
                                                                
520 Anderson and Throup, ‘Africans and Agricultural Production in Colonial Kenya’, 331. 
521 Anstey was keen to show that the department was no lapdog to the settlers in this instance, adamantly reporting 
that his squatters never allowed their cattle to wander so far and that in fact “I have several times found herds of 
the [settler] farmer’s cattle well in the forest and no herdsman in charge.” H.H. Anstey, Forester Escarpment/Kerita 
to J.C. Rammell, Senior Assistant Conservator of Forests, 16 May 1932, FOR/1/210, KNA. This apparent defence of 
the forest squatters should not be seen as a change of approach on behalf of the department, however, as 
correspondence from a year earlier reveals that the department was itself concerned about the number of cattle 
their squatters were now keeping in the forests. In 1931 I.R. Dale, assistant conservator of forests, ordered the 
forester of Kikuyu district to strictly follow department policy on cattle by eliminating the majority of the 300 cattle 
owned by five or six squatters there. Each squatter, Dale outlined, was allowed to keep 15 head of cattle in the forest 
and grazing rates had to be applied to any cattle in excess of this. The department thus accrued revenue by limiting 
the number of cattle, even if this was effectively violating the agreement the squatters had signed with the 
department. Dale stated: “If they protest that they are allowed the 300 on their agreement forms give them 6 months 
Division District Forest Squatters Cattle Sheep Goats 
Kikuyu Ngong 103 0 385 0 
 Kerita (Escarpment) 107 214 1,807 0 
 Kikuyu 138 89 873 0 
 Karura 92 162 443 39 
 Kinobop 130 0 4,320 0 
 Lari (Uplands) * 166 159 7,409 0 
Nyeri South Kenya * 140 0 101 918 
 Aberdares * 151 0 1,225 3,686 
 Nyeri 6 0 24 39 
 South West, West, & 
North West Kenya 
143 0 2,339 2,473 
Laikipia Bahati 127 0 3,373 1,739 
 Rumuruti 30 0 657 727 
 Aberdares and  
Thomson's Falls 
105 0 4,551 2,091 
Londiani Londiani 208 0 6,803 0 
 Elburgon 202 0 4,000 0 
 Maji Mazuri 181 0 2,020 0 
Eldoret Kaptagat 131 25 3,325 0 
 Elgon 24 30 55 0 
Totals  2,184 679 43,710 11,712 
* Districts that adjoined native reserves. 
Table 2-3. Number of registered Forest Department squatters and their livestock per division and district in 
1934. Source: C.W. Elliot (Assistant Conservator of Forests) to Chief Veterinary Officer, 29 May 1934, FOR/1/210, 
Kenya National Archives. 
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Complaints such as that made at Kerita kept the fire of the slow reduction programme burning. 
The approximate 300 cattle present in Kikuyu district in 1931 were, for example, reduced to 89 by 
1934 (Table 2-3). Such complaints were joined by escalating criticism of government control of 
forest reserve in the early 1930s that would see 5,462 acres of grassland (that were within forest 
reserves) removed from Forest Department control and placed under the authority of the 
Commissioner of Lands for redistribution in 1934.522 This removal of grassland from the forest 
reserves was a matter that settlers in the Legislative Council had been pursuing since 1927, eager 
to gain access to grassland controlled by the Forest Department. The department itself seemed 
quite willing to excise large portions of unforested land from its reserves and in 1928 identified 
approximately 37,000 acres of such land that it considered uneconomic from the forestry 
standpoint.523 The insinuation is that this land could not be used for forestry or was too far from 
any area being utilised for plantation establishment to effectively serve the needs of the forest 
squatters. The land excised by the department in 1934 was part of this earlier 37,000 acres; indeed 
the 5,462 acres would be the only portion of the earlier figure excised. Settlers pointed not to Forest 
Department reluctance in this case but other, unidentified, branches of government. No doubt this 
represented government concern over further land alienation; notably, land was only excised from 
the forest reserves in 1934 after the Kenya Land Commission had completed its investigation. The 
5,462 acres can thus be seen as a minor concession to another settler grievance.  
The grassland issue was part of the wider settler grievance that the Forest Department was 
holding onto land when, settlers believed, it could not take stock of the assets it possessed. On 
hearing of the department’s issues with forest enumeration, the settler F.A. Bemister declared in 
the Legislative Council session of May 1933: 
Well, Sir, I actually was staggered. … for a Forestry Department, with I do not know how many 
forest guards, and this, that and the other, to admit that in 1933 they have not got an enumeration 
of their assets! Now, Sir, is that due to policy or is that due to personality? It is due certainly to 
inefficiency.524 
Bemister was using the same argument made by settlers two decades earlier: the Forest 
Department was inefficient and incapable of the task it had. The job of enumeration, Bemister 
argued, could just as well be done by the police. His view is symptomatic of a larger 
misunderstanding of the nature of scientific forestry work; he apparently believed forest 
enumeration was akin to counting head of cattle. The government, it seems, was unaware of the gap 
in knowledge between itself and the settlers, as the Colonial Secretary, H.M.M. Moore, expressed 
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522 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1934, 2. 
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that he was “almost as staggered” upon hearing Bemister’s understanding that enumeration meant 
the counting of trees rather than surveying and the formulation of forest working plans. Moore 
continued that it was the job of assistant conservators and that foresters, let alone policeman, were 
unqualified for the task.525      
It was this continuation of settler misunderstanding of and negatively toward the Forest 
Department, combined with the repetition of the kind of resistance they presented in the 1920s to 
forest squatter-owned stock that answer the question of why the department continued with it 
cattle reduction programme. Maintaining squatter stock was politically costly for the Forest 
Department, even if it had limited forestry and financial utility.526 This is clearly illustrated in the 
case of an outbreak of rinderpest in 1935 that would see the Forest Department pitted against 
settlers and government veterinary officers. 
Rinderpest, the disease that had devastated cattle numbers in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, remained endemic in Kenya. An outbreak occurred on the farm of Mrs Willoughby of Ngong 
District (Kikuyu Province) in March 1935. Willoughby suspected that the disease had spread from 
African cattle, and the government duly dispatched stock inspectors to investigate.527 These 
inspectors, P.H. Poolman and W.S. Taylor, gathered evidence from neighbouring settlers and 
Africans that led them to the conclusion that the outbreak did indeed originate with African cattle 
and that these cattle were in fact the property of Africans employed by the Forest Department, that 
is, forest squatters.528 The Forest Department response came from Charles Elliot, Assistant 
Conservator, who had compiled the forest squatter stock report in 1934 (Table 2-3).529 This report 
                                                                
525 Ibid., 440. 
526 There were limited advantages to the maintenance of a low number of cattle in the forests for the Forest 
Department, as when discussing the issue of cattle numbers with the Chief Veterinary Officer, C.W. Elliot, an 
assistant conservator of forests admitted, “… it is often an advantage to have the forest glades grazed though 
naturally the Department would prefer this should be done by stock for which grazing fees are paid.” The 
maintenance of a low number of squatter cattle in the forests of Kikuyu Province therefore kept grass within forest 
glades low, serving the department’s needs by reducing the chances of forest fires beginning and spreading. 
Eliminating stock and then allowing the limited return of cattle under licence was likely a profitable, if small, revenue 
source for the department. C.W. Elliot (Assistant Conservator of Forests, Nyeri) to Chief Veterinary Officer, 29 May 
1934, FOR/1/210, KNA. The Forest Department did not record the revenue it accrued from grazing licences 
separately apart from in 1925-1927, when it accounted for 2 per cent of total departmental revenue, however an 
analysis of revenue falling under the heading “Miscellaneous Forest Receipts”, the only conceivable heading that it 
could be included within, with forest squatter numbers in each forest division in 1934 (the only year for which 
squatter figures for each division exist) does indicate that the department received more revenue from areas with 
forest squatter cattle. Only in the forest divisions of Kikuyu and Eldoret divisions, where the department allowed 
624 and 55 head of cattle in 1934, respectively, did receipts rise above £1 per squatter. Although receipts were also 
dependent on the number of squatters in each division and Africans residing outside forest reserves purchasing 
licences for firewood and other forest produce, the receipts per person for Kikuyu and Eldoret do stand in contrast 
to the other divisions where no cattle were kept. Forest Department Annual Reports, 1925-1927. Annual Report of 
the Forest Department (1934) and C.W. Elliot (Assistant Conservator of Forests) to Chief Veterinary Officer, 29 May 
1934, FOR/1/210, KNA. 
527 H.S. Potter (for District Commissioner) to the Chief Veterinary Officer, 21 March 1935, FOR/1/210, KNA. 
528 P.H. Poolman (Stock Inspector) to Deputy Director (Animal Industry)/Chief Veterinary Officer, 27 March 1935, 
FOR/1/210, KNA; W.S. Taylor (Assistant Inspector) to Chief Veterinary Officer, 10 April 1935, FOR/1/210, KNA. 
529 The response came from Elliot as Conservator of Forests Gardner was on leave at this time and Rammell, the 
Acting Conservator, appears to have been indisposed. 
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showed that in the forest reserve in question, Ngong, the departmental squatters held no cattle and 
on this basis Elliot began a firm rebuttal of the stock inspectors’ accusations. Elliot went as far as to 
accuse the inspectors of not having visited the forest and that their report on the outbreak was 
“purely based on hearsay evidence which I consider unreliable.”530 As the evidence in question 
came from the settlers of the area, Elliot was effectively insulting both the inspectors and the 
settlers by doubting their statements.  
Elliot’s position lost all grounding, however, when Poolman witnessed Kamura Kiarie, a Forest 
Department squatter, herding 35 cattle from Ngong forest reserve towards the Kikuyu Native 
Reserve on 29 April 1935. When questioned, Kiarie admitted he had no grazing licence; he was 
subsequently arrested and convicted for illicit stock movement.531 For Poolman, the evidence was 
now incontrovertible. The Forest Department’s actions of issuing a limited number of grazing 
licences because low numbers of cattle were useful in keeping grass levels low, a practice the 
department admitted to the Chief Veterinary Officer,532 was being used by the department’s own 
employees as cover for the illicit movement of stock not covered by those licences. Poolman argued, 
“by issuing grazing licences to Natives, they are authorising the to and fro movement of cattle from 
the Kikuyu reserve, which is in permanent quarantine for Rinderpest.”533 The Chief Veterinary 
Officer demanded the Forest Department apologise for the remarks it had made against the stock 
inspectors. Unfortunately, there are no surviving documents that reveal whether the department 
did do so or whether it changed it practice of issuing limited grazing licences.534  
The 1935 Ngong rinderpest incident should be seen as an event that reinforced the 
departmental policy on cattle reduction rather than a key turning point in that policy, while it is an 
indicator that settler opposition to forest squatter cattle could be passionately driven by fear of 
stock diseases. The number of cattle registered to Forest Department squatters fell throughout the 
1930s until, in 1939, it finally reached zero (Table 2-2). The maintenance of squatter cattle in the 
forests that potentially competed economically with those of the settlers and, in the eyes of the 
settlers at least, harboured diseases that threatened settler stock carried with it the constant 
potential for conflict between the Forest Department and cattle farmers as well as other branches 
of the government. The political consequences that squatter cattle carried with them outweighed 
                                                                
530 C.W. Elliot (for Acting Conservator of Forests) to Deputy Director (Animal Industry)/Chief Veterinary Officer, 24 
April 1936, FOR/1/210, KNA. 
531 P.H. Poolman (Stock Inspector) to Deputy Director (Animal Industry)/Chief Veterinary Officer, 2 May 1935, 
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the financial gains of grazing licences and the forestry benefits of keeping grass down. The history 
of the department has shown that it must have been well aware that the greatest opposition to 
forestry in Kenya came from the settlers and the government itself; it was this awareness that lay 
behind the cattle reduction programme rather than, for example, concern over the damage cattle 
do to forests, which was voiced only very rarely.535  
 
2.3.4 Sheep and goats  
Gardner reiterated the point on concessions to settlers in a letter to his deputy, James Rammell, in 
1930 when settlers began demanding department action over the sheep and goats its forest 
squatters kept: 
This Department, against its own interests, has always helped the Stock Industry by refusing to 
allow squatter cattle. No proof or evidence of any sort has been produced to show that the sheep 
and goats in the Forest Reserves have caused any harm or loss to the farms and I am not prepared 
to render impossible the economic reafforestation of the Colony's forests by dismissing the 
Kikuyu Squatters.536 
The settlers in question were those of the Molo Farmers’ Association of Kisumu Londiani Province, 
where the Forest Department had 591 squatter families by 1934. In early 1930, the Molo farmers 
began clearing out their own squatters’ stock and asked the Forest Department “to fall in with this 
scheme and remove such sheep and goats within your jurisdiction and bordering this area.”537 
Rammell immediately resisted, believing the department should not even consider the request.538 
He explained to the Molo Farmers’ Association that forest squatters needed their stock, and ridding 
the forests of stock risked also ridding the department of its squatters. If the squatters departed, 
Rammell explained: 
… what could not be replaced would be his cultivation, and to us unlike the farmer this is more 
than half his value. A Kikuyu without his goats I feel is a contradiction in terms, and I am sure that 
you will agree, that without being unsympathetic, it would not be in the interest of the country 
were this Department to interfere so drastically with its planting programme.539 
Rammell was highlighting a key difference between the settler and Forest Department attitudes to 
their respective squatters. Throughout the interwar years, settlers were further skewing the power 
relations between themselves and their squatters, with measures such as the Resident Native 
Labourers Ordinances, and livestock and cultivation limitations setting the squatters on a path that 
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would, the settlers hoped, end in them becoming pure wage labourers.540 The settlers saw the 
cultivation and stock rearing of their squatters as increasingly competing with their own, a result 
of government initiatives to increase African-produced exports through the 1930s, despite the 
protection of the control boards from which settler production benefitted by the time of the Second 
World War. Concurrently, the settlers sought to expand mixed farming and therefore their stock 
numbers, partly because it was a condition of the Land Bank loans that were available in the 
1930s.541 Conversely, the Forest Department saw extensive cultivation by its own forest squatters 
in advantageous terms, even aiding the growth of young trees.542 As the Forest Department saw it, 
the larger the area able to be cultivated by the forest squatters the better, as it meant a larger area 
that could later be used to grow trees.   
Less than a year and a half after this firm stand the department was conducting an audit of 
forest-squatter owned sheep and goat numbers in Londiani Division. The results of this audit are 
not comprehensive, but there were, for example, 4,090 goats belonging to 176 squatters in the 
forest district of Maji Mazuri in October 1931.543 By May 1934 all of these goats had gone (Table 
2-3). The reduction of goats seems to have begun in late 1931 or early 1932, as Archibald Cooper, 
the forester for Elburgon district within Londiani Division, reported to his superior in February 
1932 that:  
For some time now, when engaging new squatters, I have stipulated on the agreements that sheep 
only are allowed, and should we subsequently find the squatter with goats he will be discharged. 
… [And as squatters] become due for new agreements, they will be told to get rid of their goats 
before they can be taken on by the Forest Department.544 
The Forest Department did not retain any documents that shed light on this change in policy as 
regards goats. It is possible that pressure on the department from the settlers increased as they 
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themselves had removed their squatters’ stock by the beginning of 1932.545 However, the timing of 
the introduction of this policy is perhaps most revealing of its motivation. In 1930 Gardner was 
determined that rather than eliminating more squatter stock, the department should concentrate 
on establishing a “rigid limit” to the number of goats and sheep and ensure that there was a “strict 
observance of boundaries”. Although this was a policy, he admitted, that may need a larger staff.546 
The issue of staff would indeed determine actual policy on the ground. In 1931, the year after 
Gardner made his statement, the effects of the depression began to take effect and the revenue of 
the Forest Department dropped 26 per cent and its expenditure decreased by 7 per cent. Revenue 
continued to drop until 1934 (Figure 2-6) and expenditure decreased annually until 1936. The 
increased staff that would be needed to police the limit and boundary policy was simply not 
available. The forest guard force was in fact facing reduction, from 132 guards in 1930 to 116 in 
1932.547 It was a force, moreover, that was spread over a vast area of forest. Divisional guard 
strengths are not available for the 1930s, but in the early 1940s the department was only able to 
allocate an average of 13 forest guards to the Londiani division.548 When it is considered that this 
minute guard force was responsible for the general policing of the forests and not just overseeing 
squatter livestock it becomes clear that the policy of just limiting stock numbers was impractical. 
Only by banning goats altogether could the department realistically hope to maintain a livestock 
policy. 
Following the introduction of the goat reduction programme in Londiani it began to be 
expanded to all the forest divisions. By 1934, all forest-squatter owned goats had been removed 
from Londiani, Eldoret, and all but 39 from Kikuyu (Table 2-3). In Nyeri Division 7,116 goats 
remained in 1934 and 4,557 in Laikipia, but all of these were removed by the end of 1935.549 It is 
from Nyeri that evidence comes for the department’s own motivations for removing goats, since 
there is no evidence of settler pressure on the department over the issue in this division. Charles 
Elliot, Assistant Conservator in charge of the division, identified goats as giving “rise to a 
tremendous lot of trouble and damage.”550 It was a reference to the reputation of the goat, a 
browser, as an indiscriminate destroyer of crops and young trees. This view was common among 
forest officers; in the same year the former Kenya Forest Department officer Richard St. Barbe 
Baker wrote of the goat as “the bête noir [sic] of the forest.”551 R.S. Troup, professor of forestry at 
Oxford University and extremely influential within forestry discourse, wrote in 1940, “In forests, 
continuous goat browsing will entirely prevent natural regeneration, and lead to the ultimate 
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extermination of the forest.”552 Troup also argued that sheep, primarily grazers of grass, could be 
allowed to remain in limited numbers and the Forest Department indeed did allow them to remain 
in all of its forest divisions (Table 2-3).553 In January 1934 Gardner stated his view that, “I think 
Government should do all they can to encourage any policy which will tend to reduce the goat 
population.”554 The general disdain for goats held within the forestry profession combined with its 
staffing issues explain the rapid extension of the policy to those areas where no settler pressure 
apparently existed and explains why, in those areas where settlers did demand stock reductions, it 
was goats that were targeted and sheep allowed to remain. While the goat reductions were a result 
of concerns over damage to trees and, partly, a concession to settler farming, the continuation of 
sheep ownership was a concession to the reality that the forest squatters needed stock. 
The relationship with the settlers remained tense, however. E.H. Wright, the chairman of the 
Njoro Settlers Association and an elected member of the Legislative Council was grateful to the 
department for its stock policy and supported it against criticism from other settlers in the 
Thomson’s Falls District Association, yet he finished a letter to Gardner with what amounted as a 
warning. “The case”, of the forest-squatter stock in Thomson’s Falls, he wrote, “is an unassailable 
one.”555 Essentially, Wright was telling Gardner he had no choice but to obey the demands of the 
settlers. The Thomson’s Falls Association was less subtle. After Gardner visited the district but did 
not meet with the association the settlers were incensed, feeling he was dragging out the issue: 
He has been and gone without even having the courtesy to write to anyone!! … the amenities and 
general welfare of the local farmers in a matter like this … should not be torpedoed by the easy-
going habits of the Forestry Department.556 
The Thomson’s Falls District Association believed that Gardner’s insistence on not completing stock 
reductions until the settlers had done likewise was really a tactic to poach the best labour from 
their farms, as the squatters would be attracted by the Forest Department’s more lenient stock 
policy. They threatened to take the issue to the Colonial Secretary or Attorney General, arguing that 
if the settlers: 
… abolish native owned stock voluntarily because they consider it in the best interests of their 
sadly harassed industry, cannot the local Forests conform and be told so? … is it the intention of 
Government to allow the Forest Department to wreck local endeavours?557 
This strong response can partly be explained by the wider political and economic conditions of 
1934-35. In the wake of the Carter Commission, the government was finally beginning the process 
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of a clear delineation of the white highlands with a concurrent expansion of the native reserves. 
This process was done without, so the settlers felt, adequate consultation, worsening the general 
relationship between the settlers and government.558 As Harragin, the Attorney General, stated 1st 
August 1935, “the feeling between the settlers and Government is at such a low ebb at the present 
moment.”559 On the back of this issue and the continued economic grievances of the settlers, Major 
F.W. Cavendish-Bentinck, later Duke of Portland, became the unofficial leader of the settlers and it 
was Cavendish-Bentinck who led an assault on the Forest Department budget in November 1935, 
in the wake of a further downturn in global prices that hit the settlers hard.560 In the context of this, 
the proposed budget for the department in 1936 of £30,217 made Cavendish-Bentinck declare in 
the Legislative Council, “Frankly I do not believe it, and I think our sense of proportion is perhaps a 
little warped.”561 His points of comparison were the forestry budgets in Tanganyika, Uganda, and 
Southern Rhodesia, all of which were considerably lower than that proposed for Kenya. In a lengthy 
rejoinder to the claims that covered the hydraulic, timber, and fuel utility of the forests and 
therefore their important place in Kenya’s economy, Gardner pointed out that the area of forests 
and forestry operations in all of the territories mentioned by Cavendish-Bentinck were on a 
substantially smaller scale than Kenya.562 As Figure 2-6 illustrates, the arguments put forward by 
Gardner prevailed, with the expenditure of the department only dropping 1 per cent in 1936 and 
then increasing in 1937 and 1938, although the services of forest surveyors were lost (see section 
2.2.3). 
 
 The Forest Squatters 
Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Forest Department put in place an increasingly strict policy 
concerning the livestock owned by the forest squatters within its shamba agroforestry system. By 
the end of the 1930s these squatters owned no cattle or goats in the forests, being allowed a limited 
number of sheep only. Concurrently, the number of forest squatters engaged by the Forest 
Department increased overall throughout these two decades and into the 1940s. As livestock can 
be argued as central to the livelihoods and culture of the African peoples inhabiting the highlands 
of Kenya, it is pertinent to investigate how the system was able to expand when it placed limits on 
this livestock. This supposed contradiction will be examined alongside the concurrent change and 
formalisation of the operation of the shamba system in the 1920s and 1930s, which represent the 
key decades for the development of the system. 
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2.4.1 Ethnicity 
The vast majority of the squatters employed within the shamba system came from the Kikuyu 
ethnic group. Statistics pertaining to the ethnicity of the squatters were not regularly collected by 
the government, although they do exist for 1945 after a specific census of squatter ethnicity was 
conducted. As is clear from Table 2-4, by 1945 the Kikuyu dominated the system, with 99 per cent 
of forest squatters being identified as Kikuyu in that year. Kikuyu were also the largest ethnic group 
that had taken to squatting on European farms, representing 56 per cent of these squatters in 1945. 
The difference between these two figures, however, is telling. Nearly 17,000 Nandi resided on 
European farms in Uasin Gishu, yet the Forest Department had no Nandi squatters at all despite 
also operating shamba in Uasin Gishu. Similarly, 18,620 Kamba squatted on settler farms around 
Nairobi, but only eight were engaged as forest squatters for the Forest Department.563 
Although Kikuyu comprised the majority on settler farms it was a form of settlement that was 
engaged in by significant numbers of other ethnic groups. Of the total number of squatters on 
European farms in 1945 (which is given in the squatter census as 181,392), 8 per cent were Luo, 
Kisii, and Maragoli (combined), 7 per cent were Lumbwa, 13 per cent were Nandi, 10 per cent were 
Kamba, and unclassified others represented 6 per cent. The answer to these differences in the 
ethnic makeup of European farm squatters and shamba squatters lies in the requirements that the 
Forest Department had for its squatters. As discussed in the previous section, forestry primarily 
needed farmers who would clear and cultivate as much land as was available, preparing it for tree 
plantings. As Gardner argued in 1945: 
The most obvious difference [between settler squatters and forest squatters] is that of the amount 
of land to be cultivated. On the limited area of a farm it must be as small as possible but in the 
Forest Reserves where large areas of cut-over forest have to be cleared for replanting, the 
opposite holds.564 
The Forest Department thus sought Africans who were willing to cultivate on a large scale. Kikuyu, 
those whom the department had demonised for their largely agrarian, shifting cultivation-based, 
way of life, were ideally suited. In contrast, Kamba also cultivated, but on a smaller scale as they 
had a greater reliance on cattle.565 With its livestock restrictions becoming increasingly harsh after 
the mid-1920s, the forest squatting system lacked appeal to those peoples who were closer to the 
pastoral than the agrarian lifestyle. This was abundantly clear to the Forest Department itself, and 
it was particularly careful to ensure that prospective forest squatters had the intention to primarily 
grow crops not graze cattle. The issue surfaced when the department sought squatters for the 
Kakamega Native Forest Reserve in 1941. After interviewing prospective squatters, Assistant 
Conservator of Forests Edward Honorè wrote: 
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It is obvious however that these men were principally in search of grazing land. Cultivation was a 
secondary consideration. … I do not feel inclined to take on squatters… whose ideas are 
principally centred on stock grazing.566 
Farmers almost solely intent on grazing and expanding their stock within the forests did not meet 
the needs of the shamba system. The Forest Department required its squatters to clear land, 
cultivate, and then plant and tend trees. All of these activities were of low importance to the 
pastoralist. Three years after Honorè had rejected the requests of pastoralists to reside in 
Kakamega forest, the local forest officer sought Kikuyu squatters who did clearing work “for the 
right to plant crops on the land cleared for two years; in the third year they were required to plant 
up trees and thereafter vacate.”567 
The mixed agrarian and pastoral farming practice of Kikuyu farmers made them ideal forest 
squatters, especially so as it was an agricultural mode that required expansion onto forested land 
once land shortages were experienced. The importance of Kikuyu to the system is highlighted by 
the considerable trouble the Forest Department had in obtaining squatters for the forests in Uasin 
Gishu. This was a district inhabited before the arrival of colonialism by pastoral Masai and Nandi 
and became a large area of cattle ranching for white settlers. As has been seen, it was a district 
where settlers took great issue with cattle grazed within the forests as early as 1918. These were 
not, however, Forest Department squatter cattle, as the department reported that it was unable to 
attract squatters in the district when it was expanding plantation operations in 1925.568 The 
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Ethnic group 
Number of forest 
squatters 
Luo, Kisii, Maragoli 66 
Lumbwa 52 
Nandi 0 
Kikuyu 21,143 
Kamba 8 
Other 114 
Total 21,383 
Table 2-4. Ethnic breakdown of squatters employed in the shamba system in 1945. Source: R. van 
Zwanenberg, Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya 1919-1939 (East African Literature Bureau, 
Nairobi, 1975), 219. 
 
The Forest Squatters   143 
department maintained the official line that local Africans were “deterred” by the hard work they 
would be expected to perform, but it seems more likely that the prospect of clearing and cultivating 
land held little appeal to peoples whose economy was dependent on cattle. The department alluded 
to this situation itself, when it stated that in some areas of Kenya the “increasing wealth” of Africans 
had made it more difficult to recruit them into the shamba system.569 Wealth in the form of livestock 
allowed Africans to prosper without having to resort to working for the colonial regime.570 The 
cattle reduction programme can only have decreased the appeal of forest squatting to those whose 
chief ambition lay with cattle accumulation. By 1928, however, the Forest Department was 
reporting that the squatter shortage in Uasin Gishu was over and, as shown in Table 2-3, by 1934 
there were 150 forest squatters working in the area (Eldoret, which encompassed Uasin Gishu) 
although the continued presence of a low number of cattle there indicates that some concessions to 
attract recruitment were made.571 
The cattle allowed in Eldoret could indicate that the department had been successful in 
recruiting a low number of Uasin Gishu pastoralists into the shamba system. However, the 
extremely low number of cattle casts doubt on this. Within Kaptagat forest 131 squatters held a 
total of only 25 cattle, hardly a sufficient number to satisfy pastoralists who chiefly valued cattle 
over sheep and goats. The answer lies in a 1926 Forest Department statement that in some districts 
“unlimited” numbers of squatters could be procured, so many that the department could not 
provide supplementary labour to all of them and instead allowed them to work for the Public Works 
Department and District Administration.572 It was this surplus of willing recruits that allowed the 
Forest Department to meet its labour needs in Uasin Gishu and also to plug shortages in Nyeri and 
West Kenya Districts; the department was moving willing Kikuyu labour around highland Kenya to 
compensate for its inability to recruit local ethnic groups. This was the case in the forests that clad 
Mount Elgon. There, a small number of Kikuyu squatters were introduced in 1932 since the 
department had had no success in recruiting local peoples. As Mount Elgon lies far from the central 
highland areas inhabited by Kikuyu peoples prior to the arrival of the British, the shamba system 
should be seen as allowing the spatial expansion of Kikuyu cultivation precisely because this suited 
the needs of the Forest Department, which was unable to use waged labour because of its financial 
difficulties. In contrast to urban migration, whereby Kikuyu males left their families to travel to 
urban centres as wage labour, shamba required families to remain together.573 In this regard, there 
is no evidence for the feminisation of labour within shamba that Sunseri has argued occurred in the 
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similar taungya system in Tanganyika.574 As Neumann, Conte, and Sunseri have argued, however, 
the case of taungya in Tanganyika was further evidence of Kikuyu using the system to migrate to 
and cultivate new areas. After 1928 the Tanganyikan Forest Department brought in Kikuyu to its 
taungya system in Kilimanjaro Forest Reserve because local people were unwilling to work in the 
system.575       
The major motivations for the movement of Kikuyu to settler farms also lay behind their 
movement to the forests under the shamba scheme, although this was complicated by the Forest 
Department’s livestock policy. The centrality of Kikuyu settlement in Kenya, close to much of the 
so-called ‘white highlands’ geographically made them ideal for work on settler farms and in the key 
forestry areas. The movement of Kikuyu to the settler farms began soon after colonialism began 
and for forestry specifically in 1910. The depredations of the 1890s to approximately 1910, 
described in the first chapter, pushed Kikuyu who owned no land of their own into squatting. These 
landless, known as ahoi, were, however, joined by Kikuyu who sought grazing for their expanding 
stocks of sheep and goats. This movement of Kikuyu with considerable livestock wealth occurred 
largely, Zwenenberg argues, in the 1920s following an increase of movement during the First World 
War as people fled recruitment for the Carrier Corps. Taxation, imposed in the native reserves but 
not the white highlands, vassal obligations to the often corrupt African agents of colonial rule, the 
chiefs, and the consolidation and expansion of landholding by these chiefs that were beginning to 
cause land scarcity in this period further increased the motivation of Kikuyu to move to settler 
farms.576 There is no reason to believe these factors were not also behind the willingness of Kikuyu 
to join the Forest Department’s shamba system.  
 
2.4.2 Ahoi within shamba   
In 1956 L.S.B. Leakey estimated that “possibly” 90 per cent of the squatters on European farms were 
ahoi, the tenant class of Kikuyu who owned no land but instead procured the right to farm on the 
land of other Kikuyu or, as in the case of the squatters, on the land of settler farmers.577 As the 
squatter census of 1945 had shown, this was proabably unlikely as ahoi were Kikuyu and Kikuyu 
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only represented 56 per cent of squatters in 1945. Yet analysis of Forest Department records of its 
own squatters indicates that Leakey’s statement could be applied to them, albeit only after the 
livestock reduction programmes had run their course, as these were highly significant in shaping 
the socio-economic demographics of the forest squatters. To understand this significance it is first 
necessary to explain the importance and role of livestock – cattle, sheep, and goats – within Kikuyu 
society. Livestock, of which cattle were considered the most valuable over sheep and goats, were 
the means by which a Kikuyu man would expand his wealth, prestige, and power.578 Key to this was 
the conversion of cattle wealth to bridewealth, the means by which a Kikuyu man attained wives 
and thus expanded his family. As the primary cultivators on Kikuyu farms were women, livestock 
wealth and polygamy were a means for the husband to create a larger labour force and so increase 
the land that was able to be cultivated.579 It was through this process that power within Kikuyu 
society was secured: large landowners were those with sufficient livestock wealth to marry 
multiple times. In the early years of the squatter system on settler farms, before the late 1920s, a 
labour shortage created favourable conditions for the squatters, which allowed many to increase 
their wealth in this traditional manner.580 This had ramifications for the Forest Department’s 
shamba system, as the statement concerning the increasing wealth of Africans making recruitment 
in 1925 more difficult testifies to. It was also from this time in the mid-1920s that the department’s 
cattle reduction policy began to affect recruitment.  
If those engaged as forest squatters obeyed the rules of the Forest Department concerning 
cattle, and later goats, it would have effectively acted as a cap on their ability to accrue wealth and 
prestige in the traditional Kikuyu manner. As has been seen, however, not all of the forest squatters 
followed departmental regulations and continued to own and graze cattle in the forests, 
periodically transferring them to native reserves. It was not simply the department’s policies that 
dictated the behaviour of its squatters in regard to stock, as the relationships between squatters 
and those Kikuyu who remained in their natives reserves complicated matters. These relationships 
significantly affected forest squatters in Ngong Forest Reserve in 1934. The Ngong squatters were 
told to remove their cattle and goats by their forester in 1933. As Ngong forest offered poor grazing, 
the squatters agreed to do this without protest and moved the stock out of the forest to an 
unspecified location that must surely have been a native reserve. “Trouble”, which can be 
interpreted as competition for grazing land, in the native reserve in 1934 forced the squatters to 
request permission to return their livestock to the forest, which the Forest Department adamantly 
denied; those who insisted on retaining their livestock ended their contracts and left shamba. As 
the Assistant Forester at Ngong stated “the squatters at Ngong nearly all are of a very poor class 
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among the wakikuyu”581 it can be assumed that these squatters were ahoi. Moreover, these were 
ahoi who strove to increase their wealth and social position via the accumulation of cattle and goats, 
but were prevented from doing so in the native reserves and in the forest reserves. Here, both 
colonial forces and Africans within the reserves who exploited the economic changes that 
colonialism brought to expand their livestock and land holdings combined to lock the squatters of 
Ngong forest into the social status of ahoi. The shamba system gave no security in landholding to 
its squatters. Indeed, the department was adamant that it be made clear to forest squatters that 
their cultivation and habitation of the forests gave them no claim of ownership to the land they 
worked, even when squatters resided and worked within the same forest for more than a decade 
the department could choose to dispose of them when they no longer served the needs of 
forestry.582 With no land of their own and no cattle or goats, the only legal avenues of social 
advancement for the ahoi lay in departing the shamba system and using the cash earnings they had 
accrued from working for the Forest Department to attempt to buy into the native reserves or to 
attempt to find employment with the Forest Department itself. 
The livestock policy had the general effect across the forest reserves of discouraging wealthier 
Kikuyu who wanted to keep cattle or large numbers of goats from signing forest squatting contracts. 
In Elburgon, within Londiani forest division and a major site of plantation operations, Forester 
Archibald Cooper predicted in 1932: “I expect some [forest squatters] will prefer to leave rather 
than lose their goats, but there should be sufficient goatless Kikuyu about to fill their places.”583 The 
reference to ‘goatless’ Kikuyu was a clear indication that there were ample ahoi in the area willing 
to sacrifice the advantages of goat and cattle ownership for the chance to cultivate in the forests. 
Indeed, Cooper continued that the squatters he had recently engaged “agree quite readily to the ban 
on goats.”584 By 1934 this demographic transition was complete in Elburgon, as all goats and cattle 
were removed.  
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FOR/1/210. 
582 Forest Department, ‘Memorandum of Agreement (Forest Department Resident Labourers) under the Resident 
Labourers Ordinance, 1937’ 1941, DC/KMGA/1/5/2, KNA. The reluctance of the Forest Department to allow 
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insistence that he could stay was the physical manifestation of Forest Department fears that squatter residency in 
the forests would be equated by Africans with land rights. From the department’s viewpoint, the success of the 
shamba system depended on a mobile and disposable labour force that precluded security in land tenure. For details 
of the case, see correspondence within FOR/1/243.     
583 A.M. Cooper (Forester, Elburgon) to R.M. Graham (Asst. Conservator, Londiani), 9 February 1932. 
584 Ibid. 
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In most forests areas those engaged in the shamba system who wished to retain their livestock 
appear to have protested in the same manner as those in Elburgon and Ngong: by simply leaving 
the system. This was not the case in every area, as forest squatters within Kikuyu forest district in 
1933 attempted to petition the Forest Department via the district commissioner. Kikuyu district is 
notable for being one of the areas where the department permitted cattle to be grazed until the late 
1930s, which appears to have affected the demographic composition of the squatters there, as the 
1934 statistics (Table 2-3) indicate that the 138 forest squatters engaged there owned a total of 89 
cattle. A small minority no doubt owned many of these cattle, with many other squatters owning a 
single animal each and others owning none. The socio-economic status of the forest squatters in 
Kikuyu therefore probably ranged from the poorest of the ahoi to those just beginning to 
accumulate more livestock. Unfortunately, figures for the number of goats before 1934 (after this 
there were none), which would clarify this demographic range, do not exist. The presence of 
‘wealthier’ Kikuyu within this forest district, absent from most forest areas, could correlate with 
this being a site of protest. The forest squatters of Kikuyu appear to have been more politicised than 
other forest squatters and keenly aware of the timing of their protest, coming as it did during the 
Kenya Land Commission’s enquiries into Kikuyu land grievances. The petition to the district 
commissioner, written by the Mbari ya Mwenda Achera Clan, played on this point by claiming that 
the forest plantation they grazed their animals in was part of their githaka (clan landholding), a 
claim that Conservator of Forests Gardner considered “nonsense”.585 The protest highlighted the 
hardship that the goat eradication policy would cause: 
We people of Muguga Forest are in great distress as it is a big hardship which the Forest Lari [i.e. 
the Forester in Lari] is causing us, to order us to move our goats … . Now sir, we would like to ask 
that if our goats are removed from us what our children will be helped with?586      
The protest failed and the elimination of goats within Kikuyu forest division continued. Elimination 
also occurred in Nyeri, a division where the role of goats had greater significance. Within Nyeri 
forest division it was the attraction of grazing, not cultivation, within the forests that acted as the 
main pull factor for squatters coming from bordering native reserves in which land shortages for 
cultivation were not being as acutely felt. The forest officer in charge of Nyeri was running a policy 
by March 1932 whereby only squatters with “few or no goats” would be engaged on contracts. In 
contrast to almost all other forest areas, by 1934 the continued presence of some 7,000 goats in the 
division clearly showed that the availability of grazing of goats was a primary motivation for the 
engagement of squatters there. Just a year later, however, all the goats were removed from Nyeri 
just as they were in the other forest divisions of Kikuyu, Laikipia, Londiani, and Eldoret. The 
squatters were, of course, allowed to retain sheep. It is possible that those in Nyeri transferred to 
                                                                
585 Samuel Ngichu (Mbari ya Mwenda Achera Clan) to District Commissioner (Kiambu) care of the Kikuyu Land 
Hoard Association (translated), 25 December 1933, FOR/1/210, KNA. H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests) to 
District Commissioner (Kiambu), 5 January 1934. Gardner maintained that the area in question was a Forest 
Department plantation that had been sited on land previously cut out for railway fuel.  
586 Samuel Ngichu (Mbari ya Mwenda Achera Clan) to District Commissioner (Kiambu) care of the Kikuyu Land 
Hoard Association (translated), 25 December 1933. Ngichu’s reference to the forester in Lari, despite Ngichu being 
in Kikuyu district not Lari (Uplands) district, is due to the forester having oversight for more than one district.  
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sheep rather than goat grazing, assuming that adequate grazing for sheep was available in the 
division. Within Londiani division, Africans protested that sheep, even in greater numbers, were 
hardly a replacement for goats as sheep mortality was greater than that of goats in years of heavy 
rains and in years of drought and locust. Furthermore, the division lacked adequate grazing for 
sheep, while there was sufficient browsing material available for goats.587 Within Londiani at least, 
the value of goats was not only derived from their traditional importance in bridewealth and 
religious activities; rather their importance was linked to their greater survivability in the volatile 
environmental conditions of highland Eastern Africa. 588   
The livestock eradication programme run by the Forest Department thus saw protest that was 
motivated by concern over its impact on wealth accumulation and intensified by the strong 
narratives of Kikuyu land discrimination that were evident in the early 1930s, but it was protest 
also linked to the utility of goats in a region prone to environmental fluctuations such as drought. 
The programme therefore had strong socio-economic and basic welfare effects on the forest 
squatters, the perceived negativity of which compelled many to leave the shamba system. While 
some forest squatters may have adjusted to sheep rearing, it is equally possible that the approach 
explicitly taken in Nyeri and Kikuyu of recruiting ahoi willing to go without goats was finally 
successful by the closing years of the 1930s; the forest reserves had been cleared of cattle, goats, 
and the more prosperous Kikuyu who owned them. 
Throughout this period the Forest Department had an ample supply of Africans willing to sign 
on as forest squatters. By 1939, the department was reporting that in almost all of its forest areas 
the supply “exceeds the demand”, placing the Forest Department in the fortunate position of being 
able “to select as far as possible those likely to make good cultivators and generally to adapt 
themselves to forest work.”589 This position of being able to pick and choose allowed the 
department to easily not sign on or rid itself of men considered to be “nuisance” makers who would 
be “a source of annoyance both to the Department and to its neighbours [i.e. settlers].”590 The 
selective nature of squatter recruitment was one reason for the relative ease with which the Forest 
Department was able to implement its livestock reduction programme. The negative effects of 
livestock reduction were also offset by the productivity of farming within the forests. Cultivation 
on fresh soil in sheltered conditions seems to have afforded an advantage to forest squatter crops, 
especially in times of drought. 
Normally, on the fresh forest soil they obtain better crops than they would elsewhere and though 
during the year locust damage was serious in many districts, the squatters were certainly as well 
or better off than they would have been anywhere else.591 
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The Forest Department appears to have been unconcerned with recording this aspect of its shamba 
system; sporadic data do, however, support the department’s statement that the forest squatters 
were “better off”. After the Second World War, the department reported its squatters were 
producing approximately 150,000 bags of maize and 80,000 bags of potatoes annually.592 It was in 
the Forest Department’s interest to assist its forest squatters in their cultivation, as the department 
argued in the face of criticism of shamba, “the greater the area of such efficient cultivation the 
greater the plantation development.”593 The department applied the same scientific approach it 
utilised in forestry to its forest squatters, mandating that farm plots be set out in straight, orderly 
lines that would later assist in the planting of trees. Plots had to be kept tidy in order to reduce the 
risk of forest fires, grasses and weeds rooted out as they would impede tree growth, and communal 
fences erected as early as possible to both protect both crops and trees from wildlife damage and 
allow close supervision of any livestock. Perhaps surprising in a period when the government 
became so concerned about soil erosion on African farms, the Forest Department considered it of 
low importance within the forest environment of its squatters. The planting of trees made the 
system more resilient to erosion and the forest squatters would be moved to a new area before 
heavy erosion and soil nutrient exhaustion would take place.594 The forest squatters, and 
particularly the wives of registered squatters, were therefore spared the unpopular and tiring anti-
erosion measures that the Agricultural Department forced upon Africans in the native reserves.595 
 
2.4.3 Supervision and employment 
To fulfil these strict cultivation requirements the department used close supervision of its forest 
squatters. In keeping with the general policy of indirect rule and because the Forest Department 
simply had very few European officers, this supervision was carried out by Africans: forest guards, 
spearmen, headmen, and ‘old men’.596 As before 1925, the forest guards continued to be recruited 
                                                                
592 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1945-1947, 34. By contrast, in 1939-40 Kenya’s settlers’ entire 
output of maize was 618,000 bags (Spencer, ‘Settler Dominance, Agricultural Production and the Second World War 
in Kenya’, 502.). If we conservatively estimate that forest squatter production in 1939-40 was half that of the post-
war figure, this still suggests that the Forest Department’s 2,500 squatters were capable of equalling 12 per cent of 
the settler output. In the early 1960s the system was considered very productive, with the forest squatters 
producing between 6 and 10 per cent of the total African maize grown in the country. Kenya Forest Department, 
‘Taungya in Kenya: the “Shamba System”’ (World Symposium on Man-Made Forests and their Industrial Importance, 
Canberra: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1967), 4. 
593 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1945-1947, 33. 
594 ‘Squatter and Shamba Management (Bulletin No. 33)’, 5–9. 
595 Mackenzie, Land, Ecology and Resistance, 155–67; David Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and 
Drought: The Colonial State and Soil Conservation in East Africa during the 1930s’, African Affairs 83, no. 332 (1 July 
1984): 321–43; Mackenzie, ‘Contested Ground’. 
596 The Forest Department did not retain any records on spearmen. Their duties were to assist forest guards in 
general policing work, and were “generally local natives with a thorough knowledge of the district, and are often 
keener and more efficient than the guards themselves.” (Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1928, 3.) Data on 
the number of spearmen retained is patchy, however between 1938 and 1944 the number rose from 127 to 231; 
even the lower number is higher than the number of forest guards employed in 1938 (111 guards), the number of 
forest guards only rose very slightly (to 124) during the war compared to spearmen. The rates of pay for spearmen, 
however, are not recorded. Despite their apparent abilities, there appears to have been no initiative to train or 
recruit spearmen into higher positions until the change in forest guard recruitment policy in 1937 (see below). 
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from the King’s African Rifles (KAR) or police force and, as before, were therefore most likely not 
Kikuyu.597 By 1930 less than 1.5 per cent of the recruits to the KAR were Kikuyu, a rate which would 
fall through the 1930s, while the police force’s African ranks were dominated by Luo, Luhya, and 
Kamba, who along with Somali, Sudanese, and other foreign-born ‘martial peoples’ also accounted 
for the majority of Africans in the Rifles.598 The Forest Department needed literate men able to 
perform the many clerical duties of forestry (for example, the issuing of permits); in contrast, the 
Rifles and police preferred illiterate Africans as it made the task of clothing them in the mindset of 
colonialism and ‘civilisation’ as well as the uniform itself all the easier.599 The potential pool of 
forest guard recruits was therefore reduced by this requirement, yet the department had little 
trouble finding the 10-20 forest guard recruits it needed every year. Despite the steady stream of 
applicants, the poor quality of some of the forest guards employed motivated the department to 
actively change its recruitment policy to seek guards from within its forest squatter force by 1937, 
when Acting Conservator of Forests James Rammell began a system to recruit forest guards from 
among “our own men”, that is forest squatters who had proved their worth as spearmen or 
headmen.600 A new preference was established for Kikuyu forest guards, especially the sons of 
guards who had given good service and who had thus “been brought up in the Department.”601 After 
the late 1930s the forest guard force thus gradually shifted to one that was drawn from the loyalist 
and most dedicated of the forest squatters, making the system self-sustaining.   
As the rate of pay for forest guards started at 30 Kenyan shillings per month, just two shillings 
higher than the average pay in the army, the appeal of the position of forest guard most likely 
stemmed from the benefits it brought.602 If posted to a shamba area, forest guards received a hut 
and a small garden to supply their own needs, although the department was careful to ensure that 
their plots were kept small to reduce “slackness in the guard’s proper work.”603 Despite this, some 
guards were able to advance to much higher wage levels, establish large families, and afford 
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education for their sons.604 This highlights how the creation of patron-client relationships between 
the department and its African staff could be mutually beneficial, which was of course essential if 
shamba was to be successful in the long term.605 The shift to recruiting guards from the squatters 
indicates that these benefits were keenly pursued by a minority of forest squatters, people who 
could have become believers in the doctrines of forestry or just those who realised the potential of 
the system for personal progression.  
Indoctrination into the principles of forestry in Kenya was an important element of the shamba 
system. Only those forest squatters who followed the department’s rules of cultivation would 
remain in the system, with those who proved consistently unreliable being discharged. However, it 
was not the department’s aim to simply punish its squatters for rule violation. The departmental 
guidelines specified: “Petty punishment should be kept to a minimum.”606 Reform and education, 
not punishment was the goal. It did the work of plantation establishment no good to routinely evict 
or punish forest squatters, instead the department preferred to retain and train able men and 
woman who could continue to serve the department for at least the three to four years that it took 
to establish a plantation. This policy was not novel and had been employed when shamba, in its 
taungya form, had been used in colonial Burma as early as the 1860s. Within Burma, the 
punishment of resident forest labourers from the Karen ethnic group was minimized in order to 
convert the Karen from potential enemies of forestry into key allies and “loyal servants”, a process 
that was clearly at work in Kenya also.607  Conversely, this element of indoctrination was tempered 
within Kenya by the required continuation of shifting cultivation and the traditional Kikuyu 
practice of expansion into the forests. 
The redirection of African traditional practice was also reflected in the recruitment of 
headmen (referred to as neaparas608) from among the ranks of the forest squatters. “Almost 
invariably”609 headmen were chosen from “smart men”610 in the squatter force, perhaps indicating 
that authority and status could be obtained within shamba by virtue of ability not prior political 
position. With wages of up to 35 Kenyan shillings per month and a larger allocation of cropland 
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within the forest than other forest squatters, the position of headman could be lucrative, although 
their continued employment relied on their ability to strictly administer the rules of the shamba 
system.611 If the efforts of a workgroup were considered consistently below standard by the local 
forest officer, the headman of the group would be blamed and possibly “reduced to the ranks.”612 
Headmen were responsible for the majority of the daily running and supervision of the forest 
squatters, which meant supervision of communal land clearing and preparation, fencing, and the 
planting and tending of trees. The decreasing cost of plantation establishment and the increasing 
acreage of plantations created (Table 2-1 and Figure 2-5) suggest that overall the headmen were 
very successful in their jobs and that by the end of the 1930s the Forest Department had developed 
an effective system for gaining the maximum output from its squatters. 
While headmen were responsible for the technical aspects of shamba management, the Forest 
Department relied on “old-men” for the social management of its forest squatters. The “old-men” 
the department utilised were men who had been rewarded for past service to the government by 
being given a permit to reside and farm within the shamba system and therefore were not expected 
to work as forest squatters except in emergency cases such as firefighting.613 The use of elders was 
again indicative of the strong patron-client relationships that permeated the shamba system. These 
elders could solve small disputes within and between families engaged as forest squatters, and had 
responsibility for preventing illicit drinking, although every decision they made had to be approved 
by the forest officer. The department, no doubt aware of the history of problems that African agents 
of colonial rule had created within the native reserves, argued the oversight of the forest officer was 
necessary “to prevent exploitation of the less influential members”614 of the forest squatter force. 
Conversely, the department displayed no qualms about redirecting this powerful level of elder 
influence to encourage forest squatters to cultivate larger acreages of land in areas where it was 
“difficult to get enough land under cultivation to allow of a reasonable planting programme.”615 
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Headmen, elders, and forest guards, all of whom could be drawn from the forest squatter force, 
were essential for the management and considerable success of the shamba system during this 
period. Superior to all of these positions, however, was that of assistant forester (2nd grade), the 
highest position that an African could hold within the Forest Department before changes to the staff 
structure were rushed through on the verge of independence.616 Forest squatters might be 
recruited into the position of assistant forester, and upon retirement assistant foresters were 
allowed to retire into forest squatting, which served as partial compensation for their lack of 
pension provision.617 The position was potentially comparatively lucrative, as salaries started at 60 
shillings per month (twice that of forest guards and four times higher than headmen), rising in 
yearly increments of 5 or 10 shillings to a maximum of 150 shillings per month. Lodgings and 
outbuildings were also provided, presumably along with a garden for crops. However, the prospect 
of being engaged in the role of assistant forester was slim. In 1931, the department informed the 
director of the Education Department that there was “no immediate prospect of any vacancies” for 
African assistant foresters, and this proved true for the following decade and much of the Second 
World War.618  
The position of assistant forester, both for the Asian 1st grade and African 2nd grade, carried 
the responsibility of supervising headmen and forest guards, within and out of the shamba system, 
and assuming the duties of the European forester when he was on safari or leave. Candidates for 
assistant forester positions were thus required to have knowledge of clerical or forestry work.619 
Despite this, the Forest Department showed little interest in educating or training Africans for the 
position itself, an attitude no doubt hardened by the budgetary constraints of the 1930s. As early 
as 1928 the department had identified the need for a forest guards school, the ablest pupils of which 
might progress to assistant forester positions, as it had found few educated and able Africans 
willing to take up employment with the department. Literacy, the department considered, had 
acquired a “fictitious value” that prompted Africans to seek employment in higher paid urban 
positions.620 By 1945 the department was using the education argument to defend itself against 
accusations that too few Africans were employed in positions above that of labourer. The reason, 
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the department maintained, was the “comparatively low general standard of education” among 
Africans.621 The obvious answer to the problem was for the Forest Department to train Africans 
itself, which it indeed did commence doing after the Second World War. Prior to 1945, however, 
the department showed little interest in the schooling of its forest squatters, its primary candidate 
pool. From 1938 onwards, the department did liaise with the Education Department and Church of 
Scotland Mission in the provision of in the provision of sub-elementary, elementary, and adult night 
schools for its squatters. This was a development that was particularly prominent in Nakura 
District, acting as an incentive for forest squatter recruitment from settler farms where educational 
facilities were typically lacking.622 Across the colony as a whole, however, the department set out 
its rather less supportive attitude to education in 1939: “If local education facilities are lacking and 
a demand for a school exists, it should be satisfied. Generally, however, schools should be kept to a 
minimum.”623  
The Forest Department’s rather ambivalent take on African education could be seen as a 
deliberate limiting of the educational opportunities of the forest squatters, the majority of which 
did not need to be literate to perform their labouring and land clearing roles for the department. 
Limiting education would have thus encouraged the forest squatters to stay within the system and 
increased the likelihood of men born into the system staying in the system. However, this view is 
undermined by the continuous rise in squatter numbers, illustrating that the department rarely had 
problems finding new Kikuyu ahoi, and by evidence that shows that educated Kikuyu born into the 
system sought employment within it. Willis K. Kicheru was one such educated African. Having 
received five years education at the Kikuyu Church of Scotland Mission, in 1938 Kicheru sought 
work in the Forest Department’s nurseries, doing surveying, or any position above that of labourer. 
Kicheru was born into the shamba system: his father had been a forest squatter from 1926 until his 
death in 1934 and his brother became a squatter and remained one at the time of the job 
application.624 Clearly the appeal of forest squatting and Forest Department employment was great 
enough to retain personnel and turn the system into one that served several generations.  
The general deficiencies in education for forest squatters were in keeping with the 
government’s disinterest in developing state education for Africans in the interwar years, despite a 
significant eagerness from Africans to develop and access education themselves.625 Without a 
proper system of education and training, however, the Forest Department was prone to the 
recruitment of unsuitable individuals. In the late 1930s and early 1940s the department only 
                                                                
621 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1945-1947, 33. 
622 Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905-63, 81–89. 
623 ‘Squatter and Shamba Management (Bulletin No. 33)’, 5. 
624 Willis K. Kicheru to Forest Department, 26 July 1938, FOR/1/166, KNA. 
625 The 1930s saw an explosion of Harambee (self-help) initiatives launched by Africans. This was epitomised by 
independent African schools funded by African Local Native Councils, with some 1,802 elementary schools of this 
type by 1938. Anderson, The Struggle for the School, 136–38; Wambaa and King, ‘A Squatter Perspective’, 208; 
Schilling, ‘Local Native Councils and the Politics of Education in Kenya, 1925-1939’. 
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employed between three and five Africans as assistant foresters, yet of these two were clearly 
unsuitable for their positions. Esrom Kamande, who was appointed a trainee assistant forester 2nd 
grade in 1935 and became permanent in 1938 appeared perfect for the job, having been educated 
at the Church of Scotland Mission school in Kikuyu. Rapidly, however, it became clear that forestry 
work was not for him. He admitted to stealing money from the famine relief fund and his contract 
was finally terminated for bad behaviour and drunkenness in 1942.626 Similarly, E.K. Alfred, 
assistant forester 2nd grade, was appointed in 1936 but resigned in 1943 after being reprimanded 
for missing work and being drunk.627 Such individuals may have contributed to a negative 
impression of educated Africans within the Forest Department, further deterring it from actively 
pushing for the education of its squatters.   
Even when presented with qualified candidates, the Forest Department’s pessimistic view of 
the capability of African employees meant that it maintained a policy that Africans must first work 
as forest squatters, proving their worth and, perhaps most significantly their character, to the 
satisfaction of the local forester before they would be considered for higher positions. Such was the 
fate of Kicheru and many other applicants; the Forest Department response was to state that, after 
working as a forest squatter, “if you prove yourself efficient [you] will have an opportunity of filling 
any vacancies that may occur.”628 This was a policy that was applied to even the most qualified job 
seekers. It was, in part, a reflection of the general attitude toward employment of forest officers 
within the field of forestry. Africans had to prove their mettle to qualify, while for white officers 
their suitability was decided on their love of the outdoors life. The priorities of the Forest 
Department before the Second World War did not include the education of its forest squatter 
workforce, and neither did they include the training or establishment of a large number of Africans 
within more senior positions in the department, or of training its Asian assistant foresters to higher 
positions.629 Those Africans who did succeed in becoming assistant foresters, headmen, or forest 
guards (especially after the recruitment policy change in 1937) did so largely without the assistance 
of the Forest Department. These were people who excelled at exploiting the opportunities that the 
shamba system represented and were willing to accept the new relationship with the forest that 
                                                                
626 Personnel file for Esrom Kamande, FOR/1/406, KNA. 
627 Personnel file for E.K. Alfred, FOR/1/396, KNA. The primary duties of Kamande and Alfred appear to have been 
clerical; the department expressed that their performance in this respect as poor. 
628 R.M. Graham (for Acting Conservator of Forests) to Paul K. Ngugi, 11 February 1939, FOR/1/166, KNA. The 
department also seems to have been reluctant to open up new positions for assistant foresters 2nd grade. In 1939, 
for example, it rejected the application of H.M. Kanja despite his specific training in the measuring of wood and trees, 
transplanting, seed-growing, pruning, thinning, animal and insect protection, and the calculation of the cubic 
content of timber, as well as general book keeping and typing. Kanja further expressed a wish to study for a forestry 
diploma overseas. In 1939, however, there was to be no increase in the number of African assistant foresters, yet 
the number of Asian foresters (assistant foresters 1st grade) increased by three to 13. H.M. Kanja (Nanyuki) to Forest 
Department (South Nyeri), 22 May 1939, FOR/1/166, KNA.    
629 Despite the continued employment of a small number of Asians within the Forest Department (typically as 
assistant foresters), details of these individuals are absent from the department’s records. No documents have been 
found that reveal any information on the background, education, or recruitment of these men so it cannot be stated 
whether, for example, they had received forestry training in India.  
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departmental employment represented. As the presence of several generations within the system 
shows, the shamba system served such people well. 
  
2.4.4 ‘Criminal’ opportunities 
Between 1925 and 1945 the Forest Department witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of offences 
recorded within its forest reserves. Across this period as a whole, the number of crimes recorded 
by the department rose 454 per cent; even excluding the years of the Second World War, when a 
huge increase in the number of people operating in the forests occurred, the number of crimes 
increased 260 per cent between 1925 and 1939. The department recorded the offences that 
occurred in the forests under four primary headings, theft of forest produce, illicit grazing of 
livestock in the forest, damage to trees, and, grouped together, illicit honey hunting and the careless 
use of fire.630 The department also categorised offences as ‘other’, although the types of forest 
offences included within this were never elaborated on. The majority of activities relating to the 
exploitation of the forest or the utilisation of grazing or honey resources within forests were 
classified as forest offences after the 1902 Forest Ordinance, unless they were subject to licenced 
exploitation. The Forest Ordinance, 1911, which stood as the primary piece of legislation relating 
to forests until replaced in 1941, was extremely significant in clarifying the definitions of offences 
and specified that the committing of a forest offence could be punished with up to six months 
imprisonment. Furthermore, the 1911 ordinance established the principle of the compounding of 
offences. It defined compounding as a process in which: 
… the Conservator of Forests may, in any case he deems proper, accept on behalf of the Crown, 
from any person a sum of money as compensation for any offence committed by him, such 
compensation may extend to five times the value of the estimated damage done, or, where the 
value cannot be estimated to Rs. 100 for each offence.631 
Essentially, compounding amounted to an ‘on-the-spot’ fine meted out to anyone who was 
considered by the forest officer to be in violation of the Forest Ordinance. 
The compounding of offences was the Forest Department’s primary means of punishing forest 
offenders, with over 90 per cent of offences typically being compounded in this period. Although 
the practice did therefore bring in revenue directly to the department, the level of this revenue was 
                                                                
630 ‘Forest produce’ as defined by the Forest Ordinance, 1911, included “earth, trees, timber, wattles, plants, grass, 
reeds, rushes, peat, creepers, fibres, leaves, moss, fruit, seeds, galls, spices, bark, rubber, gum, resin, sap, charcoal, 
honey, wax.” ‘Timber’ was taken to mean standing trees or parts thereof, fallen or felled wood, and any wood that 
had been worked (such as sawn or split) or not. ‘Tree’ included all trees, whether they produced timber or not, 
shrubs, bushes, seedlings, saplings, shoots of any age, and any parts of trees. The Forest Ordinance, 1911, described 
all livestock as “cattle” and considered that cattle actually constituted “bulls, cows, oxen, horses, mares, geldings, 
asses, pigs, ostriches, sheep, ewes, and goats.” 
631 Forest Ordinance, 1911. 
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low, never surpassing 1 per cent of the department’s total revenue for any given year. Efficiency, 
not revenue was the attraction of the compounding system to the Forest Department. Compounding 
was quick and reduced the workload of district officers and the courts by keeping cases out of them, 
thereby reducing the costs of administration.632  
Of all the acts the government considered a forest offence, the Forest Department itself 
considered honey hunting to be the greatest danger to the forest estate because honey collectors 
would set fires to smoke bee hives suspended in trees, and thus could also involve a “great deal of 
labour and anxiety to officers and staff and expense to Government.”633 The seriousness of the 
offence, however, appeared in the eyes of the department to be unrecognised by the government. 
In a memorandum on the matter in 1935, Rammell complained of the “entirely inadequate 
                                                                
632 This was illustrated when, in 1935, Rammell, in his capacity as Acting Conservator of Forests while Gardner was 
on leave, stated that “for many years District Officers have asked us not to waste their time with compoundable 
cases… .” He went on to describe a case that demonstrates both this desire for administrative efficiency and the low 
importance forest law violation carried within the judicial arm of government. In this incident, when a local forester 
decided to pursue a case to the courts, the magistrate simply told him to settle the matter out of court. See J.C. 
Rammell (Acting Conservator of Forests) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley), 15 February 1935, FOR/1/243, 
KNA. 
633 J.C. Rammell (Acting Conservator of Forests) to Asst. Conservators of Forest (Londiani, Laikipia, Nyeri), 
‘Memorandum on Honey Hunting Cases’, 11 April 1935, FOR/1/243, KNA. 
Year 
 
Total number of 
forest offences 
Percentage 
compounded 
Compounding revenue 
(shillings) 
Percentage of Forest 
Department revenue 
1924 727  87% 5,927  0.3% 
1925 771  92% 6,640  0.3% 
1926 808  87% 7,984  0.2% 
1927 1,019  92% 11,525  0.3% 
1928 1,297  92% 727  0.0% 
1929 1,576  87% 17,848  0.4% 
1930 1,031  90% 11,996  0.3% 
1931 1,295  90% 13,689  0.5% 
1932 1,356  86% 12,524  0.5% 
1933 1,605  85% 14,146  0.6% 
1934 2,036  84% 15,663  0.6% 
1935 1,654  90% 10,912  0.4% 
1936 1,779  91% 10,957  0.3% 
1937 2,045  90% 13,452  0.4% 
1938 2,792  ? 16,206  0.4% 
1939 2,778  ? 19,647  0.4% 
   ~     
1944 4,235  92% 40,131  0.3% 
1945 4,279  93% 43,023  0.3% 
Table 2-5. Forest offences and their compounding, 1924-1945. Nb. The extremely low figure for revenue from 
compounding in 1928 would appear to be an error in the departmental records. Source: Forest Department 
Annual Reports. 
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sentences”634 imposed on honey hunters by magistrates and was further frustrated that statements 
he had made on the matter in the department’s annual reports for 1932 and 1933 had been 
censored before publication. Rammell clearly felt that the concerns of the Forest Department were 
being suppressed, that the government was demoting the needs of forestry once again. Amid the 
rising crime rate in the 1930s, the Forest Department felt it was fighting the battle without support. 
In the same year as Rammell’s effort to raise awareness of the problem of honey hunting, Reginald 
Porter, the assistant conservator in charge of Nyeri forest division, was in conflict with the 
provincial commissioner and district commissioner over the issue of Africans cutting down trees 
for fuelwood. Both the PC Nyeri and DC North Nyeri argued that the Africans were guilty only of 
misinterpreting the vague instructions of the Europeans, upon whose farms they squatted. Porter 
disagreed. Blame, he considered, lay with the Africans who preferred to take the risk of illegally 
cutting down a tree nearby rather than travelling some distance to collect deadwood; a matter that 
was worsened by what he considered the small fine imposed if they were caught. Porter thus 
declared that he would pursue the next case of such an incident, prosecuting and fining the 
offenders a suitable amount, in opposition to the PC and DC.635 
Conversely, the earnestness with which forest officers pursued forest offence cases and the 
large fines they summarily imposed through the compounding of offences were criticised by others 
within the colonial government.636 In 1935, the same year the Forest Department was taking a 
stricter stance against the rising levels of forest crime, Captain Fey, Justice of the Peace for Naivasha 
and a farmer, wrote to the Provincial Commissioner of the Rift Valley Province complaining of the 
“excessive fines inflicted upon the natives in this District for stealing wood from the Forest 
Reserve.”637 The JP claimed to have the sympathy of the Native Affairs Department in the matter. 
He considered the fines used, of 5 shillings, to be entirely disproportionate to the crimes, and as the 
offenders only had a typical monthly income of 8 shillings he conjectured that “this looks like [the 
Forest Department is] trying to starve them out.”638 Although there is insufficient evidence to 
directly link the crime rate and the hard line the Forest Department appears to have taken in 1935, 
the lower number of theft of forest produce offences in 1935 compared to 1934 and 1936 could 
suggest that the department’s tough stance was having a preventative effect in that year, and that 
the subsequent rise in produce theft could be a result of a softening of the policy under criticism 
from other branches of government (Figure 2.7). 
                                                                
634 Ibid. Rammell highlighted that the highest penalty that could be imposed on a person found honey hunting 
without a licence was £15 or two months in prison, or both, yet the highest penalty that had been meted out was £5, 
with the majority of cases resulting in fines of less than £1. 
635 R.V. Porter (Asst. Conservator of Forests, Nyeri) to H.M. Gardner (Conservator), 29 November 1935, FOR/1/243, 
KNA. Records do not reveal whether Porter made good on his threat. 
636 The Forest Department in Tanganyika faced similar disinterest from the colonial administration toward forest 
offences. Sunseri, Wielding the Ax, 75. 
637 Captain E. Fey (Justice of the Peace, Naivasha) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 23 December 
1935, FOR/1/243, KNA. 
638 Ibid. 
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Gardner believed that Fey was motivated by self-interest in his complaints about fines. The 
Africans in question were, Gardner argued, squatters on Fey’s farm and as that farm also 
encompassed forest the complaints were an attempt to hide Fey’s reluctance to issue his own 
fuelwood to his farmers.639 Once again, the Forest Department’s mistrust of settler farmers and 
belief that they did not support forestry appears to have coloured its interactions with those 
farmers. The stance of the Forest Department was that a 5 shilling fine was lenient and that the 
continuation of crime illustrated that it was in fact too low. The 2 shilling monthly cost of a fuelwood 
permit, which permitted the collecting of a headload of wood each day, was considered reasonable 
by the department. The department did, in fact, also issue forest produce for free to those it deemed 
most needy, a criterion left to the discretion of local forest officers. The rising cost of this during the 
economically bad and drought-frequent 1930s, from £344 in 1933 to £886640 in 1935, however, no 
doubt firmed the department’s view that those who could afford to pay, should pay.641 The level of 
                                                                
639 H.M. Gardner (Conseravor of Forests) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 3 January 1936, 
FOR/1/243, KNA. 
640 The Forest Department did not state how it calculated the value of the forest produce given away free. If we 
assume that this was done based on the 2 shilling-a-month licence fee, the total number of families that £886 would 
supply was 5,537 (if it is conservatively estimated that they would need the equivalent of eight months fuel to last 
12 months), clearly only a tiny fraction of the population of Kenya. As fuel and building materials were also 
sporadically given away free to settlers on farms with minimal or no tree cover, this calculation would require 
further reduction. The department rarely kept records providing details of the free issue of forest produce, however 
there is evidence that in 1931 the department agreed with the provincial administration to allow Africans in Meru 
free fuel for 12 months because they “are really so hardup that they cannot afford the small sums needed for 
royalties on fuel… .” H.M. Gardner (Conservator) to Provincial Commissioner (Nyeri), 9 February 1931, FOR/1/227, 
KNA. 
641 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1935, 12. 
 
 
Figure 2-7. Recorded forest offences between 1925 and 1945 and yearly breakdown per offence type. Source: 
Forest Department Annual Reports. 
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fines thus remained unchanged. In 1935 these stood at between 4 and 6 shillings for fuel theft, 1 
shilling per head of livestock for illicit grazing, and up to 20 shillings for damage to trees. Illicit 
squatting, residing, or cultivating in a forest carried a fine of 10-20 shillings.642 This was at a time 
when the average wages of Africans were falling, indeed the Forest Department cut the wages of its 
own forest squatters in 1935. By 1933, the average African casual labourer was earning 6-10 
shillings per month, and the average squatter 6 shillings.643 For such people, the temptation to 
forego the 2 shilling per month fee and collect fuelwood illegally must have been great. 
The Forest Department’s dogged pursuit of fines also attracted the attention of the Chief 
Native Commissioner, Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley) and Labour Inspector into the matter 
of the punishment of Forest Department squatters by the department. The Forest Department’s 
usual practice was to compound the offences its forest squatters were accused of, yet it became 
clear during investigations in 1935 that the department was acting illegally by compounding 
offences that did not fall under the Forest Ordinance. 644 Common offences such as the brewing of 
tembo, failure to obey an order, and harbouring strangers were all dealt with on the contracts of 
forest squatters but were not legally crimes; the offence was of breaking the rules of the contract, 
not colonial law. The department was further in error by allowing its assistant foresters to impose 
fines, when only forest officers of the rank of forester and above were legally allowed to compound 
any offence.645  The Forest Department did not face any consequences for the misuse of the 
instrument of compounding, which may have been occurring since compounding was established 
in 1911. Neither is there documentary evidence of protest by forest squatters about this misuse of 
power, perhaps indicating that the squatters were not aware of the precise nature of compounding; 
indeed, after the department’s illicit compounding activities became clear, the Native Affairs 
Department ordered it to ensure that when an offence was being compounded it was made clear to 
the accused that they had the right to defend themselves against the allegation in court rather than 
pay a summary fine.646 After March 1935, the Forest Department was therefore compelled to send 
any violation of forest squatter contract terms to the courts.647 Nevertheless, the percentage of 
forest offences compounded did not decrease in 1935, rather it increased by 6 per cent (Table 2-5) 
                                                                
642 C.F. Elliot (for Acting Conservator of Forests) to F. Nye Chart (Manager, Statimma Farm, Gilgil), 30 March 1935. 
Based on Forest Department revenues from the compounding of offences, the average fine between 1924 and 1945 
was approximately 9 shillings.  
643 Native Affairs Department, Annual Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1933, 123. 
644 The Chief Native Commissioner had, in fact, been pursuing the matter of the overzealous application of forest 
rules and compounding since at least 1933, when he asked Gardner his opinion on the withdrawal of the power to 
compound an offence. Gardner responded that it was a most efficient system and one that was in use by almost all 
Forest Department’s across the empire (Chief Native Commissioner to H.M. Gardner, 18 August 1933, FOR/1/243, 
KNA; H.M. Gardner to Chief Native Commissioner, 18 October 1933, FOR/1/243, KNA.) 
645 That is, the positions open to Europeans of (in increasing seniority) forester, assistant conservator of forests, 
senior assistant conservator of forests, and conservator of forests. 
646 J.C. Rammell (Acting Conservator of Forests) to all Asst. Conservators of Forest, 6 March 1935, FOR/1/243, KNA. 
647 J.C. Rammell (Acting Conservator of Forests) to Foresters (Lari, Kerita, Karura, and Machakos), and Asst. 
Foresters (Kikuyu, Ngong, and Kinobop), 11 March 1935, FOR/1/243, KNA. 
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and the number of cases prosecuted in court actually fell 46 per cent.648 The decision to (legally) 
pursue the violation of forest squatter contract terms in the courts rather than (illegally) 
compounding can hardly have been popular with forest officers. In 1934 an assistant conservator 
had complained to Gardner that when cases were taken to court the magistrate was liable to impose 
a lower fine than if the case had been compounded.649 Reginald Graham, Assistant Conservator in 
charge of Londiani division, wrote to Gardner in 1937 with an account of the considerable time he 
considered he had wasted – several days – in attending a court hearing for a forest squatter who 
was accused of “petty beer drinking.”650 This was an extra administrative burden that added to the 
requirement established in 1933 that the Forest Department file monthly returns detailing offences 
compounded to relevant district commissioners; essentially a signal of the lack of trust that the 
administration had in the Forest Department in relation to the fair handling of crime and surely a 
measure that must have irritated forest officers.651 
While there were clear concerns within government about the Forest Department’s heavy 
handedness in matters of forest crime, there was also attention drawn to the fact that the 
department’s forest squatters themselves were responsible for a good deal of that crime. 
Concurrent to the provincial commissioner’s (Rift Valley) investigation into compounding was his 
accusation that forest squatters in Elburgon district of Londiani forest division were “out of 
control”652 in 1934. Rammell attempted to play down the extent of the forest offences for which the 
forest squatters were responsible, yet, if the figures he provided are accurate, the situation did seem 
serious.653 Of the 125 forest offences compounded in Elburgon in 1934, 63 per cent appear to have 
been committed by the department’s forest squatters. Furthermore, the average fine meted out was 
                                                                
648 The number of cases prosecuted in the courts by the Forest Department was 318 in 1934, which fell to 169 in 
1935 and did not rise again until 1937. 1934 was in fact a particularly high year for prosecutions, however even if 
we take the preceding five years before 1934, when the average prosecution rate was 171 cases per year, it can be 
seen that the number of prosecutions did not increase immediately after the introduction of an actual legal policy 
for dealing with forest squatter contract violations (Forest Department Annual Reports, 1929-1937). The dip in the 
total number of forest offences recorded in 1935 (figure 2-6) could indicate that some contract violations were no 
longer being classified as forest offences, however the continued inclusion of the ‘offence’ of dirty shambas in the 
forest statistics (under the heading of ‘injuring trees or forest produce’, presented in figure 2-6 as ‘damage to trees’) 
(Ibid.), which was a forest squatter contract violation not an offence under the Forest Ordinance goes some way to 
disproving this. The dip in the number of forest offences in 1935 is just as likely to have been a consequence of 
increased caution in the wake of criticism of the department’s overzealous compounding policy.    
649 Asst. Conservator of Forests to H.M. Gardner (Conservator), 4 July 1934, FOR/1/243, KNA. 
650 R.M. Graham (Asst. Conservator, Londiani) to H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests), 10 September 1937, 
FOR/1/243, KNA. 
651 J.C. Rammell (Acting Conservator of Forests) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley), 15 February 1935. 
Unfortunately, these records of monthly returns have not survived. 
652 Ibid. 
653 Within his letter to the PC (Rift Valley) of 15 February 1935, Rammell states that there were 250 families of 
Kikuyu forest squatters in Elburgon in 1934, however the previous assessment of the forest squatter workforce, 
completed in May 1934, states there were 202 forest squatter families in Elburgon (table 2-4). It is possible that a 
further 48 families were recruited in the eight months between the squatter census and Rammell’s letter, however 
this would go against the colony-wide trend of a reduction in squatter families by 121 between 1934 and 1935. It is 
possible, then, that Rammell was inflating the number of forest squatters in Elburgon in order to lessen the impact 
of the recorded 79 forest offences committed by the forest squatters.    
162   The Forest Squatters 
16 shillings, significantly higher than the average compounded fine of 9 shillings.654 Thus, not only 
were the squatters of Elburgon engaged in activities the Forest Department considered illegal, but 
a significant proportion of these offences must have carried fines large enough to force the average 
to such a level. 
The detailed statistics on forest squatter involvement in forest offences from Elburgon in 1934 
are, unfortunately, unique. The department did not retain statistics on the level of forest squatter 
crime for other areas or in other years. However, the forest squatters were ideally situated to be 
involved in forest offences. In particular, the previously mentioned April 1935 conviction of 
Kamuru Kiarie, a forest squatter in Ngong forest,655 for the illicit movement of cattle between forest 
reserve and native reserve could indicate involvement in the growing business of organised stock 
thefts.656 Anderson has argued that the taking of cattle from African and European farms became 
an increasingly sophisticated and large-scale illicit activity, particularly in the Western 
Highlands.657 As forest squatters were located in forests across the highlands, they were in a 
position to considerably aid in the concealment of stolen stock while it was still in transit to the 
native reserves. The Forest Department policy of moving its forest squatters from area to area, after 
the tree crop had reached a stage where it competed with food crops, may have also aided this 
process as it would have given squatters the opportunity to establish communication with Africans 
in reserves and on settler farms over a wide area. 
In terms of policing, the forests themselves fell under the jurisdiction of the Forest 
Department, not the colonial police force. The department’s forest guard force, however, was 
reduced in number throughout this period, from 132 in 1930 to 102 in 1939, and only rising in 
1944 in response to the escalation in forest produce thefts and cases of illicit grazing. Writing to his 
superior in 1940, Holyoak, the forester at Lari forest station, argued that no more forest guards 
should be recruited because it was more important to keep down expenses.658 Greater emphasis 
therefore seems to have been placed on the use of spearmen, whose employment was, presumably, 
considerably cheaper. The number of spearmen rose from 127 in 1938 to 231 in 1944.659 The Forest 
Department publically argued as early as 1929 that the increasing number of forest offences 
identified was a result of the greater vigilance of its forest guards, an argument it repeated in 1937 
and 1938 after sharp rises in the crime rate.660 If greater vigilance was the cause of the increase it 
certainly did not have a preventative effect. Compounding was, perhaps, seen by Africans residing 
within and using the forests as a cost that could be absorbed if the forest offence in question was 
                                                                
654 J.C. Rammell (Acting Conservator of Forests) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley), 15 February 1935. 
655 P.H. Poolman (Stock Inspector) to Deputy Director (Animal Industry)/Chief Veterinary Officer, 2 May 1935. 
656 Anderson, ‘Stock Theft and Moral Economy in Colonial Kenya’, 407. 
657 Anderson, ‘Stock Theft and Moral Economy in Colonial Kenya’. 
658 E.A. Holyoak (Forester, Lari) to J.C. Rammell (Snr. Asst. Conservator), 2 April 1940, FOR/1/244, KNA. 
659 Forest Department Annual Reports, 1930-1944. 
660 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1929, 1929, 13; Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1937, 14; 
Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1938, 13. 
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being carried out by a large network or clan. Such networks were clearly in operation by the time 
of the Second World War, when illegal felling and pitsawing was occurring on a large scale. The 
apparently large potential profits from such operations meant that the department’s forest guards 
were subjected to “very great temptation.”661 During the war, at least two forest guards in Nyeri 
forest division were found guilty of accepting large bribes from pitsawing gangs operating in the 
Aberdares.662 The problem of bribery within the forest guards stretched back further in this period 
and was not isolated to a single area. In 1934 Gardner complained to the district commissioner of 
Kiambu, the region immediately north of Nairobi, that “attempted bribery” of forest guards was 
endemic in the area.663 Bribery also occurred within the shamba system, as the department’s 1939 
guidelines on management specifically warned foresters to ensure that when headmen recruited 
new farmers into the system that this was done in public, with other headmen and squatters 
present, to guard against “the habit of accepting a bribe.”664 
The shamba system also aided those from outside the system who wished to engage in 
activities the colonial government considered criminal by acting as a support network within the 
forests. Cattle rustlers or others committing forest offences could easily hide in plain sight in the 
forests, as Africans were permitted to stay within a forest for 48 hours, hosted by a forest squatter. 
Intended to ease the movement of Africans in search of work or visiting family or friends within the 
shamba system, the effect was that the Forest Department could never be sure of exactly how many 
Africans were, legally, staying within its forests. Describing the situation in Londiani in 1940, the 
assistant conservator R.M. Graham stated that, “I do not wish to stop our people from having friends 
to stay with them, but I do want to have a check on these friends.”665 The specific reason for checks 
on this movement cited by Graham was to empower the department to pursue Africans who were 
attempting to evade the police by hiding in a forest. Wright, the local assistant inspector of police, 
agreed.666 Against the backdrop of escalating forest crime, the 1941 Forest Ordinance plugged this 
legislative hole by forbidding any person from remaining in any forest area between 9 p.m. and 6 
a.m. the following morning unless the conservator of forest had provided permission to do so. The 
erection of any building or, significantly, cattle enclosure without the conservator’s permission was 
also expressly forbidden. Making these acts offences under the forest ordinance not only gave the 
Forest Department jurisdiction but allowed it to compound the offence of ‘trespass’, thereby 
expediting forest ‘justice’.    
                                                                
661 D.G.B. Leakey (Asst. Conservator, Nyeri) to H.M. Gardner (Conservator), 2 January 1941, FOR/1/243, KNA. 
662 Ibid. 
663 H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests) to District Commissioner (Kiambu), 8 September 1934, FOR/1/243, KNA; 
H.M. Gardner (Conservator of Forests) to District Commissioner (Kiambu), 10 September 1934, FOR/1/243, KNA. 
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The above account has made clear that what the Forest Department considered to be forest 
offences were common and increasing from the mid-1920s until the close of the Second World War. 
These were offences, moreover, in which the department’s forest squatter workforce appears to 
have involved. To properly understand this involvement it is necessary to look at forest offences 
within the wider environmental conditions of this period, specifically with regard to drought, and 
the destocking programme run by the Forest Department. These factors were also at play during 
the Second World War, however the factors behind the massive increase in crime during the war 
years are muddied by the huge influx of people into the forests, and the lack of records dealing with 
this. Africans, Indians, and large numbers of soldiers and prisoners of war were at work in the 
forests during the war, and the increase in forest offences during that time can largely be attributed 
to the presence of these often unregulated people.667 
Drought was a significant factor in influencing the formation of colonial policies toward 
Kenyans in this period, and there is evidence to support a hypothesis that drought and the rate of 
forest offences were linked.668 That is, in drought years the number of forest offences increased, 
while in years of good rains the number of forest offences dipped. The Forest Department’s own 
annual reports can provide information on the average rainfall across the colony, as the department 
made note of years when late, small, or non-existent rains affected its afforestation operations (as 
more plantings would fail in such years) and fire prevention measures (as forest fires were 
dramatically more prevalent in drought years). Between 1924 and 1939 the Forest Department 
reported that the years of 1924-1925, 1927-1929, 1931-1934, 1939, 1943 and the first half of 1944 
were notably dry. Only the years 1926, 1930, and 1935-1936 were remarked upon as having good 
rains.669 As shown in Figure 2-7, it was in the years 1926 to 1929 and 1931 to 1934, that is to say, 
drought years, when dramatic increases were recorded in the number of forest offences. In the good 
rainfall years of 1930 and 1935 there was a noticeable drop in recorded instances of forest offences. 
It is further notable that between 1931 and 1934 the largest proportion of offences were classified 
as illicit grazing. The Forest Department stated that the large proportion of illicit grazing offences 
in 1929 (the department did not provide a detailed breakdown of forest offence types in the late 
                                                                
667 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1941, 2. For accounts of the many problems the Forest Department 
faced in attempting to control wartime exploitation see file FOR/1/244, KNA. In particular, the presence of British 
soldiers in or in proximity to the forests led to a large amount of unregulated felling and accidental fires. The military 
bureaucracy hindered Forest Department attempts to exert control over these soldiers. Large thefts of forest 
produce were also common during the war. 
668 Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought’. 
669 Forest Department Annual Reports, 1924-1939. As the Forest Department primarily operated within the central 
highlands of Kenya, these assessments of rainfall are confined to that region. These reports of rainfall broadly concur 
with other rainfall data from the period, for example presented in L. J. Ogallo, ‘The Spatial and Temporal Patterns of 
the East African Seasonal Rainfall Derived from Principal Component Analysis’, International Journal of Climatology 
9, no. 2 (1989): 145–67. The highest rainfall levels in Kenya are recorded in the forested, mountainous areas of the 
central highlands and in proximity to Lake Victoria (Department for International Development (DFID), ‘Economic 
Impacts of Climate Change: Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi: Climate Report Kenya’ (DFID, ICPAC, Kenya and SEI Oxford 
Office, September 2009).), therefore if rainfall was low in the forests, as reported by the Forest Department, the 
rainfall level outside of those forests can, broadly, be assumed to have been lower; that is to say, drought outside of 
the forests was more severe than that recorded in the forests.  
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1920s aside from this notable number of grazing offences in 1929) was linked to the wider drought: 
poor grazing outside of the forests was forcing Africans to seek better grazing for their animals 
within the forest.670 Although the department did not comment on this relationship between 1931 
and 1934, it is reasonable to assume that drought in those years also pushed livestock grazing into 
the forests. These were also the years when the department was fully pursuing its African livestock 
reduction programme, indeed as were settlers and the government. Traditional practices of 
livestock movement as a drought response were therefore criminalised and conflated with the 
growth of stock theft. In 1939, another drought year, cases of illicit grazing again outnumbered 
produce theft. And although complicated by the influx of workers and lower supervision of the war 
years, 1944, which was recorded as a partially dry year, saw a record high level of illicit grazing and 
produce theft. The rise in the proportion of illicit grazing and overall increase in forest offences 
should therefore also be seen as a response to colonial policy. For Africans, the forests acted as a 
refuge for their livestock from both drought and the destocking initiative. 
The escalation of forest offences in the late 1920s and 1930s further contributed to what the 
Forest Department saw as a lack of recognition by Africans of departmental authority. In 1933, for 
example, Edward. Honorè, Assistant Conservator of Forests, complained of numerous forest offence 
cases in which those accused argued the department and its forest officers had no authority to stop 
them utilising the forest as they wished.671 The growth of offences within the forests throughout 
the 1930s may therefore be seen as symptomatic of both the need for Africans to access and exploit 
the forests in the face of environmental stresses and oppressive colonial policies, and a gradual 
decline in the perceived authority of the Forest Department to rule over the forests; a situation 
worsened by the presence of corruption within the forest guard force and headmen overseeing the 
forest squatters. As the case of the forest squatter convicted of illicit cattle movement illustrates, 
the Forest Department’s policy of maintaining pockets of forest squatters within the forests allowed 
the forests to continue to act as a lifeline in times of environmental stress and provided a support 
network for the escalating and increasingly organized occurrences of forest offences, particularly 
stock theft. Essentially, while being integral to the colonial reafforestation mission, the forest 
squatters acted to undermine the colonial goal of disconnecting Africans from their traditional 
relationship with the forest. 672 
The forest crime statistics may also suggest that the department’s resident labour force was 
politically aware and protested against colonial authority by damaging trees, setting fires, and 
participating in wider criminal networks. Direct evidence of political awareness among the forest 
squatters is, however, lacking. The major incident recorded by the Forest Department occurred in 
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1929 and was related to wider protests by squatters on settler farms concerning the signing of 
oppressive squatting contracts.673 The Forest Department reported that: 
… considerable trouble occurred among the [forest] squatters due to mischief-makers, for some 
obscure reason, persuading them that it was dangerous to sign the squatter's agreements as 
required by law. The result was that in nearly all districts the squatters, on the termination of 
their agreements, refused to sign new ones…674 
The “mischief-makers” in question were probably those within the forest squatter workforce or on 
neighbouring settler farms who were well connected to the nascent politicisation of the Kikuyu and 
wished to protest about the increasingly heavy hand taken by settlers toward their squatters. The 
protest of the forest squatters was one of solidarity with the settler squatters, although it was no 
doubt also influenced by the cattle elimination policy that the department had enacted. The forest 
squatters returned to the native reserves after this incident, although “by the end of the year either 
the old squatters had returned and signed agreements or new men had taken their places.”675 The 
statement that “new men” had replaced some of those who protested is key in signalling the method 
the Forest Department would adopt and refine in order to counter the rising political awareness 
among Kikuyu squatters.  
As already argued, the management of the shamba system contained strong elements of social 
engineering in that only hardworking, loyal workers were permitted to remain within it. 
Remembering the 1929 protests, by 1939 the department was instructing its officers to sign on 
squatters in batches staggered across a three-year period so that if trouble brewed over the signing 
of contracts again the entire shamba system would not be crippled. It was a precaution the 
department instituted because of the presence of what it considered “agitators”. Shamba guidelines 
specified that, “Once a man is known as an agitator, or as a witch doctor who continually causes 
trouble among other squatters, he should be got rid of at once.”676 The goal of the department was 
to create an apolitical workforce, isolated from the “mischief-makers” in the reserves and on 
European farms. It was a workable policy because the shamba system offered to Kikuyu ahoi 
attractive agricultural opportunities in comparison to life in the reserves. These opportunities, 
handicapped as they were by the increasing strictness of the department’s livestock policy through 
the late 1920s and 1930s, meant a steady stream of applications for squatting from which the 
department could choose ideal recruits. However, as the preceding accounts of bribery and theft of 
forest produce and cattle attest, this recruitment process was never totally effective. The Forest 
Department may have condescendingly described its squatters as “contented” in the drought years 
                                                                
673 Furedi, ‘Kikuyu Squatters’, 191. Furedi argues that squatters on settler farms protested, principally by strike 
action, to response to rumours of 30-year squatting contracts; rumours which had been stoked by the Kikuyu 
Central Association, one of the earliest Kikuyu political organisations that focused on the disparity of land rights 
within the colony. 
674 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1929, 1929, 20. 
675 Ibid. 
676 ‘Squatter and Shamba Management (Bulletin No. 33)’, 3. 
The Forest Squatters   167 
of 1933 and 1934,677 and it may have been successful in keeping political organisations out of its 
shamba system, but this did not mean that the forest squatters were all loyal, politically neutral 
workers. 
As argued by Van Onselen in the Southern Rhodesian context, the absence of political 
organisations among workers does not necessarily indicate they lack a political consciousness.678 
Rather, such a political awareness was expressed through everyday forms of protest that sought to 
deny colonial authorities either the fruits of labour or material resources themselves. Within the 
context of forestry, Bryant has shown that such action, typically expressed through the destruction 
of young teak trees, was very much a part of the Burmese taungya system, the progenitor of Kenya’s 
shamba system.679 In contrast to Burma, where entire communities sometimes participated in joint 
protest, incidents recorded by the Kenyan Forest Department as crime that could be construed as 
protest seem to have been small in scale. Indeed, as the department did not record any crimes or 
other activities as protest, apart from the 1929 incident, the disentangling of the department’s 
records can only ever partially reveal evidence of protest. Aside from their participation and 
engagement with the growing criminal networks of stock theft, a key indicator of the forest 
squatters’ indifference and hostility toward the colonial government was their involvement in 
‘damage to trees’ and forest fires. 
Recorded as ‘damage to trees’ in Figure 2-7, the Forest Department included within this 
category the injuring of trees or forest produce as well as, after 1935, the contract offence of failing 
to maintain a clean shamba (farm plot). Lack of shamba maintenance could be construed as a ‘go-
slow’ tactic that allowed the forest squatter to express his disquiet at his overseer, the Forest 
Department generally, or the colonial government. Such an action, however, caused little harm to 
forestry operations and could obviously be directly linked to the shamba owner, who would 
invariably be reprimanded or punished. By contrast, the setting of forest fires is a recognised form 
of rural protest, evident in Bryant’s research into taungya in Burma and, more widely, in the several 
case studies by Kuhlken.680 In the years during this period when the Forest Department reported 
the causes of forest fires, 1931 to 1939 and 1944 to 1945, the forest squatters employed by the 
                                                                
677 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1933, 27; Annual Report 1934, 26. 
678 Charles Van Onselen, ‘Worker Consciousness in Black Miners: Southern Rhodesia, 1900–1920’, The Journal of 
African History 14, no. 2 (April 1973): 237–255. 
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environmental conditions.  
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department were responsible on average for the starting of 11 per cent of fires.681 Although low, 
this carries significance even though other causes of fire were greater, most notably ‘honey hunters’ 
who were responsible for an average of 24 per cent of fires across the period.  
Surprisingly, of the peoples living in or in proximity to the forests, it was the forest squatters 
who had the most to gain through the use of fire. The shamba system relied on fire for the clearing 
of unproductive or economically depleted forests before cultivation and the planting of 
economically productive trees could commence. The primary benefits the forest squatters gained 
were through the process of this clearing and the growing of their crops: they received no share of 
the profits accrued from the exploitation of the trees that they tended. Thus, there was a 
disconnection between the worker and the final product of the system. Sanctioned forest clearances 
that burnt out of control, the burning of forest not yet slated for conversion to plantation, or the of 
burning tree plantations themselves, all increased the amount of labour (in fighting the fire, 
preparing land, and tending trees) that was needed and the area that would be required to be 
cultivated, thus benefitting the squatters. Forest squatters were thus well versed in the uses and 
potential abuses of fire. Moreover, it was a method of protest that could yield dramatic results yet 
be carried out by a single person with minimal physical effort and no cost.682   
Drought conditions created ideal conditions for forest fires and while many of those attributed 
to forest squatters were no doubt cases of “carelessly starting fires”683 the department had to 
defend its squatters from settler accusations that they were responsible for starting a great many 
fires.684 In 1929, the year of recorded squatter protest and also when three months were recorded 
as being extremely dry, 13 per cent of fires were attributed to forest squatters. In 1931, a year with 
good rains the number dropped to 8 per cent. Drought and forest fires were clearly linked, but so 
too of course were drought and economic hardship. 1933, another drought year, saw the highest 
percentage of fires attributed to forest squatters, which was concurrent to the department’s 
reduction of both the total number of forest squatters it employed and the amount of labour it 
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required of them. There is the very real possibility that forest fires begun by forest squatters in such 
years of drought and deprivation were far more than simple accidents; they were protests both 
against the policies of government and a means of ensuring the Forest Department provided more 
work. 
Protest was therefore likely to have occurred in the forests and was committed by the Forest 
Department’s own “contented” workforce in the form of acts defined by the government as criminal. 
Although crime has generally been shown to have increased dramatically between 1925 and 1945, 
caution must be taken in assessing the incidence of protest. The highest recorded number of forest 
fires caused by forest squatters was 18 fires in 1933, yet there were 2,184 families employed as 
squatters by the department in that year. Clearly, the majority of forest squatters were not engaging 
in activities that could be interpreted as protest. Partly this was because the shamba system did 
indeed offer opportunities to access land and even employment. Equally, it was because the Forest 
Department was developing and succeeding in creating a system in which protest or political 
agitation above the individual level was extremely difficult. 
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Scientific Ascendancy 
c.1945-1963 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the post-war period when it is argued scientific forestry truly arrived in 
Kenya. Before 1945 the Forest Department’s policies may have been founded on global networks 
of silvicultural knowledge, particularly in relation to the introduction of exotic tree species to the 
colony, but it largely lacked the research programmes, surveys, and working plans that underpin 
sustainable forest exploitation and management. This would change after the Second World War, 
as a systematic programme of scientific research was put in place to support a massively expanded 
planting programme that was laid out in the colony’s first official forestry policy. The Forest 
Department also successfully reframed forestry as not just a vehicle for economic development but 
also the social progression of its forest squatters. 
The use of scientific research by the department both in terms of its benefit to planting and its 
use as a political tool to support forestry will be discussed first in this chapter. Following this, the 
economic role of forestry in the colonial state will be explored and the relationship between the 
Forest Department and private enterprise will be highlighted. The development of forest squatting 
in the context of the increased economic importance given to forestry in the post-war period, 
particularly in relation to social and economic development and the department’s reaction to and 
use of Mau Mau, will be examined. Finally, the chapter will consider how the department attempted 
to weather the transition to Kenya’s independence in relation to staffing and policy.  
 
 The Roots of Development 
3.2.1 Wartime growth 
The Forest Department emerged from the Second World War in a stronger financial position than 
it had ever occupied before. The forest fund that the department had created in 1941 contained 
£523,150 upon its closure in 1947. The significance of this figure is revealed when it is realised that 
it almost equalled the department’s entire cumulative expenditure between 1930 and 1944.685 
Tanganyika and Uganda also produced surpluses from wartime exploitation of their forests, yet 
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period 1930 to 1944 was £524,952. Kenya Forest Department Annual Reports, 1930-1944. 
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without the protective mechanism of a sinking fund these revenues were absorbed into the general 
revenues of the territories and so did not contribute to forestry.686 Indeed, the innovation of the 
forest fund in Kenya was unique in the empire, drawing praise from the organ of empire forestry, 
the Empire Forestry Journal, and lament that it had not been adopted in other colonial territories or 
India. Although the Colonial Forest Service provided important connections between foresters 
across the empire, this communication was only as efficient as the nodes from which information 
emanated. In this case, the journal only wrote of the Kenyan innovation in 1944, three years after 
its initiation because the department had neglected to send its annual reports during the war, and 
surely too late for the innovation to be taken up in other colonies.687  
While communication gaps existed on some practical matters, by the end of the Second World 
War the empire forestry community did share a sense of optimism for the future role of forestry in 
economies across the empire. At its annual general meeting of 1944, the Empire Forestry 
Association, publishers of the Empire Forest Journal, summarised what it felt was a change in 
attitudes among those who yielded power in the empire toward afforestation policies in Europe 
and the empire: 
The war has brought home to most Governments the great importance of ensuring supplies of 
home-grown timber and other forest produce, and has led to a number of proposals for post-war 
forest policy in many parts of the Empire.688 
Kenya was no exception to this statement. The government’s forestry sub-committee of its 
Development Committee, which operated under the auspices of the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act 1945 and published its report in 1946, was considered by the Forest Department to 
have: 
… raised the whole importance of forestry in Kenya to a far higher level than it had ever been 
before … It recognized that the forest estate in fact is a great productive asset and with its resulting 
ancillary industries is capable of playing a major part in the economic development of the 
Colony.689 
Considering Kenya’s impressive record of plantation establishment and the great frugality that the 
use of the forest squatter workforce represented, the committee decreed that the establishment of 
plantations of exotic softwoods should be accelerated. This would meet the expected surge in local 
demand for wood that would go hand-in-hand with the planned development of the colony. The 
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687 H.R. Blanford, ‘Review of 1942 Kenya Forest Department Annual Report’, Empire Forestry Journal 23, no. 1 
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bulk of the department’s forest fund, £400,000, was allocated to capital investments; most 
particularly roads and buildings that would accompany an expansion in planting to 6,000 acres per 
year and an increase in staff from 16 to 40. The department’s annual expenditure was permitted to 
rise to £150,000, more than double the £74,360 the department spent in 1945 and dramatically 
more than the highest expenditure of the 1930s (£38,751 in 1930).690 The emphasis was not just 
on production, as the Development Committee also recognised the necessity of maintaining forests 
as an essential component of the hydrological cycle upon which all agriculture in Kenya relied.691 
The department was further buoyed when H.A. Marquand, UK Paymaster-General, submitted his 
own report on forestry after visiting Kenya in 1948 in which he called for the planting target to 
double to 12,000 acres per annum.692    
Marquand’s report was also the genesis of a proposal by Rammell for the transformation of 
the Forest Department into a Forest Commission. Such a commission would be run like a private 
corporation, generating a profit and investing its own revenues back into its forestry programme. 
In this way, forestry would isolate itself from the inconsistencies of government funding that 
Conservator of Forests James Rammell poetically described as “the nightmare of the annual 
budget.”693 Rammell argued in November 1948 that such a revolutionary alteration of forestry in 
Kenya was the “one way and one way only to ensure stable finance for the long-term [planting] 
project”694 suggested by Marquand. Rammell was due for retirement in 1950. His call for a forest 
commission was either being made by a man keen to secure a legacy or, perhaps more likely, the 
kind of radical proposal (that took advantage of post-war recognition of forestry’s worth) that 
would only be made by a forester that could afford to have little regard for his future career. The 
proposal was considered serious enough to warrant an official investigation, which Governor 
Mitchell called for in July 1949. The investigation was carried out with considerable pace; the 
survey commonly referred to as the Hiley Report being published in March 1950.695  
Wilfred Hiley was perhaps the leading forest economist of the empire, having lectured on the 
subject at the Imperial Forestry Institute, Oxford in the 1920s.696 Essentially the creation of a forest 
                                                                
690 Ibid., 2; Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1930. 
691 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1945-1947, 2. 
692 W.E. Hiley, P.J. Gill, and A.K. Constantine, ‘An Economic Survey of Forestry in Kenya and Recommendations 
Regarding a Forest Commission’ (Nairobi: The English Press, Ltd., 21 March 1950), 10. 
693 J.C. Rammell, ‘An Economic Survey of Forestry in Kenya and Recommendations Regarding a Forest Commission: 
A Note’, Empire Forestry Journal 30, no. 1 (March 1951): 55. 
694 J.C. Rammell (Conservator of Forests), 8 November 1948, quoted in Hiley, Gill, and Constantine, ‘An Economic 
Survey of Forestry in Kenya and Recommendations Regarding a Forest Commission’, 10. 
695 Hiley, Gill, and Constantine, ‘An Economic Survey of Forestry in Kenya and Recommendations Regarding a Forest 
Commission’. 
696 N.D.G. James, ‘A History of Forestry and Monographic Forestry Literature in Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom’, in The Literature of Forestry and Agroforestry, ed. Peter McDonald and J. P. Lassoie (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 43. Hiley is described in a recent global history of forest management as perhaps the leading 
proponent of reforming forestry into a market-oriented enterprise in the world in the interwar period. His focus on 
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Report. Brett M. Bennett, Plantations and Protected Areas: A Global History of Forest Management (MIT Press, 2015), 
74.  
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commission had two objectives: “security of finance” and “the introduction of business 
management.”697 The first of these goals was no doubt sympathised with by foresters working to 
tight budgets across the empire. To achieve financial independence, Hiley calculated that £1 million 
in capital would have to be raised via increasing exploitation, doubling royalties imposed on 
sawmillers, and government loan. The whole proposal was built on optimism stemming from the 
surpluses the Forest Department had run in its accounts since 1935.698 Significantly, the 
department’s revenues plateaued in the 1950s and even if the department had doubled its revenue 
this would not have covered its expenses (Figure 3-1). Indeed, revenues per hoppus ton of timber 
and firewood did not change dramatically in the post-war period and only came close to the 
doubling that Hiley determined was needed for financial independence in a single year, 1952 (Table 
3-1). Final decision on Hiley’s recommendations were delayed by the wish to wait for the arrival of 
the department’s new Conservator of Forests, R.R. Waterer, in 1951,  and  outbreak of the Mau Mau 
revolt in 1952. When the Legislative Council did debate the issue in December 1953 the proposal 
to form a forest commission was rejected, with its financial impracticality highlighted.699 
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Figure 3-1. Forest Department revenues and expenditure between 1935 and 1963. Sources: Forest Department 
Annual Reports, 1935-1963. 
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It was not the goal of financial independence that attracted the most attention to Hiley’s 
proposals among the colonial forestry community, but rather the means of achieving this through 
business management. This revealed sharp divisions, with, for example, the department’s Acting 
Conservator, Reginald Graham, “strongly dissenting” from the outset.700 This division was laid out 
in the correspondence column of the Empire Forestry Review and aroused such passions that letters 
between the commission’s chief supporter, Hiley, and its main (public) opponent, Norman Brasnett, 
degenerated into personal attacks.701 Brasnett, a lecturer in forestry at Oxford University, former 
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publication and it was a further factor in persuading them against the idea of a forest commission. Unfortunately, 
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around concern that such a heavy focus on the economics of forestry would jeopardise the other aspects of forestry 
in the country. Very limited information concerning Collier’s report is contained in a book seller’s catalogue: Eastern 
Africa. A Catalogue of Books Concerning the Countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Malawi., 
vol. Catalogue 97 (Michael Graves-Johnston, 2007), 10.  Correspondence by Collier: F.S. Collier, ‘Comment on 
“Scheme for Reabsorption of Kikuyu, Embu and Meru Displaced as a Result of the Emergency”’, 7 June 1955, CO 
822/797, TNA. 
700 Robertson, ‘Editorial on the Hiley Report’. Reginald Moray Graham was the acting conservator of the department 
after Rammell left in July 1950 until Waterer arrived in March 1951. Graham’s opposition was probably linked to 
his belief that the forests of Kenya were being vastly overexploited (see discussion in section 3.3.1), which he 
expressed (without departmental sanction) in a 1945 paper: R.M. Graham, ‘Forestry in Kenya’, Empire Forestry 
Journal 24, no. 1 (1945): 186–205.  
701 In particular, Hiley criticised the veracity of Brasnett’s publications and considered his attitude (of hostility to 
forest exploitation) so outdated that “by imparting it to Oxford [Nb. where Brasnett taught] students he might 
 Royalty revenue in £ per hoppus ton 
 Timber Fuelwood 
1944 1.000 0.067 
1945 0.874 0.069 
1946 0.952 0.075 
1947 0.934 0.080 
1948 0.926 0.078 
1949 0.944 0.070 
1950 1.050 0.089 
1951 1.238 0.080 
1952 1.770 0.094 
1953 1.175 0.104 
1954 1.073 0.139 
1955 1.149 0.134 
1956 1.452 0.105 
1957 1.667 0.091 
1958   
1959   
1960 1.304 0.100 
1961 1.480 0.104 
1962   
1963 1.131 0.092 
Table 3-1. Revenues accrued by the Forest Department from royalties on timber and fuelwood (per hoppus 
ton). Source: Forest Department Annual Reports, 1944-1963. 
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conservator of forests for Uganda and assistant conservator in Kenya, considered the report almost 
completely blind to the multiple aspects of a forest policy because of its singular focus on 
production forestry, specifically the softwood planting scheme, and was therefore going against the 
forest policies that had recently been enshrined in Uganda and Tanganyika that placed the 
protective, productive, and supportive (that is, supplying immediate local needs, such as firewood) 
roles of forests almost equally.702 His greatest concern was that “dominance of the industrial aspect 
over all other forestry should not be enshrined in a new organization.”703 Brasnett was not alone in 
his views. Rammell admitted there was “practically unanimous condemnation of the whole 
document emanating from foresters of high and low degree.”704  
This was the old, arguably innate, fear within the forestry community surfacing once again: 
the long-term stewardship and sustainable exploitation that forestry espoused could be 
undermined by private enterprise. Rammell identified this fear directly, writing that foresters 
feared a “business-minded board” of commissioners dominated by sawmillers that would “flog the 
forests for present profit… .”705 For Hiley and Rammell, this fear was a barrier to effective forestry 
because by distancing itself from direct exposure to capitalism forestry was allowing the vagaries 
of economics to dictate its policies indirectly, via the annual budget. Hiley and Rammell were 
motivated by the empire’s post-war need for timber with their emphasis on productive forestry; 
within this, they considered Kenya to have unique potential to become a significant producer of 
softwoods for the East African region. The potential stemmed partly from the favourable climate 
for rapid softwood growth in Kenya, but largely from the cheapness with which plantations could 
be established because of the shamba system.706 The fear of the private sphere represented, Hiley 
wrote, a “creed outworn”; he explained: 
Are we not so imbued with a sense of forestry as a service [that is, the protective and local utility 
aspects], and have we not neglected economics and business management to such an extent that 
we are unfitted to undertake these new responsibilities?707 
This, then, was why Rammell had suggested and Hiley had supported the idea of the private sphere 
taking a direct role in the running of the forest commission and this was why their vision never 
materialised. The rejection of the Hiley Report in 1953 passed almost without mention in the 
                                                                
seriously jeopardise the future timber supplies of the Commonwealth.” Correspondence re: Kenya Forestry by W.E. 
Hiley, Empire Forestry Review 32, no. 4 (December 1953): 364–65.  
702 F.C.H., ‘N. V. Brasnett’, The Commonwealth Forestry Review 54, no. 1 (159) (1975): 1–3; William Julius Eggeling 
and R. G. Sangster, Elementary Forestry : A First Textbook for Forest Rangers, 2d ed. (London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 
1949), 10–13; Correspondence re: Forestry in Kenya by N.V. Brasnett, Empire Forestry Review 32, no. 2 (June 1953): 
172. 
703 Correspondence re: Forestry in Kenya by N.V. Brasnett. 
704 Correspondence re: Forestry in Kenya by J.C. Rammell, Empire Forestry Review 30, no. 1 (September 1952): 228. 
705 Ibid. Rammell also raised another interesting aspect of this fear that he believed foresters would not admit: the 
involvement of businessmen in forestry might mean a more critical examination of what he considered the often lax 
accounting methods of forestry departments. 
706 Correspondence re: Forestry in Kenya by W.E. Hiley, Empire Forestry Review 32, no. 1 (March 1953): 63–64. 
707 Ibid. 
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department’s annual reports, save for the fact that it had delayed the publication of a forest policy; 
probably indicating Waterer’s (the Conservator of Forests from 1951) views on the matter.708 
Similarly, the department’s own official history produced in 1962 omits all mention of the 
proposal.709 When Kenya’s forest policy was finally produced in 1957 the protective aspects of 
forestry figured as largely as the productive.710 In contrast to the welcome that was given to the 
arrival of the scientific forestry experts within the colonies, whose research promised to strengthen 
the hand of forestry against its natural and human enemies, the economic expert was turned away.          
 
3.2.2 Of mice and mycology 
The new attention given to forestry in Kenya was part of the massive expansion of the Colonial 
Service and metropolitan investment in the colonies that occurred in the wake of the Second World 
War and which included within it closer focus on the technical fields and conservation.711 As argued 
by Kent, the new emphasis on technical development and its allied increase in technical co-
operation between officers in British and French colonies, absent before the war, was part of the 
attempt by the old imperial powers to exert influence against the emergence of American power 
and American-dominated international bodies, notably the United Nations.712 Metropolitan interest 
in increasing technical development and co-operation was very much at play in East Africa, as 
evidenced by the 1944 wish of Edward Cavendish, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, to 
further co-ordination of research between the three British territories in that region.713 This wish 
was built on a preceding decade of consolidation in which, as Hodge has argued, “the stage was 
finally set” for the application of science to the imperial project.714 At a 1946 conference of the 
governors of the three East African territories alarm was clear at the perceived rate of soil erosion 
in East Africa, further heightening the importance of forestry by considering that it, along with 
veterinary science and agricultural research, were “inseparable components of a whole” needed to 
combat the problem.715  
                                                                
708 Kenya Forest Department, ‘Annual Report of the Forest Department for 1951, 1952, 1953’ (Nairobi Government 
Printer, 1953), 1, CO 544/78, TNA. 
709 Logie and Dyson, Forestry in Kenya. 
710 ‘White Paper No. 85 of 1957. “A Forest Policy For Kenya”’, in Forestry in Kenya: A Historical Account of the 
Development of Forest Management in the Colony, by J.P. Logie and W.G. Dyson (Nairobi: Colony and Protectorate of 
Kenya, 1962). 
711 Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 207–53; Kirk-Greene, On Crown Service, 43–53; Neumann, ‘The Postwar 
Conservation Boom in British Colonial Africa’. 
712 John Kent, The Internationalization of Colonialism: Britain, France and Black Africa 1939-1956 (Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 263–85. 
713 Max Nurock (for Chief Secretary, Uganda) to Chief Secretary (Governors’ Conference, Nairobi), 15 August 1944, 
VF/2/5, KNA.  
714 Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 206, 179–206. 
715 East African Governors’ Conference, ‘East African Research: Agriculture, Animal Health and Forestry, 
Proceedings of a Conference Held in Nairobi, 21-22 March, 1946’ (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1946), 17. 
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The wartime forest fund in Kenya, an example of the importance of local agency to 
development meant that regardless of the strengthening of science as an element of empire the 
Forest Department would have been able to expand its operations after 1945. The greater 
importance of the heightened metropolitan and international focus on forestry in the post-war 
period was in armouring forestry against accusations of its irrelevance in the colonial state. Full 
metropolitan commitment to technical development meant the Forest Department’s position 
within the state was secure, and with that security came the ability to pursue fundamental scientific 
forestry research that was so lacking. 
So, the Forest Department was enabled to begin a recruitment drive between 1945 and 1947 
for the new posts of entomologist (an expert on the insect pests of trees), mycologist (an expert in 
the fungal afflictions of trees), and soil chemist, and dedicated posts for utilisation officer and 
silviculturist, which had previously been combined.716 The need for such specialists was recognised 
within the wider forestry community, with one anonymous writer remarking that scientific work 
in forestry across all the colonies prior to the 1940s was tantamount to “blind gropings in the 
dark”717 and that the days when all that forest officers needed were bush craft skills and a 
rudimentary grounding in forestry were over. By the late 1940s, officers increasingly needed “brain 
and brawn.” 718 Experts, not generalists, were about to have their day.  
Attention to forestry research in Kenya was concentrated by embarrassing revelations during 
the war concerning the condition of timber exported from the colony. The poor quality of timber 
produced in Kenya was an old problem, and one that continued to dog the development of the 
timber industry through the post-war period.719 The military seems to have been rather lenient in 
accepting unseasoned timber, however, in 1944 a consignment of railway sleepers was rendered 
useless by wood-boring insects. Potentially dangerous if it had gone undetected, the military 
demanded an investigation. Yet the Forest Department had no one with entomological training to 
conduct such an investigation, forcing it to turn for assistance to the entomologist of the East African 
Agricultural Research Institute, based in Amani, Tanganyika. The subsequent bulletin was the first 
published account of insects that threatened to disrupt timber production in Kenya.720 The fact that 
it was an agricultural, not forestry, researcher that published this work was highlighted in a review 
                                                                
716 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1945-1947, 12. 
717 Rubus Rosaefolius [Roseleaf Bramble], ‘Organization for Scientific Forestry’, Empire Forestry Journal 23, no. 1 
(July 1944): 29. Rubus rosaefolius (more usually now spelled Rubus rosifolius), the botanical name for the roseleaf 
bramble plant, is used here by the writer as a rather witty alias to conceal their true identity. The writer’s concern 
for his anonymity in making statements about the need for new experts to replace the old generalists hints at his 
fears about how the ‘old guard’ would accept them, while his use of the bramble as a penname suggests the sort of 
prickly reaction he might receive.  
718 Ibid., 28. 
719 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2. for discussion of the problems of poor timber quality in the interwar period, and 
section 3.3 of this chapter for discussion on attempts to modernise the sawmill industry within Kenya.  
720 T.W. Kirkpatrick (Entomologist, East African Agricultural Research Institute), Notes on Insect Damage to East 
African Timbers (Nairobi: East African War Supplies Board, Timber Control, 1944); B.A. Keen, The East African 
Agriculture and Forestry Research Organisation: Its Origins and Organisation (Nairobi: East African Standard Ltd., 
1951), 3. 
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of the bulletin in the Empire Forestry Journal, which saw it as symptomatic of the very poor state of 
entomological research across the whole Colonial Forest Service.721 The situation was mirrored 
with mycological research. While Samuel Wimbush, Utilisation and Silvicultural Officer, first drew 
attention to a fungal infection blighting Kenya’s economically important cypress plantations, the 
work on identifying and tackling the problem could only go forward with the aid of Dr R.M. Nattrass, 
the mycologist of the Agricultural Department in 1944.722 Continued problems with finding its own 
mycologist meant Nattrass led research on this potentially very serious infection and concurrently 
expanded his research into a fungal infection afflicting eucalyptus in Kenya.723    
These informal networks of experts working in related technical departments were the main 
means of accessing scientific knowledge for the Forest Department during the 1940s. Men like 
Nattrass had provided the department with extremely valuable assistance, yet they were not 
foresters and could not devote the majority of their energies to forestry research. This was clearly 
recognised within the Forest Department and steps to correct this deficiency were begun in 1945 
when a conference of the conservators of Uganda, Tanganyika, and Kenya met to discuss their 
shared problems. J.C. Rammell, the Conservator of Forests for Kenya, was keenly aware of the need 
for scientific expertise within East Africa. However, he did not push for an expansion of this 
knowledge within the confines of his department, but rather for the reformation of the East African 
Agricultural Research Institute into a centralised organisation for agricultural and forestry 
research.724 This push for a formal, centralised research organisation was not just a reflection of 
the reality that the three territories shared many problems when it came to forestry, but also a 
manner of correct direction and economy. It is no surprise that centralising research would bring 
clear financial savings. It reduced the risk of replication of work and meant the territories could 
pool resources for the construction and maintenance of a suitably equipped laboratory. More 
revealing is Rammell’s admission that scientists would receive better direction in their research at 
a central, specialist, organisation as “the average Conservator is not qualified to ensure that such 
scientists are working on the right lines… .”725 This is not a surprising statement coming from a man 
                                                                
721 R.C. Fraser, ‘Review of “Notes on Insect Damage to East African Timbers”’, Empire Forestry Journal 24, no. 1 
(1945): 74. 
722 S.E. Wimbush, ‘Canker on Monterey Cypress in Kenya’, Empire Forestry Journal 23, no. 1 (1944): 74. 
723 R. M. Nattrass and Ciccarone, ‘Monochaetia Canker of Cupressus in Kenya’, Empire Forestry Review 26, no. 2 
(1947): 289–90; R. M. Nattrass, ‘A Botrytis Disease of Eucalyptus in Kenya’, Empire Forestry Review 28, no. 1 (1949): 
60–61. Nattrass expertise in the cypress canker led him to publish on it once again in R. M. Nattrass, C. Booth, and 
B. C. Sutton, ‘Rhynchosphaeria Cupressi Sp.nov., the Causal Organism of Cupressus Canker in Kenya’, Transactions 
of the British Mycological Society 46, no. 1 (March 1963): 102–8. Note that Nattrass was fortuitous in having the 
assistance of A. Ciccarone in Kenya, as Ciccarone was apparently an Italian prisoner of war in the colony at the time. 
A. Graniti, ‘Seiridium Cardinale and Other Cypress Cankers’, EPPO Bulletin 16, no. 3 (1 September 1986): 479–86, 
doi:10.1111/j.1365-2338.1986.tb00309.x. 
724 For the wider context surrounding the reform of the East African Agricultural Research Institute into the East 
Africa Agricultural and Forestry Research Organisation see Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 203. 
725 J.C. Rammell (Conservator of Forests) to F.W. Cavendish-Bentinck (Member for Agriculture and Natural 
Resources), 6 June 1950, VF/2/5, KNA. 
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who had of course also believed foresters were ill-suited to the financial management of forestry. 
Rammell was welcoming of the arrival of experts of all types within forestry. 
Men such as Rammell, who had worked in the Kenya Forest Department for 30 years – all his 
career – were the generalists of which the anonymous Rubus Rosaefolius wrote.726 The generation 
of foresters that held senior positions by the late 1940s were no longer at the forefront of the 
rapidly expanding field of forest knowledge. More research was necessitated by the realities of the 
planting programmes that had occurred, in Kenya’s case, for the majority of the prior 50 years. The 
creation of plantations of exotic timbers meant the “maintenance of an unnatural ecological unit, in 
which one age group only is represented, [and as such] provides an ideal environment for the 
epidemic spread of parasites.”727  
Rammell and his counterparts in Uganda and Tanganyika pushed for the creation of a 
centralised East African forestry research organisation because of their realisation that it was 
essential to forest development. Their resolution was passed to and accepted by the 1946 
Conference of East African Governors.728 Forestry was thus accepted as part of the reform The East 
African Agriculture Research Institute, which became the East African Agriculture and Forestry 
Research Organisation (EAAFRO) in 1947 with assistance from funding provided by the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts.729 Under British control, since 1928 this institute had concentrated 
on improving plantation crops.730 Its reformation into EAAFRO in 1947 represented heightened 
receptiveness to post-war forest development, no doubt increased by Kenya’s significant level of 
                                                                
726 Rubus Rosaefolius [Roseleaf Bramble], ‘Organization for Scientific Forestry’, 28. 
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wartime timber production, from government and the metropole within the wider economic 
development of Britain’s colonial territories. However, the new realisation of this worth did not 
immediately extend to practical progress.  
The centralisation of research in EAAFRO also meant the literal centralisation of the research 
centre itself, moving from Amani in Tanganyika to Muguga forest reserve, close to Nairobi, although 
practicalities of infrastructure delayed its effective operational beginning until 1951.731 Given the 
organisation’s prior focus and the importance of agricultural development within East Africa, it was 
inevitable that forestry initially occupied comparatively little space in its list of research priorities. 
EAAFRO’s research programme in 1951 discussed forestry only to the extent that, “Forest 
entomology problems must also receive attention because of their economic importance.”732 
Resources during the post-war period were on a hitherto unknown scale, yet this did not mean they 
were inexhaustible. 
Individual scientific programmes and the continued existence of EAAFRO needed the financial 
assistance of the often very reluctant governments of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika.733 A 1951 
confidential note by J.G. Hibbert, Secretary of the Colonial Research Council, speaks of unofficial 
members of Kenya’s legislative council voicing “very strong” opposition to further funding of 
                                                                
731 The move from Amani to Muguga required the establishment of extensive shared research facilities for EAAFRO 
and the East African Veterinary Organisation (EAVRO) and accompanying transport links where previously there 
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Figure 3-2. Combined headquarters of EAAFRO and EAVRO at Muguga, 1951. Source: ‘East African Agriculture 
and Forestry Research Organization: Annual Report 1951’ (East Africa High Commission, 31 December 1951). 
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scientific research in East Africa.734 With EAAFRO’s research into agriculture and forestry being of 
benefit to the settler community in Kenya, however, the organisation was spared the full force of 
opposition, and this despite having the joint third highest recurrent expenditure of any of the East 
African research programmes in 1951.735 Hibbert alludes to opposition about increased science 
spending and stalling the building of the joint EAAFRO/EAVRO headquarters in Kenya coming in 
particular from three men: Brigadier W.E.H. Scupham, unofficial Member of the Kenya Legislative 
Council, railway committee member, and by 1953 first unofficial Speaker of the Tanganyika 
Legislative Council; Alfred Vincent, Member of the Development and Reconstruction Authority, 
prominent Nairobi businessman, Member of the Legislative Council, and a leader of Kenya’s white 
settlers in the post-war period; and W.A.C. Bouwer, a Justice of the Peace, unofficial Member of the 
Legislative Council in 1948, and member of the Uasin Gishu District Production and Manpower 
Committee in 1951.736 Significantly, Hibbert does not cite Cavendish-Bentinck, the unofficial but 
effective leader of Kenya’s settlers and the Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, as 
amongst those who opposed research funding. Although Cavendish-Bentinck had been sceptical of 
Forest Department spending in the 1930s, he was also a founder of Timsales and so had a vested 
interest in furthering research in forest development.737 With such powerful support and 
association with agricultural development in EAAFRO that assisted settler farming, forestry may 
have been buffered from the lingering suspicion cast toward state forestry by some elements of the 
settlers.  
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When the Specialist Committee on Forestry Research met in December 1950 to determine 
forestry’s future research agenda, the issue of resources meant minor forest products - including 
already established products like honey as well as possibly lucrative medicinal products derived 
from forest plants - were excluded from the East African forestry research agenda.738 Only research 
of high priority to the development of the colonial state was deemed necessary, meaning the highest 
priority was understanding the complete ecology of the exotic forest plantations and the 
regeneration (both natural and artificial) of indigenous East African species.739 It was this 
committee that set the agenda for forestry research in East Africa until the end of colonial rule. As 
such, it established guidelines for the transmission of research notes between territories and 
EAAFRO and the creation of a forestry bureau to collate existing research knowledge.740 Seemingly 
trivial, this was a vitally important mechanism by which officers would collaborate and remain in 
the loop in regards to ongoing research, as well as ensuring that research was not unnecessarily 
duplicated. Moreover, this was a key first step in creating a true scientific forestry community 
within East Africa that went beyond problems and associated research only being shared when an 
officer was transferred, it was presented at one of the empire-wide forestry conferences, or, rarest 
of all, it was published in a forestry or other scientific journal. Certainly this was not anything like 
the mature epistemic communities of forestry that are commonplace today, but it was a beginning.         
With EAAFRO becoming fully operational by 1951 and the setting of a joint research agenda 
by the Specialist Committee on Forestry Research, co-operation between EAAFRO and the Forest 
Department intensified. Without its own mycologist, the Forest Department relied on Dr Rudd 
Jones of EAAFRO. From 1950, Jones was working full time on continuing the research of Nattrass 
into Monochaetia unicornis, the fungus causing the canker that was blighting the department’s 
plantations of cypress.741 Ignorance of ongoing mycological research outside Kenya carried with it 
repercussions. Between 1927 and 1949 the department established approximately 45,000 acres of 
exotic softwood plantations, the vast majority of which were Cupressus macrocarpa and Cupressus 
lusitanica (cypress), which was by far the most planted species in that time period. Concurrent to 
this programme, canker disease broke out among the same species in California in 1928, where the 
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741 H.H. Storey (Acting Director, EAAFRO) to Secretary for Agriculture and Natural Resources, 10 August 1950, 
VF/2/5, KNA. Note that Monochaetia unicornis was reclassified Seiridium unicorne in the 1970s. By the 1980s it was 
discovered that these were likely misidentifications, and the canker in cypress in East Africa was actually caused by 
Lepteutypa cupressi. Graniti, ‘Seiridium Cardinale and Other Cypress Cankers’. 
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tree was indigenous, and New Zealand in 1933.742 By 1939, some 11 years after first detection, 
canker of cypress had reached “major epidemic proportions” in California, where it rendered trees 
economically valueless.743 In 1944 Wimbush, Kenya’s part-time Silvicultural and Utilisation Officer, 
made the discovery of a disease that caused cypress planted in the Iveta Hills, 40 miles east of 
Nairobi, to die from the top down.744 It was Nattrass who then identified this as the same disease 
that was afflicting cypresses in California. The Forest Department was fortunate in being able to call 
on the assistance of Nattrass as it had no means to investigate the disease itself. His connections, 
experience, and expertise, all of which the Forest Department lacked, were no doubt essential in 
the identification of the disease and subsequent enquiries into preventing it.745 By 1950 canker had 
swept across Kenya and was being found in cypress plantations in all three East African 
territories.746  
                                                                
742 Nattrass and Ciccarone, ‘Monochaetia Canker of Cupressus in Kenya’, 289. 
743 Wagener, quoted in ibid. 
744 Wimbush, ‘Canker on Monterey Cypress in Kenya’. 
745 Nattrass, who arrived in Kenya in 1938 after serving in the Cyprus agricultural department, had been a member 
of the British Mycological Society since 1925. The Official Gazette of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, vol. 46, 40 
(Nairobi, 1938), 1204; ‘List of Members: Corrected to 30 June 1950’, Transactions of the British Mycological Society 
33, no. 3–4 (1950): 383–97, doi:10.1016/S0007-1536(50)80102-X. 
746 Jones, ‘Report on Priorities for Research in Forest Pathology and the State of Present Investigation’, 28. 
Figure 3-3. A plantation of Cupressus macrocarpa established via the shamba system (background) and crops 
interplanted with Pinus insignis (foreground) at Kinangop, southern Aberdare Mountains, c.1952. Image copyright 
and reproduced with permission of Commonwealth Forestry Association. Source: H.M. Glover, ‘Soil Conservation 
In Parts Of Africa And The Middle East: Part I (Continued)’, Empire Forestry Review 33, no. 1 (1954): 39–44. 
The Roots of Development   185 
The Forest Department’s response to cypress canker was to fell any infected tree and any tree 
that it considered particularly susceptible.747 Planting of several cypress species continued through 
the 1940s, with a record-high acreage planted in 1949. The Forest Department’s report and 
counterpart EAAFRO report covering 1948-50 highlighted canker as being most serious in 
Cupressus lusitanica after a survey of plantations was complete, while the report for 1951-53 states 
that Cupressus macrocarpa was the most afflicted and lusitanica was relatively resistant.748 The 
apparently conflicting statements perhaps indicate the still nascent stage of knowledge of the 
disease and its extent, while statements in the 1951-53 report also show a lack of clarity over the 
precise identification of cypress species, with speculation presented over the hybrid nature of some 
plantations.749 Despite this, by the end of 1953 the seriousness of the disease seems to have been 
clear to the department: it ceased all planting of Cupressus macrocarpa and began thinning or clear-
felling old plantations of the species.750 When this policy drew criticism in 1956 from a timber 
industry that saw it as heavy-handed and wasteful the department was forced to publically defend 
itself in the pages of the Empire Forestry Review and announce that it was moving to a selection-
felling only policy.751 The records of the department do not reveal the cost of the response to canker, 
but it surely must have been significant as cypress had been a plantation mainstay before 1950.   
This mycological episode is illustrative of how Kenya forestry began to engage with and 
usefully employ the wider research community in the early 1950s, but also the mistakes that were 
made by ignoring this community for so long. Significantly, the Monochaetia unicornis canker was 
identified and a policy to address it formulated before the Forest Department was able to employ 
its own mycologist, I.A.S. Gibson, who arrived in February 1953. More was published across forestry 
and biology journals by Nattrass and Jones on the problem of cypress canker in a period of less than 
ten years than had been published on any other technical problem in the Forest Department’s 
history up to 1945.752 It was also with the arrival of Jones that EAAFRO became a member of the 
                                                                
747 Trees in the wetter, higher altitude forests east of the Rift Valley suffered the highest infection rates. Wimbush, 
‘Canker on Monterey Cypress in Kenya’; Kenya Forest Department, Forest Department Report for the Years 1948, 
1949 and 1950 (Nairobi Government Printer, 1950), 11. 
748 East African Agriculture and Forestry Research Organization: Annual Report 1949 (East Africa High Commission, 
1949), 20–21; Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1948-1950, 9. 
749 Kenya Forest Department, Report of the Forest Department for the Years, 1951, 1952, 1953 (Nairobi Government 
Printer, 1953), 18–19. The report also discussed the high resistance of Cupressus benthami and Cupressus torulosa 
(although it also admitted these were likely hybrids with macrocarpa as well), however these species were not 
planted further because of their higher susceptibility to the boring insect Oemida gahani. 
750 Ibid., 18. 
751 H.H.C. Pudden, ‘Response to Statement on Cupressus Clear Felling’, Empire Forestry Review 35, no. 1 (March 
1956): 91. 
752 The publications on cypress canker were: D. Rudd Jones, ‘Canker Disease of Cypresses Caused by Monochaetia 
Unicornis.’, Rep. E. Afr. Agric. For. Res. Organ. 1949, 1950, 20–1; D. Rudd Jones, ‘Studies on a Canker Disease of 
Cypresses in East Africa, Caused by Monochaetia Unicornis (Cooke & Ellis) Sacc: I. Observations On The Pathology, 
Spread And Possible Origins Of The Disease’, Annals of Applied Biology 40, no. 2 (1 June 1953): 323–43; D. Rudd 
Jones, ‘Studies on a Canker Disease of Cypresses in East Africa, Caused by Monochaetia Unicornis (Cooke & Ellis) 
Sacc: II. Variation in the Morphology and Physiology of the Pathogen’, Transactions of the British Mycological Society 
37, no. 3 (1 September 1954): 286–IN6; D. Rudd Jones, ‘Studies on a Canker Disease of Cypresses in East Africa, 
Caused by Monochaetia Unicornis (Cooke & Ellis) Sacc: III. Resistance And Susceptibility Of Species Of Cupressus 
And Allied Genera’, Annals of Applied Biology 41, no. 2 (1 June 1954): 325–35. The department’s publications in the 
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British Mycological Society in 1949, a trend which continued with the appointment of Gibson 
bringing Forest Department representation in the society. In comparison, Kenya’s agricultural 
department had held membership since 1923, when other members included representatives of 
forestry in Britain, the United States, and South Africa, to be joined by members from the Indian 
forest service and Sierra Leone Forest Department in 1927.753 Kenya forestry was not exceptional 
in its distance from international discourse on mycology, with the general malaise among the 
colonies toward research and particularly forestry research being a cause for lament by the 
president of the British Mycological Society in 1929.754 
By 1960 the department had changed the focus of its mycological research. Its own mycologist, 
Gibson, operated from and worked closely with EAAFRO from 1954 onwards, while commitment 
to his research was illustrated by the attachment of two learner foresters to his division as 
mycological assistants. This trend was mirrored in entomological research, with an early example 
of Africans being recruited into a technical field. In 1954, 12 Africans joined the department’s 
entomological team as “observers”; in fact, they were responsible for carrying out of the majority 
of the vital fieldwork involved in identifying, surveying, and controlling insect pests.755 Gibson was 
thus enabled to engage more closely with shared problems across the region, visiting both Uganda 
and Tanganyika by 1958.756 In a reflection of the attitude of proper dissemination of research that 
was relatively novel to the Kenya Forest Department, Gibson published a slim volume on pathology 
within Kenya’s plantations in 1957 that was followed by a much expanded second volume in 1962 
that covered all known tree diseases and fungi in Kenya.757 By 1960 this was joined by the 
unfortunately titled publication Pest Digest. Carrying articles on the topics of pathology and 
                                                                
Empire Forestry Journal are indicative of its contribution to forestry knowledge. In the 1920s the department 
published five articles in this journal, in the 1930s only one, and a further three between 1940 and 1945. Of these 
the only topic that was addressed more than once was pencil cedar, on which three articles were published, although 
only one of these (by Wimbush, in 1937) was technical in nature. Indeed, Wimbush’s article was one of only two 
truly technical papers the department published in the interwar years, a situation that reflected the department’s 
deficiency in research staff and funding. Additionally, the Oxford Bodleian catalogue records the publication of one 
technical pamphlet in 1928 (on seed propagation; now apparently lost), and a further two in the 1940s (on cypress 
plantation management and technical data on Podocarpus). The department’s publications were: Gardner, ‘Re-
Afforestation in Kenya Colony by Means of Shifting Cultivation’; R. S. Troup, ‘Forestry in Kenya Colony’, Empire 
Forestry Journal 2, no. 1 (1923): 46–60; N. V. Brasnett, ‘Fires in the Pencil Cedar Forests of Kenya Colony’, Empire 
Forestry Journal 3, no. 1 (1924): 74–77; R. St. Barbe Baker, ‘The Men of the Trees (or African Forest Scouts)’, Empire 
Forestry Journal 3, no. 1 (1924): 87–92; H. M. Gardner, ‘East African Pencil Cedar’, Empire Forestry Journal 5, no. 1 
(1926): 39–53; S. H. Wimbush, ‘Natural Succession in the Pencil Cedar Forest of Kenya Colony’, Empire Forestry 
Journal, 1937, 49–53; H. M. Gardner, ‘Kenya Forests and the War’, Empire Forestry Journal 21, no. 1 (1 July 1942): 
45–47; Wimbush, ‘Canker on Monterey Cypress in Kenya’; Graham, ‘Forestry in Kenya’; A.C. Sprunt, Raising of Young 
Trees from Seeds, Kenya Forest Department Pamphlets (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1928); Forest Department, 
‘The Management of Cypress Plantations in Kenya’; J.B. Smart, Volume Tables for Podocarpus Gracilior, Kenya Forest 
Department Pamphlets, 1945. 
753 ‘List of Members’. 
754 E. J. Butler, ‘Presidential Address: The Development of Economic Mycology in the Empire Overseas’, Transactions 
of the British Mycological Society 14, no. 1–2 (11 March 1929): 1–18. 
755 Kenya Forest Department, Report of the Forest Department for the Period January 1st 1954 - June 20th 1955 
(Nairobi Government Printer, 1955), 18. 
756 Ibid., 13, 20. 
757 I.A.S. Gibson, A Notebook on Pathology in Kenya Forest Plantations, 2nd ed. (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 
1962). 
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entomology by experts working within EAAFRO and Kenya’s and Uganda’s forest departments, this 
quarterly news sheet was distributed among East Africa’s forest departments and was made 
available to the public; although what appetite they had for it is unclear.758 
Gibson’s research was predominantly concerned with problems associated with the pine 
plantations that dominated the planting plan after 1952759. The Forest Department announced it 
would diversify its plantings of exotic species in the late 1940s, with cypress planting planned to 
account for no more than 50 per cent of all exotic plantations.760 The cypress planting policy had 
been W.A. Robertson’s chief criticism of forestry in Kenya. Robertson, the Forest Adviser to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, considered the department was “putting too many eggs in one 
basket,” a cliché that was borne out by the spread of canker among the cypress plantations.761 This 
accelerated the new mixed planting policy and by 1952 63 per cent of the exotic softwoods being 
planted in the colony were pines, with the percentage increasing to 77 by 1960.762  
The shift to a mixed-planting policy was a milestone for the Forest Department. The spread of 
canker disease among the plantations of cypress writ large the dangers of following a limited policy. 
Equally, the disease taught the department that the planting of pines must run parallel with a 
research programme to safeguard those trees from disease. Gibson’s research, then, was focussed 
on the problem of Armillaria root rot that was afflicting 30 per cent of the new pine plantations by 
1959. The solution was to remove the stumps of previously felled trees, from which the disease was 
spreading, from the site of the new plantations.763 Similarly, the very establishment of pines in the 
department’s plantations was dependent on its new commitment to science and co-operation. The 
initial post-war period was one of continued experimentation with the growing of pines, and the 
department had little success in its nurseries prior to the early 1950s.764 Partly, success was 
dependent on simple pest control. Pine seedlings were apparently particularly susceptible to attack 
by mice; a problem overcome by better protection.765 The department’s best laid plans for the 
                                                                
758 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest Department, 1960 (Nairobi Government Printer, 1960), 
20. 
759 Note that the discussion of pines here is limited to those tree species within the genus Pinus, which is in 
accordance with the manner the Forest Department discussed pines. Some species within the genus Podocarpus and 
Afrocarpus (family Podocarpaceae) have common names that incorporate the word ‘pine’ (for example, Afrocarpus 
falcatus, which may be conspecific with Afrocarpus gracilior – podo – has a common name of African fern pine) but 
are not true pines and, as far as I am aware, were not referred to as pines by the Kenya Forest Department. All of 
the pines, species within Podocarpaceae, and Cupressus, mentioned within this thesis do of course all belong to the 
order Pinales, commonly referred to as the conifers.  
760 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1945-1947, 28. 
761 Ibid., 4. 
762 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1960, 7. 
763 I.A.S. Gibson, ‘Armillaria Root Rot in Kenya Pine Plantations’, Empire Forestry Review 39, no. 1 (March 1960): 94–
95. 
764 A Rule, ‘East African Timber Production’, Empire Forestry Journal 24, no. 1 (1945): 51. 
765 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 20. 
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propagation of what was to become the most economically important timber grown in Kenya’s 
plantations were initially thwarted by more than mere mice, however. 
Further pests were encountered when the larvae of the pine emperor moth attacked pine 
plantations in the late 1940s. In this entomological case the department was fully informed on the 
matter, drawing on the experience of South African foresters who had encountered and dealt with 
the moth by deploying pigs trained to root out the larvae from the ground before it hatched.766 
However, as with the growing of cypress it was to be mycological problems that had the largest 
effect on the propagation of pine. With its focus on pine over cypress, the department put its efforts 
into growing Pinus radiata (like Cupressus macrocarpa, a Californian native), which proved to grow 
rapidly and produce high-quality timber. Showing that the department was now aware and 
responsive to lessons from other forest departments within the commonwealth, and with 
memories of the failure of cypress, planting of radiata ceased between 1955 and 1957 on the advice 
of South African and Rhodesian foresters who had little success combatting the fungal infection 
Diplodia pinea that was blighting their plantations.767 Subsequently, the Mexican pine Pinus patula 
became the department’s main plantation choice.  
Compared to cypress, the propagation success rate of P. radiata and P. patula in the 
department’s more than 80 nurseries was low, partly because of the industrious efforts of rodents 
but more so the soils being used.768 The essence of the issue was a mycological one, as both P. 
radiata and P. patula have mycorrhizal root systems. That is, they have a symbiotic and mutualistic 
relationship with fungi that envelop their roots, with the fungi’s presence in the soil being essential 
for successful growth. Research on mycorrhizal fungi within forestry began in the 1920s, with work 
by S.L. Kessel on their role in pine propagation in Australia appearing in the Empire Forestry 
Journal.769 The true pioneer of the field was Mabel Rayner, whose doctoral thesis and subsequent 
paper of 1915 was on mycorrhizas. She was subsequently employed by the Forestry Commission 
(UK) to investigate the fungal relationships of forests. Her publications, including a key 1930 article 
in the Empire Forestry Journal, indicate knowledge of her work and the growing awareness of the 
importance of mycorrhizas within forestry across the empire.770 Most significantly, in what appears 
                                                                
766 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1945-1947, 12–14. 
767 Kenya Forest Department, Report of the Forest Department for the Period 1st July, 1955 to 31st December, 1957 
(Nairobi Government Printer, 1957), 16; R. M. Nattrass, ‘Host Lists of Kenya Fungi and Bacteria’, Mycological Papers 
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to have been a novel approach, in 1938 she issued a questionnaire to 47 Forest Departments and 
research institutions across the empire regarding their research and experience of growing pines. 
Thirteen questionnaires were not returned, but the rest were. Significantly, Forest Departments in 
Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, and Nyasaland all gave long responses detailing their own 
research programmes and their successes, or not, with inoculating soil with mycorrhizas, the merit 
of which Rayner applauded. Tellingly, Kenya is not mentioned as providing details of its research 
or even responding to the questionnaire.771   
With its monocular focus on cypress, during the inter-war period the Kenya Forest 
Department therefore remained detached from and possibly even ignorant of the investigations 
concerning the growing of pines that were occurring across the empire and even within eastern 
Africa. When it began to take seriously the establishment of its own pine plantations in the early 
1950s it was comparatively unprepared and uninformed about the problems it would face. 
Fortunately for the department, by this point it could turn to EAAFRO for assistance, calling on 
horticulturist W.B. May in 1951 for advice on the soils it was using in its nurseries.772 Certainly May 
and EAAFRO’s silviculturist were fully aware of the deficiency in nursery and mycorrhiza research, 
describing the nurseries across East Africa as extremely mixed in their quality and “somewhat 
crude compared with standards elsewhere.”773 As such, they experimented with various 
“mycorrhizal brews” through the 1950s that could be distributed among nurseries.774 EAAFRO 
further disseminated its findings through courses on nursery practice that were open to nursery 
officers from across East Africa, a practice considered invaluable by foresters within the 
department.775 By the late 1950s the Forest Department’s own research on soil inoculation, 
conducted by its mycologist I.A.S. Gibson, was extensive enough to warrant brief mention in its 
annual reports.776 Progress was gradually being made. A great deal of political impetus was added 
to this research when the Supplementary Forest Development Scheme was enacted in 1956 in 
which increased plantation establishment would play an important role in the ‘reabsorption’ of 
Kikuyu displaced by Mau Mau into colonial society.777  
                                                                
771 M. C. Rayner, ‘The Use of Soil or Humus Inocula in Nurseries and Plantations’, Empire Forestry Journal 17, no. 2 
(1 December 1938): 236–43. Rayner also highlighted South Africa’s response, which was that inoculation of soil was 
found unnecessary as the soils within which they had established pines already contained suitable mycorrhizas. 
772 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 20; East African Agriculture and Forestry Research 
Organization: Annual Report 1951, 18. 
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Despite the joint efforts of Gibson and EAAFRO, propagation rates of P. patula continued to be 
poor. This factor combined with the consideration that P. patula was a markedly inferior timber to 
P. radiata and the dangers of relying once again on a single main softwood species to urge the 
department to continue its search for better softwood plantation trees. This was a search that the 
department’s silviculturist, W.G. Dyson, considered the department to have an “urgent need” for 
even as late as 1960. 778 The trialling of exotic species accelerated throughout the 1950s, with 24 
new species planted just between 1955 and 1957.779 Where species trials had hitherto been 
haphazard and based more on “individual enterprise” with incomplete records, the arrival of 
scientific involvement and funding in the 1950s allowed a thorough scientific approach to be taken 
with this search.780 After Kenya won its independence from British rule this search continued and 
became more centralised. In what was an attempt to keep research on a secure footing within an 
atmosphere of political uncertainty across Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, EAAFRO took over 
department-level tree breeding programmes in 1963.781   
The concerted and methodical approach the department was taking by the end of 1950s was 
further illustrated when Dyson travelled to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation’s 
(FAO) Latin American Conifer Seminar and Study Tour (Mexico, British Honduras, and Cuba) in late 
1960. In doing so, he had the specific objective of finding more suitable pine species for Kenya’s 
plantations, and as such he returned with the seeds of 19 candidates.782 This, then, was a forest 
department that was now listening to, co-operating with, and following the direction of scientific 
experts in East Africa and beyond. It was a department that had learnt to no longer allow its plans 
and policies to be undermined by mice, moths, and fungi. Just as the department had reacted to 
opposition from settlers and the government in its early years and then increasingly taken the 
initiative to defend its work by the 1930s, through the 1950s the department, rather belatedly, 
                                                                
778 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1960, 14. 
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Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 19; Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1960, 14. 
780 East African Agriculture and Forestry Research Organisation (EAAFRO), ‘Report of Study Group C: Reproduction 
and Regeneration’, in Proceedings of the Specialist Committee on Forestry Research (Nairobi: East African Agriculture 
and Forestry Research Organisation, 1950), 17. 
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FAO, Republic of the Ivory Coast, 1968), 399–420.  
782 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1960, 14. Dyson does not state the 19 species and varieties of seeds he 
returned with, although he does indicate that Pinus pseudostrobus, Pinus oocarpa, Pinus ayachuhuite and Piuns 
montezumae were likely to be the most successful candidates. By this point in 1960 the department’s trials of various 
Pinus since 1952 had revealed two candidates as being ‘good’: Pinus montezumae and Pinus pinaster. ‘Promising’ 
trees (grew well if slowly) were: Pinus canariensis, Pinus Khasya, Pinus leiophylla, Pinus longifolia, and Pinus taeda. 
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responded to the need for science and, as will be seen, began to use this in defence against its old 
opponents of forestry who had also taken up science as a weapon. 
 
3.2.3 Redefining boundaries and invoking science 
The greatly increased involvement of the Forest Department in scientific research within Kenya 
and beyond its borders illuminated the continued clashes the department experienced in its 
dealings with the white settler community. This section will show how science became a tool 
wielded by both that community and the department to support their respective arguments within 
this conflict. This becomes apparent in the department’s preparations for and conclusions drawn 
from the inter-African conference on forestry held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in December 1951. Run 
by the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA), the conference 
brought together foresters from French, Belgian, Portuguese, and British territories as well as South 
Africa and Rhodesia.783 While the level of co-operation that the CCTA achieved was novel between 
imperial powers that largely resisted the exchange of knowledge prior to the Second World War, 
its attempt at status quo preservation was a failure and its success in fostering international 
collaboration on forestry matters was rather limited.784  
Kenya’s interim conservators, James  Rammell and Reginald Graham, initially had no plans to 
send a representative to Abidjan. This changed with the transfer of Ralph Ronald Waterer from 
Cyprus to Kenya as Conservator of Forests in 1951. Waterer espoused the enthusiasm and 
optimism that marked the immediate post-war years, strongly believing that Kenya’s deficiencies 
in research (particularly pertaining to protection forests) should be addressed by any and all 
means. As such, his request to send a representative to Abidjan was granted.785 Reiterating his point 
to a perhaps sceptical Cavendish-Bentinck (Member of the Legislative Council for Agriculture and 
Natural Resources) after the conference had concluded, Waterer argued: 
Kenya has been far too complacent in the past in the belief that other territories cannot teach us 
much. This is quite wrong and has tended to keep our forest staff at home which is not in the 
interests of Kenya or of the staff.786  
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The department’s new silviculturist, Hedley Pudden (Figure 3-4), a conservator formerly of Burma, 
was duly sent to represent Kenya at Abidjan. His conclusions, as well as what he was not permitted 
to officially say, reveal the grievances shared by foresters across territories and the particular 
constraints forestry was facing within Kenya in the early 1950s. The conference resolved that each 
territory must have its highest administrative level of government publish a forest policy that 
would legally secure the forest estate from alienation and allow forestry to pursue its twin goals of 
maintaining protective and productive forests. Like Kenya, several French and Belgian delegates 
complained of their lack of success in producing an officially accepted forest policy. On the matter 
of securing the forest estate so that it could not be alienated, Pudden noted that “much emphasis 
was given to this, there were no two opinions and the difficulty of convincing those other than 
forestry personnel of the difficulties of carrying out long term silviculture without adequate 
security and protection was repeatedly stated.”787 Kenya’s struggles over the previous half century 
to secure its own forests were, then, far from unique. However, the official report on forestry in 
Kenya that Pudden presented in Abidjan contained no statement on this. Instead, it stated that the 
department’s forest areas were “effectively protected” and that the main danger was physical, that 
of fire, not political.788 By contrast, the draft of this report, tellingly preserved by the department, 
                                                                
787 ‘Report from the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya’ (Inter African Conference of Forestry, Abidjan, Commission 
for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, 19 December 1951), VF/11/1, KNA. 
788 Ibid. 
 
Figure 3-4. Hedley Pudden (centre), Kenya Forest Department Silviculturist examines milled mountain ash with 
O.L. Tobing of East Sumatra and M. Poudou of France while on a forestry tour of Australia with foresters from 
twenty other countries. Copyright, National Library of Australia. Source: Mary Coles, ‘Forest Men Are “Gumnuts” 
to Their Drivers’, Australian Women’s Weekly (1933 - 1982), 22 October 1952. 
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presented a picture of the disharmony within Kenya over the issue of forest protection. The draft 
argued: 
Owing to the absence of any written statement of Forest Policy and the doubt existing as to the 
form of future forest administration, it is extremely difficult to defend all classes of forests against 
alienation or damage.789 
The draft maintained that between 1946 and late 1951 the forest area under departmental control 
had been reduced by 11.9 per cent, which the department considered an attack on its authority. 
This was not pure hyperbole, with the 373,416 acres this represented being the largest combined 
excision from government forest areas through the entire colonial period, with approximately 
200,000 acres being excised in 1950 alone (Figure 3-5).790 The period from 1947 to 1954 was one 
of unparalleled reassessment of the extent of government forest areas. 
By 1955 this trend had dramatically reversed, with each year featuring modest increases in 
Forest Department-controlled land or, as in the case of 1956, extremely large accumulations of land 
as the department gained control of forests in previously ignored northern territories of the colony. 
                                                                
789 ‘Report from the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya [Draft]’ (Inter African Conference of Forestry, Abidjan, 
Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, 19 December 1951), VF/11/1, KNA. 
790 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1948-1950; Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 
1951-1953. The percentage given in the draft Abidjan report differs very slightly (0.4 per cent) from that calculated 
from the department’s tri-annual and annual reports. As the figures provided by the department and also presented 
in the notifications of additions and excisions from forest areas in the government gazette were only ever 
approximations (with some areas being added to or excised before a survey was even begun), all figures that refer 
to the area of land under Forest Department control should be considered estimates only.  
 
Figure 3-5. Annual additions and excisions (in acres) from Crown forest (excludes forest areas under African 
administrative control) between 1947 and 1963. Source: Forest Department annual reports, 1945-1963. 
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It was the Forest Boundary Commission, and the interplay of scientific arguments, that caused both 
the excisions and the abrupt change in policy. 
Appointed by Cavendish-Bentinck in March 1946, the Forest Boundary Commission’s (FBC) 
terms of reference were to investigate the boundaries of existing forest areas and make 
recommendations for their extension or reduction, and advise on the creation of entirely new forest 
areas. The accompanying notes to these terms heavily indicate the commission’s main role was one 
of reinforcing state control over forests for “both productive and protective” reasons.791 This was 
also the Forest Department’s understanding of the purpose of the commission, as it estimated that 
a mere 64,000 acres would be excised, far below the approximate 400,000 acres that would be 
removed over the following decade.792 The creation of the FBC held the promise of finally beginning 
an aspect of the extension of forest control that had been laid down in the 1911 Forest Ordinance 
but never enacted in practice. This was the creation of a ‘demarcated forest’, a term used in the 
1911 ordinance to refer to a forest area with boundaries approved by a body of four forest 
commissioners and which could only be removed from the forest estate with the approval of the 
governor and at least half of the forest commissioners.793 By contrast, the legal definition of a state 
or Crown forest was that of ‘forest area’, which could be excised and sold off with the sole approval 
of the governor.794 A higher level of protection was thus afforded to demarcated forests as they 
were insulated from the whims of the governor. This theoretical protection was strengthened 
further by the Forest Ordinance, 1941, which mandated that alteration to the boundaries of a 
demarcated forest could only occur with the approval of the Legislative Council.795 By allowing 
boundaries to be scrutinized and firmly established on the ground, the FBC was a first step toward 
the creation of demarcated forests. This goal was, in fact, never achieved during the colonial period, 
as no forest area was legally converted to a demarcated forest. The department’s optimism toward 
the FBC was quickly replaced with alarm. As the official history of forestry in Kenya rather 
diplomatically put it, the FBC made a series of decisions that were “not always palatable” to the 
Forest Department.796 
The membership of the FBC was a key reason why it made decisions that were so disagreeable 
to the Forest Department. The committee was an expression of white settler and colonial 
government opinion, although these opinions were by no means in agreement. The African and 
                                                                
791 ‘Government Notice No. 262 (13 March 1946)’, The Official Gazette of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 48, 
no. 14 (19 March 1946): 137. 
792 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1945-1947, 8. 
793 The forest commissioners referred to here should not be confused with the concurrent attempt to establish a 
forest commission in Kenya.  
794 An Ordinance to Provide for the Better Protection of Forests and Trees on Crown Land, No. 3 of 1911, 1911, 2–3. 
The Forest Department frequently referred to ‘demarcated forests’ in its reports and correspondence, however 
these were, confusingly, not legally recognised demarcated forests but forest areas with boundaries that were 
physically demarcated (that is, marked on the ground with a post, tree, ditch, road, or fence). 
795 ‘Government Notice No. 262 (13 March 1946)’. 
796 Logie and Dyson, Forestry in Kenya, 7. 
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Asian population went entirely unrepresented on the FCB. Indeed, when the FBC was accepting 
appeals regarding excision of land between 1948 and 1951 a directive was issued by the Chief 
Native Commissioner to his officers specifically stating that “the Forest Boundary Commission was 
not constituted for the purpose of considering any claims of right which were decided by the Carter 
Land Commission report.”797 Clearly the commissioner was anxious to not dredge up African 
complaints at what was, of course, a time of increased disquiet within the native reserves. Where 
Africans did submit claims district commissioners were to vet these before forwarding them to the 
FBC with comments. Claims of right, the directive repeated, “should not be entertained” as the 
commission was only concerned with releasing land from Forest Department control that could be 
better utilised in some other manner.798 Concurrent to this, and beyond the remit of the FBC, was 
an extension of forests under African District Council (ADC) control. This is not to say that land was 
excised from state forest and amended to ADC forests (legally referred to as Native Forest 
Reserves). Rather, this was an extension of the forestry philosophy into the African administrative 
structure; the proceeds from the exploitation of ADC forests may have accrued to the council itself, 
but the management practices of those forests were very much under the direction of the Forest 
Department. ADC forests more than doubled in extent in the post-war period, from 420,480 acres 
in 1947 to 918,656 acres in 1962, and the department maintained it could hardly keep up with 
African demand for more land to be reserved as ADC forests. This was a result, it argued, of 
“enlightened opinion” regarding afforestation and its value in water preservation spreading 
through African councils that had often previously been hostile to the forestry agenda.799 As Otieno 
has shown, realisation of the financial benefits of forest reservation to ADCs was also a key factor, 
which could also be exploited as a socially divisive measure by African elites.800 
The omission of any representative of Kenya’s Asian community on the FBC was also a key 
signifier of the racial and agricultural bias that underlay the committee’s actions. The point is 
further emphasised by the presence of Yacoob Deen on the Forest Advisory Committee but not on 
the FBC. Deen was a sawmill owner and appears to have been the most prominent Asian to conduct 
business with the Forest Department. Certainly, he was considered engaged in both politics and the 
business community to a sufficient extent to warrant his standing on the Forest Advisory 
Committee, which was convened after the Second World War to advise the government on forestry 
matters, but not on boundary issues. The notion of a man such as Deen on the FBC was probably 
doubly untenable as Deen’s status as a sawmiller suggests he would have been sympathetic to 
extensions of the forest estate.801 In fact, there was no representation of the timber industry on the 
                                                                
797 Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley) to Districts Commissioners of Rift Valley, 29 June 1948, DO/ER/2/10/2, 
KNA. Notably, 22,353 acres were excised from state forest in the 10 years after the Land Commission report was 
published in 1934, however 583,017 acres were added to the forest estate. Annual Reports of the Forest 
Department, 1934-1944. 
798 Ibid. 
799 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1954-1955, 5–6. 
800 Otieno, ‘Forest Politics in Colonial and Postcolonial Kenya, 1940-1990s’. 
801 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 1; Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 
1954-1955, 2; Robert G. Gregory, Quest for Equality: Asian Politics in East Africa, 1900-1967 (Orient Blackswan, 
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FBC whereas members from the settler farming community and the Agricultural Department were 
both present. 
Of the seven members of the FBC in 1951, three can be classified as broadly supporting the 
extension of the forest estate.802 These were a representative of the Forest Department, a 
hydrologist of the Public Works Department (Major F. Grundy), and Rebecca Fane, who also sat on 
the council of the Arbor Society. Hydrologists of the Public Works Department were on record as 
supporting afforestation and opposing deforestation in the interests of conserving water supplies, 
so it seems likely that Grundy took this line.803 The presence of Fane on the committee is interesting 
in and of itself, as it highlights the rarity of the female voice within forestry matters in Kenya. Along 
with E. Grant, Fane was one of two women who sat on the Kenya Arbor Society’s council (out of a 
total of 12 councillors) in the late 1940s. Fane also acted as the society’s general secretary, while 
the Lady Muriel Jex-Blake one of the society’s four vice-presidents. Women within Kenya’s white 
settler community clearly sought engagement with the forestry debate yet could only do so through 
the Arbor Society. The 1946 annual report of the society states that Fane secured her position on 
the FBC primarily to pursue an increase in the area of land included within forest reserves, 
indicating her allegiance to the Forest Department in this matter.804  
H.R. Montgomery sat as the chair of the FBC from 1951, replacing Sir Guy Pilling who had 
chaired since 1946. Both had long careers in the colonial service, with Pilling serving as governor 
of St Helena, and Montgomery rising from the position of district officer in Nyanza to a position of 
provincial commissioner. There is no indication that either held strong convictions towards 
forestry matters. Another former district officer that sat on the FBC was R.O. Hennings. He would 
go on to become secretary to the Legislative Council Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources 
in 1952 and wrote extensively on African agriculture, particularly in relation to irrigation. Further 
agricultural knowledge was brought to the committee by Captain G.J.L. Burton, who worked as a 
                                                                
1993), 85. According to Gregory, Yacoob Deen was one of the few Asians within Kenya to support Mau Mau fighters, 
supplying them food, clothing, and medicine from the cover of his sawmill. For this, Deen apparently fled to India 
by the late 1950s. If an indication of an incendiary political character, rather than just pragmatism, this could be 
added to the reasons why Deen was not a member of the FBC.   
802 ‘Government Notice No. 823 (6 July 1951)’, The Official Gazette of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 53, no. 35 
(17 July 1951): 686. The composition of the FBC between 1946 and 1951 and after 1951 is less clear. Prior to 1951 
the chair of the commission was Sir Guy Pilling, a previous governor of St Helena and Zanzibar, and holder of no 
obviously strong opinion on forestry matters. Fane sat on the committee from its creation in 1946 (Kenya Arbor 
Society, Annual Report and Balance Sheet for the Year 1946, 3.) The official gazette does not report on any further 
changes in committee members during the 1950s, nor does the Forest Department. It is likely that if changes did 
occur they followed the same general pattern as laid down in 1946: a chairman drawn from the colonial service, 
representatives of “unofficial opinion” (excluding Africans and Asians), a Forest Department representative, an 
agricultural department representative, and an expert on hydrology (Kenya Forest Department, Departmental 
Report 1945-1947, 8.)   
803 G Starmans and H.G. Michael, ‘Correspondence in Response to “Forests and Water Supplies in East Africa”’, 
Empire Forestry Review 29, no. 1 (1950): 60–61. 
804 Kenya Arbor Society, Annual Report and Balance Sheet for the Year 1946, 3; Mrs R. Fane (General Secretary, Kenya 
Arbor Society) to Chief Secretary (Kenya Colony), 22 February 1944. Muriel Jex-Blake had clear botanical interests, 
publishing a short volume on Kenya plants in 1948: Muriel Jex Blake, Some Wild Flowers of Kenya (Nairobi: Highway 
Press, 1948). 
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plant breeder for the Agricultural Department in the 1920s and 1930s. By 1941 Burton had his own 
farm in Rongai of Nakura District (Rift Valley Province), and by 1950 his presence on the European 
Agricultural Settlement Board confirmed his commitment to white settlement in Kenya.805 Perhaps 
ambivalent toward the extent of Crown forest, yet he may have benefitted personally from sitting 
on the FBC. In 1951 he was granted 178 acres of land in Naru Moro, North Nyeri District (Central 
Province) and appears to have been resident there through the 1950s.806 Significantly, Naru Moro 
was in proximity to Nyeri and Mount Kenya forest reserves, both of which suffered excisions in 
1949 and 1950.807 If Burton did have sympathy toward increasing alienation of forest in areas of 
white settlement, this was a view surely shared by the last member of the committee, E.H. Wright. 
Chairman of the Njoro Settlers Association from 1927 to 1946 and European elected Member of the 
Legislative Council for Aberdare until 1940, Wright was shrewd enough to maintain a cordial 
relationship with the Forest Department in the 1930s that allowed him to exert his influence 
regarding livestock reductions.808 In a 1938 speech to the Legislative Council over the issue of 
government assistance to agricultural development he portrayed himself as a supporter of forestry 
and criticised the government for not giving greater assistance to the department. However, 
Wright’s appreciation of forestry only extended so far as it benefitted agriculture within the colony. 
As such, he believed in the value of forestry in relation to climate, rainfall, and soil conservation and 
in supplying timber to settlers.809 Agriculture was his major concern here; if a forest did not have 
obvious utility to settler agriculture it is doubtful whether he would have supported its reservation. 
Overall, the composition of the FBC espoused various competing views of the value of forestry 
in Kenya. Along with the Forest Department’s representative, Fane and Grundy were probably the 
keenest supporters of forestry, although Grundy’s greatest concern probably lay with the 
hydrological aspects of forests rather than the economic role of forestry. However, their arguments 
appear to have lacked sufficient weight, as the extent of the excisions from the forest estate prior to 
1955 indicate that it was those forces broadly aligned against the Forest Department that had the 
upper hand. In its draft report for the Abidjan conference, the Forest Department cited the lack of 
an official forest policy as a leading cause for this.810 This explanation, however, is inconsistent with 
the history of forest reservation before the 1950s and with the large additions that were made to 
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Figure 3-6. Reserved Crown and African District Council Forests, late 1950s. Data for forest reserves comes 
from 1956 and 1959, that for alienated land from 1954. Sources: Atlas of Kenya, 1st ed. (Nairobi: Survey of 
Kenya, 1959), 19; Directorate of Colonial Surveys, ‘East Africa - General’, 1954, E1:4 (14), NLS; Survey of Kenya, 
‘Forest Reserves’ (Nairobi: Government Printer, January 1956), E10 (104), NLS. 
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1. Mt. Ntiru 
2. Marsabit 
3. Nooto’s Range 
4. Matthew’s Range 
5. Leroghi 
6. Mt. Elgon 
7. Kapolet 
8. Kapsaret 
9. Kaptagat 
10. Kipkabus 
11. Lembus 
12. Timboroa 
13. Maji Mazuri 
14. Nabkoi 
15. North Tinderet 
 
16. Tinderet 
17. Mt. Londiani 
18. Molo 
19. Western Mau 
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27. Ol Bolossat 
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39. Karura 
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41. Thika River 
42. Nyeri 
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44. Njukiini 
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47. Ndare 
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52. Gongoni 
53. Arabuko-Sokoke 
54. Mwachi 
55. Mailuganji 
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57. Gogoni 
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the forest estate in 1955. The absence of a forest policy was apparently no hindrance to the 
extension of the forest estate before the Second World War, even within a climate of suspicion 
toward Forest Department activities that emanated from the white settler farming community and 
the considerable limitations placed on the material resources of the department. Moreover, the 
largest additions to the forest estate came in 1956 (Figure 3-5), a year before Kenya’s forest policy 
was enacted.811 The policy itself was noteworthy in representing an official endorsement for the 
preservation of forests and recognition of their dual role in protecting water catchment areas and 
providing timber, yet it provided no strengthening of the legal status of forests and did not put the 
department any closer to its goal of creating legally recognised demarcated forests. The key aspect 
of the policy was that it was the product of a shift in attitudes within a government that was 
beginning to place significant emphasis on the protective role of the forests and the scientific 
evidence that supported this role. 
The vast majority of the 653,999 acres that were added to the forest estate in 1956 were found 
in the Northern Frontier (Figure 3-6). These were protection forests; being far from the main 
transportation corridors of the colony they held little prospect for exploitation. Their gazettement 
was a victory for a growing body of research that supported the positive role of forests in the 
hydrological cycle. Conversely, the excisions from the forest estate in the early 1950s were the 
result of FBC members with sympathies toward agriculture being swayed by research that argued 
the opposite, that forests were depleting the colony of valuable water that could be better directed 
toward agriculture and denying access to land that could be converted to profitable agriculture. The 
counter-argument against the positive influence of forests on water conservation was highlighted 
in the draft report the department prepared for the Abidjan conference (and was notably absent 
from the final report): 
The status of forestry in Kenya has suffered greatly from a report written in 1938 [1948] by a 
visiting ‘expert’ claiming every soil and water conserving virtue for a well known species of 
grass…812 
Erroneously cited as a 1938 report, the publication in question was actually published in 1948. 
Written by P.A. Buxton, the report addressed the trypanosomiasis issue in Eastern Africa.813 The 
ability of this report to damage the argument in favour of forestry revealed that there existed 
serious gaps in knowledge relating to the role of forests in water conservation in Kenya.814 The 
Abidjan draft argued:  
                                                                
811 ‘Forest Policy for Kenya’. 
812 ‘Report from the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya [Draft]’, 2. 
813 Patrick Alfred Buxton, Trypanosomiasis in Eastern Africa, 1947, Part of a Series Prepared for Tsetse Fly and 
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Until the advantages of the forest cover types existing in Kenya as water conservers have been 
demonstrated an understanding by the governing classes of the need for conserving forests will 
be difficult.815  
Buxton was an extremely well-renowned medical entomologist who held a professorship at the 
University of London, had headed the Department of Entomology at the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine and had become a fellow of the Royal Society two years before his expedition 
to East Africa in 1945-46. This was a research trip he undertook at the request of the Colonial 
Medical Research Committee, upon which he also sat; a body which was greatly concerned with 
addressing the problem of tsetse fly and trypanosomiasis. It was because of such investigations, as 
well as numerous others across the empire, that he became a Companion of the Order of St Michael 
and St George in 1947.816 Buxton thus wrote with considerable authority on his subject. As he sat 
on the Colonial Office’s Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis Committee, Buxton’s 1948 report, along 
with his 1955 book, undoubtedly informed the tsetse control programme within Kenya.817 In the 
early 1950s this programme did not include Forest Department involvement, considered a “marked 
omission” in the department’s draft Abidjan report.818 This omission was symptomatic of the 
conclusions drawn by Buxton in his 1948 report; conclusions which extended beyond tsetse control 
and, if the department’s statements in its draft Abidjan document are correct, influenced 
government and gave ammunition to settlers eager to continue their siege on Forest Department 
control. 
Buxton did not hold a favourable view of forests. Bush land and forest harbour the tsetse fly, 
particularly around water courses and bodies of water where the fly breed, protected from 
exposure to the sun.819 Buxton repeatedly made this point across his several publications on the 
matter, and in 1955 he explicitly framed this as a dichotomy in his magnum opus on the tsetse fly: 
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in general) on water supplies within South Africa. Although the committee determined that exotic species had no 
negative effects on hydrology, the debate did lead to five research stations being set up in South Africa before the 
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It will be remembered that all species of tsetse are closely associated with forest, trees or bush, at 
least as breeding places: to a considerable extent, therefore, the struggle against tsetse cannot fail 
to be an effort to replace woody vegetation by grass. There is, therefore, an essential conflict 
between control of tsetse and preservation of forests.820  
Across western and eastern Africa, this struggle against tsetse within the colonial period invariably 
took the form of landscape transformation. Clearances of bush, forest, and woody vegetation were 
in use by the British in Africa as a form of tsetse control from at least as early as 1909 (in Uganda 
and Tanganyika), and had been shown effective as a means of eliminating tsetse from an area if that 
area was subsequently grazed.821 Tsetse research proceeded at a rapid pace in the interwar period; 
even more so because of its inter-territorial approach.822 This created a vast body of research upon 
which Buxton could call and he therefore supported his arguments with reference to pioneers in 
the field such as Charles Swynnerton.823  
Within Kenya only a small percentage of Crown forest and African forest reserves actually fell 
within those areas considered infected by tsetse in the 1950s (Figure 3-7). Otieno’s work on 
Chepalungu forest reserve highlights an exception to this statement and also how, prior to the 
1950s, the Forest Department was involved in a scheme of tsetse control that sought to exclude the 
local Kipsigis people from the forest. The ultimate objective of this programme was to protect 
settler farms from tsetse by allowing the forest to grow to a degree that made it unsuitable for 
habitation by the tsetse fly, while permanently settling the Kipsigis as a further deterrent to tsetse 
encroachment.824 The technique of forest development used in Chepalungu was in fact an approach 
to tsetse control that had been experimented with in Tanganyika through the 1930s. Clearly a way 
                                                                
820 Buxton, The Natural History of Tsetse Flies. An Account of the Biology of the Genus Glossina (Diptera), 550. 
821 Ibid., 558, 552; Kirk Arden Hoppe, Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900-1960 
(Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 66–73.  
822 Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-
1950 (University of Chicago Press, 2011), 185–200. 
823 Buxton, The Natural History of Tsetse Flies. An Account of the Biology of the Genus Glossina (Diptera), 550. Leak 
has argued that bush clearance should now be recognised as having limited value because it has wider ecological 
impact and in some cases its effectiveness is disputed. Leak cites a 1933 paper on experimental bush clearings in 
Northern Nigeria by Lloyd et al to support this assertion. Stephen G. A. Leak, Tsetse Biology and Ecology: Their Role 
in the Epidemiology and Control of Trypanosomosis (Wallingford, Oxon, UK: CABI; International Livestock Research 
Institute, 1999), 388. The paper Leak references is: Ll. Lloyd et al., ‘Experiments in the Control of Tsetse Fly. Part II’, 
Bulletin of Entomological Research 24, no. 2 (July 1933): 233–251. Nevertheless, bush clearance and conversion to 
grassland does continue to be employed on a limited scale as an effective means of tsetse control, see Leak, Tsetse 
Biology and Ecology, 386–88.  Notably, Lloyd et al is not among the seven papers that Buxton draws upon in his 
advocacy of bush clearances as a tsetse control measure. Buxton cites the following (notably, none of these papers 
deal specifically with Kenya): J. R. Ainslie, ‘Forestry and Tsetse Control in Northern Nigeria’, Empire Forestry Journal, 
1934, 39–44; F.S. Collier, ‘Notes on the Preservation of Fauna of Nigeria’, Nigerian Field 4 (1935): 3–13, 51–62, 101–
13; Thomas Arthur Manly Nash and others, ‘Tsetse Flies in British West Africa.’, Tsetse Flies in British West Africa., 
1948; C.F.M. Swynnerton, ‘How Forestry May Assist towards the Control of Tsetse Flies. Appendix II’, in Colonial 
Forest Administration, by Robert Scott Troup (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 439–42; William Allan, ‘African Land 
Usage’, Rhodes-Livingstone Journal 3 (1945): 13–20; John Ford and R. de Z. Hall, ‘The History of Karagwe’, 
Tanganyika Notes and Records 24 (1947): 3–27; J. M. Winterbottom, ‘The Ecology of Man and Plants in Northern 
Rhodesia’, Human Problems in British Central Africa, no. 3–5 (1945): 33. 
824 Alphonse Otieno, ‘“Reordering and Counterordering”: Forestry Preservation, Bush Clearing and the 
Sociophysical Mapping of Chepalungu, Kericho District, Kenya, 1930-1963’, Environment and History 16, no. 4 (1 
November 2010): 381–408. 
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Figure 3-7. The 1959 distribution of Crown Forests and African District Council Forests in comparison to the 
declared ‘tsetse-free’ zone. Comparison to a 1954 map of areas surveyed for tseste corroborates the above 
distribution, with the exception of tsetse being mapped as occurring on the eastern and south-eastern slopes 
of Mount Kenya (Meru and Embu). Sources: Atlas of Kenya, 1st ed. (Nairobi: Survey of Kenya, 1959), 19, 21; 
Directorate of Colonial Surveys, ‘East Africa - Population, Tsetse Fly and Rainfall’ (GSGS, 1954), E1:4 (15), NLS. 
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for forestry to play a key role in tsetse control, Buxton considered this approach merely 
experimental while being largely impractical (because of the slowness of forest growth) and, at 
worst, “dangerous” for allowing an ecosystem that typically favoured tsetse to remain. 825  
The real danger of Buxton’s arguments to forestry came not from the direct interaction 
between tsetse control and the forests but in the applicability of his arguments to forests that were 
free of tsetse. Using the terms ‘bush’ and ‘forest’ interchangeably without definition, Buxton’s 
argument of bush clearance was made at a time of high concern about soil erosion, concern that 
typically benefitted the Forest Department in its mission of increasing the acreage of land under its 
protection.826 Within the context of a colonial narrative that placed the blame on African land 
misuse for the spread of the tsetse fly, bush clearance (in concert with forced population movement, 
settlement, and grazing) became the main weapon employed by the British in attempts to reclaim 
land from the tsetse fly.827 It was, for example, a primary tool in the anti-tsetse programme in 
Western Narok, Maasailand and formed part of the strategy implemented in Tanganyika from the 
1920s onwards.828 It thus follows that arguments for bush and forest clearance also needed to 
address the issue of erosion; it was hardly worth the effort of repelling the tsetse fly from an area 
only to have the fertility of that area washed away. As argued by Hoppe, erosion concern was a key 
factor along with the dangers of sleeping sickness epidemics for increased intervention by the 
colonial state in tsetse control from the 1930s onwards.829 The value of forests located on ridges as 
a means to abate the rapid run off of rainwater was recognised by Buxton, but in other cases he was 
more sceptical.830  “In the experience of the entomologist,” he wrote, “the danger of erosion after 
clearing thicket or woodland has been exaggerated, for when grass replaces woody vegetation the 
land is generally protected from erosion.”831 His 1948 report argued that bush and forest 
“preservation has been applied too widely”, leading to the spread of both G. morsitans and pallidipes 
tsetse flies.832 This preservation policy had reduced the use of burnings of bush late in the season, 
when vegetation was at its driest. This was a practice employed by Africans and the colonial 
authorities to cheaply and quickly clear an area of woody vegetation. Instead, trees and areas of 
bush were preserved with the Forest Department-approved practice of early season burning 
                                                                
825 Buxton, Trypanosomiasis in Eastern Africa, 1947, 33; Buxton, The Natural History of Tsetse Flies. An Account of the 
Biology of the Genus Glossina (Diptera), 552. Buxton wrote in 1955 that the technique of allowing bush or forest to 
develop to a degree that inhibited tsetse habitation was actually reliant on the increase in parasites and predatory 
insects that would accompany forest development. Leak states such methods of biological control invariably fail 
where the insect used to exert control comes from the same ecological area, as the prey/host and predator/parasite 
would have adapted to each other. Leak, Tsetse Biology and Ecology, 391. 
826 Anderson, Eroding the Commons, 244; Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought’. 
827 Ford, The Role of the Trypanosomiases in African Ecology, 6–8; Hoppe, Lords of the Fly, 143–70. 
828 Richard D. Waller, ‘Tsetse Fly in Western Narok, Kenya’, The Journal of African History 31, no. 1 (January 1990): 
89; Hoppe, Lords of the Fly, 95–101; Ford, The Role of the Trypanosomiases in African Ecology, 197–216. 
829 Hoppe, Lords of the Fly, 128. 
830 Buxton, The Natural History of Tsetse Flies. An Account of the Biology of the Genus Glossina (Diptera), 553. 
831 Ibid., 552. 
832 Buxton, Trypanosomiasis in Eastern Africa, 1947, 30. 
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(owing to the greater fire resistance of such vegetation after rains).833 He further argued that 
replacing bush or forest with grassland would usually have a beneficial effect on protecting the soil 
and increasing the availability of water.834 
As revealed by the response to Buxton’s report by J.F. Hughes of the Uganda forestry 
department, the 1940s witnessed a barrage of publications that undermined the position of forestry 
as a guardian of the soil and water. Some of these publications, Hughes argues, were written by 
“well-known extremists,” while others came from more authoritative sources such as R.R. Staples 
of the Veterinary Department of Tanganyika.835 Buxton’s 1948 report and his subsequent 
monograph on tsetse flies were effectively the culmination of these respectable, scientific attacks 
on forests. Buxton’s position of authority, his scientific prestige, and his citations of other scientific 
works (including Staples and Nash, his former pupil) lent his arguments considerable weight. In 
reality, the works on which Buxton based his argument were of a highly localised nature; Buxton’s 
conclusions, however, were not. Based on his fieldwork across British Africa, Buxton anecdotally 
concluded that grass could effectively fulfil the anti-erosion role: 
... if grass replaces bush the soil is effectively protected from erosion. This point is very important 
and I made it my business to enquire about it wherever I went [in East Africa], and from men of 
different types: in general I am satisfied that if one reduces bush it is replaced by grass, and that 
nearly everywhere this holds up the soil which is not eroded.836 
Herein lay the ammunition that could be taken up by settlers and administrators in Kenya critical 
of Forest Department control. Previously the Forest Department had retained the high ground 
through its use of supposedly scientific arguments relating to the hydrological role of forests; this 
was now under assault with what were, perhaps, equally suspect scientific arguments. Importantly, 
the claim that grass could replace forest with no damage to the water cycle or the soil was a serious 
challenge to the department’s efforts to increase its holdings classified as protection forests. In this 
way, arguments that Buxton made to support tsetse control measures were subverted and 
extended in applicability to any forest in the colony.  
It was this argument concerning the replacement of forest with grass that the Forest 
Department’s draft report to the Abidjan conference indicates was the cause of great damage to the 
case for extending the forest estate. Buxton’s writings therefore appear to have influenced the 
decisions of the FBC relating to the excising of forest. It is clear that ambiguity on the relationship 
between forest and water supplies existed within the government, outside of the departments of 
forestry and public works, until the mid-1950s. An account of a speech to influential members of 
                                                                
833 Ibid. The Forest Department policy of early season burning allowed the burn to be more controlled and was a 
major fire-prevention strategy because it eliminated grasses and bushes that allowed forest fires in the dry late 
season to spread rapidly. Deliberate burning in the dry season was looked upon by the Forest Department with 
great concern because of the large danger of any fire quickly reaching uncontrollable proportions. 
834 Ibid. 
835 J.F. Hughes, ‘Forest and Water Supplies in East Africa’, Empire Forestry Journal 28 (1949): 314. 
836 Buxton, Trypanosomiasis in Eastern Africa, 1947, 30. Buxton repeated the point, again without adequate evidence, 
in 1955: Buxton, The Natural History of Tsetse Flies. An Account of the Biology of the Genus Glossina (Diptera), 554. 
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Kenya’s white settler community at the Nairobi Rotary Club in 1955 by the Minister for Forest 
Development, Game and Fisheries, L.R.M. Welwood, addressed the “great asset” that the forests of 
Kenya were to the country but admitted “Kenya’s forests and climate were indelibly linked although 
it was difficult to say what effect each had on the other.”837 Welwood clearly did not want to 
antagonise such an influential audience by entering a scientific debate that he was himself unsure 
of. Misunderstanding also occurred outside of government. After visiting EAAFRO’s laboratories in 
March 1956, a reporter for the East African Standard came away with quite the wrong impression 
of their research, writing “Indigenous forests are drinking millions of gallons of water which would 
otherwise flow down mountain-sides to irrigate pastures and cultivated farmland… .”838 H.C. 
Pereira of EAAFRO viewed such statements with alarm, particularly as it was printed in the Friday 
edition of the Standard and would have therefore been widely read by the farming community. 
Addressing the Secretary for Forest Development, Pereira stated the article “will have a very bad 
effect indeed on your Ministry’s case for forest protection unless it is promptly refuted.”839 Refuted 
it was, with Pereira drafting the responses that would appear within the following week’s edition 
of the paper. As Figure 3-5 shows, the tide was beginning to turn in favour of more reservation by 
this point in the mid-1950s. 
By 1960 the government became fully committed to forest protection on the grounds that it 
would be dangerous to allow further excisions until clarity was obtained on the relationship 
between forest cover and water supplies. This attitude was clear when the African Member of the 
Legislative Council for Central Province North urged the excisions of Crown forest on Mount Kenya 
to allow the local Chuka residents to establish tea plantations on the land. Support came from the 
European Member for the Coast Constituency, who in stating the government should “go in for short 
term profit rather than for long-term forest planning” displayed his ignorance of the government’s 
concerns for water supplies.840  W.E. Crosskill, Minister for Tourism, Game, Forests and Fisheries, 
was adamant excision would not occur. While acknowledging the value of tea production, Crosskill 
maintained the government:  
…is not prepared to consider excisions until conclusions can be drawn from the water catchment 
research now taking place in the southern-western Mau forest reserve, with particular reference 
to the effect of converting indigenous forest to tea gardens.841      
This turnaround was the result of a decade of scientific research into forests and water supplies 
that, although still not complete by 1960, had progressed to a sufficient degree to allow this 
delaying tactic to be employed. Hughes’ article in the Empire Forestry Journal of 1949, which was 
essentially a response to Buxton’s 1948 report, framed the scope of this research. Hughes 
                                                                
837 ‘Forests and Wildlife “a Great Trust”’, East African Standard, 4 August 1955. 
838 ‘Zoology Has a Big Role in Developing East Africa’, East African Standard, 16 March 1956. 
839 Dr H.C. Pereira (EAAFRO) to Colchester (Secretary for Forest Development), 19 March 1956, VF/8/3, KNA. 
840 S.V. Cooke (European Member for Coast Constituency), Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, ‘Legislative Council 
Debates Official Report’ (Vol. LXXXV. Fourth Session. Hansard, Nairobi, 12 June 1960), 488. 
841 W.E. Crosskill (Minister for Tourism, Game, Forests and Fisheries) ibid., 487. 
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addressed the matter by looking at the fundamental relationship of forests to the water cycle. He 
considered the role of forests in relation to precipitation, the interception and evaporation of 
rainfall, and the run off and storage of rainfall. The paper emphasized the large knowledge gap and 
continued debate over these points in East Africa. Compared to the repeated assurances of the 
inexorable link between forests and water supplies commonly found in forestry literature of the 
period, Hughes displayed a refreshing frankness.842 He stated, for example, “The effect of vegetation 
upon rainfall has been debated for many years and, it may as well be admitted, is far from being 
resolved.”843 Hughes even concludes that many forested areas could be replaced by grassland with 
a resulting positive effect on local water supplies. His ultimate conclusion, however, was that the 
matter needed urgent and extensive research and that “until we have a better knowledge of local 
hydrology there surely should be no question of large scale attack on bush… .”844 Support came 
from hydrologists from the Public Works Department, who also urged more research and were 
eager to engage with the Forest Department on this, something which they claimed had not 
previously been achieved. 845 
The Forest Department was well aware of Buxton’s research and his likely conclusions before 
his 1948 report was published. In its report for 1945-47 the department pre-empted those 
conclusions by admitting it had paid “little attention” to hydrological questions when creating 
plantations.846 The statement foreshadowed Hughes’ more detailed and honest assessments of the 
complex relationship between forests and water supplies.847 A turning point was being reached in 
the mind set of foresters in East Africa by this point. Under assault by another branch of science, 
forestry reacted by engaging in more research. This was its only option if it was to persuade the 
government and prominent settlers who held power within or influence over that government of 
the value of forestry in areas where competition for land that could be used for agriculture was 
strong.  
The Forest Department was not equipped or staffed to handle the highly technical level of 
research needed to refute the arguments epitomized by Buxton. Indeed, when Dr C.R. Hursh, an 
                                                                
842 The Sub-committee of the 1945 Development Committee stated, for example, that all forests or potential forests 
should be reserved “for climatic reasons.” Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1945-1947, 2. 
843 Hughes, ‘Forest and Water Supplies in East Africa’, 315. 
844 Ibid., 322. 
845 Starmans and Michael, ‘Correspondence in Response to “Forests and Water Supplies in East Africa”’. The 
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expert hydrologist with the United States Forest Service, arrived in Kenya in 1952 to advice on 
hydrological matters he was very critical of past inaction. He cited a lack of co-operation between 
forestry and the other branches of government that manged land and the “failure” of those involved 
“to acquire a working knowledge of the natural processes that determine favourable soil, water and 
climate relations.”848 While Hursh’s presence under a Fulbright Act grant may be interpreted as 
representing the growth of American soft power within Africa, his brief work in Kenya appears to 
have added considerable weight to the Forest Department’s case.849 The creation of EAAFRO was 
of huge benefit in this regard as it allowed the department to draw on the assistance of experts from 
within the empire and beyond. This was assistance that Kenya’s new Conservator of Forests, R.R. 
Waterer, actively sought after he too realised that foresters in Kenya had too long laboured alone, 
often not even communicating adequately with other foresters in the colony.850 It would be EAAFRO 
that took the lead on the matter, with research on hydrology beginning after the organisation’s 
headquarters were complete in 1952. Dr H.C. Pereira led research from his base within EAAFRO 
throughout the 1950s; the Forest Department providing little more than labour for the endeavours. 
Pereira was extremely capable: his pioneering work is still read and he was knighted in 1977 for 
the far-reaching effects of his hydrological research on agriculture.851 By the mid-1950s Pereira had 
begun two water-catchment research projects within Kenya. The first concerned the hydrological 
effects of replacing bamboo on the Aberdares with pine plantations, and the second on water use 
following the conversion of montane rainforest to tea plantations in the Timbilil area of the south-
west Mau forest.852 These were joined by a project in Mbeya, Tanganyika that looked into the 
comparative water use of montane rainforest and subsistence agriculture on steep slopes, and a 
study in Karamoja, Uganda on the hydrological effects of overgrazing on rangeland.853 
Preliminary results of these investigations began to be published in 1962.854 As early as 1954, 
however, Pereira published a paper that supported the argument for the retention of forests rather 
than their conversion to agricultural land. Two years later the department was able to reserve a 
record annual acreage of forest, largely because of arguments for the value of protection forests. 
Pereira even argued that maximum water catchment could be achieved by a periodic clear felling 
of the forest and then replanting with trees which would be allowed to develop until they formed a 
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closed canopy.855 Such conclusions were ideally suited to the goals of forestry and were no doubt 
influential in persuading government of the importance of the forests in the 1950s while it waited, 
and stalled excisions, for the final results to arrive. When the results of EAAFRO’s investigations did 
come they were in fact only partially supportive of forestry. It was concluded that there was no 
discernible hydrological difference when a bamboo forest was replaced by a pine plantation, thus 
supporting the planting programme of the department. Yet, this research also showed that the 
water catchment abilities of a montane rainforest and a tea plantation were almost identical. In 
other words, there was no longer any argument relating to hydraulic concerns over the 
preservation of forest that could be more economically utilised for tea.856 When African demands 
for land became triumphant during the transition to independence of the early 1960s, the lack of 
an iron-clad scientific argument against forest clearance meant the department could not stop the 
1962 excising of 10,930 acres of Crown Forest from Central Province for African settlement, 
although this did not prevent simultaneous additions that resulted in the department controlling a 
record total of 4,309,120 acres as the country moved to independence.857 Overall, through the 
1950s the Forest Department, in essential partnership with EAAFRO, rose to the challenge of the 
counterclaims concerning the place of forests in the water cycle and a scientific programme was 
engaged which successfully reversed the trend of excisions which was evident at the beginning of 
the decade.   
 
 Scientific Exploitation 
3.3.1 Growing the economy 
The increased attention given by Britain to the development of its colonies extended beyond 
administrative and technical improvement. The placing of economic advancement, even 
industrialisation, at the core of post-war colonial governance carried with it capital that flowed out 
to the private sphere. Much of this capital accumulated in the hands of Kenya’s white settlers 
because of their discriminatory role in Kenya’s exports. The protected markets and artificial prices 
guaranteed by the wartime produce control boards ensured that many settlers entered the post-
war period as newly prosperous, no doubt full of the same optimism that characterised Forest 
Department accounts of this time. Through the 1950s the settlers were joined by further white 
immigrants keen to establish their own farms in a buoyant market. The colonial government of 
Kenya spent £2 million on assisting these new arrivals and passed legislation, such as the 1948 
Industrial Licensing Ordinance, designed to facilitate an influx of private capital into Kenya’s 
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856 McCulloch, ‘Sir Herbert Charles Pereira. 12 May 1913 - 19 December 2004’, 250. 
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nascent commercial and industrial sectors.858 The metropolitan and colonial states were now 
proactive in the aid and leadership they gave to the private sphere. Material, educational, and 
legislative assistance were delivered to the white settlers to shore up the racial status quo and 
attempt to guarantee the prosperity of the core export commodities they produced, such as coffee. 
Concurrently, the pre-war aversion to industrial development held by the Colonial Office and its 
colonies out of the fear of competing with British industries was replaced by a commitment to 
establish industries that could replace imports into the colonies. The opportunities for 
metropolitan capital were epitomised by the arrival of companies such as Unilever (1953) in Kenya, 
while the majority of firms formed in Kenya in the post-war period were owned by white settlers 
and a minority by the Asian community.859   
The post-war period represented a fundamental alteration of the relationship between the 
state and the private sphere in Kenya. The new emphasis on industrial development and the need 
to supply local markets to support this had a profound effect on forestry in Kenya. The Development 
Committee’s focus on the importance of exotic softwood plantations was directly related to this 
need. As softwoods were the major type of timber traded and consumed across the northern 
hemisphere, it was expected that Kenya would also have far reaching needs for these high-utility 
woods. Because Kenya could establish large plantations of these cheaply, it became apparent that 
forestry should also strive to ensure that local production could replace imports and even produce 
an excess that could be exported to the other East African colonies and, vaguely, “to countries 
bordering the Indian Ocean.”860 W.A. Robertson, Forest Advisor to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, toured East Africa after the Second World War and expressed the same opinions.861 
Forestry in Kenya therefore appeared to have a clear purpose within the wider scheme of the 
colony’s development.   
Immediately following the close of the Second World War, the Kenya government’s priority 
concerning forestry was ensuring that the timber needs of the military continued to be as ably met 
as they had been during the war; this was then supplemented by a rapidly expanding timber 
demand within the colony itself. The government ordered the Forest Department “to produce an 
arbitrary tonnage to meet the present local demand and that of the military authorities.”862 This 
amount, set at 54,000 tons of timber in 1947 and 1948, respectively,863 was easily surpassed in 
those years and in every subsequent year of colonial rule, as shown in Figure 3-8. Military need was 
practically nil by 1949; thereafter the timber was sold locally or exported. Significantly, this tonnage 
                                                                
858 Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination, 267–72. Berman state that an additional 
240 white settler farmers (and families) were settled in the white highlands on farms of under 1,500 acres by 1952. 
By 1960 there were 3,609 total land holdings in the white highlands, a 14 per cent increase since 1954.  
859 Zwanenberg and King, An Economic History of Kenya and Uganda 1800-1970, 125–34. Nicola Swainson, The 
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was overwhelmingly the result of the exploitation of Kenya’s natural forest, with the plantations of 
cypress that the department had begun in the 1920s only making a meaningful contribution to this 
figure in the late 1950s. Indeed, before 1955 cypress was “becoming unpopular” in the local Kenya 
market because the only timber available from the not yet mature plantations was of a low grade.864 
The plantations of eucalypts and black wattle that dominated the department’s planting 
programme prior to the mid-1930s produced little timber, instead being used for fuel. The reliance 
on the natural forests was a situation that deeply affected the success of individual sawmilling firms 
and influenced the character of the entire industry.  
The exploitation of the indigenous natural forests and the plantations required different 
approaches. Kenya’s natural forests produced a very low yield of timber per acre as the limited 
number of trees of economic value, primarily podo, were scattered and of extreme variability in 
quality. These dispersed trees were typically extracted by teams of Kikuyu with the aid of oxen 
employed by the millers. 865 These problems of low yield per acre and the costs of extraction meant 
                                                                
864 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 32. 
865 Data recording the labour employed by sawmills are largely incomplete, with these workers usually passing 
unrecorded by the Forest Department or wider government. Many squatted in the forests close to the area of 
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Figure 3-8. Annual timber production (in hoppus tons) from Crown forest between 1946 and 1963. Timber 
harvested from indigenous forest (that is, natural forest) primarily constituted podo and cedar (it is assumed 
that the plantations of cedar that the department established from the mid-1920s onwards would not have 
reached sufficient maturity to contribute greatly to the output of cedar within this period). Timber harvested 
from the plantations was primarily cypress, with small quantities of pine becoming available from 1953 
onwards. Source: Forest Department Annual Reports, 1945-1963. 
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that the natural forests could only be profitably exploited by establishing small mills situated close 
to the source. The irregular growth and presence of numerous ‘defects’ such as knots in indigenous 
tree species further meant a lower rate of conversion of merchantable timber from these species 
than the straight and uniform imported exotic softwoods. Conversion itself required milling 
techniques and equipment adapted for either indigenous or exotic species because of these 
differences. Essentially, a sawmill built to exploit the indigenous forests could not exploit the exotic 
plantations because of its location, the unsuitability of its machines, and the training, or lack of, 
given to its workers.866  
By 1957, when logs from the cypress plantations were becoming available, several mills were 
processing these using the same techniques they employed for indigenous species. However, as a 
report from Timsales, the representative body of the timber industry, indicated, “they are not likely 
to remain in business very long unless they change their methods.”867 At least one mill that did 
embrace modern techniques for processing exotic timber was that of Sokoro Saw Mill Limited, 
incorporated in 1952 but apparently set up in 1945 to exclusively process thinnings from the exotic 
plantations.868 The industry as a whole had no choice in the eventual changeover to the processing 
of cypress rather than podo. As early as 1947, the Forest Department “believed, though the full data 
to substantiate the belief are not available, that the forests are being overcut particularly with 
regard to Podocarpus.”869 If the sawmilling industry was to remain viable through the 1960s, it had 
to modernise in order to exploit the plantation forests that would be replacing the indigenous 
forests as the source of softwood. Mills that did not adapt to this change would be unable to compete 
against the cost and efficiency savings made by mills that had begun exploiting the plantations.  
 
3.3.2 The retardation of modernisation 
As argued in chapter 2, the lack of modernisation was a defining factor that inhibited the further 
development of the timber trade prior to the Second World War. Although some mills did take some 
steps toward updating their equipment, facilities, and methods, particularly with regard to the 
chemical treatment of timbers and seasoning, between the time of the war and Kenyan 
independence, many did not. In 1947 the department stated the mills “leave much to be desired to 
achieve efficient milling.”870 In 1955, the department again complained that mills seemed happy to 
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satisfy large local demand with unseasoned, low quality timber.871 By 1957, most mills were still 
operating using steam power rather than diesel or electric, limiting their efficiency, and were not 
kiln-drying their timber,872 and in 1960 complaints were still being received from timber inspectors 
checking wood for export.873 At the point of Kenya’s independence from British rule, an official 
history of forestry in the country lamented the inability of the industry to keep pace with wider 
forestry developments. As large acreages of exotic softwood plantations were reaching maturity 
the industry was not ready to exploit them and the changes required to do so were considered 
“difficult as the necessary capital is not in the present industry.”874  At least in the early 1950s, the 
sluggish pace of modernisation in the milling industry hampered its ability to compete 
internationally. In 1951 a representative of the Twentsche Overseas Trading Company Limited 
complained to Waterer, the conservator of forests, that mills were unable to cut timber to the 
standards required by overseas buyers.875 Responding to similar complaints a year later, Waterer 
was “not at all surprised” as “Till recently any exporter could export any rubbish in the form of 
timber that he liked, it is known that many such parcels of timber did leave Kenya.”876 As will be 
seen, what the Forest Department perceived as the unresponsiveness of many mills to 
modernisation was actually a response to the market conditions for timber in Kenya and the United 
Kingdom.  
The production of timber from government forests increased 117 per cent (Figure 3-8) 
between 1946 and 1955, representing both a very strong local demand and a market for Kenya’s 
timbers in the United Kingdom. This period continued and accelerated the trend of exploitation 
begun during the war, when massive military demand was able to absorb all that the forests of 
Kenya could produce. While wartime production had turned sawmilling from a “side-line”877 into 
an industry in Kenya, the military’s eagerness for any wood, no matter the quality, meant “the 
sacrifice of the initial groundwork done in the seasoning and grading of timber.”878 Both imports 
and exports of timber rose between 1946 and 1949, feeding the needs of development in Kenya 
and the military in North Africa (Figure 3-9), yet continuing the situation that proper grading and 
seasoning was not required to achieve a profit. Timber exports as a percentage of production fell 
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from 37 per cent in 1947 to 10 per cent in 1949879 as military need ended and the timber industry 
began to divert timber to the burgeoning local market.880 The Forest Department then “hoped from 
the forest point of view that the demand for timber might fall to something nearer to what is 
believed to be the permissible cut.”881 This was not to be. Military need was replaced by a rapidly 
expanding local need and a strong market in the UK.  
Within the UK, Forestry Commission alarm at the rate of unsustainable deforestation in 1950 
led it to curtail the exploitation of the UK’s forests, providing a huge opportunity for increased 
imports.882 As a result, exports from Kenya to the UK surged. Shipments of Kenya’s general utility 
softwood, podo, more than doubled to 10,000 hoppus tons in 1950, with the UK share of this rising 
from 62 per cent in 1949 to 92 per cent in 1950. Control of timber production in Kenya by the 
timber marketing board ceased in 1950, however powers over timber exports were retained by the 
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Figure 3-9. Imports and exports of timber and timber products (e.g. cedar slats, flooring blocks, plywood, and 
box boards). Source: Kenya Forest Department Annual Reports 1945-1963. 
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Forest Department to safeguard supplies for the local market and prevent the export of low quality 
timber that might “prejudice”883 the international market against Kenya’s forest products.  
The department was instructed to only issue export licences to “bona fide millers,”884 that is 
not middle men or millers putting an inferior product onto market. However, as the 
correspondence on the matter reveals, this instruction was only issued verbally and seemingly just 
to Rammell, the outgoing Conservator of Forests. In the nine months between Rammell’s retirement 
in June 1950 and the arrival of his successor, R.R. Waterer, in March 1951 this instruction was lost. 
The arrangement was absurdly informal given the importance of supplying local demand and 
conserving indigenous forests because there was expected to be a gap between when the 
indigenous forests were depleted and the softwood plantations reached maturity in the 1960s. 
“Caution”, a British timber merchant assessing East Africa advised, “must be the watchword and 
the low-yielding natural forest conserved to cover this gap.”885 Seemingly casting caution aside, the 
Forest Department freely gave out licences to timber merchants and millers eager to dump largely 
ungraded timber on a desperate UK market.886 The mistake, which only became apparent and 
corrected in April-May 1951 with a 20 per cent limit on mill exports, was the cause of the peak in 
exports in 1951. With a value of £824,435, 1951 represented the zenith of timber exports from 
Kenya for the entire colonial period. This loss of government control over exports was not 
something to be celebrated. In April 1951, Ahluwaha Pritam, Member of the Legislative Council for 
Western Area, began voicing his concern to Cavendish-Bentinck, Member for Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, over worsening timber shortages in his district. Prices of podo were rising 
alarmingly on the local market, forcing buyers, at least in western Kenya, to source timber from the 
black market to supply their building projects.887 
Pritam and Waterer agreed that the problem was exacerbated by the actions of agents, such 
as Twentsche Overzee Handel Maatschappij, who sought only the export market and showed little 
regard for the local market.888 Such middlemen were buying up timber from local traders that was 
intended for the local market and exporting it to Britain. The gains from doing this were short term, 
but agents such as Twentsche were diverse in their business activities and therefore had no great 
investment in what to them was the minor business of timber export: it was a means to a quick 
profit in a buoyant market that was, unintentionally, left unregulated by the Forest Department. 
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The fleeting benefits of such exports to middle men, which naturally did not feed back into 
investment in the mills, were likely more than offset by the further damage caused to the reputation 
of Kenya’s timbers in the United Kingdom. By mid-1952, the chairman of the Timber Development 
Association in the UK complained to Cavendish-Bentinck that there appeared to be “no grading 
rules in regard to timber exports from East Africa, including Kenya, or that rules were not being 
enforced”, and that podo shipments were arriving at UK docks “in spite of defects” in the wood.889  
Timber grading was an issue that went back to the 1930s in Kenya and still, 20 years later, had 
not been resolved. In 1949 the Forest Department was beginning to grapple the issue through the 
work it was doing with the East Africa Timber Advisory Board (EATAB).890 EATAB advised the East 
African colonial governments on all matters relating to the production, distribution, utilization, and 
export of timber. Immediately after its formation it began drafting legislation dealing with the 
grading and handling of timber.891 However, it was not until the closing months of 1951 that the 
Export of Timber Ordinance was passed, and the following year on 1st April when rules stipulating 
grading standards allowed by this law were promulgated, finally giving the Forest Department legal 
powers over the quality of timber exported.892 Even so, further legislation on the matter was needed 
by 1955.893 After this, the paucity of complaints in the records and the acceptance of cypress timber 
on the European market by 1962 indicate that real progress had finally been made and Kenya’s 
mills were producing the quality of product demanded overseas.894 
Undermining the rather limited Forest Department efforts to improve the timber industry was 
a branch within that industry that sought to maximise its profits with the absolute minimum of 
development required. This branch was epitomised by the actions of the “business houses” 
between 1949 and 1951 who applied for export licences of almost double the tonnage of those 
applied for by sawmills who were members of Timsales.895 The Forest Department relied on 
Timsales for liaison with the industry: those who were not members essentially escaped the gaze 
of the department. In 1950, there were 45 firms licensed to operate sawmills in Kenya and of these, 
17 were not members of Timsales.896 To Pritam, the Legislative Council member greatly concerned 
with local timber shortages, these unaffiliated mills would willingly disobey government directives 
as “they are busy in exporting every piece [of timber] and would continue to do so until some 
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administrative action is taken against them.”897 This action would only come with the passing of the 
Export of Timber Ordinance 1951. What these mills and middle men with eyes fixated on exports 
seem to have been either ignorant of or indifferent to was that the market they sought was entirely 
artificial with little prospect for future expansion. 
The chief source of expanding export revenue for Kenya timbers between 1945 and 1952 was 
podo, that met some of the demand for softwoods in the post-war reconstruction of Britain, which 
was favouring timber from the Commonwealth. This timber was aided greatly by its classification 
in the UK market not as a softwood, which it botanically is, but as a hardwood. Hardwoods from the 
Commonwealth required no licence and carried no duty, whereas hardwoods from outside the 
Commonwealth were subject to both a licence (that is, approval for import from the government) 
and a 10 per cent ad valorem import duty.898 The market for podo in Britain was thus artificially 
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Figure 3-10. Extraction of podo or possibly pencil cedar by ox, c.1945, Rift Valley 
Province. The description accompanying this images notes that “Oxen are used for 
logging in forests of this type, though where practicable tractors are gradually taking 
their place.” Photograph by H.M. Gardner. Source: The Timber Forests of Kenya, 1945, CO 
1069-137-73, TNA, https://www.flickr.com/photos/nationalarchives/5404433689/ 
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receptive. By the beginning of 1952, the UK had introduced a quota on softwoods imported from 
outside the sterling area, effectively providing a huge opportunity for imports from the 
Commonwealth of both softwoods and hardwoods to replace those from North America. Under this 
new arrangement, instigated by the newly formed commodity trade controller, the Ministry of 
Materials, podo was reclassified as a softwood that required a freely-issued licence for import.899 
Theoretically, this should have continued the preferential treatment given to podo, however at least 
some of the members of Timsales did not believe so and dispatched a representative, W.W. Murton, 
to the UK in the autumn of 1952 to investigate the matter and plead the case for the import of East 
African timbers. Writing to the Ministry of Materials, Murton argued the increase in bureaucracy 
had caused a 70 per cent fall in podo exports.900 Such pleas were rejected by the Ministry of 
Materials, the East African High Commissioner, and finally silenced completely by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies in December 1952.901 
The Ministry of Materials was deliberately restricting the usage of softwoods in the UK 
because demand outstripped supply, which, combined with the Forest Department’s restriction on 
the level of exports and a fall in the prices of timber coming from the huge and very efficient Swedish 
producers caused the slump in exports of Kenya timber.902 Significantly, licenses were not the issue 
as exports of pencil cedar slats, for which the main market was also Britain, fell 55 per cent between 
1951 and 1952 yet required no licence for import into the UK and faced no regulatory restriction 
of any kind.903 As Edwards, writing for the Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, stated, 
“the Podo market in the United Kingdom is somewhat artificial and unlikely to survive a return to 
free consumption of softwoods.”904 Waterer was in complete agreement with the assessment and 
was proved right. After the temporally buoyant market for softwoods in the UK in 1953, restrictions 
on softwood imports to the UK were lifted in November 1953, causing podo exports to slump to 
their lowest level since the war and a mere 8 per cent of what they stood at in 1951.905 In 1954 
exports of podo fell to only 1 per cent of total podo production and would only rise above 2 per cent 
at the end of the decade.906 Surprisingly, while the escalation of the Mau Mau conflict caused 
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production to drop from Nyeri, Nairobi, and Thomson’s Falls forest divisions, this was compensated 
by increased output from mills west of the Rift Valley that were unaffected. Indeed, production from 
the indigenous forest reached its peak during Mau Mau in 1954 and only started to decline in 1957 
(Figure 3-8) because of the knock-on effects of a recession in the world timber trade that followed 
the post-war boom and increased exploitation of the exotic plantations.907 
When Waterer stated in regard to the post-war timber industry up to 1953, that “in the space 
of a very few years … an export trade [has grown] which ranks as one of the major currency-earners 
for the Colony,”908 he may have been trying to put a positive face to the expanded trade of 1951, but 
the reality was that timber exports were not a large earner for the colony (Figure 3-11). The post-
war surge in demand, especially UK demand, allowed many sawmills to continue bad practices in 
their processing of logs into timber. The exports to the UK indicate that at least some of the mills 
were producing to a standard that was acceptable in the UK. However, the reports of poor quality 
shipments and the preference to return to the use of European and North American timbers once 
these became available are indications that the Kenyan mills had failed to make a favourable 
impression on the UK market. This was so because while supplies of indigenous timbers were 
                                                                
907 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1955-1957, 23–26. 
908 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 32. 
 
Figure 3-11. Annual export article value as percentage of total value of exports. Source: Forest Department Annual 
Reports, 1948-1955; Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1955 (Government Printer, Nairobi, 
1957), p.22. Note that a wider definition of timber to include logs, slats, manufactured articles, and railway 
sleepers has been used to produce the timber data in preference to the definition in the Statistical Abstract, which 
only considered logs. 
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plentiful and there was a strong market for these within Kenya and abroad that could apparently 
be satisfied by low-quality produce, there was little incentive to sink large amounts of capital into 
the modernisation of equipment and techniques. Such an attitude was indicative of a wider malaise 
within the Kenya timber industry. Timber brokers and importers in the United Kingdom reported 
that they had seen little commitment from millers in Kenya in regards to developing exports. The 
lack of a proper timber storage yard in Mombasa was taken as evidence “for not taking the export 
trade seriously.”909 The overwhelming focus of the timber exporters was the British market in the 
post-war period,910 a fact that exposed the sawmills in Kenya to the fluctuations in that market with 
only moderate penetration in other markets in Africa and around the Indian Ocean that could 
compensate for slumps. 
Criticism like that offered by the British timber brokers and the slump of 1951 that resulted 
in two sawmill firms going bust and a further four changing hands appear to have woken some of 
the mills to the realisation that reform was needed.911 Timsales reported in 1957 that “very efficient 
mills, very near to the optimum for these circumstances [of exploiting indigenous forests], are 
already operating.”912 These were perhaps the most profitable mills, as the same report considered 
that “profits are meagre for all but the most efficient millers.”913 It seems likely that such efficient 
millers were pulling ahead in the industry, leaving behind those smaller, less professional mills 
more suited to the ad hoc patterns of exploitation associated with the earlier days of colonialism in 
Kenya. Lack of extant financial data concerning the mills hinders assessment of this claim, however 
it seems clear that Timsales itself was evolving into a major player in milling. More than simply an 
association of millers, by 1947 Timsales owned four sawmills and by 1955 it was sufficiently 
capitalised to respond to criticisms of lack of commitment by erecting new warehouses at Mombasa 
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for the proper storage of timber awaiting export.914 By 1957, Timsales was reporting an annual 
turnover of £1.5 million, by contrast it considered the financial position of many of the other mills 
in Kenya to be “little short of disgraceful.”915  
The primary cause of this divide between the larger, progressive sawmill firms and the others 
was the lack of investment into the industry. In the first three decades of colonial forest exploitation 
in Kenya, wealthy settlers like Delamere were able to call upon their assets in Britain to invest in 
small milling operations that would in turn bolster their nascent attempts at farming. The situation 
by the 1950s was very different. Sporadic attempts at exploiting the timber export market had 
largely been unsuccessful; where financial success had been achieved it typically accompanied a 
worsening of the reputation of Kenya timbers as low quality product was dumped on the market. 
At the same time, sustained, large-scale local demand was predicated on the economic development 
of the colony’s African population and secondary industry, which was projected by Timsales to only 
reach a significant level in the 1960s.916 The timber industry in Kenya was therefore very much a 
long-term project. Thus, there was negligible attraction for foreign capital in Kenya’s timber 
industry between 1945 and 1963, a situation reflected in the Timsales’ statement that “by and large, 
there is very little overseas capital at all invested in the timber industry of Kenya, except in the form 
of bank overdrafts.”917  
The lack of capitalisation within the timber industry stood in stark contrast to the large 
amounts of money flowing into both white and African enterprises in the 1950s, as well as the huge 
expansion in financing the Forest Department itself received. Of the forestry fund the department 
accrued during the Second World War, nothing was directly invested into the timber industry 
although mills did indirectly benefit by the building of a more extensive road network into the 
forests and would, of course, ultimately benefit from the increase in plantations of softwoods. 
Henson, of Timsales, argued in a draft press release of 1954 that “the Forest and Timber Industries 
of Kenya may provide the major pattern of economic expansion now so essential to the well being 
of the future of the Colony.”918 His hyperbole was no doubt rejected by most, yet the influx of money 
into forestry indicates that its value to the colony was recognised whereas the importance of the 
other arm of forest development, exploitation, was not. Three years later, Henson had ceased 
talking of forestry and the timber industry as quite so closely connected. Instead, he wrote of what 
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was tantamount to an ideological division between the forester and lumberman that was hindering 
the ability of the Forest Department to assist the industry: 
The high degrees of specialization necessary in forestry make it practically certain that foresters 
lack the industrial qualifications and experience necessary to offer guidance to the industry. The 
most successful foresters remain foresters, just as the most successful lumbermen remain within 
the industry.919   
This was an attitude that though strongly felt in Kenya was not confined to that colony. Comments 
by a delegate of the Timber Trades Federation on his attendance of the Sixth Commonwealth 
Forestry Conference held in Ontario, 1952, that “too long have Foresters and Timber Traders dwelt 
as races apart”920 indicate that the division between forestry and private enterprise was a common 
and long-standing situation.  
As the Forest Department retained a monopoly of control over the timber industry’s raw 
material, the forests, its attitude shaped the success or otherwise of that industry.921 Through its 
system of licenced exploitation the Forest Department regulated the quantity and type of timber 
that could be extracted from its forests and therefore could restrain the profits of the timber 
industry in the name of sustainable yield. When the department stated in its 1950 report that it 
hoped demand for timber would decrease to enable production to fall back into line with the 
“permissible cut”922 it was essentially stating that production, and therefore the potential profits, 
of the sawmills should be held back. The Forest Department’s position was informed by its fear of 
overexploitation. This was a fear that had been very publically aired in the pages of the Empire 
Forestry Review in 1945 and 1946 when R.M. Graham, Assistant Conservator within the 
department, wrote an uncompromising article, complete with detailed statistics to argue his case, 
on how the forests of Kenya were being overexploited.923 Graham’s intention was no doubt to make 
the case for the expansion of forestry efforts in Kenya, but to the potential investor in the timber 
industry such pessimistic accounts can hardly have been reassuring. The department’s utilization 
officer, S.H. Wimbush, unsurprisingly refuted all that Graham argued, and did so very publically by 
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calling Graham’s article a “slur upon forest management in Kenya.”924 Graham was effectively 
implying that Wimbush was failing in his role as liaison and assistant to the timber industry.925 Five 
years later, Graham was acting conservator of the department and it is therefore no surprise that 
the department’s annual report again expressed his concern at overexploitation; again, the reaction 
among potential timber industry investors can hardly have been positive. 
The establishment of the position of utilisation officer in the 1930s has been shown (chapter 
2, section 2.2.2) as an important development as it increased Forest Department engagement with 
the timber industry. Wimbush was transferred on promotion to Nigeria after the Second World War 
with a successor arriving at the end of 1948. The new utilisation officer, R.A.C. Skipper, brought 
experience from his time working in an “important sawmilling post” in a timber company in Burma: 
he was a lumberman not a forester.926 Clearly, then, the Forest Department was aware that it 
needed a man with practical experience of the industry not forestry, and put him in charge of 
improving the handling and care of timber during transit and storage, the creation of timber grading 
rules (appointing two grading inspectors to work under him) and investigating the characteristics 
of Kenya’s timbers pertinent to their use in industry. Publically the department stated that Skipper 
“is a great asset”927 because of the work he was undertaking. Privately the department considered, 
“it must be confessed that Mr. Skipper’s efforts to improve the organisation and technique of sawing 
in the mills throughout the country generally have so far been disappointing.”928 This statement 
appeared to blame Skipper for the lack of development in the timber industry, and displayed no 
awareness of economic conditions that were curtailing investment. The lack of faith in Skipper led 
the department to reject the idea that he be sent to America on a fact-finding mission about the US 
timber industry in favour of W.E.M. Logan, a conservator of forests who received a Commonwealth 
Fund Fellowship for the trip.929  
The choice of Logan represented the department falling back to old ways: Logan followed the 
classic forestry path, being educated at Oxford and then going into a senior position in Kenya 
immediately after the Second World War. Logan went on to become Chief Conservator of Forests in 
Uganda, and so was certainly a very capable officer, yet he had no particular specialism in forest 
exploitation nor experience of working with or for industry. His promotion to Deputy Chief 
Conservator of Forests, Tanganyika, almost immediately after his return from his one-year mission 
to America also meant that the primary means for the dissemination to the timber industry of all 
that he had learnt was his report of 1953.930 How this report was taken and how widely it was read 
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within Kenya’s timber industry is unknown. For those that did read it, Logan’s main point of 
emphasising the extent of mechanisation of American exploitation must have seemed little more 
than a pipe dream to many millers in Kenya although some of his points on efficient mill design may 
have been taken on board.931 All of Logan’s suggestions would have required extensive capital 
investment, yet not a single paragraph within the 121 pages that made up his report mentioned 
finance. The report was a reflection of the approach the Forest Department was, at its core, taking 
toward industry: akin to its experiments with establishing exotic trees within Kenya, the 
department viewed the problems within the industry as technical and saw its role in solving these 
as advisory. 
Skipper resigned in 1953 to move to Uganda.932 His replacement as utilisation officer, L. 
Lowsley, had a background in sawmilling in many countries, thus illustrating that the department 
did continue to recognise the value of employing a liaison with experience of industry. Along with 
Lowsley, the department also continued to employ two timber grading officers whose duty it was 
to ensure the timber produced by the sawmills met the standards defined by the East Africa Timber 
Advisory Board (EATAB).933 Under Lowsley, between late 1955 and 1957 the department also set 
up a sub-committee of EATAB composed of the utilisation officers of the three East African 
territories: Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. EATAB itself had provided a means for executive 
collaboration on matters of timber exploitation, although the comparatively immature state of 
milling in Uganda and Tanganyika meant this functioned more as a way for Kenya to distribute its 
knowledge to the other territories. The utilisation sub-committee extended such co-operation to 
those who had most regular communication with the industry.934 
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Little material survives that allows thorough evaluation of the impact Lowsley, who served 
until his death in 1960, and his colleagues were able to make on the timber industry. However, 
documentation such as that by Henson certainly make it clear that mill efficiency did generally 
improve, albeit this was also because the licences the department was issuing to mills mandated 
improvements.935 In its report of 1954-55 the department very clearly, almost defensively, stated: 
The Department, through its Utilization Officer, has provided all assistance within its power 
toward the improvement of sawmill layout, design, and equipment to the industry.936 
Such a statement was also printed in its 1951-53 report. In doing so, the Forest Department was 
pre-empting and possibly responding to any criticism of the timber industry; any problems in the 
industry, in other words, were laid squarely on the shoulders of the industry itself while the 
department could be congratulated for its assistance in any improvements that were made. In fact, 
the strong market for timber up to 1955 would have allowed those mills equipped to cater for it to 
gradually invest and improve (Figure 3-6), which was probably as significant a motivator for 
investment as the regulatory measures enforced by the department.  
It was only with the 1962 official history of forestry in Kenya that the department spoke 
directly of the issue of undercapitalisation of the timber industry and identified its own policies as 
partly to blame. The department had an inherent fear of over-exploitation of the forests. Intensified 
by the absence of proper enumerations of the forests, the granting of overly generous concessions 
to individuals such as Grogan in its nascent phase of establishment, the rampant exploitation of the 
Second World War and immediate post-war years, and the very patchy distribution of easily 
exploitable trees within the natural forests, such fears were manifest in its insistence on short-term 
licences that rarely exceeded ten years.937 With only limited prospects and an unpredictable local 
and export market, mills operated on a temporary footing, seeing large investments as unnecessary 
and even a risk to short-term profit.   
One option that would have allowed more cost-effective forest exploitation was the more 
extensive use of pit sawing.938 This extraction method relied on large teams of Africans working 
with hand tools to fell trees and process the logs on the spot. Long in use by forestry across the 
world before extensive mechanisation took over, the method was also used in Kenya throughout 
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the colonial period. The department had gradually allowed an apprentice system to develop among 
pitsawyers, who were largely Kikuyu. With the massive need for any grade of timber during the 
Second World War pitsawing became a large-scale and mostly unregulated industry.939 Forest 
Department alarm at this was joined by that of at least one Local Native Council (LNC, which later 
became African District Councils), Meru’s. In 1942 Meru LNC expressed alarm at the exploitation of 
large timber trees by pitsawyers in their district. Such trees were supposedly protected by clan 
elders, yet the LNC complained that elders were routinely being “persuaded by means of a small 
present” from Kikuyu pitsawyers who wanted access to trees in Chuka and Mwimbi (north-east 
Mount Kenya).940 With pitsawyers thus diverting money away from LNCs, over-exploiting the 
forests, and a cause of ethnic division in the Meru case, between 1945 and 1950 the department 
strove to extend regulation to this burgeoning business, and by 1947 it stated that most pitsawyers 
had been disposed of, with those remaining being the most efficient and now operating under 
licences issued by LNCs. This was a process that attracted the full support of the Meru LNC, which 
also set in place a scheme for replanting trees felled by pitsawyers.941  
Significantly, this process allowed pitsawing to become isolated to those areas where no 
sawmills operated, preventing competition between low-cost African enterprise and the mills.942 
Between 1948 and beginning of the Mau Mau rebellion in 1952, the department attempted to 
intensify the regulation of pitsawing by encouraging the formation of pitsawing co-operative 
societies with the aim of raising production standards. With the majority of pitsawyers being 
Kikuyu, Mau Mau meant they were “obviously a menace to the security of the districts in which they 
were working.”943 Pitsawing was therefore all but completely eradicated by the end of 1952 and 
although it did return by the late 1950s, it did not resume anything like the scale it operated at 
before 1952. The draconian regulation inhibiting the growth of this industry was a cause for 
complaint in the Legislative Council by the early 1960s, when S.I. Kathurima of Meru raised the 
issue of an apparent de facto prohibition on pitsawing in Crown forests; a complaint no doubt 
related to the revenue the Meru council had lost with the demise of the industry.944 Even prior to 
1952 pitsawing can be seen as a marginalised industrial activity, kept in its place to protect the 
weak sawmilling sector that supplied colonial needs. In 1952 the department sold 5,130 hoppus 
tons of logs for processing to pitsawyers. Seemingly an impressive figure, this equated to just 2 per 
cent of total timber sales in 1952.945 
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3.3.3 Science versus the lumberman 
The post-war period was one in which the Forest Department reinforced its position of control over 
the exploitation of state forests, expanding its regulatory powers and effectively pursuing a policy 
through licencing that exacerbated the reluctance of investors to look upon Kenya’s sawmill 
industry in a positive light in a period of fluctuations in timber demand. The department’s mistake 
in 1950 that allowed huge quantities of timber to be exported, hurting local supply, must have 
shown it that the timber industry would seek short-term gain at the expense of its own future if it 
was unregulated. Caution, then, characterised the department’s approach. Assistance to the 
industry was increased, although this largely took the form of guidance that, for the smaller sawmill 
firms in particular, was probably lost in the clamour to stay solvent. Essentially, the Forest 
Department needed a timber industry to absorb what it considered to be the sustainable yield of 
the natural forests, but it did not need anything more than this while its exotic plantations of 
softwoods were still immature. This was a point the Hiley report on the future of forestry in Kenya 
explicitly made regarding exports. The immediate goal was not to develop a large export trade as 
Kenya had not the standing timber available to do so; exports would only turn a significant profit 
when the output of the plantations was ready from the mid-1960s onwards.946  
This attitude toward economic development was also present in other national forest policies 
of this period. Neighbouring Uganda, for example, established a forest policy in 1948 that ranked 
the importance of protection forests947 equal with that of production forests and was clear that 
production could only be allowed at a level where it did not threaten the core value of maintaining 
the country’s forest reserves at a set acreage.948 Owing to debate concerning the Hiley report’s 
recommendations for establishing a forest commission and the subsequent outbreak of Mau Mau, 
Kenya did not publish its own official forest policy until 1957. Within it the same attitude as that 
presented in Uganda was present. Its first three articles were all exclusively concerned with 
conservation of the forest estate and protection of water catchment and soil. Only after this were 
articles in which forest product exploitation was highlighted, with the caveat that this must be done 
following the principle of sustained yield.949 This was a principle that the policy did not define, 
perhaps considering it common knowledge, which it certainly was within the sphere of forestry.950 
An actual definition of sustainable yield is given in the handbook of forestry produced by the 
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Uganda Forest Department, but was also suitable for use across the tropical and sub-tropical 
colonies, where it is stated that the yield must be “equal in quantity each year and for all time.”951 A 
sustainable yield was thus a rigid figure that, it follows, could only be derived at once a full inventory 
of forest stock had been made and estimates produced on annual increases in the volume of this 
stock. To Bryan Latham, a representative of the timber industry present at the Sixth Commonwealth 
Forestry Conference (1952) this idealistic view on yield ignored the reality that “a policy of 
sustained yield required as a necessary corollary a policy of sustained and orderly markets, as free 
as possible from Government interference.”952 Indeed, the fifth resolution of the conference called 
for Commonwealth governments to pursue the goal of “orderly marketing” to aid the sustainable 
yield goal.953 Five years later, at the Seventh Commonwealth Forestry Conference, the need to 
support industry was made explicit as it was resolved that sustainable yield needed “to be more 
closely linked to the needs of the wood-using industries as an essential to their long-term 
stability.”954 The Kenya Forest Department made no such link between its policies and the needs of 
the timber industry. 
The Kenya Forest Department did not possess a full inventory of its forests, needed to calculate 
accurate sustainable yield, within the colonial period. A project to accomplish this by using aerial 
photography, which was funded by the Canadian government and conducted by staff of the 
Canadian Department of Forestry, was only begun as Kenya gained independence.955 Throughout 
the 1950s the department did increase the number of working plans it compiled. Mau Mau hindered 
this process but by 1961 approximately a quarter of the colony’s forests were under working plans 
or the simpler planting plans.956 Prior to these being completed, estimates that were essentially 
little more than educated guesses on the quantity of timber in the colony’s forests varied widely. 
Graham’s dire predictions of future timber shortages and overexploitation published in 1945 stated 
that Kenya’s forests would be exhausted of podo after another 400,000 hoppus tons were 
extracted.957 However, Graham knew this was just a guess, later adding “nobody is in a position to 
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say how much millable timber is left in Kenya.”958 His own figure was a vast underestimate; 
between 1946 and 1962 more than one million hoppus tons of podo were felled from Kenya’s 
forests. Another remaining standing timber figure of 4,400,000 hoppus tons of podo and cedar 
calculated for the 1947 Fifth British Empire Forest Conference was considered accurate enough to 
be repeated in other official publications although the department, probably keen to downplay its 
own lack of knowledge and the possibly dismal economic opportunities, never published it in its 
own annual reports.959  
The closest to an actual annual sustainable yield, surely the figures investors would have been 
most interested in, are those given in Henson’s 1957 survey of lumbering. Henson provides a figure 
of 50,000 hoppus tons of podo and cedar available for exploitation in 1960, with an additional 
35,000 hoppus tons of exotic softwoods (mainly cypress) available in the same year.960 He further 
states that local demand for softwoods would be approximately 64,000 hoppus tons in 1960.961 
These figures for both availability and demand were conservative in the extreme. Clearly the 50,000 
tons figure for 1960 was not a yield set by the Forest Department, as in actuality the department 
allowed 151,809 hoppus tons of timber (all species) to be extracted in that year (Figure 3-8).962 
Rather than there appearing to be a clear set of sustainable yield figures being produced by the 
Forest Department, it seems that an entirely ad hoc approach was being taken with the local forest 
officer effectively deciding on the spot how much a licensee could fell. Furthermore, Henson’s low 
figure for local demand was far below any amount that had been felled since 1942. This figure 
appears to have been set deliberately low to mask the great deal of uncertainty that existed on the 
levels of local demand and overall yield; if this had been known publically it would have damaged 
even further the investment appeal of the Kenya timber industry. The department’s attitude to the 
timber industry should very much be seen within this light; it could not allow the industry to 
develop to a large degree when it did not have a clear picture of how mush stock it possessed.   
The attitude is further reflected in incidences of Forest Department interaction with the 
industry. When uncertainty over Kenya’s future caused a reduction in local building in 1960 and a 
subsequent recession in the timber trade the department brought in a 50 per cent rebate on timber 
royalties. This was enough to save the industry but not the smaller, less efficient mills, who went 
into receivership or liquidation while the more modern mills operating under Timsales 
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continued.963 The culling of the less efficient operations was a boon to a department whose focus 
was propagating the proper level and manner of exploitation, not propping up industry. Within this 
light, the heavy involvement of the department in attracting overseas interest, investigation and 
investment in the establishment of a paper mill through the 1950s, a process that was still ongoing 
in 1963 but eventually successful, was not motivated by an interest in developing the already 
existing timber industry.964 Indeed, the project did not assist the existing industry at all, rather it 
was the result of a realisation that the timber industry was not in a position to exploit the increasing 
quantity of small, secondary material that was being produced by the exotic softwood plantations. 
Abandonment of such material would have been wasteful and reflect badly on the department, its 
exploitation was therefore needed; the participation of the existing Kenya sawmills was not. 
Henson of Timsales was thus very much correct in identifying a rift between the technocrats of the 
Forest Department and the businessmen of the sawmills. The Forest Department never wanted a 
large timber industry as the sustainable yield of the forests would not permit it; instead, it was 
working toward fostering a smaller but modern industry that would be able to properly exploit its 
large acreage of exotic plantations for years to come.  
 
 
 Reservation, Re-afforestation, and Re-education 
3.4.1 Taking control 
The Forest Department was the largest beneficiary of the rampant forest exploitation of the early 
1940s, yet Africans within the native reserves were certainly not blind to the potential riches that 
this period of extensive logging revealed. In particular, African elites sought engagement in forestry 
dialogues in an attempt to gain access to forest revenues and products that were being 
appropriated by the sawmilling industry and the government. However, Africans were almost 
totally excluded from the machinery of high-level forest policy; within the Forest Department 
Africans were restricted to only junior positions, and had no representation on the key bodies that 
directed forestry: the Forest Boundary Commission, the Forest Advisory Committee, the Specialist 
Committee on Forestry Research, the East Africa Timber Advisory Board and its Utilisation 
Subcommittee, nor were Africans part of Timsales. From 1946 onwards, Africans attempted to gain 
access to the discourse occurring on the subject of forests through a rather unlikely agent: the 
settler-initiated and backed Kenya Arbor Society (KAS).  
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In 1946 the Local Native Councils (LNCs) of Meru, Machakos, Kamasia, Elgeyo, Central 
Kavirondo, and Digo all joined KAS as corporate members.965 KAS was primarily concerned with 
increasing both rural and urban tree cover, through the Forest Department and by private means, 
within Kenya and preserving standing forests. From this viewpoint, the society no doubt saw its 
new LNC membership and a further 20 African members in 1947 as a result of the ‘enlightenment’ 
of Africans toward forest conservation as it considered “only a few [Africans] are now beginning to 
have an understanding of their right relationship to the land.”966 This statement is ignorant of the 
probable true rationale behind the sudden upsurge in African membership of an organisation that 
had existed since 1934; membership allowed indirect access to, and possibly influence, the colonial 
government’s forest policy. This was possible because KAS’s executive council comprised such 
influential figures as the Conservator of Forests, Director of Agriculture, Regional Planning Adviser, 
and the executive officer of the national parks.967 
Whether this move to gain access to the networks of forestry discourse within the colonial 
state was useful or not for the LNCs is unclear. Indeed, it is not obvious that the LNCs actually sent 
delegates to KAS meetings. Certainly the LNCs felt the chance of engaging with this discourse was 
worth the 10 shilling annual membership fee.968 This, then, was the significance of the moves made 
by the LNCs to engage in forestry through KAS; it represented a wish by African elites within the 
native councils to participate in affairs related to forestry beyond that which was allowed through 
the apparatus of the Native Reserve Forest. This was a wish that was at least partly motivated by 
the revenue potential that forestry represented to LNCs. Figures for 1944, the only year 
represented in Forest Department records, indicate that at least some of the LNCs were making 
healthy profits during the Second World War. Meru LNC received £756 in revenues from its Native 
Reserve Forests (NRFs) in 1944, while Kakamega (Central Kavirondo) received £2,122 and Elgeyo 
£ 4,970.969  
The first of those native councils to join KAS, Meru LNC, is illustrative of the push for 
participation in forestry, particularly in relation to how the council attempted to modify forest 
development for its own benefit. The case of the reservation of Meru’s forests under LNC control 
was, indeed, used as a model and an example for the same process in neighbouring Embu in the 
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1930s.970 Contiguous with the Mount Kenya forest reserve, the western third of what would be later 
become Imenti forest was identified as the possible site of Meru District’s first NRF in the early 
1920s. A modicum of Forest Department interest was stirred when James Rammell, then an 
assistant conservator, conducted a rapid tour of the district from the vantage point of a motor car 
in 1923 and recommended gazettement as NRFs.971 However, the department showed little interest 
in pursuing this matter with much vigour beyond the pages of correspondence. The extent of action 
by the end of 1923 was the cutting of a rough boundary along the forests while royalties from a 
sawmill established there were not finding their way back to the Meru people.972 By early 1928 the 
Forest Ordinance (Meru) 1927 came into force.973 By 1933, the department was controlling 40,514 
acres of forest in Meru, all within Imenti NRF.974 By 1959 the department had extended this to 
96,127 acres in 18 separate NRFs across the entire district; all managed according to the principles 
of scientific forestry and with revenues directed to the LNC.975 
Beginning in 1932 the Forest Department introduced the shamba system into Meru. 
Pitsawyers and forest squatters, both predominantly Kikuyu, were brought in and clashes between 
these immigrant groups and Meru occurred rapidly after their arrival.976  The process continued, 
                                                                
970 Alfonso Peter Castro, ‘Njukiine Forest: Transformation of a Common-Property Resource’, Forest & Conservation 
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971 Apparently never venturing far from the road, Rammell’s preconceived notions were confirmed when he 
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January 1928, AG/23/315, KNA; G.V. Maxwell (Chief Native Commissioner) to Provincial Commissioner (Kikuyu 
Province), 26 October 1927, FOR/1/227, KNA. The Forest Ordinance finally clarified the legal position of the forests. 
Dead and fallen wood could be collected by residents of Meru without hindrance or fee, while all cutting of trees had 
to be done under licence. Simultaneously came the publication of notice 14 under the Native Trust Fund Ordinance, 
which specified that any royalties derived from this new set of rules should be credited to the Meru LNC. The passing 
of the ordinance appears to have been directly related to reports of Meru farmers taking advantage of the Forest 
Department’s negligent attitude by increasing encroachment upon the boundary reaching government by October 
1927 
974 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1933, 22. 
975 ‘Meru Forest Rules 1959 (Legal Notice No. 502)’, 9 November 1959, AG/23/315, KNA; Mutegi and Kyalo, ‘Origins 
of Human-Wildlife Conflicts in Meru District’, 63. Mutegi and Kyalo highlight the popular reaction to this tightening 
of the noose: further incidents of arson in 1927 and knock-on effects for local farmers as the now protected forests 
allowed wildlife to proliferate and destroy crops through the 1930s. 
976 ‘Minutes of Meru Local Native Council Meeting’, 17 March 1937, VQ1/28/35, KNA; ‘Minutes of Meru Local Native 
Council Meeting’, 8 June 1937, VQ1/28/35, KNA. By 1937 the Forest Department did attempt to employ Meru 
squatters in its forests, yet such engagements were unpopular as the department insisted on filling supervisory 
positions from its pool of experienced Kikuyu forest squatters. The Meru, it seems, were unwilling to be supervised 
by Kikuyu while the department insisted this was necessary as the Meru farmers it had managed to recruit did not 
adapt well to the shamba system. They were not, for example, willing to reside within the forests themselves. The 
reasons for this are not clear, although it was perhaps related to the restrictions placed on forest squatters that 
deterred other ethnic groups from taking up Forest Department contracts. As a result, the department brought in a 
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however, and by 1946 divisions within Meru district were demanding that Kikuyu forest squatters 
be made to leave the district after their contracts were up; suggesting that Kikuyu squatters were 
using the shamba system as a conduit for immigration into areas outside the Kikuyu reserves.977 At 
a LNC meeting in mid-1947 this “problem of Kikuyu immigration into Meru District”978 was 
discussed in detail, wherein: 
The Rev. Philip M’Inoti stated that the original trouble began when Government agreed to allow 
Kikuyu squatters in Imenti Forest. When the contract with these Kikuyu squatters terminated 
they settle in Meru District instead of being returned to their own District. These squatters then 
brought their friends and relations who in turn brought their friends and relations until the 
numbers grew to the present proportions.979 
Investigation of the “proportions” of the problem were begun a week earlier when the LNC forest 
committee demanded to know the number of Kikuyu forest squatters in the district and what 
measures had been taken to replace them. “New appointments” to the forest squatter force, it 
maintained, “should only be Meru.”980 The Meru LNC forest committee was satisfied to hear that 
the number of Meru forest squatters had increased from eight in 1944 to 44 in 1946.981 Several 
months later the issue was raised once again as the Forest Department persisted with its policy, 
“until the Meru displayed more energy and skill it was essential to retain a nucleus of 30 Kikuyu, as 
at present.”982 The department clearly had preference for its experienced Kikuyu squatters and so 
placed the goal of efficient plantation establishment over that of local ethnic politics.  
The Meru LNC’s insistence on prioritising Meru farmers for squatter contracts combined with 
the reluctance of those farmers to accept such contracts again became an issue in 1949 when the 
assistant conservator for Meru was forced to issue an “urgent appeal”983 for Meru squatters. One 
hundred squatters were required, yet only 10 had come forward. The assistant conservator’s 
environmental argument that “the forests would degenerate and become barren in 50 years 
time”984 if insufficient labour caused the halting of replanting was unsuccessful as the silence of 
Forest Department records on the matter of Meru forest squatters in the 1950s indicates that none 
were found. The true context for this need for 100 squatter families was the Forest Department’s 
1946 Development Plan. This called for the annual planting of 200 acres of plantations by shamba 
within Meru’s Imenti forest until a target of 5,788 acres had been reached.985 Based on a comparison 
                                                                
larger number of Kikuyu, a policy that exacerbated Meru concerns over Kikuyu immigration into the district through 
the 1940s. 
977 ‘Minutes of Meru Local Native Council Meeting’, 24 July 1946. 
978 ‘Minutes of Meru Local Native Council Meeting’, 16 June 1947, VQ1/28/37, KNA. 
979 ‘Minutes of Meru Local Native Council Meeting’, 11 June 1947, VQ1/28/37, KNA. 
980 Ibid. 
981 Ibid. 
982 ‘Minutes of Meru Local Native Council Meeting’, 23 September 1947, VQ1/28/37, KNA. 
983 ‘Minutes of Meru Local Native Council Meeting’, 22 August 1949, VQ1/28/37, KNA. 
984 Ibid. 
985 D. Davis, ‘Basic Plan for Exotic Softwood Planting in Kenya’ (Nairobi: Kenya Forest Department, September 
1955), 7. 
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of the annual acreage of plantations created between 1945 and 1963 with the annual number of 
squatters employed across the colony in those years, each family, on average, was capable of 
establishing 1.97 acres of forest plantation per year.986 One hundred squatters, then, was the 
number the department needed to meet its annual planting target. By 1954, eight years after the 
Development Plan began, only 212 acres had been established in Imenti, indicating that the 
department had failed to recruit the needed number of squatters and that the Meru LNC had 
continued to resist the employment of Kikuyu squatters in its forests.987 
By resisting the Forest Department over the matter of Kikuyu squatters the Meru LNC was 
taking the initiative on matters of forestry within its jurisdiction. This trend was mirrored with its 
handling of pitsawyers within its forests in 1947, wherein their regulation and registration by the 
Forest Department was supported by the LNC because it was losing revenue from pitsawyers who 
were paying bribes to local elders to illegally work in forests.988 After its early troubles in securing 
the creation of NRFs within Meru in the 1920s, through the 1930s to when reservation of the 
district’s forests was complete in the late 1940s the Forest Department appears to have 
encountered little resistance among the elites of the Meru LNC.  
Across the interwar and post-war period the Forest Department employed the rhetoric of soil 
erosion and the relationship between forests and local climate to bolster its case for the creation of 
NRFs. Despite the effective absence of scientific research in relation to Kenya’s local conditions to 
back these arguments, the Meru LNC appears to have been receptive to them. Hinting at a 
connection between forest reservation and missionary activity, in early 1937 the Rev. Phillipe, 
presumably the same reverend who would talk on the matter of Kikuyu immigration ten years 
later,989 explained to a receptive Meru LNC meeting that trees should be protected because they 
“bring rain”.990 Several months later the LNC minutes recount a talk given by the council’s president, 
District Commissioner V.M. McKeag, in which he argued the issue of “afforestation is intimately 
connected with that of soil erosion.”991 To this statement the council was apparently in unanimous 
agreement and reported they would have no trouble in getting their constituents to plant trees. 
Indeed, the rationale behind the final set of NRFs created within Meru in the colonial period was an 
environmental one. These were the Tharaka Hills, totalling some 36,000 acres scattered across 
southern Meru District. According to the Forest Department these 11 hills were “purely protection 
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forests and of little economic value.”992 It was this protection argument and the threat of 
desertification that the department employed in its debates with the LNC beginning in March 
1944.993 Concerns raised by a lone chief over reservation inhibiting the use of the hills as areas of 
cultivation during periods of famine appear to have been swept aside; the council thereby implicitly 
advocating the forestry argument of the greater good of the forests to the district as a whole rather 
than just the people of Tharaka.994 Opposition was so slight that agreement, demarcation, and the 
cutting and beaconing of boundaries was complete by the time of the publication of the 
department’s 1945-47 report.995 Far from being a case of simple opposition to the encroachment of 
Forest Department control into the native reserves, the Meru LNC’s interactions with the 
department suggest some African elites were able to exploit and benefit from forestry arguments.  
 
3.4.2 Hamlets, Village Greens, and the Engineering of a European Idyll 
Concurrent to the expansion of the influence and interest of African elites over forest areas within 
the native reserves was the Forest Department’s massively expanded post-war planting 
programme. This was a programme designed to meet Kenya’s long-term timber needs and as such 
became the core interest of the department, and it was a programme that was almost wholly 
dependent on the department’s forest squatter system. Discussed here will be the manner in which 
the Forest Department attempted to mould its workforce into a viable, stable entity between 1946 
and 1952 that would ensure the security of its plantations and planting programme for generations 
to come, while the reciprocal interactions between the squatter workforce and the Mau Mau conflict 
will be discussed following this. 
The increased rate of planting in the post-war period would see the size of the forest squatter 
population reaching new heights. By 1952, some 5,500 adult men were contracted as resident 
labourers to the Forest Department (Figure 3-12). If the department’s estimate that every male 
worker, on average, headed a family of five wives and children, the total squatter population was 
approximately 28,000 in 1952 and reached a height, in 1960, of some 42,000 men, women, and 
children.996 This substantial workforce allowed the department to establish larger acreages of 
plantations than it ever had before. The only significant dip in the planting rate in this period came 
during the State of Emergency when all forestry activity in the Aberdares and on Mount Kenya 
ceased because of Mau Mau activities.997 The drop in both the planting rate and squatter population 
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as Kenya transitioned to independence goes unexplained by the department. It was perhaps merely 
a pause as planting programmes came to an end before new programmes began. Excisions of 
several thousand acres from the forest estate were also being considered at this point, including 
one scheme for the resettlement of ex-Forest Department squatters.998 It was natural, therefore, for 
the department to be hesitant in beginning or continuing planting in areas that were possibly to be 
excised. 
Rapid expansion in the size of the forest squatter workforce came immediately after the 
cessation of hostilities in 1945 and by 1947 the department was employing more squatters than it 
ever had before. This great bolstering of the forest squatter population stood in stark contrast to 
the concurrent deprivations being suffered by the squatters residing on the farms of European 
settlers. This immediate post-war period, up until the outbreak of Mau Mau in 1952, was one in 
which the settlers strove to reduce the status of squatters from that of farmers who worked for 90 
days per year to almost pure resident labourers. That is, the squatters on settler farms suffered 
dramatic reductions in the amount of land they could cultivate and the livestock they could keep 
while also being required to work 240 days per year. As Furedi has argued, this was a time of the 
                                                                
998 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1962, i, 2. Areas earmarked for excision were: Muguga forest (3670 
acres), Chieni forest (1522 acres), Mt. Kenya (a) (2446 acres), Mt. Kenya (b) (1404 acres), and Kikuyu Escarpment 
Forest (1888 acres). 
 
Figure 3-12. Annual total acreage of plantations and type of plantation (indigenous tree species and exotic tree 
species) compared to the annual size of the forest squatter population (representing male heads of household 
only). Data on the breakdown of plantation type is unavailable for 1942 and 1962. Sources: Forest Department 
Annual Reports 1925-1963. 
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“gradual impoverishment of the Kikuyu squatters.”999 Heightening political consciousness that 
would eventually erupt in the all-out revolt of Mau Mau, many farm squatters resisted these 
restrictions, peacefully or with violence against property, but many more were simply evicted by 
the farm owners or chose to leave of their own accord.1000  
The Forest Department benefitted from the impoverishment of the settler farm squatters. 
While the department had never struggled to attract Kikuyu into the ranks of its forest squatter 
force, by the late 1940s the potential pool of recruits was expanding daily because of squatters 
leaving settler farms, at precisely the time when the department needed more labour than ever 
before. Kanogo’s evidence indicates that prior to the Second World War Forest Department 
employment was seen by farm squatters as a very attractive alternative; this view was surely 
prevalent among the farm squatters who suffered at the hands of their settler landlords after the 
war.1001 In at least one documented case after the war, Kikuyu farm squatters were becoming forest 
squatters, resulting in complaints from a settler in Eldoret, Uasin Gishu, that he was unable to get 
enough labour for his farm.1002 The department, then, could continue to pick only those Kikuyu 
which it considered to be the best workers without any hindrance on the rate of recruitment.  
The Forest Department, of course, also imposed restrictions on its squatters. Indeed, as was 
demonstrated in chapter 2, it sometimes led the way in curtailing livestock ownership within the 
forests. Further appeasement of settler attitudes came after 1945 when the Forest Department 
agreed to allow its squatters, now usually referred to by the settlers preferred term of ‘resident 
labourers’, to be subject to resolutions passed by District Councils.1003 This came at a time when 
certain groups of forest squatters, particularly those in Elburgon, Uasin Gishu, and Mount Elgon 
were raising considerable concern within the Labour Department and settler associations because 
of their alleged ability to cultivate and engage in numerous enterprises apparently with virtually 
no supervision from the Forest Department. Indeed, Furedi goes as far as to argue that these forest 
communities were centres of political subversion.1004 In part, this claim is supported. For example, 
the Forest Department clearly had significant issues with the level of forest crimes perpetrated by 
its squatters in Elburgon through the 1930s.1005 As shown in chapter 2, however, across Uasin Gishu 
there was a great deal of settler resentment of the Forest Department and its squatters that led to 
exaggerated statements on the criminality of the forest squatters. The extension of the minimum of 
240 labour days per year to the forest squatters should therefore probably be seen as both a 
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concession to settlers and others in government and also a partial realisation by the Forest 
Department that it needed to do more to control its resident labour force. This was done not 
without protest from forest officers who realised the importance of successful cultivation by the 
squatters as a foundation of the system, yet by 1948 the 240 days rule was being enforced and 
achieved almost without exception across the department’s forests.1006 The squatters apparently 
accepted these limitations of forest life and did not choose to leave Forest Department employment 
as they had done the settler farms. The ultimate reason behind this acceptance was probably a 
factor repeatedly highlighted by the department in its defence of the forest squatter system: 
There is one fundamental difference between the requirements of the [European settler] farmer 
and Forester. The farmer requires the minimum of native cultivation on his land and the Forester 
requires the maximum…1007  
As cultivation was a necessary precursor to tree planting within the shamba system, the department 
did not view squatter cultivation as the evil that settlers did. Kanogo’s oral testimony indicates that 
for some at least forest squatting was a means to illicitly cultivate acreages beyond those actually 
prescribed by the Forest Department; a point supported by Furedi.1008 If the increased labour days 
mandated after the war did have a negative effect on forest squatter recruitment or retention this 
is not reflected in the statistics or statements published by the Forest Department. Rather, the 
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Figure 3-13. A woman tends her crops within a shamba plantation of pine trees, c.1952, at Kinangop, southern 
Aberdare Mountains. Copyright and reproduced with permission of Commonwealth Forestry Association. Source: 
H.M. Glover, ‘Soil Conservation In Parts Of Africa And The Middle East: Part I (Continued)’, Empire Forestry Review 
33, no. 1 (1954): 39–44.   
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department was extremely keen in the post-war period to build on its burgeoning pre-war efforts 
to engineer a contented, multi-generational forest workforce. 
In 1948 the Forest Department began its forest squatter development programme in earnest. 
This programme was in keeping with rising awareness of the need to increase welfare provision 
and foster communal spirit as an element of development, not least by senior members of the 
Agricultural Department.1009 Although it had always hinted at its goal to create a loyal forest 
community of workers it was only after 1948 that this became an explicit element of policy. This 
was a goal that strikingly reflected the European roots of forestry. The department presented its 
vision in its 1948-50 report: 
There will be villages with shops and a village green, a church and a school. Cottages and 
tradesmen will be grouped together. Roads will connect these centres and hamlets and cottages 
will be scattered along these roads. The population will be one of skilled forest workers living in 
and on the forest and handing on the trade from father to son. Such, briefly, is the build-up which 
the Department has in view for the Forest Estate of Kenya.1010 
The department dreamt of a rural idyll, a recreation of the English countryside but with the long-
term focus on forestry found in Germany or France.1011 This was but part, albeit a core element, of 
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1948-
50 
1951-
53 
1954-
55 
1955-
57 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 Total 
Quarters/housing * 10 32 36 19 9 
 
44 72 
 
222 
Schools 11 21 5 13 1 9 9 11 4 84 
Dispensaries 8 4 
    
5 5 8 30 
Shops 8 35 19 51 1 
 
25 26 
 
165 
Water 
schemes/sanitation 
1 3 3 25  
 
25 19 8 84 
Other + 7 28 8 5 
  
4 16 
 
68 
* Quarters and housing refers to permanent accommodation for school teachers and other staff, most notably 
the African Village Managers and their assistants. 
+ Market stalls, milk distribution centres, produce stores, slaughter house/blocks, sports grounds, and 
community halls 
 
Table 3-2. Buildings constructed under the Forest Department’s African welfare schemes. Sources: Forest 
Department Annual and Triannual Reports, 1948-1962. 
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the larger dream espoused by forestry across the empire: forestry could be a large, self-sustaining 
industry supporting not only direct forest workers but numerous indirect industries and their 
workers and craftsmen who processed the products of sustainable, perpetually managed forests. 
As forestry students learnt from Wilhelm Schlich’s tome on forestry, the model was Germany, 
where forestry was claimed to have supported not just a large, forest-dwelling workforce but the 
livelihoods of 12 per cent of the population of the entire country in the early twentieth century.1012 
The Kenyan Forest Department’s possession of a large workforce resident in the forests, which was 
unique in scale in British Africa, and apparent ability to expand this workforce at will must have 
played strongly into this dream, suggesting that in Kenya at least it might be possible to achieve. 
This partly explains why the department so strongly defended its shamba system from what it saw 
as meddling by settlers and government: shamba was not just cost-effective, it was a key element 
in achieving a larger forestry goal. 
Prior to 1948 the Forest Department took very little action in terms of the direction of capital 
or construction of facilities to assist the welfare of its forest squatters. Significantly, however, and 
in contrast to many European settlers, the department did not resist initiatives taken by the 
squatters themselves, particularly in regard to the construction of schools. The extent of active 
assistance was, as admitted by the department, the provision of cleared land for schools or 
shops.1013 Kanogo’s evidence suggests that squatting with the Forest Department before the 1940s 
was already seen by some Kikuyu squatters residing on settler farms as a means to access the 
education denied to them by settlers and the colonial government.1014 Furedi also argues that from 
the 1930s onwards the economic opportunities that forest squatting offered allowed squatters in 
Elburgon to spearhead the independent schools movement in that area.1015 Resistance by colonial 
forces to African education, especially the independent schools movement that was pioneered by 
Kikuyu and taught a syllabus more aligned with the political aspirations of Kikuyu elites than the 
practical skills preferred by the mission schools, was born of the racially motivated protectionist 
approach taken by the British to many issues in Kenya.1016 Following the Second World War, the 
more interventionist and formalised approach taken to African welfare and development within 
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doi:10.1111/j.1540-6563.1998.tb01395.x. ‘Practical skills’ is here used to suggest the teaching of manual skills that 
in the racist considerations of the missions were deemed more suited to life in rural Africa, for example 
woodworking and farming. For discussion of the wider debate within the empire on the course of African education 
see Walter Schicho, ‘“Keystone of Progress” and Mise En Valeur D’ensemble: British and French Colonial Discourses 
on Education for Development in the Interwar Period’, in Developing Africa: Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-
Century Colonialism, ed. Joseph M. Hodge, Gerald Hödl, and Martina Kopf (Manchester University Press, 2014), 222–
50. 
240   Reservation, Re-afforestation, and Re-education 
Kenya was clearly reflected in the new attitude to education. With the 1948 Ten-Year Plan for the 
Development of African Education and the 1949 report of the Beecher Committee into African 
education in Kenya, the extension of primary, and to a much lesser extent secondary, education to 
Africans became clear government policy because of the government’s practical realisation that it 
must take control of education from the burgeoning independent schools movement.1017  
It was within this context of increasing government intervention into welfare and specifically 
African education that the Forest Department launched its own welfare programme, which was also 
very heavily focused on education.1018 This was a programme in which the department took direct 
control of the direction of development and oversaw the building of shops, dispensaries, 
community halls, maize storage facilities, water and sanitation systems, and sports facilities, but by 
the early 1950s the department was publically stating that the building of schools was the “first 
consideration.”1019 This was an operation overseen by two dedicated officers first appointed in 
1948, a reflection of the budget expansion the department experienced after the war. Initially styled 
as Welfare Officers, from 1951 onwards these became Forest Officers (African Affairs). These 
officers worked closely with the Commissioner for Social Welfare and the Education Department 
as well as the newly created position of African Village Managers, which were intended to bridge 
the gap between the forest squatter villages and District Commissioners and were being installed 
in all forest villages by 1953.1020  
The African Affairs officers’ ultimate responsibility was the allocation of funds from the 
department’s African Trust Fund. The government’s ten-year education plan of 1948 established 
the principle that primary education should be paid for by Africans themselves, hence the majority 
of primary schools in the African reserves being built with Local Native Council funds from the late 
1940s onwards.1021 The Forest Department also followed this principle and applied it to its entire 
welfare programme. Thus, the department’s African Trust Fund, which stood at £15,315 in January 
1948, was generated entirely by a tax placed on all maize produced by forest squatters and 
administered by the Maize Controller. By the early 1950s, the rents the department charged to 
                                                                
1017 Anderson, The Struggle for the School, 33, 39, 128; Education Department Annual Report 1949 (Government 
Printer, Nairobi, 1951), 5; Education Department Annual Report 1950 (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1951), 4. 
1018 The discussion of Forest Department African welfare presented here is confined to the Forest Divisions 
contained within Central, Rift Valley, and Nyanza Provinces: Nairobi, Nyeri, Thomson’s Falls, Londiani, Elburgon, 
Eldoret, Kitale, and Nyanza. As the Forest Department employed only a small number of casual labourers, and no 
forest squatters, in Coast Province, the Masai Extra-Provincial District, or the extra-provincial districts of northern 
Kenya there were virtually no forest welfare programmes operating in those areas. 
1019 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 41, 44. In a further indication of the department’s 
goal of creating true German-style forest communities from its squatters, the same report envisaged the building of 
industrial training schools that would teach not only those skills found in mission schools – carpentry, masonry, and 
agriculture – but would have a special emphasis on woodsman’s crafts with the overall goal of developing a 
“woodman artisan class.” There is no evidence from Forest Department records that this suggestion was pursued 
any further. 
1020 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1948-1950, 36; Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 
1951-1953, 41–42; Education Department Annual Report 1952 (Government Printer, Nairobi, 1953), 28. 
1021 1949 Education Department Report, 5; 1950 Education Department Report. 
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shops in the forest reserves were being added to this fund, as were levies on potatoes, vegetables, 
and other produce being grown by the forest squatters.1022  
A rough comparison of the Forest Department’s spending on education and that of the Local 
Native Councils in Central Province, where the majority of the Kikuyu population from which the 
forest squatters were drawn can be made. In 1949 the Education Department estimated that LNCs 
in Central Province spent a combined £64,855 on education. With a total African population of 
750,000 (also an imprecise figure) in that province according to the 1948 Census of Kenya, this puts 
the per person LNC spending on education in Central Province at £0.08. In 1950 (a figure for 1949 
is unavailable) the Forest Department spent £6,087 on welfare in total. Based on figures provided 
for that year it appears that approximately 42 per cent of this was devoted to schools. With an 
estimated total forest squatter population of 24,012 in 1950, the department was spending £0.10 
per person on education. Although the various estimations in these figures preclude a definitive 
conclusion, it would appear that the Forest Department was at least displaying a commitment in 
financial terms to education that was on parity with that of the LNCs in Central Province.1023 The 
contribution of the Forest Department’s schools in the high rate of primary school enrolment in 
Central, Rift Valley, and Western Provinces by independence should be recognised in this 
respect.1024  
The Forest Department reported little opposition from its squatters to the taxes on their 
produce, with the forest squatters largely supporting the welfare programme. Particular support 
was apparently received from women, “who have proved receptive to new ideas and eager to profit 
by the instruction given them”1025 in terms of postnatal care and in handicrafts that provided 
further revenue streams. Such support is hardly surprising: self-help (Swahili: harambee) grew 
dramatically during the inter-war period and became the principle means by which thousands of 
schools and other welfare initiatives across the colony were established independently of colonial 
control as Africans sought the keys that would give them access to a modern world free of the 
disenfranchising policies of colonial rule.1026 The key difference was that this was development on 
Forest Department terms. Government control of the independent schools movement failed partly 
because it feared teaching Africans the skills beyond the rudimentary for a stable, rural life. This 
failure would ultimately lead to the draconian measure of closing down the independent schools 
                                                                
1022 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1948-1950, 36; Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 
1951-1953, 42. 
1023 The forest squatter population figure for 1950 is based on the department’s own estimate that each male forest 
squatter was accompanied by five women and children. Figures come from 1949 Education Department Report, 30; 
Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1948-1950, 36. 
1024 Donald Rothchild, ‘Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 7, no. 4 (1969): 692. Using 
data gleaned from a 1965 Kenya Education Commission report, Rothchild reported that 94 per cent of 7-13 year-
olds in Central Province were in primary education by 1964. The figures for Western Province were 70.6 per cent 
and for Rift Valley Province 38.6 per cent. The large presence of forestry in Rift Valley Province may indicate that 
forest village schools played a particularly significant role in the provision of primary education in that province.  
1025 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 42. 
1026 Anderson, The Struggle for the School, 136–38. 
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movement in 1953 because of further fear of its involvement with Mau Mau recruitment, while 
settler opposition to schooling forced schools operating on their farms to go underground after the 
Second World War.1027 By contrast, the forest squatter schools flourished. As shown in Sandgren’s 
research, access to education in the 1950s was at the heart of the creation of the first generation of 
postcolonial African elites.1028 Yet, within this clamour for modernisation the Forest Department 
was not about to hand over the keys to the forests. Forestry may have been intrinsically modern, 
embracing science and framing itself as an essential cog in the machinery of the capitalist, industrial 
machine, but it was (as has been seen) mistrustful of capital and private enterprise. Its model for 
social and economic development in shamba was to look to Europe’s idealised past in an attempt to 
complement sustainable exploitation of the forests with a sustainable workforce. This workforce 
was intended to remain locked in a stage of economic development that would make it dependent 
on the forests and the Forest Department.1029 Therefore, prior to Mau Mau, the Forest Department’s 
schools were restricted to a maximum of standard six education: below the standard required for 
entrance to a secondary school outside the forest reserves.1030 Yet, the Forest Department appears 
to have been successful in providing the educational opportunities that its squatters wanted; a 
process that was undoubtedly eased by the department’s long experience with partially pacifying 
politics within its forest squatter villages and in the “very close bond” that it reported as existing 
between itself and its workers in its 1954-55 report, coupled with its promises of impending further 
expansion of education in the forests to the higher grades, and the underlying productivity that 
forest cultivation offered over that found on many settler farms.1031 
 
                                                                
1027 Mwiria, ‘Education for Subordination’, 268–73; Anderson, The Struggle for the School, 128. 
1028 David P. Sandgren, Mau Mau’s Children: The Making of Kenya’s Postcolonial Elite (University of Wisconsin Pres, 
2012). 
1029 Notably, this element of dependence may have been an intrinsic feature of historic shamba/taungya systems. 
Raymond Bryant has shown that in colonial Burma, the Forest Department there forced taungya systems onto the 
local Karen people in the nineteenth century to grow teak, causing multiple incidents of protest. Just as these people 
had accepted the system and become dependent on it in the early twentieth century the British abandoned it (as it 
was no longer required economically since access to larger forests of teak had opened up). Bryant, ‘The Rise and 
Fall of Taungya Forestry’, 20. I have argued elsewhere that giving forest cultivators greater involvement and 
investment in the system, through guaranteed land rights and the growing of tree crops that are of worth to the 
cultivator not just the forester and his customers are probably important functions of creating a long-term, stable 
shamba-style system. Fanstone, ‘Shamba Forestry in Colonial Kenya: Colonial Dominance or African Opportunity?’   
1030 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 44. A summary of the education structure 
established in Kenya by the Beecher Report in 1950 can be found in Anderson, The Struggle for the School, 168–70. 
In sum, primary grades ran from standard 1 to 4, followed by intermediate at standard 5 to 8, at which point 
candidates could sit the Kenya African Preliminary Examination that would allow them to enter secondary school. 
1031 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1954-1955, 31. Furedi has briefly argued that the advantages of 
holding a forest squatter contract were directly linked to the greater productivity of farming on forest land and the 
associated developmental opportunities that this and other forest enterprises (such as charcoal burning) brought, 
which were particularly marked in Elburgon: Furedi, Mau Mau War in Perspective, 52.  
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3.4.3 Disruption, eviction, and concentration: shamba during Mau Mau1032  
As the smouldering tensions over land and the lack of economic and political opportunities in the 
reserves of Central Province and on the European farms began to erupt in increasing acts of 
violence through 1952, precipitating the official recognition of the Mau Mau uprising with the 
Declaration of Emergency in late October, the Forest Department increasingly found its policies and 
operations being drawn into the conflagration. As shown in section 3.3.2, the Mau Mau conflict 
actually had little effect on the overall exploitation of Kenya’s forests. Conversely, in other areas 
this was not the case. Several European forest officers were called up to serve in the military, 
although precise numbers are unclear.1033 At least during the early stages in the development of the 
government’s counter-insurgency campaign, when British forces lacked expertise particularly in 
small-scale forest fighting and tracking, European forest officers were called upon to participate in 
raids and tracking operations because of their obvious familiarity with the area and terrain.1034 
Overall, however, the Forest Department took a back seat in the British campaign despite its forest 
knowledge. This was likely because foresters’ knowledge was not actually suited to military 
operations; it was the European officers of the Game Department and National Parks Department, 
and their African trackers, who found their skillset of hunting and tracking in high demand during 
the conflict, not those of the Forest Department.1035 There is a hint that this was also the case with 
the Forest Department’s Forest Guards, with an account by one guard, Sigila arap Cheptale, who 
was stationed at Lari Forest Station shortly after the infamous massacre there in March 1953, 
emphasizing that “I left the Mau Mau alone and only guarded the forest.”1036 Indeed, Cheptale 
further reveals that Forest Department Land Rovers would often lead columns of British soldiers 
into the forest but that Cheptale would warn Mau Mau fighters ahead, out of fear for his own life, 
by waving a white handkerchief.1037 
Cheptale’s attitude of neutrality, of prioritising his duty as a Forest Guard to the forest while 
civil and colonial war waged around him, is also reflected on a general level by the Forest 
Department. This commitment to forestry was evident in the Chief Conservator of Forests closing 
statement of the 1954-55 departmental report in which he described how his staff “overcame every 
                                                                
1032 Largely owing to practical reasons of time and the identification of documents in the Kenya National Archives, 
the following analysis of the shamba system and Mau Mau should very much be considered as an introductory 
investigation that seeks to establish the major themes of this interaction through an examination of documents that 
primarily deal with Rift Valley Province. 
1033 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 47. 
1034 Anthony Clayton, Counter-Insurgency in Kenya: A Study of Military Operations against Mau Mau, Transafrica 
Historical Papers 4 (Transafrica Publishers, 1976), 22; Ian Parker, The Last Colonial Regiment: The History of the 
Kenya Regiment (T.F.) (Kinloss: Librario Publishing, 2009), 344. 
1035 Timothy J. Stapleton, Warfare and Tracking in Africa, 1952–1990 (Routledge, 2015), 44–53. 
1036 Sigila arap Cheptale, ‘The Adventures of a Forest Guard’, Old Africa, May 2007, 6. 
1037 Ibid. Cheptale, a Kipsigis not Kikuyu, recounts a tale that probably contains a degree of exaggeration out of his 
clear concern to paint himself as a neutral party during the Emergency. Forest Department records do not illuminate 
the issue of the role of its European officers or Forest Guards in the conflict. However, as Forest Guards were armed 
with rifles, in Cheptale’s case a powerful elephant gun, it does seem likely that they may have been called upon in 
emergency situations to aid British or KAR soldiers, settlers, and of course the Forest Department’s own squatter 
workforce in defence against attack. 
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difficulty and carried on the work of forestry cheerfully and with great fortitude in spite of every 
possible obstruction” during the period of Emergency.1038 For the Forest Department, Mau Mau 
represented not just a physical threat to the lives of its personnel but a threat to the very forest 
policy of plantation establishment that the department had strived to develop for decades. As a 
testament to the determination of the department’s personnel to continue working as normal, while 
the fall in annual acreage of plantation established was large between 1951 and 1953, at 24 per 
cent, the figure for 1953 of 6,882 acres was larger than anything that had been achieved on an 
annual basis before 1948. After 1953 the acreage once again started to increase (Figure 3-12). The 
real danger in Mau Mau to the department was that it would force the government to end the system 
of squatting that allowed it to operate its plantation policy. Squatting, principally on the settler 
farms but also in the forests, was a system that had allowed dissent against colonial rule to grow. 
While the government never seriously considered ending the squatting or resident labour system, 
it was certainly something that some European farmers were pressuring for. In 1953, for example, 
the Nakura County Council proposed the “forest squatter system be done away with.”1039 As this 
section will show, it was defence of forest squatting, of the shamba system, that would colour the 
department’s eagerness to reform the system and proactively engage in evictions and the 
concentration of forest villages. 
Shortly after European farmers in the Rift Valley began to evict Kikuyu squatters from their 
land in November 1952 the Forest Department, or rather some forest officers, began to use the 
same tactic. Ironically, the first to go were those Kikuyu forest squatters furthest from the areas of 
trouble in Central Province. These were the forest squatters on Mount Elgon, bordering Uganda. 
These squatters were repatriated using a “movement by driblets” approach because of the logistical 
problems of moving the entire squatter force at one time. For the local District Commissioner the 
uncertainty that this policy introduced into the daily lives of the squatters, who were never told 
when they were to be moved, had benefits as a form of “psychological warfare” which might induce 
the squatters to relinquish useful intelligence about Mau Mau.1040 It was extremely doubtful that 
these squatters, who lived more than 300km from Central Province, had extensive knowledge of 
Mau Mau. The Forest Department was probably little interested in the slight possibility of Mau Mau 
among its squatters on Mount Elgon and their eviction seems more connected with attracting other 
ethnic groups, possibly Elgonyi, to diversify shamba but who refused to work alongside Kikuyu, 
especially as Mau Mau intensified.1041 This highlights the other significant theme of how the Forest 
Department operated during Mau Mau: while it was engaged in defending its operations from 
                                                                
1038 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1954-1955, 36. 
1039 ‘Minutes of Provincial Commissioners Meeting of 30 Sept 1953 and 1 Oct 1953’, 1953, DC/KMGA/1/5/2, KNA. 
1040 District Commissioner (Kitale) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 10 December 1952, 
PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1041 E.J. Honorè (Divisional Forest Officer, Eldoret) to R.R. Waterer (Conservator of Forests), 23 July 1951, 
DC/KMGA/1/5/2, KNA; E.J. Honorè (Divisional Forest Officer (Eldoret) to District Commissioner (North Nyanza), 
29 December 1950, DC/KMGA/1/5/2, KNA; District Commissioner (Kitale) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley 
Province), 27 May 1954, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
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attack by insurgents and European critics, it was also using emergency powers to tackle old 
problems.1042  
During the final month of 1952 a general policy began to emerge in regards to the handling of 
the Forest Department’s squatters. Cavendish-Bentinck, Member for Agriculture and Natural 
Resources, envisaged a limited programme of “repatriating a few of the worst characters [forest 
squatters] whom the forest officers thought they should be rid of.”1043 Concurrently, the Forest 
Department was putting forward its own policy for the eviction not of “a few” squatters but for 
between 20 and 25 per cent of its entire resident labour workforce. As Honorè, the Conservator of 
Forests West of the Rift, explained, “the individuals to go would be the less satisfactory workers and 
those upon whom any suspicion has fallen” but that these evictions would be in addition to “any 
batches or individuals who are removed following conviction for being actively connected with any 
subversive activities.”1044 As the Provincial Commissioner for Rift Valley Province highlighted, 
“Few, if any, of those discharged would be known to be Mau Mau adherents.”1045 Statistics provided 
in response to a House of Commons question regarding evictions up to 23 December 1952 in Kenya 
highlight this issue further. The Forest Department led the way in evictions outside of Central 
Province by evicting 300 men, women, and children from Njoro Forest in Nakura District; by 
contrast, only one settler had evicted his squatters in Nakura by that time. Of the 300, only 13 were 
charged with Mau Mau offences; the rest were victims of the department’s pruning of its squatter 
force.1046 While the evictions allowed the Forest Department to rapidly rid itself of poor workers, 
Cavendish-Bentinck also admitted that its proposals for further large-scale evictions of forest 
squatters were partly because it wished to comply with the wishes of District Councils in settler 
areas.1047 The Forest Department was now being shrewd enough in its dealings with the settlers to 
understand that it needed to sacrifice a substantial part of its squatter workforce that it considered 
most likely to have Mau Mau sympathies in order to protect the shamba system as a whole. If large 
                                                                
1042 The state was particularly empowered in its evictions of squatters from the forests and settler land, and in its 
concentration of squatters in villages by Defence Regulations supplemented by CONF.0/12/10C106 of 12 December 
1952, which allowed the movements of squatters to be restricted, Government Notices 189 and 192 of 1953, which 
allowed District Officers to move suspect persons and the Governor to order any Kikuyu moved, respectively, and 
the Emergency (Forest Area Resident Labourers) Regulation 1953 (Government Notice 32 of 1953) which allowed 
District Officers, Labour Officers or special magistrates to compel forest squatters to concentrate into villages 
regardless of Forest Department approval.  
1043 Chief Native Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 15 December 1952, 
PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1044 E.J. Honorè (Conservator of Forests, West of Rift) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 16 
December 1952, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1045 Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province) to Provincial Commissioner (Central Province), 23 December 
1952, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1046 C.M. Johnston (Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province) to Chief Native Commissioner, 23 December 
1952, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. The same response outlines that approximately 4,324 men, women, and children 
were evicted from European settler farms that fell under the remit of the Aberdares District Council. 17 families 
were evicted from the farm of Michael Blundell, the only settler in Nakura to have done so at this point.  
1047 ‘Note of a Meeting Held in the Secretariat on Wednesday 31st December, 1952 between Deputy Chief Secretary, 
Member for Agricultural and Natural Resources, Member for Health, Lands and Local Government, Chief Native 
Commissioner, Provincial Commissioner (Central Province), Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), Native 
Courts Officer, and Commissioner Local Government.’, 31 December 1952, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
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numbers of Mau Mau adherents had been discovered within the ranks of the forests squatters it 
would have added significantly to calls for the entire system to be scrapped. 
While the Forest Department’s main concern was reducing further criticism of its shamba 
system, Cavendish-Bentinck and the Provisional Commissioners of Rift Valley Province and Central 
Province expressed alarm at the practicalities and dangers of trying to resettle so many forest 
squatters in the native reserves. Cavendish-Bentinck went so far as to argue it “would be an 
injustice to the Kikuyu to carry out this policy [of large-scale evictions].”1048 By March 1953 he was 
reiterating the point by spelling out the clear economic dangers of decimating the key workforce of 
the forests and the farms.1049 In agreement with the PCs on 31 December 1952, he therefore 
ordered the Forest Department to primarily direct its energies into the concentration of its 
squatters into easily controllable and defendable villages; the same policy that was being urged on 
settler farms.1050 Settlers were demanding that the Forest Department take action over its forest 
squatters, and anticipating this Cavendish-Bentinck also saw this process as important in 
improving relations with the settlers, stating that as,1051  
… it was frequently alleged that Forest squatters did little work and were insufficiently controlled, 
and in order to exercise control more effectively the forest squatters were now being grouped 
into villages in the forest glades…1052  
The use of villagization did not mean an end to the reduction in size of the forest squatter force. 
Indeed despite Cavendish-Bentinck’s reservations it decreased not by a quarter but by 36 per cent 
by the end of 1953, with a total 43 per cent reduction between late 1952 and the end of 1954 (where 
after the number of squatters increased).1053  
Villagization, usually referred to in documents as concentration, was a process that the 
department had actually begun in early December 1952 although progress was determined more 
by the attitudes of individual forest officers to the proposal than central departmental policy.1054 At 
                                                                
1048 Ibid. 
1049 ‘F.W. Cavendish-Bentinck (Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources) to Chairman of Board of Agriculture, 
Members and Executive Committee of the Board of Agriculture, Chairman of Production Committee and Sub-
Committees, Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners, Senior Labour Officers and Labour Officers, and 
European Elected Members’, 11 March 1953, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1050 ‘Note of a Meeting Held in the Secretariat on Wednesday 31st December, 1952 between Deputy Chief Secretary, 
Member for Agricultural and Natural Resources, Member for Health, Lands and Local Government, Chief Native 
Commissioner, Provincial Commissioner (Central Province), Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), Native 
Courts Officer, and Commissioner Local Government.’ 
1051 ‘Njoro Settlers Association. Notes for Interview by President with Provincial Commissioner’, 16 January 1953, 
PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1052 ‘Note of a Meeting Held in the Secretariat on Wednesday 31st December, 1952 between Deputy Chief Secretary, 
Member for Agricultural and Natural Resources, Member for Health, Lands and Local Government, Chief Native 
Commissioner, Provincial Commissioner (Central Province), Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), Native 
Courts Officer, and Commissioner Local Government.’ 
1053 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953; Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 
1954-1955. 
1054 Within Uasin Gishu the District Commissioner complained of the slow progress the local forest officer was 
making with the concentration of his squatters. By contrast, the forest officer in Laikipia proceeded much more 
quickly. District Commissioner (Uasin Gishu) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 8 December 1952, 
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Bahati Forest Reserve, between Nakura and Thomson’s Falls, some 50 km west of the Mau Mau 
strongholds within the forests of the Aberdares, the forest officer’s concern with building proper 
housing and welfare facilities caused considerable delay, and frustration for the local DC, in the 
establishment of the new concentrated forest squatter village.1055 Bahati has been identified by 
Furedi as one of the forest sites with deep anti-government and anti-settler sentiment. Within this 
context of Bahati as a possible site for Mau Mau recruitment the forest officer’s interest in welfare 
should be seen as more than just concern for his squatters.1056 Through welfare the department 
was perhaps attempting to address the issue of ill-discipline within its forests and attempting to 
generate loyalty within its workforce. Nevertheless, security concerns overrode those of the Forest 
Department’s grander plans for the development of its idealized forest community, with the PC 
politely ordering the forest officer to ignore welfare and concentrate as soon as possible on 30 
December 1952.1057 
The first stage of the concentration process was to screen the forest squatters for Mau Mau 
oath-taking and so determine who could be trusted to live in the newly formed and barricaded 
villages. Like the screening process undertaken in much of the Rift Valley and the settled areas, this 
was conducted by Europeans, specifically the forest officers themselves, rather than the infamous 
Home Guard screening teams.1058 The concentration of a village in South Kinangop illustrates at 
least one of the procedures employed: the forest officer classified each squatter on a scale from A 
to D, with those falling within A or B considered loyal, the allegiance of those in class C being largely 
unknown although they were not considered dangerous, and those in class D being labelled 
“disaffected” and therefore possibly Mau Mau. Only those in class D were evicted and sent to a 
transit camp. In South Kinangop the department employed 190 families of Kikuyu forest squatters, 
of which the forest officer determined 13 per cent fell within the “very loyal” classification of A 
while only 4 per cent were considered class D; the forest officer argued, “The worst that can be said 
of the vast majority of the rest is that they are undecided.”1059 By this point in April 1953 the Forest 
                                                                
PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA; District Commissioner (Laikipia) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 16 
December 1952, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA.  
1055 District Commissioner (Nakura) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 29 December 1952, 
PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1056 Furedi, Mau Mau War in Perspective, 63. 
1057 C.M. Johnston (Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province) to Divisional Forest Officer (Thomson’s Falls 
Division), 30 December 1952, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1058 S.S. Gill (for Conservator of Forests, East of Rift) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 22 April 
1953, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA; Greet Kershaw, Mau Mau from below (James Currey, 1997), 325–27; Daniel Branch, 
Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization, 111 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 82. It is unclear whether forest squatters were subjected to periodic or random screening by Home 
Guard units after the initial screening and villagization process. 
1059 S.S. Gill (for Conservator of Forests, East of Rift) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 22 April 
1953. The precise definitions of the classifications used at South Kinangop were:   
"A. Those who were believed to be as loyal as any Kikuyus are and who should be kept at the station where they 
would be extremely useful to Government. 
B. Those who were thought to be loyal and who were wanted on the station to do necessary work. 
C. Those about whom nothing was known for certain, either for or against them. They also should remain to work. 
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Department was following Cavendish-Bentinck’s orders to attempt to retain as many workers as 
possible, an attitude that was no doubt strengthened until the end of the Emergency by the 
department’s inability to attract other ethnic groups into its workforce.1060 
The retention of Kikuyu labour was not unique to the Forest Department. While many settlers 
became paranoid with fear concerning the loyalty of their squatters, many were also totally 
dependent on them economically.1061 Cavendish-Bentinck led the government in believing that the 
Forest Department villages could act as a positive example to terrified settlers: concentrated and 
fortified forest squatter villages filled with loyal workers would be centres of government control 
within Central and Rift Valley Provinces and spur settlers on to concentrate their own squatters. 
Already by late March 1953, 30 forest villages had been created in Central Province with many more 
under construction in Rift Valley Province.1062 This seems to have been a particular concern in Uasin 
Gishu. Far from Mau Mau activity, the settler-dominated Uasin Gishu District was slow to 
concentrate its Kikuyu squatters, with only 37 per cent of all farm labour in Kitale being 
concentrated by the end of April 1953. By contrast, all of the Forest Department’s labour was 
concentrated by that time and the trend seems to have been a general one across Rift Valley 
Province.1063 The same was true of defences erected around the villages, with the PC, Rift Valley, 
hoping that the barb-wire fences around forest squatter villages would encourage recalcitrant 
settlers to overcome the expense of doing the same for the villages on their farms. Other, more 
security paranoid European farmers and officials pushed for even greater defences around forest 
villages because of the tactical positions of such villages near to the forests and the danger of food 
being taken from them.1064  
Limited evidence also reveals that some groups of forest squatters were actively assisting the 
government in anti-Mau Mau operations. One such group was that found in North Kinangop forest 
who had an initial population of 170, although it is not clear if this is a reference to the total 
population or the number of families. After screening in January 1953 this number was reduced to 
                                                                
D. Those whom it was thought were disaffected and ought to be removed." 
1060 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 41; District Commissioner (Kitale) to Provincial 
Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 27 May 1954. 
1061 ‘F.W. Cavendish-Bentinck (Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources) to Chairman of Board of Agriculture, 
Members and Executive Committee of the Board of Agriculture, Chairman of Production Committee and Sub-
Committees, Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners, Senior Labour Officers and Labour Officers, and 
European Elected Members’. 
1062 W.R.N. Hinde (Chief Staff Officer to the Governor) to Provincial Commissioner (Central Province), 26 March 
1953, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1063 Prov. Staff Officer, Kenya Police Reserve (Nakura) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 28 April 
1953, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
1064 District Commissioner (Thomson’s Falls) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 8 April 1953, 
PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA; C.M. Johnston (Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province) to District Commissioner 
(Laikipia District), 11 April 1953, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA; H.B. Sharpe (Chairman, Laikipia Man Power and 
Production Committee) to District Commissioner (Laikipia), 7 April 1953, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
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72. As early as November 1952, these squatters had apparently willingly and in large numbers been 
assisting the government in operations against Mau Mau: 
They are being used mostly as guides in the forest areas, trackers, and general labour when 
assistance is required by Military Forces, etc. besides carrying out their own duties as Forest 
Department Labour. Whenever there is a camp placed on top of the mountain where supplies 
have to be taken up, this labour has done its work with their own donkeys without complaint, or 
asking for any recompense whatsoever.1065 
This is the only reference to Forest Department squatters acting as trackers for the military; indeed, 
this may have been a unique case as most trackers appear to have been recruited from Game 
Department staff, ‘martial tribes’ such as the Kamba and Turkana, or from the forest-dwelling Ogiek, 
although many more came from the Kikuyu Home Guard.1066 Forest squatters sometimes directly 
opposed military operations: in one case an African scout for British forces “was lured to a drinking 
session by some forest labourers and on his way home was abducted and executed in the forest.”1067 
As has been shown in work by Daniel Branch on loyalism to the colonial government, the deep 
divisions evident in Kikuyu society by this time were reflected in the actions of Kikuyu. As with any 
internal state conflict, the boundaries between sides were porous, with individuals and groups 
passing from the status of ‘loyalist’ to ‘insurgent’ or vice versa, or even occupying both positions at 
once. Motivations for assisting or fighting for either side could be numerous, based on local 
incidences of retaliation or with a mind to which side was likely to aid the social, political, or 
economic position of an individual or group at that particularly time.1068  
The North Kinangop forest squatters had clearly determined that assisting in the early stages 
of anti-Mau Mau operations was of benefit to them. They also captured, apparently unaided, two of 
the Mau Mau fighters who killed Eric Bowyer, the first white casualty of the conflict, and broke up 
a large Mau Mau meeting in December 1952.1069 Furedi’s casting of forest squatters as often at the 
heart of Mau Mau sentiment therefore seems an overgeneralisation and while certain forest areas 
may have bred discontent it does not follow that they continued to do so through the conflict. 
Conversely, forest squatters acting in a ‘loyal’ manner may not have always done so or been doing 
so out of any sense of loyalty to the government or Forest Department.1070 Yet, overall the evidence 
suggests that many forest squatters did obey the government. The development of welfare within 
the forest villages, the economic opportunities that forest squatting offered, and the department’s 
                                                                
1065 A. Dale (ADC, North Kinangop) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), District Commissioner 
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long-term policy of purging the forest workforce of what it considered troublemakers combined 
with the apparent willingness of forest squatters to rapidly concentrate their villages after the 
Declaration of the State of Emergency would seem to indicate a strong sense that forest squatters 
saw their lot of working in the forest as the more likely source of political and economic 
advancement than siding with Mau Mau. For many forest squatters, aiding Mau Mau, through the 
provision of food for example, was likely a temporary, pragmatic choice. Indeed, such an 
assessment fits with Branch’s arguments concerning the important role of the concept of self-
mastery in determining Kikuyu attitudes toward Mau Mau. At the heart of Kikuyu politics, self-
mastery centred on the success of one’s shamba, with the requisite hard work and large family 
which that implied. The achievement of self-mastery earned one the respect of other Kikuyu and 
allowed one to speak, and be listened to, on political matters.1071 As ahoi, many of those in the Forest 
Department’s shamba system were victims of the erosion of this system in the Kikuyu reserves by 
the corrupting influence of the patron-client relationships that the colonial government built. Thus, 
the shamba system was probably not just seen as a way to survive physically but as a means to 
prosper morally and politically through hard work. 
Those forest squatters who provided the most assistance to the government in its anti-Mau 
Mau operations no doubt expected to be rewarded for this loyalty, indeed they were told as much 
by the Forest Department and district administration.1072 In one case in 1953 the fears and hysteria 
generated among the European and African government staff by Mau Mau resulted in the wrongful 
eviction of approximately 190 families from South Kinangop forest. The incident was sparked by 
an inexperienced forest officer believing the absence of a few women and children from the 
squatter village was a precursor to an attack akin to the infamous massacre that had occurred at 
Lari some two weeks earlier.1073 Lari had made the police nervous and they acted quickly and 
decisively to this erroneous information: the entire workforce was evicted and removed to a 
holding camp in Naivasha while their village, which had already been concentrated, was burnt to 
the ground on 16 April 1953. The provincial commissioner quickly blamed rampant fear within the 
police reserve while the Forest Department lamented:1074 
This operation might have been specially designed to alienate a body of men who had given every 
indication of wishing to keep in with us. During the past few months they had every opportunity 
of going against us, but they have remained loyal so far as can be judged.1075   
                                                                
1071 Daniel Branch, ‘The Enemy within: Loyalists and the War against Mau Mau in Kenya’, The Journal of African 
History 48, no. 2 (1 January 2007): 294–95. 
1072 A. Dale (ADC, North Kinangop) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), District Commissioner 
(Naivasha) and Brig. Dew (Naivasha), 20 November 1953. 
1073 For discussion of the Lari massacre, in which Mau Mau fighters slaughtered the occupants of a village because 
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1074 C.M. Johnston (Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province) to Chief Conservator of Forests, 27 April 1953, 
PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA; S.S. Gill (for Conservator of Forests, East of Rift) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley 
Province), 22 April 1953. 
1075 S.S. Gill (for Conservator of Forests, East of Rift) to Provincial Commissioner (Rift Valley Province), 22 April 
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By the end of 1953 the forest squatter population had been reduced to 3,548 families and of these 
nearly 1,000 lived in such proximity to Mau Mau operations that they were denied the ability to 
cultivate crops out of fear this would find its way into the hands of Mau Mau fighters. This was done 
despite protest from the Forest Department itself; within the context of the Emergency and the 
power of the District and Provincial Emergency Committees (DECs and PECS) dominated by settlers 
and security concerns all the department could do was pay such squatters casual labour rates.1076 
Such was the case with the loyal forest squatters of North Kinangop. Malnourished and on the brink 
of starvation, they were at the centre of a power struggle between the department and the 
emergency committees over the issue of forest squatter cultivation in 1954. The department had 
the support of both the Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner and the Chief Native Commissioner in 
the case, but at both the district (specifically Naivasha) and provincial level the emergency 
committees voted against allowing cultivation in North Kinangop on four separate occasions.1077 
The key issue was revealed in discussions of the PEC, where it voiced that “the policy [of residing 
and cultivating in forests] for the forest squatters will have to be reconsidered after the 
Emergency.”1078  
In other areas it appears opposition to forest squatting was less severe and that it increasingly 
became seen through 1954 and 1955 as an asset in operations against Mau Mau. This was shown 
by the return of forest squatters to areas that had previously been seen as too dangerous. The first 
such return appears to have been in Kinari, near Nakura, in mid-1954, where forest squatters were 
allowed back in a fortified and concentrated forest village under the protection of the Home Guard 
and a police post. Significantly, these squatters were allowed to cultivate. Mau Mau fighters did take 
a portion of this food, yet the district administration felt it a price worth paying as the women 
working in the shambas supplied valuable information that resulted in “many” Mau Mau being 
killed.1079 This policy of denying a vacuum and therefore freedom in territory to Mau Mau by filling 
it with forest squatters who were at least willing to aid anti-Mau Mau operations seems to have 
been extended to other areas. Partly this seems to be because settler arguments about forest 
squatters being a security risk became increasingly nullified as supervision and security was 
increased. Although settlers continued to voice these concerns, by early 1955 they were even 
starting to be ignored by Blundell, the European Minister without Portfolio and effective 
                                                                
1076 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 41. 
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PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA; E.H. Windley (Chief Native Commissioner) to R.E. Wainwright (Acting Provincial 
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1078 R.E. Wainwright (Acting Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province) to E.H. Windley (Chief Native 
Commissioner), 3 May 1954. 
1079 F.A. Lloyd (District Commissioner, Kiambu) to A.C.C. Swann (Acting Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley 
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Province) to F.A. Lloyd (District Commissioner, Kiambu), 15 September 1954, PC/NKU/2/17/18, KNA. 
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mouthpiece of the settlers in government.1080 The expansion in the forest guard force employed by 
the Forest Department reflects this increasing security. In 1947 the ratio of forest guards to forest 
squatters was approximately 1 to 224, with each guard responsible (in theory) for 31,799 acres. 
This ratio rapidly decreased, with 1 guard for 51 squatters in 1951 and by 1955 had fallen to 1 to 
28, with each guard covering 4,202 acres. Thereafter the ratio settled at approximately 1 guard for 
50 squatters by the early 1960s, largely owing to the expansion in the forest squatter system.1081 
By 1955, the highpoint of control, forest guards were conducting daily patrols of forest squatter 
villages.1082 The generally decreasing trend in recorded forest crimes after 1954, particularly in 
respect of the key crimes of theft of forest produce and illicit grazing, also reflect this escalation of 
security (Figure 3-14). However, the increase in forest guard numbers makes deciphering the crime 
data in terms of protest more difficult in comparison to the 1930s, when the level of Forest 
Department supervision was fairly static, as greater departmental presence would have deterred 
possible protests while simultaneously making the detection of crime easier. The spike in the crime 
of damage to trees in the later 1950s and early 1960s is most likely related to inexperience on the 
part of the large number of new recruits into the shamba system: the serious repercussions of 
incorrect planting to the plantation meant the department was particularly strict in its prosecution 
of inefficient workers. 
If reservations did exist within the government over the trustworthiness of the forest 
squatters this was certainly not reflected in policies after the mid-1950s. From 1955 onwards, when 
the department exerted the highest level of control over its workers, the forest squatter population 
expanded dramatically. From a 1955 figure of 3,180 families, the population doubled by 1957 and 
reached its highest point of the colonial period in 1960 with 8,474 families (Figure 3-12). This huge 
increase in recruitment was a reflection of the department’s newly formulated official policy that 
firmly put it on the path of creating protection forests and production forests (see section 3.3.3). 
Within African District Council areas the emphasis was firmly on the conservation or 
reafforestation of hilltops that served as water catchment areas for agricultural production. As 
Anderson has shown in his investigation of the struggle over development in Baringo, by the 1950s 
arguments concerning water conservation carried huge weight within the colonial administration 
                                                                
1080 R.E. Wainwright (Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province) to District Commissioner (Nakura), 25 March 
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1081 Data comes from Forest Department annual and triannual reports, 1947-1963. As the department only recorded 
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1082 M. Blundell to Wainwright, 18 April 1955. 
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because of concern over soil erosion destroying the productive potential of the colony.1083 The 
African Land Development Board (ALDEV) was established in 1946 (as the African Land 
Development Organisation) but it was only under the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 that forestry would 
become a recipient of its funding, reflecting the official acceptance of the role of forest conservation 
in aiding agriculture.  
Between 1954 and 1957 eight schemes were begun under ALDEV for the protection or 
afforestation (with exotic species) of hilltops. By 1958 two of these, at Kisian (Kisiani), close to 
Kisumu in Central Nyanza District and Lambwe Valley, South Nyanza District, were brought to a 
close because of opposition from the local African District Council and natural obstacles, 
respectively.1084 Investigated in detail by Otieno, the case of Kisian illustrates how the Forest 
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Figure 3-14. Recorded prosecutions of forest offences between 1946 and 1963. No data exist for the latter half 
of 1955 and 1956. Source: Forest Department Annual and Triannual Reports, 1946-1963. 
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Department and government were blind to local uses of the hill, being primarily focused on water 
conservation. This attitude was undermined when, in 1960, EAAFRO cast serious doubt on the 
significance of the hill to local hydrology. However, Otieno also shows how local African agency and 
factors such as energy provision influenced the negotiation and implementation process of 
afforestation on Kisian hill.1085 Yet this argument does not preclude the overriding importance of 
the conservationist agenda espoused by the Forest Department; protection and production forests 
did not have to be mutually exclusive entities in the eyes of the department, a fact which is borne 
out by the department’s policy to plant exotic species of potentially valuable softwoods in all ALDEV 
schemes rather than regenerating indigenous species.  
Also analysed by Otieno was another of the eight schemes, that of Maragoli, North Nyanza 
District, begun in 1956/57 and the site of “attempts to sabotage afforestation work both by arson 
and by the uprooting of trees.”1086 The Maragoli case largely mirrored that of Kisian, with proposals 
for its afforestation originating with concern for local fuelwood supply in the 1940s; yet the project 
only made headway following the increased political weight of conservation discourse in the 1950s. 
Protest occurred not directly over afforestation but over the management of the forest, which lay 
in the hands of the Forest Department.1087 Deliberate destruction of planting also occurred in the 
most easterly projects, Sagalla and Mbololo within the Taita hills of Coast Province, although it did 
not stop planting overall. This was possibly another case of opposition to government control, 
especially as the Forest Department had minimal involvement in these forests before the ALDEV 
schemes of the 1950s.1088 Indeed, the level of government control and participation of local peoples 
in the management of the forests of these hills remain contentious to this day.1089  
Further ALDEV schemes were begun in Machakos and Kitui Districts, where the department 
reported “overwhelming” support and a great desire for the increased afforestation of already 
denuded hills.1090 In 1957 schemes were begun in Rift Valley Province, covering the Tugen hills of 
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Baringo as part of the wider Perkerra Catchment Scheme and Kamatira, Sekerr, and Lelan of West 
Suk District.1091 Afforestation of these areas proceeded more slowly with little actual forestry work 
being done during the colonial era, although the emphasis in Baringo and West Suk was firmly on 
protection of existing trees.1092 Departmental work in all ALDEV areas was hampered by drought 
in 1960-61 and further expansion of the ALDEV schemes. Nascent planning taking place for a 
scheme in Turkana in 1961, for example, stretched the resources of the department further, 
particularly in view of the need to develop an unprecedented number of working plans, although 
aerial surveys allowed more rapid demarcation than in decades past.1093 Uncertainties over the 
transition to independence and staff shortages further slowed all the ALDEV schemes in 1962 and 
1963.1094  
Notably, the Baringo and West Suk schemes both utilised Mau Mau detainee labour. The 
employment of such labour was intended as a final element in what was termed the ‘pipeline’ of 
rehabilitation that those accused and detained for association with Mau Mau had to undergo. In 
Baringo, where the labour was employed on the larger catchment scheme rather than forestry, this 
policy failed, with the majority of the detainee labour leaving the open village they were settled in 
to seek work across the Rift Valley.1095 Further research is required into the use of detainee labour 
in West Suk, but the ALDEV report indicates it was used successfully for forestry operations.1096 It 
was in this use of agricultural and forestry development as a means to rehabilitate supposed Mau 
Mau-supporters that links to the expansion in the Forest Department’s forest squatter workforce 
can be found, for alongside the schemes falling under the Swynnerton Plan was the Forest 
Department’s own Supplementary Forest Development Scheme. 
What became the Supplementary Forest Development Scheme began in 1954 as the ‘Scheme 
for the reabsorption of Kikuyu, Embu and Meru displaced as a result of the Emergency’. Initiative 
for this plan actually originated outside of the department, with the Resettlement Committee that 
sought to deal with the repatriation of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru who had been either forcibly or 
voluntarily displaced by the outbreak of Mau Mau hostilities.1097 It was a scheme founded on the 
success of the shamba system and represented belief within the government, beyond the Forest 
Department, that forest squatting was an effective means to both conduct forest development and 
allow Africans to live in close proximity to or within forests, despite the obvious danger of this at 
that time. Commenting on the proposal, the Forestry Adviser to the Secretary of State for the 
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Colonies, F.S. Collier emphasised this was a “politically important scheme for controlling and 
employing large numbers of Kikuyu” rather than a profit-generating project.1098 In late 1954 the 
Council of Ministers referred the plan to an outside expert, Dr Ian Craib, formerly a research officer 
of the Union Forestry Department and by 1954 the manager of a timber company in South Africa. 
In commenting on Craib’s extensive report into the prospects of the timber industry in Kenya and 
the proposed scheme, which was only completed in mid-1956, the Ministry of Forest Development, 
Game and Fisheries did consider the security implications of allowing “the most dangerous people 
in Kenya” back into the forests.1099 This danger, it quickly established, could be easily overcome by 
the concentration of workers into villages and close European supervision; in other words, a 
continuation of the Forest Department’s current practices. There were not, then, any major security 
hurdles blocking the way for the return of Kikuyu to the forests. Indeed, it may have been 
considered that increasing the number of forest villages increased security if they were filled with 
loyalists or Mau Mau detainees who could be ‘reformed’ by the Forest Department’s apparently 
effective welfare and supervisory strategies into loyal, hardworking servants of the Crown. 
Craib’s report gave full support to an extension of afforestation of economically viable 
softwood species, going as far as to say the combination of high rainfall in the highlands of Kenya 
and the cost-effectiveness of the Kikuyu shamba workforce, “a forest worker par excellence”, meant 
the country had perhaps the greatest potential of any in Africa for softwood timber.1100 Based on 
Craib’s suggestions, which were fully endorsed by F.S. Collier, and the Forest Department’s own 
1954 plans drawn up by Davis, the working plans officer, a revised plan was put into action in 1957 
for the establishment of 300,000 acres of softwood plantations over a 25-year period, which 
included the afforestation targets set in 1946, with the first of the new plantations being exploitable 
within 10 years.1101  
To achieve this, it was estimated the Forest Department needed a forest squatter labour force 
of 14,000 families or labourers, including those it already employed.1102 It was this that explained 
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despite this apparent shortfall in labour. Craib, ‘A Scrutiny of the Programme of Afforestation by the State in Kenya’, 
18; Ministry of Forest Development, Game and Fisheries, ‘Memorandum on Dr. Ian Craib’s Report entitled “A 
Scrutiny of the Programme of Afforestation by the State in Kenya”, Dated 11/7/56’, 4–5; Minister for Forest 
Development, Game and Fisheries, ‘Monthly Report for February/March 1957’. 
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the almost doubling in the number of forest squatters after 1957 and the vastly increased annual 
acreages of plantations the department was able to achieve. By the early 1960s annual acreages 
varied between 12,000 and 15,000, which indicated that the department would have no trouble 
meeting the 300,000 acre target of the project. The identities of this new intake of forest squatters 
are more difficult to detect than the work they accomplished. Certainly they were overwhelmingly 
Kikuyu from the inception of the project, with lower numbers of Embu and Meru.1103 In her 
assessment of the wider rehabilitation schemes employed during the Mau Mau emergency and 
based on a 1954 statement by L.R. Maconochie-Welwood (Minister for Forest Development, Game 
and Fisheries), Elkins has argued that the Supplementary Forest Development Scheme (SFDS) was 
used to reward Kikuyu loyal to the government, whom she considers the ‘haves’ of the pre-
Emergency period, rather than the landless Kikuyu, the Mau-Mau sympathising ‘have-nots’ who had 
been displaced by the Emergency.1104 This is a powerful argument, especially when considered in 
light of the capacity of the shamba system to accommodate Kikuyu families. Between 1955 and 
1960 the Supplementary Forest Development Scheme took on 4,835 families, while the number of 
displaced families in Nyeri District, for example, was estimated to be 4,000 out of a total of 20,000 
families across Kiambu, Fort Hall, and Nyeri in February 1955.1105 Clearly the forest scheme had 
the potential to have a large impact on the problem of accommodating displaced Kikuyu, yet if 
Elkins is correct and the 4,835 families that became forest squatters were from, as she implies, the 
‘landed’ loyal it represents strong support for her argument of the failure of the wider rehabilitation 
project.  
The division made by Elkins here between the displaced and the loyal, however, appears to be 
too absolute. The ‘landed’ loyalists of Central Province certainly benefitted in the wake of Mau Mau, 
dominating the land consolidation process and the transforming national political arena, yet the 
government gained much support against Mau Mau from poorer, landless Kikuyu who largely 
sought work in the white highlands after the cessation of counter-insurgency measures.1106 
Branch’s study of loyalism highlights a case of a landless loyalist who sought forestry work in 1956; 
indeed, with the obvious restrictions that forest squatting brought, this pool of landless loyalist 
                                                                
1103 ‘Press Office Handout No.716. Forest Squatter Policy’ (Press Officer, Department of Information, 8 June 1954), 
CS/2/8/231, KNA. The policy as articulated in this press office handout was presented by L.R. Maconochie-Welwood 
(Minister for Forest Development, Game and Fisheries) to a meeting of European organisations in Kenya. He 
emphasised that the Forest Department had no policy against recruiting forest squatters from other ethnic groups 
beside those from Central Province but that is was largely the hostility displayed by those other ethnic groups to 
working with Kikuyu that prevented their recruitment. As the Supplementary Forest Development Scheme was of 
course expressly designed to cater for Kikuyu the accuracy of this statement is in some doubt; it is more likely that 
Maconochie-Welwood was entertaining the idea of other ethnic groups in the forests only to placate European 
concerns about the return of Kikuyu to forest areas.    
1104 Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, 267. 
1105 Council of Ministers Resettlement Committee, ‘Long Term Absorption of Displaced Kikuyu - Absorption in 
Kikuyu Districts’, 15 February 1955, CO 822/797/8, TNA. The same source equates this number of families to a total 
displaced Kikuyu population in these districts of 150,000, implying notably larger families than any Forest 
Department documents concerning the average size of forest squatter families. The figure for the number of forest 
squatters recruited comes from the Forest Department’s Annual Reports, 1955 to 1960.  
1106 Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya, 122–24, 129; Daniel Branch, ‘Loyalists, Mau Mau, and Elections in 
Kenya: The First Triumph of the System, 1957-1958’, Africa Today 53, no. 2 (2006): 27–50. 
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labour seemed the ideal source for recruitment into the Supplementary Forest Development 
Scheme.1107 It is also not entirely clear that the figure of 20,000 displaced persons, from which the 
SFDS would draw, were indeed all classified as ‘loyal’ by the government. The same memorandum 
that produced this figure, for example, talked of resettling 3,090 Kikuyu in addition to 325 
confirmed loyalists in the same scheme, surely suggesting that the 20,000 displaced were not all 
‘loyal’ in the eyes of the Resettlement Committee at least.1108 Thus, while Elkins is correct that the 
scheme as outlined by the Ministry for Forest Development, Game and Fisheries was one of 
“’reward’ for loyal Kikuyu, Meru and Embu”, what was meant by ‘loyal’ was never clearly 
defined.1109 Indeed, the same plan even considered that those in work camps who displayed “good 
behaviour” but fell outside their vague criteria for loyalty could also be included as potential 
candidates for the SFDS.1110 Statements made by Sydney Draper, a forester heavily involved with 
several sites of afforestation under the scheme indicate that such work camp detainees did enter 
the system, as he recalled that some forest squatters had indeed been ex-Mau Mau, a point 
supported by the department’s own official history.1111 Rewards, however, were certainly on offer 
within this scheme, as of the few surviving agreements between the Forest Department and 
squatter recruits, some clearly indicate the department was making concessions by allowing five 
head of cattle per squatter in 1959, two decades after the ban on cattle ownership among the forest 
squatters had been established.1112 Clearly the system was now open to more than just the poorest, 
livestock-less ahoi and it seems likely that this represented the return of Kikuyu from higher social 
classes into forest squatting; a process that lay at the heart of the collapse of the shamba system in 
the post-colonial era.1113 Overall, the narrative of rewarding the loyal should also be seen within 
the context of the Forest Department’s own high standards that it set for its forest squatters. As the 
department reported in 1958 in relation to recruitment to the scheme: 
Care is exercised in the selection of these new employees, but on arrival at their destination not 
all are found to be acceptable. None are attested until they have served a trial period. At some 
stations a high proportion of some of the batches of new recruits have been sent back to their 
Reserve as being unsatisfactory.1114 
                                                                
1107 Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya, 126. 
1108 Council of Ministers Resettlement Committee, ‘Long Term Absorption of Displaced Kikuyu - Absorption in 
Kikuyu Districts’, 5. 
1109 Ministry of Forest Development, Game and Fisheries, ‘Scheme for Reabsorption of Kikuyu, Embu and Meru 
Displaced as a Result of the Emergency’, 1. 
1110 Ibid. Kikuyu who had been sent to detention camps (those classified as ‘black’, that is suspected of closest Mau 
Mau affiliation) but were subsequently labelled as ‘white’ were the only group explicitly excluded from the scheme, 
largely because it was seen as too dangerous to allow them into the forests.  
1111 ‘Press Office Handout No.716. Forest Squatter Policy’; Draper, interview; Logie and Dyson, Forestry in Kenya, 9. 
1112 ‘Memorandum of Agreement between Kindi S/o Keter and Forest Department’ 18 March 1959, 
DC/KMGA/1/5/2, KNA. 
1113 For an examination of the shamba system since 1963 and the impacts of its colonial origin on the collapse of the 
system and then reinstatement (as of 2016) see Fanstone, ‘Shamba Forestry in Colonial Kenya: Colonial Dominance 
or African Opportunity?’ 
1114 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1958, 28. 
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No matter any particular forest squatter’s attitude toward Mau Mau, what the department sought 
above all was good workers. Any disobedience or political protest would, the department no doubt 
felt, be adequately dealt with directly by the expansion in supervision and policing and indirectly 
by development initiatives that went along with the concentration of the forest workers into 
villages. 
Closer governance over the forest squatters developed as their numbers increased in the late 
1950s and through the early 1960s, when the department began recruiting a further 1,000 
squatters as part of the Accelerated Reafforestation Scheme designed to alleviate 
unemployment.1115 In itself, this further expansion of the system reiterated the acceptance that 
forestry had gained in Kenya since 1945, not only in terms of its revenue potential but also as a 
form of social policy. By 1963 the department was operating 71 concentrated forest villages from 
the coast to Lake Victoria, although not in the Southern or Northern Provinces. Serving these 
villages were 103 schools, 123 shops, and 142 water schemes, as well as numerous facilities such 
as granaries and market centres.1116 To manage this expansion in population and development 
while also maintaining a high level of security, the Forest Department furthered its delegation of 
powers to Africans. From 1958 onwards and beginning in those areas where security was most 
paramount – that is, where white settlers resided – headmen were installed in each village. How 
these headmen affected the existing power dynamics of forest village life is unknown. The headmen 
selection process is also unclear, although it is apparent that they were chosen by the district 
administration not the Forest Department, which could indicate the department was again willing 
to allow administrative oversight that would aid in its arguments against critics of the forest 
squatters.1117  
 
3.4.4 Localisation and Independence 
Accompanying the process of closer governance was an overall expansion in staff levels across the 
department. The number of front-line positions, that is those involved in running forest villages, 
plantation work and overseeing forest reserves, doubled in the post-war period (see Table 3-3). 
This was not surprising given the department’s greatly expanded functions in this time period; 
what was remarkable was the persistence of European domination of the department at both the 
                                                                
1115 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1963, 18. 
1116 Ibid., 11. The breakdown of forest villages (recorded as ‘Labour villages’) per forest district was: Nairobi, 13; 
Nyeri, 16; Thomson’s Falls, 4; Southern, 0; Coast, 2; Londiani, 10; Elburgon, 12; Eldoret, 9; Kitale, 3; Nyanza, 2. Note 
that the same annual report also provides resident labour figures for each forest district and states that there were 
no forest squatters in Coast District, suggesting that either the two villages there were not yet occupied (unlikely as 
squatters constructed their own villages) or used for casual labour (80 casual labourers were reported to work in 
Coast). Numbers of forest squatter families in each forest district in 1963 were: Nairobi, 1,697; Nyeri, 1,348; 
Thomson’s Falls, 349; Southern, 0; Coast, 0; Londiani, 1,423; Elburgon, 1,346; and Eldoret, 1,277. The absence of 
Kitale and Nyanza from the labour returns is unexplained, as despite having three and two forest villages, 
respectively, they had no recorded casual labour or squatters.   
1117 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1958, 28. 
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senior and junior level. By independence less than half of the department’s foresters were African, 
many of whom were rapidly promoted in 1963 to compensate for the resignation of one Asian and 
22 European foresters. Eleven Africans were studying forestry at university level abroad by 1963, 
yet the first of these did not take up a senior position (assistant conservator) until 1964.1118 The 
Forest Department’s lacklustre efforts at the Africanisation of its staff during the 1950s and early 
1960s are highlighted through comparison with its counterpart in neighbouring Uganda. A much 
smaller department than Kenya’s, with revenues during the 1950s being as low as a third of those 
in Kenya, the Uganda Forest Department was considerably more advanced in its Africanisation 
programme by the time of independence in 1962.1119 In contrast to Kenya’s training of 11 Africans 
abroad, by 1963 the Uganda Forest Department was already employing five Africans who had 
received university-level forestry education abroad while a further 13 were studying for degrees 
in forestry.1120 By the late 1940s the Uganda Forest Department had decreed that it would recruit 
no more Europeans as foresters, a position it could take because of its very early commitment to 
formal forestry education for Africans: it opened its first forestry school for African rangers, and 
later for African foresters, in 1932 (at Kityerera).1121 This commitment to forestry schooling led to 
the Uganda Forest Department having a pool of trained African rangers and foresters from which 
the most able could be selected for further education. Sustained support for African forestry 
                                                                
1118 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1963, i, 14. The majority of the 11 Africans to receive university-level 
training abroad began this in October 1962. None were funded from by the department but instead by UK sources 
and the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organisation. The majority attended courses at Edinburgh University, 
but Syracuse and New Hampshire in the USA also featured, as did Ibadan in Nigeria. 
1119 Webster and Osmaston, A History of the Uganda Forest Department 1951-1965, 97. Uganda is chosen here 
because of its proximity to Kenya, suggesting that the two respective forest departments would have been broadly 
aware of developments in their neighbouring colony, especially after co-operation increased during the 1950s. 
Comparisons with other colonies can also be drawn. For example, Tanganyika opened its own African Forest 
Rangers School at Olmotonyi (subsequently Forestry Training School and today the Forestry Training Institute) in 
1937 and was training African foresters there by the early 1960s (‘Eighth British Commonwealth Forestry 
Conference Report. Tanganyika Main Tour’, Commonwealth Forestry Review 41 (4), no. 110 (December 1962): 317. 
Nigeria’s training regime was also more advanced, with the Ibadan Forestry School opening in 1941, and senior 
training in operation by the 1950s with, for example, A.J.K.G. Imam (Malam Kalli) of Northern Nigeria gaining his 
BSc in forestry from Aberdeen University in the 1950s and  going on to become Chief Conservator of Forests 
(Northern Nigeria). Imam also represented Northern Nigeria at the 1962 Eighth Empire Forestry Conference. 
Indeed, by 1962 Nigeria was leading the way in the training of local officers in the African Commonwealth, with 29 
out of a total of 85 professional positions being held by Africans. This low figure underscores the overall sorry state 
of professional forestry education for Africans in the early 1960s. ‘Eighth British Commonwealth Forestry 
Conference Report. Introductions to the Discussions in Plenary Session of the Main Items of the Agenda’, 
Commonwealth Forestry Review 41 (4), no. 110 (December 1962): 348; F.S. Collier and R.W.J. Kay, ‘Regional Training 
of Forest Staff in Nigeria’, Prepared for Fifth Empire Forestry Conference, 1947; ‘AJKG Imam: Memories of a Great 
Pioneer’, accessed 25 April 2016, http://www.dailytrust.com.ng//news/tribute/ajkg-imam-memories-of-a-great-
pioneer/21530.html.  
1120 Webster and Osmaston, A History of the Uganda Forest Department 1951-1965, 85–86. Martin Rukuba was the 
first Ugandan to complete degree-level training in forestry, graduating from the University of Aberdeen in 1959. In 
July 1965 Rukuba became the colony’s first black Chief Conservator of Forests. Significantly, Rukuba rose through 
the ranks of the Uganda Forest Department, initially receiving forest training as a ranger in Uganda’s forest school 
before progressing to the position of forester. F.C.H., ‘N. V. Brasnett’, 3. 
1121 Webster and Osmaston, A History of the Uganda Forest Department 1951-1965, 82. The Kityerera forest school 
(in south Busoga, Uganda) operated from 1932 to 1941, being shut due to staff shortage during the Second World 
War. Its successor, sited at Budongo forest, was opened in 1951 and still operates as a forestry school today. In 1959 
the school also accepted students from Nyasaland and Tanganyika (although those from Tanganyika never arrived); 
there is no indication that any students came from Kenya. 
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education within the leadership of the Uganda Forest Department itself made this possible. In 
particular, the Chief Conservator of Forests, N.V. Brasnett, who had moved to Uganda from Kenya 
in 1929, strongly backed African education. He considered it the “most important contribution” to 
the safeguarding of Uganda’s forest estate and this view was reinforced by his successor, W.J. 
Eggeling who published on the subject.1122  
Concurrent to Uganda’s developments, the 1947 Empire Forestry Conference highlighted 
Nigeria’s moves toward establishing a forestry school for African rangers.1123 Kenya’s Forest 
Department was clearly aware of its shortcomings in terms of forestry education for Africans in 
relation to other African colonies, publically stating in its 1949-50 report that the absence of 
training in Kenya was “really very serious.”1124 Subsequently a three-week experimental training 
course was run for African rangers in 1952. It was considered a success but plans for expansion 
                                                                
1122 Eggeling and Sangster, Elementary Forestry, ix. 
1123 Collier and Kay, ‘Regional Training of Forest Staff in Nigeria’, 2, 5. 
1124 Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1948-1950, 38. 
Year 
Forest 
Guards 
Forest 
Rangersn1 
Assistant 
Forestersn2 
Forestersn3 
Assistant 
Conservatorsn4  
1951 597 69 14 46 15 
1952 597 69 7 46 14 
1953 603 74 7 48 14 
1954 693     
1955 693 82 4 46 14 
1956      
1957 687 86 3 70 21 
1958 801 134 4 83 24 
1959 850 148 5 99 25 
1960 880 148  104 25 
1961 886 161  96 25 
1962 885 160  96 24 
1963 885 160  108 21 
n1 Forest Rangers were predominantly African and were often listed as ‘African Forest 
Rangers’ although a minority were Asian. Before 1951 this position was listed as ‘African 
Assistant Forester’. 
n2 Assistant Foresters were predominantly Asian (with this being explicit in the job title 
before 1951), although a minority were European. This position seems to have been 
phased out in preference to employing full foresters. 
n3 Foresters were predominantly European with a minority Asian. By 1962 the 
department was promoting African Forest Rangers to forester positions, with 21 
promoted in 1963.  The figures for Foresters also includes Senior Foresters (these 
represented approximately 10-15 per cent of the total figure and were positions usually 
held by Europeans). Foresters were in charge of forest districts. 
n4 Assistant Conservators of Forest were all European, with forestry training at degree 
level. They were in charge of forest divisions or had ad hoc specialist duties. 
 
Table 3-3. Annual Forest Department personnel figures. Blanks indicate an absence of data. Senior and 
specialised positions are excluded. Source: Forest Department Annual and Triannual Reports, 1951 to 1963. 
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were shelved with a lack of funds and manpower as well as the unfolding Mau Mau crisis cited as 
explanation for this.1125 Uganda suffered more seriously than Kenya from underfunding and staff 
shortages, but still it pushed on with its commitment to forestry education. In 1957 Kenya did gain 
its own Forest Training School for African rangers, with a course for junior foresters following the 
next year.1126 Located in Londiani, this school still operates today. In the wake of Mau Mau, the 
department initially sought recruits for its ranger force not from its forest squatters, despite their 
obvious familiarity with forestry and increasing although primary levels of literacy, but from the 
Kings African Rifles, the well-established source of its forest guards. However, it was considered 
that recruits would probably have to be sought from Central Province, and the low numbers of 
applicants and successful graduates of the school in its first several years suggests that the 
emphasis on KAR recruits was probably quickly dropped.1127   
The consequence of the late development of a forest ranger school was the deficiency in the 
department’s preparations for independence in terms of having African staff educated to degree 
level. There simply was not enough time for the forest school to develop and for promising students 
to be identified and passed up to higher institutions of learning. Compounding this situation was 
the department’s insistence on recruiting only European, or in a small minority of cases Asian, 
foresters. Africans were effectively barred from even the intermediate position of forester until 
1962 and so promising candidates could not progress through the department. This situation 
undoubtedly must have acted as a strong deterrent to many Africans who had the potential to rise 
to the highest, most technically demanding positions in the department. This was a reality that had 
been realised two decades earlier in Uganda and acted upon by the late 1940s, partly of course 
because there was no large white settler community to draw upon. Conversely, the Kenya Forest 
Department had a long history of recruiting settlers, an approach that was intensified through the 
1950s and reaffirmed by the Craib report in 1957 for the specific role of forester in preference to 
recruiting men from Britain.1128 Turning settlers or the sons of settlers into foresters was to short-
                                                                
1125 1952 Education Department Report, 28; Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1951-1953, 44. 
1126 Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1958, 30–31. 
1127 ‘Minutes of Liaison Meeting No.2/57’ (Forest Department, Kenya, 30 January 1957), VF/2/3, KNA; ‘Minutes of 
Liaison Meeting No.7/57’ (Forest Department, Kenya, 28 June 1957), VF/2/3, KNA; Kenya Forest Department, 
Annual Report 1958, 30; Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report of the Forest Department 1959 (Nairobi 
Government Printer, 1960), 24. In its first two years of operation the department complained of the low standard 
of candidates enrolled on its rangers’ course, with a particular point that many were illiterate. Of the 56 candidates 
in the first two years only 36 received certificates of competency. Given that 34 of the 56 were already serving 
rangers, this indicated general educational deficiency among the department’s forest rangers and also that the 
school was attracting few candidates from outside the Forest Department. Because of these issues the initial two-
year course was changed to a one-year course in 1958. In addition to recruiting from the KAR and Central Province, 
potential rangers could be found in families that already had connections with the department. This was 
demonstrated by the case of a Tugen candidate, Peter A. Rotich, who was a Lembus-rights holder (the site, of course, 
of a long-standing dispute between Tugen and the Forest Department) who was apparently attracted to a career 
with the Forest Department because his father was a forest guard. Recruiting people like Rotich was no doubt seen 
by the department as a way to increase support for forestry in African areas. T.A.M. Gardner (Divisional Forest 
Officer, Londiani) to District Officer (Ravine), 16 May 1956, DO/ER/2/10/2, KNA.    
1128 Craib, ‘A Scrutiny of the Programme of Afforestation by the State in Kenya’, 31. There was no formal training 
regime for local European foresters in Kenya prior to 1945. After this “local boys” were sent for a forestry course at 
Saarsveld Forest School in South Africa, a practice which ended by 1953 because the school switched to providing 
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term advantage for the department as, of course, the settlers had represented the stubborn thorn 
in the side of the department for decades. The perceived necessity of increasing European oversight 
of the forests in the context of Mau Mau only increased this trend. This placatory atmosphere 
suffused through a colonial government that had of course been hostile to any African education 
outside the missions prior to the Second World War and resisted higher education after this. If there 
was any will within the Forest Department to Africanise, it withered within this environment, only 
beginning to properly take hold as independence loomed.  
The department’s newly found willingness to accept localisation in the early 1960s was less 
to do with the department itself, of course, and more the prevailing winds of change. Actions such 
as Tom Mboya’s 1960 African airlift programme were a manifestation of African demands for 
higher education, while the Administration rapidly Africanised between 1960 and 1963.1129 These 
developments must have brought fears to the Forest Department that rapid localisation would 
occur outside of its control, that forestry might be jeopardised by Africans with no formal forestry 
education at all. There was a clear double-standard here as the department had been recruiting 
settlers for decades who held no qualification other than an appetite for outdoor life. Overall, 
however, the Forest Department was successful in controlling the localisation process, although it 
is notable that a handful of officers were appointed through the 1960s with agricultural rather than 
forestry training due to a lack of adequately trained candidates. The absence of urgency which 
characterised this change did, however, result in interference from above the department, although 
the precise origin of this is unclear. In 1964 all European senior foresters were given notice of the 
end of their contracts that became effective in 1965, resulting in a rapid changeover to Africans. Of 
great assistance to the department was the beginning, in 1962, of a two-year forestry diploma at 
Egerton Agricultural College in Njoro. This institution provided training for foresters while the 
department’s own Forest Training School trained rangers and forest guards.1130  
The cumulative effect of the localisation initiatives was the replacement of white Europeans 
within the department with Africans through the 1960s. Yet it would be 1966 before an African 
attained the rank of conservator of forests, and the decade finished with J.P.W. Logie as Chief 
Conservator. The first Kenyan to study forestry abroad, Onesimus Mbruru, would go to become the 
                                                                
instruction purely in Afrikaans.  The restarting of formal education was then paused until the Junior Forest Training 
Scheme was launched in early 1958 (the first graduates of which were European) and even then the scheme was 
heavily dependent on what had become the accepted practice of shadowing more senior officers for approximately 
12 months. Kenya Forest Department, Departmental Report 1948-1950, 37; Kenya Forest Department, Departmental 
Report 1951-1953, 44; 1950 Education Department Report, 23; Kenya Forest Department, Annual Report 1958, 31; 
Holman, Inside Safari Hunting, with Eric Rundgren, 60.    
1129 David Goldsworthy, Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget (East African Publishers, 1982), 166–67; 
Anthony Hamilton Millard Kirk-Greene, Britain’s Imperial Administrators, 1858-1966 (St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 256. 
1130 Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1969 (Republic of Kenya, 1974), i; Forest Department, 
Forest Department Annual Report 1964 (Republic of Kenya, 1967), 11; Forest Department, Forest Department Annual 
Report 1965 (Republic of Kenya, 1967), 13–16; Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1966 (Republic 
of Kenya, 1968), 17–18; Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1967 (Republic of Kenya, 1969), 23–
26; Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1968 (Republic of Kenya, 1970), 33–35; Forest 
Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1969, 16–17. 
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department’s first African chief conservator of forests, but this did not happen in the 1960s.1131 The 
department also made extensive use of Commonwealth personnel, particularly Canadians and New 
Zealanders, during this decade – itself a reflection of the inadequacies of African education - and 
many of the Kenyans who travelled overseas to study forestry did so in North America.1132 The 
continued presence of expatriates within the professional positions in the Forest Department was 
by no means unique within the government of course, as Kenyatta’s regime favoured stability. Four 
years after independence, there were still 1,700 Britons spread across Kenya’s civil service.1133 
As Kenya transitioned to independence, the continuity of forestry in Kenya - the persistent 
presence of European influence and leadership, and the central role of the state in forest 
governance - was underlined by the decision to hold the Eighth Commonwealth Forestry 
Conference in Kenya in 1962. The conference primarily focused on technical matters but the 
general policy direction it followed was well-reflected in Kenya: an emphasis on state-controlled 
exotic softwood establishment because of its greater economic and technical viability than 
regenerating indigenous forests.1134 Reflected also was the continued dominance of expatriates 
within the forest departments of the Commonwealth countries.1135 Indeed, of the 30 delegates from 
the African Commonwealth members, only six were not expatriates. Two of these were in fact Asian 
representatives of the sawmill industry while the other four were senior members of Nigeria’s 
                                                                
1131 Through the 1960s the structure of the Forest Department remained the same as that established in the 1950s. 
A chief conservator of forests headed the department and was assisted by a deputy chief conservator of forests. 
Completing the executive level of management were the conservators of forests, who had a large body of delegated 
powers to enable them to run the two major geographic divisions: west of Rift and east of Rift. Following 
independence, conservators were also created for forest industry (reflecting the importance of this in Kenyan 
forestry’s focus on softwood plantations) and research (again, crucial when forestry was relying on alien species 
that had proved vulnerable to disease in the past). More local control was provided by the assistant conservators of 
forests and foresters. See Appendices for an overview of departmental organisation. Forest Department, Forest 
Department Annual Report 1966, 18; Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1969, 17. 
1132 Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1964, 13. In 1964 six Canadians and three Kiwis worked 
within the department and this continued at the approximate same level for the rest of the decade. Their expertise 
was particularly deployed in survey and mapping work but also in exploitation. Although it falls outside of the 
research bounds of this thesis, the presence of these personnel and the numbers of Africans heading to North 
American universities may indicate a greater focus being placed on exploitation in the early post-colonial period. 
For example, Forest Department revenues rose through the 1960s to a record high of £431,087 in 1969, although 
this can of course be attributed to the beginning of the exploitation of plantations founded in the 1950s. Rising 
expenditure (the department had an annual deficit of £1,319,201 in 1968 for example) no doubt resulted in political 
pressure being placed on the department to pay its way. Indeed, by the 1980s this dynamic was seriously hindering 
the ability of the department to function; see D. K. Mbugua, ‘The Forest Revenue System and Government 
Expenditure on Forestry in Kenya’, Forest Finance: Working Paper (FAO), 2003, http://agris.fao.org/agris-
search/search.do?recordID=XF2006425929. For discussion of the shamba system after independence in this 
context see Fanstone, ‘Shamba Forestry in Colonial Kenya: Colonial Dominance or African Opportunity?’ 
1133 William Robert Ochieng’, ‘Structural and Political Changes’, in Decolonization and Independence in Kenya 1940-
93, ed. Bethwell A. Ogot and William Robert Ochieng’ (Ohio State University Press, 1995), 97. 
1134 ‘Eighth British Commonwealth Forestry Conference Report. Silviculture.’, Commonwealth Forestry Review 41 
(4), no. 110 (December 1962): 356, 360. The natural and artificial regeneration of indigenous forests was dealt with 
by nine papers at the conference, significantly more than the three papers that dealt with exotic planting. This was 
a reflection of the comparative difficulty (but of course interest in) of regenerating indigenous forests and debate 
over to what stage an indigenous forest should be allowed or coaxed into regeneration.  
1135 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations also used the conference to recruit colonial 
foresters whose careers in the former colonies were coming to an end. In doing so, the hegemony of the status quo 
in forestry was preserved. See Gold, ‘The Reconfiguration of Scientific Career Networks in the Late Colonial Period’. 
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Forest Department.1136 At a panel on future staffing in the Commonwealth this very issue was 
raised. Nigeria was praised for having the most advanced programme of professional training for 
Africans, but even so with 29 out of 85 professional-grade officers being African (two years after 
independence) this represented less than half. East and Central Africa were highlighted as being 
particularly far behind in localisation; Kenya’s situation was conspicuous by the absence of any 
mention of it. R.J. Dewar, Chief Conservator of Forests for Nyasaland, was forthright when he 
complained of “the complete lack of foresight in the building up of indigenous cadre or professional 
and sub-professional officers to take over from the expatriate cadre at the time of 
independence.”1137 Kenya was thus not alone in its sluggish realisation of the importance of 
localisation, but it was one of the worst. Dewar continued by speaking of the fear that now 
permeated through the ranks of expatriate foresters that the transitions to independence would 
bring inexperienced personnel and a general collapse in forest departments. This was a fear, as 
Dewar rightly stressed, that was a product of its own making: if proper training programmes had 
been instigated for Africans at an earlier date it would never have arisen.1138    
Despite the trepidation that European foresters held about the future of forestry in Kenya 
during the transitional period, also of course connected to the vagaries now exposed in their future 
careers, appearances indicated that the Forest Department that became a part of the Republic of 
Kenya was better placed than it ever had been before to play a role in the economic and social 
development of the country. Kenyatta’s government favoured the preservation of many colonial 
departments. While the forest reserves were eaten into by settlement schemes and (to a greater 
extent) by the transfer of land to national parks, they were now permanent features of the 
landscape; the forests were one of the essential resources that would remain under government 
control.1139 State centralisation even increased in 1964 when African District Council control over 
forests in the former African reserves was ceded to central control.1140 Yet cracks soon began to 
form in the bough of this colonial institution. Even before Britain relinquished control, the political 
enfranchisement of Kenyans allowed a much greater degree of scrutiny to fall upon the Forest 
                                                                
1136 ‘Eighth British Commonwealth Forestry Conference Report. Delegates, Associate Delegates, Observers and 
Persons in Attendance’, Commonwealth Forestry Review 41 (4), no. 110 (December 1962): 399–403. The dry official 
accounts of the conference hide what must have surely been fascinating and possibly discriminatory social dynamics 
within this event. The interpersonal communication between delegates, probably unrecorded and now lost, would 
have provided insight into just how the minority African delegates were treated. When one conference tour was at 
risk of collapse, for example, because delegates were too engaged in games of cricket and rounds of golf, were the 
African delegates excluded? ‘Eighth British Commonwealth Forestry Conference Report. Kenya Main Tour’, 
Commonwealth Forestry Review 41 (4), no. 110 (December 1962): 328–29.   
1137 ‘Eighth British Commonwealth Forestry Conference Report. Introductions to the Discussions in Plenary Session 
of the Main Items of the Agenda’, 346. 
1138 At an executive level, the Commonwealth Forestry Association recognised this situation and the need to reorient 
its focus away from Britain by increasing the representation of Commonwealth members on its executive board, 
which began by the inclusion of members from Nigeria, Ghana, India, and Pakistan.‘Eighth British Commonwealth 
Forestry Conference Report.’, Commonwealth Forestry Review 41 (4), no. 110 (December 1962): 98. 
1139 For discussion of the perceived importance of maintaining resources and services under state control in the 
immediate post-colonial state, see Ochieng’, ‘Structural and Political Changes’, 93, 83–109. 
1140 Otieno, ‘Forest Politics in Colonial and Postcolonial Kenya, 1940-1990s’, 157. 
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Department. The shamba system and the department’s overall recruitment practices were accused 
of ethnic favouritism as they were, of course, largely dominated by Kikuyu. This was a serious 
accusation as at least the rhetoric of independence, if not the reality, called for ethnic 
egalitarianism.1141 The lot of the forest squatters themselves was also questioned. In particular, 
criticism was levelled at their low wages, poorly managed pensions, and lack of land tenure: all 
factors that contributed to an increasing number of forest squatters abandoning the system in 
favour of more secure settlement schemes during the 1960s.1142 Indeed, just as the Forest 
Department had struggled to assert itself within the colonial state against the pressures of the 
private sphere, in the decades after Kenya’s independence forestry would be challenged because of 
the colonial inequalities that manifested themselves within the postcolonial state.1143 
                                                                
1141 Ochieng’, ‘Structural and Political Changes’, 91–92. 
1142 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, ‘Legislative Council Debates Official Report’ (Vol. LXXXIX. Second Session. 
Hansard, Nairobi, 8 July 1962), 1170–73. Concerns over the ethnic favouritism of the Forest Department were raised 
by W.C. Murgor, Member for Elgeyo-Suk, and supported by Tom Mboya in his capacity as Minister for Labour. In 
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concerns in the same debate over some forest squatters suffering from poor harvests over several years with little 
help from the Forest Department. After 1962, meetings of the Ministerial Joint Industrial Committee provided a 
forum for the discussion of the working conditions of the forest squatters, however little improvement in their 
condition seems to have been affected and from 1965 onwards the Forest Department’s annual reports openly 
report large numbers of desertions from the shamba system because of low wages, poor working conditions, and 
lack of security of land tenure. As the decade closed the department was beginning to attempt to stem this flow by 
allowing greater livestock ownership within the system. As I have argued elsewhere, this overturning of a central, 
yet of course draconian, aspect of the shamba system is likely to have increased the appeal of forest squatting to 
wealthier segments of society that had previously been largely deterred from the shamba system. Kenya Forest 
Department, Annual Report 1963, 18; Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1965; Forest 
Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1966; Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1967; 
Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 1968; Forest Department, Forest Department Annual Report 
1969; Fanstone, ‘Shamba Forestry in Colonial Kenya: Colonial Dominance or African Opportunity?’  
1143 For a detailed account of the decolonization process in terms of forestry and forest policy see Otieno, ‘Forest 
Politics in Colonial and Postcolonial Kenya, 1940-1990s’, 157–221. Otieno, whose account is focused on several case 
studies of forests in eastern Kenya, emphasizes the local influence on the Forest Department and how the 
Africanisation of the department led to ambiguities in its policies as some newly trained officers followed the 
established mantra of colonial forestry while others displayed greater sympathy to local peoples and their forest 
needs. 
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Evaluation 
On the eve of Kenya’s independence from British rule in 1962 the colony’s Forest Department stood 
on firmer ground than it ever had before in its 60-year existence. With a budget approaching £1 
million annually, government commitment to long-term forest development was demonstrably 
strong. Moreover, despite cracks emanating from emerging inequalities in the department’s 
shamba system, this agroforestry regime undoubtedly underpinned the department’s strength with 
its promise of being able to supply timber and fuel to support the modernisation of the economy, 
while also representing a seemingly stable system that could sustainably allow tens of thousands 
of people to live and work in the forests. European officers might have feared that the influx of 
Africans into the department in the 1960s and Kenyatta’s government would throw forestry off 
course, but initially they were wrong; forestry, that is scientific management of forests by the state, 
was as much a part of the authoritarian postcolonial state as it was the authoritarian colonial state. 
From the 1970s to the early 2000s, the elite-heavy character of the postcolonial state would see 
literal encroachments on forestry’s ability to control the forests as lucrative and fertile land was 
creamed off the forest estate and funding reduced. Yet, forestry remains today a core institution of 
the state, with all the environmental protection, economic benefits, and socio-economic 
controversies that comes with that in evidence.1144 
                                                                
1144 For example, Justin Kenrick of the Forest Peoples Programme NGO has stated that as of 2016 the Kenya Forest 
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Sunset Hotel, Kisumu. 30th September-3rd October, 2008, ed. D. O. Ogweno, P. S. Opanga, and A. O. Obara (Kisumu: 
Forestry Society of Kenya, 2009), 77–80; Francine Hughes, ‘Conflicting Uses for Forest Resources in the Lower 
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2011), 
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Economists, Hammamet, Tunisia, 2013), 
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The colonial occupation of Kenya ensured that forestry was both introduced to the country 
and achieved its status as being a core institution of the colonial state imposed there. The expansion 
of Forest Department control over almost two million hectares of land, approximately 20 per cent 
of the fertile, central highland lands of Kenya where the majority of the indigenous and European 
settler population lived, represented a massive strengthening of state sovereignty within Kenya. 
This sovereignty was contested, of course; a fact most clearly demonstrated by the use of the forests 
by Mau Mau fighters in the 1950s. Within the colonial period the Forest Department's goal of 
complete overlordship of the forests was not fully achieved and neither is it complete today, yet the 
fact that the present-day Kenya Forest Service still pursues this goal of eliminating the 'non-state 
spaces'1145 within the forests by upholding the principle of state-ownership and evicting those 
accused of illegally occupying forest land demonstrates that the ideology of full state ownership 
and control of forests is fully engrained within the Republic of Kenya. Sovereignty does not have to 
go uncontested to be considered legally and practically valid by the state, thus the development of 
forestry through Kenya's colonial occupation is ultimately a tale of state power, both territorially 
and in intensity. The intricate links between the state and modern, scientific forestry have been too 
easily overlooked. The history of the development of scientific forestry within Kenya reminds us 
that forestry must be considered as a part of the state while also an independent force in its own 
right if we are to fully understand how forestry has operated and how states have made sovereign 
claims to forested land.  
State supremacy over the forests, however, was never a foregone conclusion under colonial 
rule. Indeed, the development of scientific forestry within Kenya was just one of the competing 
visions of who should control the forests of Kenya and to what uses they should be put. Differing 
conceptions of the 'good forest’ were put forward by foresters, both within Kenya and outside, 
others within the colonial government, white settlers, and Africans. The Forest Department never 
had any doubt that, within its vision, no matter the use a forest was put to, it should be managed by 
the department, by the state. In Kenya, just as in those other nations that adopted scientific forest 
management, Benthamite rhetoric guided actions. As the Oxford professor of forestry Robert Troup 
expressed it in 1938, "where the welfare of the general community is affected, restrictions should 
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be placed on the rights of the few."1146 Guided by this principle, the department saw the forests as 
under threat from every angle, from the fires of allegedly primitive African agriculture and the 
overexploitation of capitalist white settlers.  
The alignment of the Forest Department and its policies with the needs of the Uganda railway 
through the establishment of plantations of exotic Eucalypts in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century was linked to this utilitarian principle, as it sought to end the indiscriminate 
clearing of native forest by creating a stable fuel supply for the railway. Here, the needs of the many 
were translated as the needs of the colonial state and the wider empire as the economic 
development and exploitation of both Kenya and Uganda relied on the railway. While it is possible 
to argue that these early plantations safeguarded the native forests for use by Africans, the reality 
was that Africans were often forcefully removed from forests that were accessible and potentially 
profitable in timber. These evictions went hand-in-hand with the elimination of indigenous systems 
of forest management, sweeping away precolonial African visions of the ‘good forest’ before they 
had the chance to develop any further. Conservationist rhetoric of the destructiveness of African 
agriculture on the forests was used to justify such actions, but it is clear that these arguments were 
based on, at best, received wisdom rather than any attempt to properly determine the ecological 
and the wider environmental role of forests within Kenya. Indeed, it seems clear that the 
encroachment of African farms onto the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests of central Kenya was 
often not a case of expansion onto virgin land within the forests but a reclamation of land from the 
forests that had been lost following the disease and famine-induced population decline of the 
1890s. The "welfare of the general community" was never really considered by the Forest 
Department until the 1950s, when the conservation of Crown forests as, to use the modern 
terminology, Kenya’s ‘water towers’ received official sanction through a published forest policy.  
The Forest Department's vision of a good forest was therefore distinctly alien to Kenya, as 
rather than encompassing the myriad uses that forests had to Africans it was one in which a single 
core product was being produced - typically timber or fuel. The plantations as homogenous orderly 
ranks of alien tree species superimposed atop the native forest were the ultimate expressions of 
this. However, the fiscal realities of colonialism in Kenya, emphasised by the limited profit potential 
of forestry in the colony, the Great Depression, and criticisms levelled at the Forest Department by 
politically powerful European settlers hindered the progression of this vision until after the Second 
World War. Pre-war development of plantations, enabled by the economic and social viability of 
the shamba agroforestry system, did however serve as a strong foundation to rural development 
that became obvious to policy makers in Britain and Kenya in the early stages of the second colonial 
occupation. Upon this foundation the vision of extensive plantation establishment, again with exotic 
softwoods intended to meet the local needs of economic development, grew through the 1950s.  
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Science was a vital enabler of this vision. Compared to the engagement with scientific research 
locally and internationally by the Forest Department in the 1950s, before this decade the 
department devoted only slight financial and manpower resources to researching the silviculture 
of native or exotic trees within the colony. Partly this was simply because it was allowed only a very 
limited expenditure, but also it was because the department had quickly found eucalyptus and 
cypress to grow well in Kenya’s climate and was almost utterly focused on these exotics in an 
attempt to prove that the colony could develop to have a profitable and sustainable timber industry. 
Thus, before the Second World War Kenya’s Forest Department engaged with the wider network 
of empire forestry to only a limited extent. It only, for example, published on its remarkably 
successful shamba system once, and was evidently unaware of developments in the silviculture of 
pine that it could have benefitted from; and knowledge exchange between Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanganyika was minimal, mainly occurring when an officer was transferred to another territory. 
Knowledge and, more particularly, advice and direction, was received in Kenya after it was filtered 
through representatives of Oxford’s Imperial Forestry Institute. Men such as Troup, who reported 
on Kenya in 1922 after a tour of East Africa, carried with them inoculations of metropolitan wisdom 
against embedded local ignorance. Yet the efficacy of these inoculations relied on local personnel 
and funding, as well as their regularity. 
Under Harold Gardner’s almost 20-year guidance (1926-1945), the department was 
seemingly expertly equipped to handle the political problems of forestry development but not the 
technical ones, as greater focus on science quickly came with the ascendancy of his successor, James 
Rammell, and then Ralph Waterer. Of course, Rammell’s and Waterer’s respective leaderships 
coincided with the massive injection of metropolitan capital and development interest into the 
tropical possessions. However, the replacement of the ‘old guard’ of forestry generalists, of which 
Rammell considered himself the last, with the new wave of ambitious and more specialised officers 
must be seen as essential in facilitating the scientific development of forestry in Kenya after the 
Second World War. In this regard, much scope exists for further investigation into the roles of 
individual officers in aspects of forestry development in Kenya. For example, it is unclear how 
significant or extensive knowledge exchange between officers was when they proceeded on lengthy 
periods of leave outside the colony. 
The major force of opposition against forestry development in Kenya did not come from 
Africans. Although localised visions of the good forest meant that Africans were able to pressure or 
use the Forest Department, these visions were engulfed by the department’s grand, colony-wide 
vision. Instead, major and largely united opposition came from European settlers, who used their 
political sway to reduce the Forest Department’s budget and influence its policies, most notably the 
programmes of livestock reduction among its African employees. In the eyes of the foresters, the 
settlers represented capitalism unleashed. The acquisition of stretches of forest by settlers during 
the first two decades of the Forest Department’s existence confirmed this to the department and 
galvanized its defences against future alienation of Crown forest to private, European hands. 
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Indeed, these defences were strong, as a 1922 report on the state of forestry in the empire reveals 
that in Kenya the state retained ownership of 98 per cent of the (then known) forests in the country; 
a situation that largely remained unaltered at independence.1147 The settler vision of the good forest 
was a private forest, managed perhaps but definitely exploited to aid what they perceived to be the 
greater good: the development of Kenya as a white man’s country. The coupling of forestry to the 
railway cleared a path for the Forest Department to high ground through the contradictions of a 
colonial state that paradoxically sought to create this white man’s country while protecting Africans 
from modernity. Yet, forestry in Kenya should also be seen as an important check on the 
progression of European settler power, as it literally prevented the expansion of land alienation to 
whites. The Forest Department also allowed the weakest within the settler-dominated timber 
industry to wither, preferring only the most modern and efficient mills with a viable future of being 
able to compete on the world market to remain. The department was not enthralled to settler 
capital by any means, rather it was remarkably successful in directing it toward a future of 
sustainable, high-quality production. 
Within the Forest Department’s vision of the future good forest, such sustainability relied 
almost totally on its shamba system. Through its ability to enable the cheap establishment of forest 
plantations while providing farmland for its African workers, shamba was the defining feature of 
forestry in Kenya; and while such agroforestry systems appeared elsewhere in British Africa, 
notably Tanganyika and Nigeria, none were as widespread and successful as that in Kenya. It was a 
system whose success relied on the very inequalities in Kikuyu society that had been exacerbated 
by colonialism, for as it emerged in the 1950s as a viable method of rural development by enabling 
tens of thousands of Kikuyu to live and work in the forests, it should be understood that this was a 
success that resulted from the prior economic underdevelopment of those same landless Africans. 
Shamba flourished in Kenya, while it often withered in Tanganyika, because of the readiness of the 
landless ahoi to tolerate the harsh realities of the system only because those realities were 
preferable to the even worse life within the African reserves. Shamba was draconian; its workers 
had few rights and were evicted with ease if they did not meet the Forest Department’s expectations 
of hard work. Most significantly, the workers lacked any claim to the land they farmed and 
experienced strict limitations on the livestock they could keep. They were, essentially, locked into 
the system as it could not provide them with the means to accrue wealth that would enable them 
to buy back into the reserves unless they violated colonial law. Yet, these workers were not 
powerless, they did not lack aspiration. By embracing education they were creating opportunities 
for a minority to break free of shamba. By the 1950s this was an aspect of the system the Forest 
Department itself was fostering as it had come to learn that by giving access to the gateway of 
modernity through education and healthcare it could create a loyal and sustainable workforce. This, 
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then, was why shamba became an element of development, because in doing so the Forest 
Department was ensuring that its grander vision of the good forest could be achieved.  
The rhetoric of shamba’s modern successor, PELIS (Plantation Establishment for Livelihood 
Improvement Scheme) takes this important aspect of development into account, but modern 
foresters would be well-advised to remember that shamba was a stable system for so long partly 
because it relied on poverty and strict administration, a fact that bred crime and corruption. For 
PELIS to be successful in the long term it seems clear that it must embrace the vision of the good 
forest put forward by its workers, not just that of the forestry establishment. More historical 
research is required into the shamba ancestor of PELIS, particularly in regards to the decades falling 
outside the scope of this project, precisely because of its importance to rural development along 
with the wider use of forestry to aid economic development in tropical countries.    
The legacy of the system of scientific forestry established in Kenya during the colonial period 
was long. By the 1950s forestry was embracing its role as a possible way to alleviate rural poverty 
through providing employment in its forest plantation schemes. However, the grander narrative of 
forestry in Kenya is one that reveals the ascendancy of a singular vision of the good forest. This 
vision did incorporate the economic development of the colony, but only in so far as managing 
forests for the production of timber and fuel which mostly did not benefit the majority of the 
colony’s population. The Forest Department was ultimately fixating on trying to service a developed 
capitalist country that in reality did not exist in Kenya. While foresters may have defended this by 
arguing they were looking to the future, it seems clear that they themselves could have helped to 
create that future if the rural development aspects of shamba had been embraced decades earlier. 
Ultimately, the Forest Department and the forestry that was practised within colonial Kenya should 
be seen not as serving the needs of settlers or Africans, rather forestry served its own agenda, an 
agenda of the colonial state, at the expense of the majority.  
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1. Forest Department organisation, pre-1951. 
Nb. This list does include clerical staff, such as accountants and typists. Clerical staff were typically 
recorded as being Asian with a minority of Europeans (including women). There appears to have 
been fewer African clerical staff before the 1950s, although African telephone operators and typists 
are sometimes mentioned in correspondence and reports. 
Conservator of Forests  Head of department, stationed in Nairobi. Styled as ‘Chief Conservator of 
Forests’ under Hutchins’ leadership only. Conservators were: 
Charles Frederick Elliot (1902-1905) 
A.A. Linton (1905-1906) Temporary; Linton was Commissioner of 
Agriculture.  
Edward B. Battiscombe (1906-1907) Acting Conservator in interim 
before Hutchins was appointed. 
Sir David Hutchins (1907-1911) 
Edward B. Battiscombe (1911-1925) 
Harold Mence Gardner, OBE (1926-1945) Was in charge as Senior 
Assistant Conservator of Forests from 1926, was officially made 
Conservator 1st January 1928. 
James Cuthbert Rammell (1945-1950) 
Senior Assistant Conservator of Forests Deputy head of department. Assumed leadership duties while 
Conservator was on leave of absence and typically stationed in Nairobi. 
Gardner and Rammell held this position before becoming Conservator. 
N.V. Brasnett held this position (1928-1929) before becoming 
Conservator of Forests for the Uganda Forest Department. 
Assistant Conservator of Forests Typically held degrees in forestry and placed in charge of forest 
divisions. Were also given ad hoc specialised roles such as utilisation 
officer or silviculture. 
Surveyor or Survey Officer Position sporadically filled. 
Senior Forester 
Forester 
Positions all held by Europeans. Chief duty was to run forest districts 
and associated forest stations. Sometimes referred to as verderers. 
Degree-level education in forestry or sciences not required although 
some had agricultural qualifications earned in the UK or elsewhere. 
Learner Foresters typically engaged locally in Kenya and were often the 
sons of settlers. Foresters could also be appointed on a temporary basis. 
Junior Forester 
Learner Forester 
Asian Assistant Forester Highest position attainable by Asian members of the department. Acted 
as assistants to Foresters and in some cases took on the full duties of 
Foresters. 
African Assistant Forester Highest position attainable by African members of the department. 
Assisted Foresters. Literacy was a requirement. 
Forest Guard Recruited from the police and army. Often illiterate. Were responsible 
for daily patrols and general policing duties. 
Spearman No clear information on recruitment or duties available. Spearmen were 
sometimes also referred to as Forest Guards and it seems they had 
general policing duties and could be promoted to the position of Forest 
Guard.   
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2. Forest Department organisation, post-1952 
The Forest Department underwent modernisation at the beginning of 1952 to cope with the 
expansion of its activities during the 1950s. Power was delegated further, in particular through the 
division of the colony’s forests along the Rift Valley and placing of each of these conservancies in 
the hands of a Conservator of Forests. The department was divided into the ‘technical staff’ (all 
trained conservators), ‘specialists’ (including a multitude of new positions along with the forester 
positions), and ‘clerical staff’ (expanded but little changed from before 1952, with an assortment of 
senior clerk and accountant positions held by Europeans and Asian and African subordinates). 
Educational requirements continued as before 1952, with the technical and scientific staff holding 
degrees in forestry or relevant subjects, but the foresters below them not necessarily so. See 
chapter 3 for discussion of the creation of the scientific arm of the department and the eventual 
Africanisation of forestry in Kenya, and table 3-3 in particular for staff levels. 
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Chief Conservator of Forests  Head of department, stationed in Nairobi. Position effective from 1st 
January 1952. Specialist staff stationed in Nairobi and at EAAFRO 
reported to him, as did the two Conservators of Forest. 
Chiefs were:  
Ralph Ronald Waterer CBE (1952-1957) 
Edward Joseph Honorè (1957-1962) 
Maurice Campbell Argyle (1963-1969) 
Conservator of Forests (East of Rift) In charge of forestry operations east of the Rift Valley and stationed in 
Nairobi. All staff within the East of Rift conservancy reported to him. 
Divisions within this conservancy were: Nyeri, Fort Hall, Nairobi, 
Thomson’s Falls, Southern, and Coast. 
Conservator of Forests (West of Rift) In charge of forestry operations west of the Rift Valley and stationed in 
Londiani. All staff within the West of Rift conservancy reported to him. 
Divisions within this conservancy were: Londiani, Eldoret, Nyanza, and 
Elburgon. 
Assistant Conservator of Forests Placed in charge of forest divisions or important forest districts and 
oversaw particular projects. 
‘Specialist’ staff: 
Working Plans Officer 
Silviculturist 
Entomologist 
Mycologist 
Utilization Officer 
Staff Surveyor 
Road Engineer 
These positions were all held by Europeans with university-level 
education. There was typically only one of each officer. 
Senior Forester 
Forester (Grades I and II) 
Temporary Forester 
Trainee Forester 
Positions typically held by Europeans although Asians began to be 
promoted to these ranks in the 1950s. In charge of forest districts and 
associated forest stations. As before 1952, were often recruited locally. 
Forests stations in East of Rift Conservancy: Nairobi, North Kinangop, 
South Kinangop, Uplands, Ngong, Kerita, Machakos, Karura, Mombasa, 
Lamu, Kwale, Jilori, Nyeri, Kiandongoro, Kabage, Ragati, Ontulili, Meru, 
Embu, Nanyuki, Thompson's Falls, Bahati, Maralal. 
Forest stations in West of Rift Conservancy: Elburgon, Mariashoni, 
Shapaldarakwa, Maji Mazuri, Narasha, Nessuit, Sorget, Eldoret, Kaptagat, 
Nabkoi, Mount Elgon, Kimothen, Elgeyo, Timboroa, Maseno, Kakamega, 
Nandi. 
Senior Assistant Forester 
Assistant Forester 
Mostly held by Asians although there were some Europeans. Acted as 
assistants to Foresters and in some cases took on the full duties of 
Foresters. By the end of the 1950s this position was being phased out in 
preference to creating more foresters. 
Rangers Formerly known as African Assistant Foresters. Positions exclusively 
held by Africans and was the highest rank an African could attain in the 
department before 1962. 
Forest Guard 
Assistant Forest Guard 
As before 1952, Forest Guards were Africans drawn from the police and 
King’s African Rifles although from the late-1930s onwards more 
Africans were recruited from within the department’s own shamba 
system. Assistant Forest Guards were equivalent to the pre-1952 
position of Spearman. 
Other racially defined positions in the department were: Seedsman (Asian), Draughtsman (Asian), Surveyors 
(Asian), Lorry Drivers (African), and Medical Dressers (African).    
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